Abstract: The article is devoted to the study of the causes, circumstances and consequences of the armistice between France and Nazi Germany in 1940. After the invasion of Hitler's army into Belgium, Holland and France in May 1940, in conditions when Franco-British troops suffered heavy defeats and retreated, the highest political and military circles of France began to discuss the possibility of ending hostilities by reaching an agreement with the enemy. Ultimately, these discussions and the struggle of various political currents, accompanied by changes in the composition of the government of the republic, ended in June 1940 with the adoption of a decision to conclude an armistice with Germany on German terms, which led to France's withdrawal from the war and its de facto subordination to the Third Reich. The article, relying on published sources and documents extracted from the funds of the National Archives of France, reconstructs the course of events that led to this outcome. The positions of key statesmen and representatives of the military command on the issue of the armistice are analysed, and their evolution is traced. The role of the British factor in the debates on the choice of military-political strategy is revealed. The author substantiates the point of view according to which the conclusion of an armistice was not the only option for France: it was possible to continue the resistance in case of the evacuation of the government and part of the troops to the French colonies in North Africa. The decisive factor that predetermined the choice in favour of an armistice was the position of some of the high military command and some members of the government (primarily P. Pétain and M. Weygand), who, adhering to right-wing political views, were inclined to reconciliation and cooperation with Nazi Germany.