The defeat of France in 1940: The road to armistice

Gusev Anton Alekseevich PhD in History Senior Lecturer; Department of History and Philosophy; Plekhanov Russian University of Economics 36 Stremyanny Lane, Moscow, 115054, Russia gusev.aa@rea.ru Other publications by this author

On May 10, 1940, with the attack of Nazi Germany on Belgium and Holland, and on May 13 on France, the "strange war" in Western Europe turned into an open armed conflict. In the very first days of hostilities, the Germans managed to inflict a strategic defeat on the allied forces of England and France, which predetermined the outcome of the entire military campaign. Despite fierce resistance that lasted for more than a month, the Allies failed to turn the situation around, mainly due to the gross miscalculations of the French high command. Under these conditions, the French Republic faced an alternative: to continue resisting the invaders, no matter what, or to conclude a truce with them, which in the circumstances meant submission to the Nazi dictate and the actual enslavement of the country. A struggle between supporters of both points of view unfolded in the country's leadership, and its study makes it possible to understand why France ended up being the only European country to conclude an armistice with Nazi Germany, even without being completely occupied, although such an outcome, as events show, was neither inevitable nor obvious. It is also important to analyze why the alternative of continuing the struggle was not realized, despite all the efforts of its supporters, which had the most tragic effect on the fate of the country and caused serious damage to it in the international arena.

The history of the armistice of France with Nazi Germany and fascist Italy attracted some attention from researchers, although few works specifically devoted to this issue have been published. One of them was published in the USSR back in 1964.^[4] This topic was also touched upon in other monographs by Soviet and Russian researchers on the military-political defeat of France ^{[1; 6; 7]}. Only four special studies on the armistice have been published abroad, and two of them are of a popular scientific nature ^{[16; 21; 38; 52]}. Some sources related to this event were also published: diplomatic documents ^[27], transcripts of trials ^[47], materials of the parliamentary commission of inquiry ^{[34; 35; 36; 37]}, memoirs ^{[2; 8; 9; 19; 32; 39; 43; 48; 49; 53 56]} and the diaries ^{[26; 30]} of the participants in the events. Nevertheless, despite this, a number of issues remain unclear: starting with who and when first proposed to consider the possibility of concluding a truce with the invaders, and ending with whether such a position received majority support in the last legitimate government of the Third Republic. In this article, including relying on unpublished materials deposited in the National Archives of France, an attempt is made to answer these questions and analyze the circumstances, causes and consequences of France's armistice with the occupiers in 1940.

France and Britain entered the war with Nazi Germany on September 3, 1939, but did not conduct active hostilities against it, hoping to gain time to build up their combat potential. On March 28, 1940, an alliance treaty was signed between the two democratic powers, according to which they undertook not to conclude a separate peace with the enemy ^{[27, p. 5-6]}. After the German attack on Belgium and Holland on May 10, 1940, the main forces of the Allied forces entered these countries to fight on foreign territory ^{[5, pp. 24-27]}. However, the Germans considered the invasion of small coastal states as a distraction, and intended to strike the main blow at the most vulnerable location of the enemy, in the Ardennes mountain forest, which was not reached by the fortified Maginot line ^{[5, pp. 44-47]}.

As a result, from the very beginning, the fighting in Western Europe unfolded according to the German scenario. The decision to send troops to Belgium turned out to be a gross strategic mistake of the French command. The second serious mistake was adherence to the doctrine of positional warfare (essentially defensive ^{[46, pp. 58-59]}) and the refusal to use powerful mobile armored formations. On May 13-15, the Germans crossed the Meuse River, and their tank columns, supported by aviation, rushed in a southwesterly direction. The few French units defending this area could not hold back their advance. The French command turned out to be completely demoralized by what was happening ^{[19, p. 214]}. On the evening of May 15, Commander-in-Chief Maurice Gamelin reported to the Minister of Defense: "This is the destruction of the French army" ^{[51, p. 87]}. And the next day, when the German troops were already 120 km from Paris, they responded to the demand to put a maneuver reserve into battle: "He is not there" ^{[8, p. 57]}.

