Lebedev S. —
Peacekeeping operations and economic assistance: anthropological approach
// Conflict Studies / nota bene. – 2020. – ¹ 1.
– P. 15 - 25.
DOI: 10.7256/2454-0617.2020.1.32590
URL: https://en.e-notabene.ru/cfmag/article_32590.html
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Abstract: The object of this research is the world politics, while the subjects is the psychoeconomic stimuli that incite the Libertarian Party of Russia to manifestation of altruism in world politics, reflected in participation in peacekeeping operations or rendering humanitarian assistance. At the same time, the classical concept of “regional choice” or the school of realism cannot explain propensity of the states for displaying altruism. In majority of cases, it was beneficial for the states to choose the strategy of “fare evader”; but the practice demonstrates that many countries spent considerably on altruism that are disadvantageous from the perspective of classical paradigm. The research methodology is bases on the historical and anthropological methods; the latter can be interpreted extensively, since the article uses the concepts of evolutionary psychology and economics. The scientific novelty consists in application of the concept of “conspicuous consumption” and “costly signaling” to the analysis of foreign policy of the states. The article underlines that certain foreign policy acts of the countries may be aimed at gaining additional prestige, rather than acquisition of actual strategic profits on the international arena.
Lebedev S. —
The influence of oil on civil wars: the political economy paradigm
// World Politics. – 2019. – ¹ 3.
– P. 1 - 7.
DOI: 10.25136/2409-8671.2019.3.30614
URL: https://en.e-notabene.ru/wi/article_30614.html
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Abstract: The research subject is the interconnection between oil wealth and political processes. The research object is the influence of hydrocarbons on ethnic conflicts. The author considers the ‘political’ dimension of the problem of resource curse and puts emphasis on the economic component of politics. There’s empirical data proving that the existence of ground or subsea oil or gas fields increases the probability of a civil war. At the same time, political and economic sciences still can’t explain this fact clearly and definitely. The main research paradigm is political economy with the rational choice methodology in the core. The author proceeds from the assumption that political actors try to analyze their profits and costs and make decisions based on this analysis. The article considers three explanations of the influence of oil on civil wars. Firstly, it’s a “honeypot effect”, when profits from hydrocarbons make official positions more enticing. Secondly, it’s the reduction of administrative competences of the state as a result of the resource curse. Thirdly, it’s the increase of probability of international intervention. The author concludes that the key conditions of a civil war are the low cost of a riot and the concentration of hydrocarbon wealth in one region which can be interested in separation.
Lebedev S. —
Pressure groups and regulation of financial markets
// Politics and Society. – 2017. – ¹ 3.
– P. 104 - 110.
DOI: 10.7256/2454-0684.2017.3.22271
URL: https://en.e-notabene.ru/psmag/article_22271.html
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Abstract:
The object of this research is the financial markets pressure groups, in other words, associations of influential financial experts and industrialists that attempt to affect the regulatory rules established in the financial markets. The subject is the motivation of pressure groups towards limitation of the financial development, tools applied for introduction of the anti-market legislation, as well as the political climate used for adoption of laws that restricts the financial development of one or another country. Global statistics demonstrates that the financial sector manifests as one of the most “regulated”, which substantiates the relevance of this work. Theoretical base of the research contains the political economy paradigm alongside the rational choice theory that view the political actors as economic agents that maximize their value. The article explains why the restriction of financial development can be profitable for the large industrial and financial corporations. The author systematized the theoretical positions of the rational choice theory in application to the pressure groups. Based on the example of the Japanese financial markets, it is described the precise mechanism of the pressure groups used to constraint the financial development.