Abstract: The article examines the features of the formation of the conceptual and methodological apparatus of sociological and psychological theories of law from the point of view of the use of such a key concept as "ideal type" and its analogues. The study demonstrates that, although both areas of study and understanding of law – sociological and psychological – were based on empirical research methods and corresponding logical-conceptual constructions, quasi-rationalistic techniques were essential for them, which gave the character of an "understanding" science, which is not limited only to descriptive tasks, but claims to express normative judgments. Using the example of the ideas of M. Weber, R. Stammler, V. Wundt, G. Radbruch, L.I. Petrazhitsky and some other legal scientists and social philosophers, the spread of the "ideal type" technique and its analogues in empirically oriented theories of law is shown. The novelty of the research lies in the fact that it presents original judgments about the role and meaning of the "ideal type" construction for the formation of the conceptual and logical apparatus of socio-psychological theories of law in the recent history of legal thought. It is demonstrated that this construction is a characteristic method of analyzing law in psychological and sociological approaches to it, and is present in one form or another in a wide range of relevant areas of legal thought. The study shows that the construction of the ideal type is associated with such socio-psychological attitudes as "healthy legal psyche", "normal legal consciousness" and others.

Abstract: The article examines the nature and main characteristics of the legal views of Scandinavian lawyers, who are traditionally identified in the history of modern legal thought as representatives of legal realism. The focus is, first of all, on the nature and methods of substantiating law as a psychological fact, which largely determines the profile of the legal views of Scandinavian realists (on the example of the writings of A. Hagerstrem and A. Ross). In this regard, the psychological orientation of the theoretical and legal views of the Scandinavian realists makes it possible to more accurately highlight the question of the place, meaning and orientation of the psychological by its nature Scandinavian theory of law in the history of modern legal thought. In addition, the study focuses on the features of epistemological approaches underlying the legal views of the realistic movement in legal thought in the Scandinavian countries. В  The novelty of the research lies in the fact that it gives a problem-critical assessment of the content of the legal views of the Scandinavian realists, determines the specifics of the semantic load of realism as an epistemological attitude underlying their philosophical, ethical and legal views, reveals the peculiarities of the interpretation of law as a psychological fact, and also demonstrates the possibilities of typologizing the corresponding ideas about law as a psychological theory law and its regional interpretation. In addition, clarifications are made to the definition of the place and significance of the psychological theory of law of Scandinavian authors in the history of pan-European legal thought, and some essential features of psychologism in the legal understanding of the considered regional group are identified.

Abstract: The subject of this research is the essential characteristic of the history of legal thought of the last two centuries, which directly pertains to the theoretical-methodological fundamentals of legal theory. In the conditions of the object-disciplinary establishment of legal science as the theory of law since the end of the XVIII century, crucial significance has acquired the orientation towards demarcation of logical-gnoseological and real-psychological aspects of legal understanding. The article analyzes the peculiarities of the corresponding theoretical-methodological opposition, which manifested in the appeals to the construction of “refined” legal concepts that exclude any real arguments of social, historical, political, or psychological nature. By the end of the XIX century, namely in the field of the philosophy of law, has escalated the competition between psychologism and anti-psychologism in law. The novelty of this research lies in determination of the new patterns of theoretical and methodological opposition of psychological and anti-psychological attitudes of legal understanding in the evolution of legal thought in contemporary history. It is demonstrated that the phenomenological approach, which claimed to provide jurisprudence with an authentic scientific methodological apparatus, reduced the problem of legal understanding, however, did not contribute to the adequate understanding of law as a complex gnoseological object. Anti-psychological classification of phenomenology cannot be acknowledged without a profound analysis of the conceptual framework that contributed to the evolution of this approach in the sphere of cognition and interpretation of law.

Abstract: This article examines the nature and specificity of the criticism of psychologism as a theoretical-methodological orientation towards studying law and its interpretation, which in particular was associated with such version of interpretation of law as the “Pure Theory of Law” of Hans Kelsen. More in-depth representations of modern legal theory in understanding the patterns of law and its essential aspects requires the due coverage of the history of psychological and anti-psychological approaches towards law that form of the major oppositions in the development of legal though at the turn of the XIX – XX centuries. Multiple aspects of H. Kelsen's legal views are yet to be examined, including the correlation of his doctrine with other doctrines, as well as the nature of substantiation of law and the analysis of legal phenomena. The scientific novelty of lies in the fact that based on the analysis of legal views of the Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen wirh his pronounced claim to exclude all “non-legal’ elements, it is revealed that a significant part of conceptual-logical apparatus of Kelsen’s teaching and the approaches towards substantiation of law were psychological in nature. Unlike the objective-idealistic positions of H. Kelsen, legal Neo-Kantianism was methodologically more accurate in elucidation of interrelation between the actual legal phenomenon and the role of gnoseological methods of perception and comprehension of law. The assessment of H. Kelsen’s doctrine as the theory of law is subject to criticism in this article, since in reality it is limited to the issues of legal methodology.