On that day, the threat hanging over the French capital temporarily receded, as the German armada rushed west to the sea to cut off and surround the main Allied forces in Belgium. Taking advantage of the respite, centrist Prime Minister Paul Reynaud decided to oust the incapable commander-in-chief and on May 17 appointed the former commander of the French contingent in Syria, General Maxime Weygand, to this position. The choice was by no means obvious. The 73-year-old general was very energetic, but had no direct experience of command in combat conditions, having served at the headquarters throughout the First World War. The second most important personnel decision was the appointment of the famous commander of the First World War, 84-year-old Marshal Philippe Petain, to the post of deputy Prime minister of the center-left government of France. Both warlords were known for their extreme right-wing views. Testifying at the Petain trial after the war, Reynaud bitterly had to admit: "I made a capital mistake. [...] I believed that the patriotism of these two people would prevail over political preferences and personal ambitions" ^{[47, p. 15]}. It is not possible to establish whether the Prime Minister made this decision on his own or on someone else's recommendation; his assistant, Colonel Paul de Villume, claimed after the war that he had advised him on both candidates ^{[37, p. 2795]}, but his statements are not verifiable. Anyway, the politician underestimated the military leaders, who, not possessing sufficient military abilities to lead the French army to victory, saw in the defeat of the country an opportunity to implement their own political project.

It took Weygand some time to get from Syria to France, and he took office only on May 19. On this day, Hamelin finally proposed an operational plan, which, if successful, had a chance to stop the German offensive and turn the tide of hostilities in favor of the Allies. It was about cutting the German Panzerstrasse ("tank corridor") about 40 km wide in the Arras area and ensuring the connection of two groups of the French army. Weygand did not cancel the order of his predecessor, but decided to postpone its implementation until he got acquainted with the situation on the spot. This study trip led to the loss of 5 days, crucial for the defense of the country, and the commander of Army Group 1 in Belgium, G. Billot, who died returning from a meeting with the commander-in-chief. After that, attempts to break through the location of the Germans, whose tanks were joined by motorized infantry, did not bring success ^{[29, pp. 285-288, 293-308]}. By May 24, the outcome of the Battle of France was a foregone conclusion.

On May 20, the first German tank columns reached the sea at Abbeville, cutting off the Allied forces in Belgium. On the same day, Paris received a peace offer from the Germans, coming from Reichsmarschall of Aviation Hermann Goering. In mid-May, the Swedish consul in Paris, Raoul Nordling, was passing through Germany, through whom a proposal to conclude a separate peace was transmitted to the French government. Its terms are stated rather vaguely in the sources: Germany claimed Alsace and Lorraine, as well as part of other territories and colonies of France, information about which varies. The diplomat was detained at the German border, and he was able to meet with the French Prime Minister only when the German plan to split the Allied forces in two was crowned with success. Reynaud rejected the German proposal ^{[43, pp. 84-89; 49, p. 509]}.

The question of who was the first in France to propose an armistice with the enemy is the subject of discussion in the literature, and a number of authors believe that this idea was first voiced at the military council on the evening of May 25, 1940 ^{[16, p. 55]}, but this point of view is not confirmed in the sources, as will be shown next.

However, there is documentary evidence that allows us to attribute to an earlier time the first mention by French officials of the idea of making peace with the occupiers. In his diary, the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, General Aime Dumenk, cites a conversation that took place at 8.30 am on the same day on May 25 with Commander-in-Chief Weygand. The commander-in-chief expressed concern about the difficult situation of the French troops and fear that it would worsen even more, however, he noted that he would still have to fight: "... Because, General Weygand said, it is on the fortress of our defense that the conditions of peace that we can achieve will depend. I told him that if there was ever a question of a truce, it needed to take the form of a political truce and by no means a military one. He thought about it and agreed" ^{[26, p. 266]}. Subsequent events showed that the commander-in-chief remembered the advice of his chief of staff well.

On the same day, before the military council, Reynaud decided to discuss with the President of the Senate, Jules Jeanninet, whether to seek the opinion of parliament if peace proposals came from the Germans. The Prime Minister could not rule out such a possibility, even considering that the informal proposal transmitted by Nordling was primarily an attempt to probe the position of the French leadership or put pressure on it. Jeannenet replied in the negative and added: "We wish that they were unacceptable. Because otherwise, they will clearly conceal the intention to crush France in two stages. Munich will be followed by Prague again" ^{[30, p. 55]}.

It should be noted that of all the published diaries of participants in the events, only two (Chairman of the Senate J. Zhannene and General E. Dumenka) can be considered reliable historical sources, since, according to their publishers, they have not been substantially corrected. For the rest, which have undergone deep processing, whether their authors were guided by the desire to justify their actions, like P. Baudouin ^[18], to exaggerate their own importance, like P. de Willum ^[55], or to denigrate political opponents, like A. de Monzi ^[41], the researcher should approach critically and use such examples of construction memory only to the extent that they are confirmed by other data.

In his testimony before the parliamentary commission of inquiry after the war, Reynaud claimed that on May 24, after listening to the report of Major Fauvel, who arrived from Army Group 1, Petain and Weygand told the Prime minister: "If the battle for France is lost, we will have to request an armistice" ^{[36, p. 2389]}. But, testifying from memory, Reynaud was obviously mistaken, since, according to the diary entries of General Dumenka, Fauvel arrived in the capital only in the afternoon of May 25 ^{[26, p. 268]}. However, further, when the politician was asked to clarify the date, he did not answer so confidently: "It must have started on May 24, and on the 25th they insisted more strongly" ^{[36, p. 2399]}.

On May 25, at 7 p.m., a military council was held in Paris with the participation of security ministers, Commander-in-Chief and French President Albert Lebrun to discuss the situation on the fronts. The protocol was entrusted to the Secretary of the Military Council, Paul Baudouin. Already on May 16, by his own admission, he decided that the Battle for France was finally lost ^{[35, p. 2052]}. Forced to hide his defeatist sentiments for the time being, he nevertheless distorted some statements of the council members in a way that was beneficial to him, hoping that no one would check the text of the secret document in those conditions. However, Reynaud requested the protocol that evening, while checking only his own statements and making edits, deleting, in particular, the words attributed to him that "the enemy will offer us to immediately conclude a truce." The document was published in facsimile reproduction only after the war ^{[34, c. 1711-1716]}, many surviving members of the council denied the authenticity of a number of statements contained in it (cit. in: ^{[48, c. 581-582]}).

Taking into account the above, we can summarize the course of the military council as follows. General Weygand made a report on the situation on the fronts and, admitting the loss of Army Group 1, which was encircled in Belgium, proposed to strengthen the line of defense along the Somme and Aisne rivers in order to "fight to the end and save the honor of the country." Neither the commander-in-chief nor the rest of the council members said that France should request a truce. Only President Lebrun raised the question of the need to consult with Britain if the Germans proposed an armistice. Those present agreed that the problem concerns both allies ^{[42, p. 70]}. To which Reynaud objected that both countries were bound by a formal obligation not to conclude a separate peace (words omitted in the protocol by Baudouin) ^{[34, p. 1714]}. The Council decided to request additional military assistance from England. No other decisions were made.

But if the government of the country at that moment took a firm position, then the idea of a truce gradually spread both among military leaders and in the state apparatus, and the above-mentioned Baudouin and Willum were by no means an exception. Minister of Armaments Raoul Daughtry recalled after the war that for the first time he heard about the need to conclude an armistice with Germany and even "go over to her side" from his chief of staff Jean Bichlonne, the future Minister of Labor in the collaborationist Vichy government. At that moment, Daughtry decided that his employee had "gone crazy" ^{[12, L. 5]}. At the same time, around May 29, the commander of the troops on the Maginot line, General A. Pretla, told the minister that "the battle is lost and a truce must be demanded immediately. [You are] not a politician, and [it is] easier for you than for any other minister to come up with this initiative" ^{[35, c. 1966-1967]}. Indeed, Daughtry, the former director of the nationalized railways, was invited to the government as a technical specialist. A brilliant organizer who managed to achieve a significant increase in the production of weapons starting in January 1940, he enjoyed authority in the army. And therefore the military leaders did not give up trying to influence him, so in the end he had to sharply answer two of them: "The law adopted by the Convention and, undoubtedly, still in force, punishes with death any general who proposes to lay down his arms without the consent of the government" ^{[12, L. 5]}.

Commander-in-Chief Maxim Weygand, given the government's firm position on the truce, in agreement with Marshal Petain, preferred not to force events, but to go towards his goal gradually, without easing pressure on the civilian leadership of the country. On May 29, he drafted a memorandum for the Prime Minister, which described the difficult situation on the fronts and said: "The Commander-in-Chief, due to the seriousness of the situation, is obliged to consider all hypotheses. [...] If the defense is breached, the government will have to make the most important decisions" ^{[34, c. 1858]}. For Weygand, the staff officer of the First World War, "the breakthrough of the front clearly meant the final defeat" ^{[25, p. 159]}. The document does not mention a truce, however, as Reynaud later recalled, Weygand and Petain, after the announcement of the memorandum, directly suggested that he consider such a possibility ^{[49, p. 377]}.

Indeed, at this time the position of the French army became critical. Army Group 1 and the British Expeditionary Force were unable to break out of the encirclement. On May 26, England launched an operation to evacuate these troops through Dunkirk. The situation was complicated by the fact that Belgium surrendered on the night of May 28. By June 4, it was possible to evacuate to England the entire surviving composition of the BEK and a significant part of the French units, but not all of them: Many were captured and had to abandon all equipment ^{[3, pp. 581-591; 8, pp. 113-123, 128-129]}.

On the same day, June 4, the Germans regrouped their troops and on the 5th went on the offensive in a southerly direction along the entire front. The ratio of forces of the sides in terms of the number of calculated divisions was 1 : 3, in addition to the numerical advantage, the Germans now had overwhelming superiority in technology ^{[3, pp. 614-615]}.

At the same time, on June 5, Paul Reynaud reshuffled his cabinet for the second time, which were formalized as a collective resignation of the government ^{[42, pp. 77-78]}. The prime minister hoped to get rid of outright defeatists and replace them with people more determined to resist ^{[36, pp. 2407-2408]}. However, Petain remained in the post of deputy prime Minister, and many of those on whom Reynaud had pinned his hopes supported the conclusion of a truce at a crucial moment. Although not all of them: in particular, the former commander of the 4th Armored Division (BTC), Charles de Gaulle, who had just been promoted to brigadier general, was appointed to the post of Deputy Minister of Defense. In the mid-1930s, Reynaud turned out to be almost the only French politician who shared the ideas of this officer about creating powerful, autonomously operating armored units capable of making deep breakthroughs of enemy defensive lines ^{[2, pp. 32-35, 39, 42]}. This circumstance, as well as the relatively successful operations of the 4th BTC at Montcorn and Amiens against the general background, led to the appointment of de Gaulle.

On June 8, the new Deputy Minister of Defense held a meeting with Weygand and, noting his defeatist sentiments, suggested that Reynaud replace him ^{[2, pp. 74-75]}. But the prime minister did not see a suitable candidate among the generals (according to him, "they were all about the same level" ^{[36, p. 2387]}), and it was not possible for him to put yesterday's colonel above the generals of the army.

Meanwhile, despite the fierce resistance of French troops to significantly superior enemy forces, the Germans crossed the Somme, and on June 9 reached the Seine, advancing from the west, north and east to the capital ^{[29, pp. 346-350]}. On June 10, France was attacked by fascist Italy. "It is a pity that we did not sign an armistice before Italy entered the war," Petain remarked in the presence of General Dumenka ^{[26, p. 315]}. On the same day, the commander-in-chief addressed the prime minister with a new memorandum stating that the French lines of defense could be broken at any moment ^{[34, c. 1814]}. As de Gaulle, who was present at the conversation, recalled: "His conclusion was obvious: we must immediately ask for a truce" ^{[2, p. 81]}. But this time the commander-in-chief did not achieve his goal.

On the same day, June 10, the Government evacuated to the Loire region. It was obvious that this was just an intermediate point. De Gaulle proposed the creation of a so-called "Breton redoubt" in the west of the country. But there was no time left for the construction of the fortified area, and this idea had to be abandoned. Seeing no way to stop the enemy in France, the government began to prepare for the evacuation of the armed forces and legitimate authorities to the French colonies in North Africa ^{[2, pp. 75-76]}.

On the afternoon of June 11, Weygand, by his own decision, ordered Paris to be declared an open city, putting the government in front of a fait accompli. The military governor of Paris, who received the order verbally in the evening, demanded written confirmation from the commander-in-chief, which was given the next day ^{[34, c. 1884-1885]}. The decision was justified not only by the desire to avoid casualties and destruction, but also to save the troops who were supposed to defend the capital.

At the same time, on June 11 at 19 o'clock, the Allied Council was held in Briar, to which British Prime Minister Winston Churchill arrived, accompanied by several generals. Weygand and the commander of the northeastern front, A. Georges, described the military situation as almost hopeless. The French military leaders again requested British military assistance. "Now is the decisive moment," Weygand stressed. "He could hardly imagine how France could continue the war in such conditions," wrote British General Louis Spears, who was present at the meeting. "... It was impossible to be mistaken about the meaning of the words of the general—in—chief" ^{[53, p. 179]}. The leaders of both states understood them precisely as a proposal to conclude an armistice (Churchill directly writes about this in his memoirs ^{[8, p. 174]}). Paul Reynaud sharply replied that the decision to continue hostilities remained with the government ^{[8, pp. 173-176; 39, pp. 311-313; 53, pp. 162-184]}. The next morning, the Allies continued their meeting. As a result, Churchill asked the French government to discuss this with the British leadership before making a final decision on the conduct of the war ^{[8, p. 177]}.

On June 12, the French lines of defense were breached in several places. At noon, Weygand gave the troops an order drawn up the day before for a general retreat ^{[13, l. 5]}. From that moment on, as Weygand's biographer notes, the commander-in-chief withdrew from the leadership of the fighting and focused on the "political" battle for the truce ^{[25, p. 168]}. The Council of Ministers was to discuss the situation in the evening.

In view of this, Raoul Daughtry drafted a memorandum on the need for the immediate evacuation of industry and troops to North Africa. "The time has come to make a final decision," the document said. — ...In two years we will be able to [...] arm this army. [...] In 1943 or 1944 or 1945, we will be able to crush Germany and revive [...] a new France" ^{[11, l. 1, 3, 4]}. And these were not the projects of a dreamer, but the calculations of an engineer.

The Council of Ministers began at 8 p.m. at the Castle of Cange (residence of the President of the Republic). At it, Weygand openly proposed for the first time to conclude a truce with the enemy, adding that "all the commanders of armies and army groups are behind him" ^{[13, L. 6]}. Petain stepped out of the shadows and strongly supported the commander-in-chief. Reynaud was the first to object to them, admittedly not too firmly: "We could consider a truce if our opponent were a normal head of state. [But] this is Genghis Khan" ^{[14, l. 5]}. The Prime Minister, Daughtry and several other members of the government managed to repel the attack (the Minister of Armaments, however, did not read out his memorandum and only handed it to Reynaud the next day ^{[17, p. 211]}). The split in the government over the armistice became a fait accompli, and the ministers eventually agreed, before making a final decision, to ask the British allies whether they would agree, if necessary, to release France from its commitment. Reynaud again summoned his British counterpart for talks and promised that he would take part in the Council of Ministers the next day ^{[16, pp. 103-108]}.

On June 13, Winston Churchill and two power ministers arrived in Turkey. On the French side, only Reynaud and State Secretary Baudouin were present at the talks. The Foreign Ministry official Roland de Margerie, who usually translated at such events, was able to join them only later, and Churchill asked the British General Spears to translate. This is probably why there was a misunderstanding. When Reynaud, "in a voice devoid of any expression" ^{[53, p. 233]}, conveyed to his English counterparts what had been entrusted to him by the government, Churchill, knowing French and seeing Spears' difficulties, said several times: "I understand." The British leader only wanted to say that he understood the meaning of what was said, but Baudouin hastened to interpret his words as: "England will understand if France concludes a separate peace or truce," as he later told "everyone who wants to listen to him" ^{[39, pp. 316-317; 53, pp. 251-252]}. The clever state secretary distorted in a favorable light not only Churchill's words, but also, which became his habit, the text of the minutes of the meeting drawn up by him, which differs significantly from similar documents written by the British side and Margery ^{[52, p. 280]}.

The British ministers replied that such an important decision as the release of an ally from its obligations should be taken by the British government, and asked to wait for its decision. At the same time, Churchill assured his French counterpart that Britain would continue to fight in any case. Reynaud, who could now express his personal position, said that he would do everything to prevent a truce, and intended to seek help from U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt ^{[16, pp. 108-114; 53, pp. 230-251]}.

After the meeting, Reynaud, fearing negative consequences, decided not to invite Churchill to a meeting of the Council of Ministers, as he had promised his colleagues. Instead, before it was too late, by a strong-willed decision to expel the defeatists from the leadership of the country and the army and organize the evacuation of the authorities and troops to the colonies to continue the struggle, he preferred to maneuver. A man of great courage and iron endurance, Paul Reynaud remained a democratic politician and did not imagine it possible to go beyond the framework of the Constitution, which such decisions would require ^{[2, pp. 98-99; 36, p. 2424]}; he would follow it to the very end. According to people who knew him, the Prime Minister admired Robespierre and the Committee of Public Safety, their efforts to defend France ^{[20, p. 60; 56, p. 20]}. But the French revolutionaries achieved the liberation of the motherland from the interventionists only by suspending the operation of the democratic Constitution and establishing an authoritarian government in the country, as well as by nominating young talented generals from the grassroots to senior positions in the army. "Our government was nothing like the Committee of Public Safety," Raoul Daughtry admitted after the war ^{[35, c. 2032]}. The leaders of the III Republic knew the history of their country well, but did not dare to draw lessons from it…

The second government meeting in Kange on June 13 began only at 6 p.m. The ministers, who had waited in vain for Churchill, expressed their dissatisfaction to the Prime minister. The protests were also caused by Reynaud's statement about the intention of the French government to continue the struggle, because the previous Council of Ministers did not take such a decision. Weygand, seeing the mood of the audience, went on the attack again, demanding an immediate truce, and Petain read out a written statement drawn up for this purpose. Now several ministers have supported them. Time was inexorably working for the supporters of the truce. However, the majority of the council opposed this time too. As a result, it was agreed that the government would not make any decision regarding the truce until it received answers from England and the United States ^{[16, pp. 115-123]}.

The next day, June 14, the Germans entered Paris. Due to the approach of enemy troops, the government evacuated further south to Bordeaux. Margery, who was driving with Reynaud, recalled how the refugees he met on the way, despite their plight, urged the prime minister not to give up and fight to the end: "We wish you well. [...] Do not give in!" ^{[39, pp. 330-331]} And this is just one of many evidences of the mood of a significant part of ordinary Frenchmen, despite the military defeat ^{[23, pp. 802-804]}. But, as the historian J.-L. Cremier-Briillac notes, in the current situation, the population of the country practically "had no opportunity to express their opinion and did not know what choice its leaders faced" ^{[23, p. 841]}.

But the supporters of the truce were not going to give up either. Petain summoned Weygand to Bordeaux for a separate meeting, which took place on the afternoon of June 15 at Baudouin's apartment ^{[13, l. 12]}. The commander of the Navy, Admiral Francois Darlan, who had previously been a strong supporter of the continuation of the struggle, was also present. However, after this meeting, Darlan changed his mind ^{[9, p. 43, 49]}, as Baudouin informed him that Churchill at the Allied Council in Tours agreed to France concluding an armistice ^{[34, p. 1855-1856]}. Namely, the evacuation of troops and authorities to Africa depended on comfort.

At the Council of Ministers on the evening of June 15, in the face of the impossibility for the army to continue organized resistance to the invaders, the Prime Minister proposed that the ground forces unilaterally cease fire, which would save the lives of fighters, and the fleet, aviation and legitimate authorities evacuated to North Africa. But Petain and Weygand continued to stand their ground: the government should conclude an armistice so that the responsibility falls on him, and not on the command ^{[34, c. 1823, 1842]} (the advice given by Dumenko on May 25 was not wasted). Even in a critical situation, the military leaders were primarily concerned with preserving the prestige of the army, designed to maintain order ^{[13, L. 5]} under a future authoritarian regime, with which they intended to replace the republican system ^{[34, c. 1923]}. And then, in order to break the deadlock, Deputy Prime Minister Camille Shotan made a proposal: to ask the Germans about the terms of the truce, which would certainly turn out to be unacceptable, which would give grounds to continue the fight. Shotan used tried and tested parliamentary tactics designed to split the majority and change the balance of power, and he succeeded. Following the discussion, 13 ministers supported his proposal, while only 6 of those present opposed it ^{[36, p. 2416; 49, p. 367]}. However, Reynaud succeeded in postponing the decision, since there had not yet been a response from the British government (Roosevelt refused the French request to enter the war on the side of the Allies ^{[16, p. 144]}).

After the meeting, Reynaud personally ordered the Commander-in-chief to order a cease-fire. Then Weygand, retreating a few steps so that others could hear, began shouting at the leader of the state that he refused to "capitulate" (an obvious substitution of concepts ^{[38, p. 40]}). Reynaud, without raising his voice, replied that he "takes full responsibility." The general did not calm down and went to complain to President Lebrun, but he supported the Prime Minister ^{[13, l. 14-15; 34, c. 1842, 1872]}. Thus, the commander-in-chief openly refused to obey the civil authorities of the country.

After that, he considered it necessary to hedge his bets and went to the flight school in Merignac near Bordeaux. It was announced to the cadets that "Marshal Petain and General Weygand decided to continue the fight [...], but the civilian [authorities] are supporters of the truce. It is very possible that civilians will try to arrest"military leaders, and therefore it is necessary to protect "these outstanding generals." The cadets were put on alert and handed out light machine guns ^{[47, p. 156; 49, p. 438-439]}.

But the government did not take any measures against the rebellious general. On June 16, at 11 a.m., the next Council of Ministers met. While the meeting was in progress, at 12:35 the British embassy received a telegram stating that "His Majesty's government gives its consent for the French government to try to clarify the terms of the armistice," but the French fleet must leave for Britain before the negotiations begin ^{[31, p. 182]}. Realizing that this telegram would give an advantage to the supporters of the truce, Louis Spears persuaded the ambassador to detain her ^{[53, pp. 320-321]}. The British general was French by his mother and was born in Paris ^{[33, p. 85]} — it was about the fate of his homeland. It was only after the government meeting was adjourned until 5 p.m. that the British showed Reynaud's telegram. "He was unhappy and did not hide it," recalled Spears ^{[53, p. 323]}. At 4 p.m., the second telegram confirming the first one was received ^{[53, pp. 329-330]}. However, a few minutes later, General de Gaulle, who was there on a mission, called the embassy from London. He informed the Prime Minister that the British government was proposing to unite France and England into a single union state. Churchill confirmed his words. But when Reynaud read out the draft Franco-British union at a government meeting ^{[27, pp. 35-36]}, none of the ministers supported it ^{[16, pp. 161-162]}. The fierce discussion about the truce continued, "words flew like bullets," recalled Daughtry ^{[35, c. 2034]}. Shotan repeated his proposal again, which influenced those who hesitated ^{[15, l. 3; 22, p. 201]}. But the enemy was rushing to Bordeaux, it was necessary to make a decision. Since the days of the Public Safety Committee, there has been a tradition that members of the government did not keep minutes and did not vote. Reynaud did not put the issue to a vote either because it was unknown how the vacillators would have voted ^{[35, p. 2029-2032]}. He announced a break until 22 hours, but he had already made a decision for himself, having come to the conclusion that most of the ministers were now in favor of a truce. This "completely subjective assessment", as the biographer Reynaud writes ^{[50, p. 636]}, which, however, was shared by some of the participants in the council ^{[47, p. 47]}, was then disputed by a number of witnesses, in particular, Minister Louis Maren, an opponent of the truce ^{[47, p. 70-71; 40, p. 21-24]}, and still causes discussions in the literature ^{[16, pp. 164-167; 21, p. 219]}. However, a comparison of eyewitness accounts allows us to conclude that both are wrong, and the votes were evenly divided: 12 to 12, given that the prime minister could not count on the support of the wavering. This opinion, in particular, was held by both the Minister of Colonies Louis Rollin ^{[15, l. 4]}, who opposed the armistice, and the ardent supporter of the latter, the Minister of Labor Charles Pomare ^{[14, l. 19-20]}. At 9 p.m., Paul Reynaud resigned, hoping, by his own admission, to arrange a reshuffle in the government through her, as he had already done on June 5 ^{[36, p. 2424, 2426; 32, p. 221]}. The leaders of the parliament supported him. However, President Lebrun had already accepted that he would have to request a truce, and since Reynaud categorically refused to do so, he asked to propose another candidate. Then Reynaud couldn't help himself: "That's your business. And it will not be difficult for you. Marshal Petain told me this morning that the composition of his government is in his pocket."The parliamentary leaders did not insist and left ^{[9, p. 48; 30, pp. 414-417; 40, pp. 18-19]}. After that, the President appointed Philippe Petain to the post of Prime Minister by his own decision. Thus, the new government was not completely legitimate, since it was not approved by either the parliament or even its leaders, in violation of the traditional interpretation of the Constitution in force since 1879 ^{[45, pp. 103-105, 107]}. Indeed, on August 9, 1944, the leadership of the Resistance declared all laws and regulations adopted after June 16, 1940 under Petain's rule invalid and legally null and void ^{[54, pp. 56-57]}.

But the marshal finally achieved his goal. He thanked the pro-truce ministers by including them in his cabinet. His first decision, taken at 0.30 on June 17, was the German request for an armistice through the Spanish Embassy ^{[27, p. 43]}. In the morning, Philippe Petain made a radio address to the nation, in which the words were heard: "We must stop fighting" ^{[28, p. 233]}. They caused confusion in the ranks of the army, which continued to wage a desperate unequal battle. Some fighters, believing the honored veteran, laid down their weapons and were captured. The situation was aggravated by Weygand's order given the day before to all internal troops to remain in place even under threat of capture ^{[34, p. 1881-1882]}. As a result, 1,100,000 of the 185,000 French prisoners of war fell into enemy hands after June 16, that is, a significant majority ^{[24, p. 925]}. When it became known about the confusion in the troops caused by Petain's words, Baudouin, who became Minister of Foreign Affairs, made adjustments on the radio: "Spiritual and moral values are more precious to the French than life, they will go to any renunciation for this. [...] The government stayed with you to ask the enemy [...] what the terms of the truce would be, but it did not give up the fight and did not lay down its arms" ^{[10, L. 1]}. However, the belated and insincere explanations sounded unconvincing.

And yet, not everyone has come to terms with the defeat of the country. Some military units continued to fight after the signing of the armistice. More than 20 deputies, including several former ministers of the Reynaud cabinet, went to Morocco on the ship "Massilia" to continue the struggle and even at the initiative of former Interior Minister Georges Mandel to form an alternative center of power ^{[21, p. 152]}, but were interned by the colonial authorities and returned to France. On June 18, General Charles de Gaulle spoke on the radio from London with a call to continue the fight: "France lost the battle, but did not lose the war. The flame of the French resistance will not go out" ^{[44, p. 98]}. His words turned out to be prophetic, but they did not immediately receive a response.

The Germans responded to the request for an armistice only on June 20 ^{[16, p. 213]}, during which time their troops advanced far ahead. The French delegation left immediately. The negotiations (if you can call them that, since they were actually about the German dictate) took place on June 21-22 in Retonda near Compiegne, in the very staff car in which Germany signed the armistice on November 11, 1918, which ended the First World War. German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop warned his Italian counterpart Galeazzo Ciano the day before that the terms of the armistice should be drawn up in such a way that France agreed to sign them and, most importantly, did not continue the struggle ^{[34, c. 1938]}. In accordance with the agreement concluded on June 22, Germany annexed Alsace and Lorraine and occupied 3/5 of the territory of France, leaving the so-called "free zone" in the south of the country under the authority of the Petain government. The French fleet was not confiscated, but had to remain in its home ports. In addition, paragraph 19 of the document stated that France undertakes to extradite political refugees from Germany to the Reich at his request, which was completely contrary to the norms of international law ^{[27, pp. 123-130]}. On June 24, a similar agreement was signed with fascist Italy (with the exception of the paragraph on the extradition of refugees) ^{[27, pp. 167-173]}. On July 10, 1940, Marshal Petain carried out a constitutional coup in the city of Vichy and established an authoritarian fascist-type regime that collaborated with the Nazi Reich. The blackest page in the history of France of modern times has opened.

Thus, the French government preferred to conclude a truce with the enemy, although the enemy did not occupy the entire territory of France and it still had significant forces, in particular, the 4th largest fleet in the world, practically not involved in battles. The evacuation of part of the troops, industry and legitimate authorities to North Africa also remained possible, since England, which had a similar experience in Dunkirk, offered its help ^{[21, pp. 204-206]}. On October 28, 1940, Hitler admitted in a conversation with Mussolini that it would be extremely difficult to conquer these French colonies ^{[34, c. 1938]}. And one cannot disagree with Reynaud's colleague, and then de Gaulle, Gaston Palevsky, who asked a rhetorical question: "How could Germany conquer North Africa if it could not even land in England?" ^{[38, p. 16]} Supporters of the truce claimed that it allowed the lives of French fighters to be saved, but, as noted above A decision on a unilateral ceasefire would also lead to this. The argument that the enemy did not occupy the whole country as a result of the armistice also does not stand up to criticism, since the Nazis did it on November 11, 1942. The argument that France has retained its own government is all the more unconvincing. This government was a puppet, acting at the behest of the Reich, launching brutal persecution of Jews, Freemasons, dissidents, and then Resistance members, and French military factories worked for Germany, strengthening its combat potential. On the other hand, if France had continued to fight with its available forces as part of the Anti-Hitler Coalition, this would undoubtedly have accelerated the victory over Nazism, and the country would have retained its prestige as a world power. But in the conditions of military defeat, the extreme right-wing forces, who did not shun any means and were ready to go to a military coup and commit a constitutional one in order to achieve their goals, were able to gain the upper hand over the democratic forces, who did not want to accept defeat and sought to continue the struggle. This predetermined both the fate of France and the course of the Second World War for many years.