Abstract: This article reveals the author's view on the issues arising in the field of intellectual property rights in connection with the development of artificial intelligence systems. The topic of the research is touched upon due to the fact that the modern technological renewal in the modern world is so large-scale that many scientists are inclined not only to historical changes, but also to anthropological ones: technology becomes dominant in an inextricable connection with the human operator. In the modern Russian legislation there is no institutional fixation of norms of law regulating the relations connected with creation and use of results of artificial intelligence. In the global legal field the recognition of artificial intelligence as the author of the invention has been an open question for a long time. The article considers different points of view on the definition of artificial intelligence, including foreign sources. The author argues about the applicability of the concept of "inventor" in relation to artificial intelligence. The author's position in relation to the results of artificial intelligence is presented on the basis of the principle of intellectual property duality, where the main idea is the separation of non-property and property rights to the results of artificial intelligence. Methods of analysis, synthesis, modeling, comparative-legal were used. In the end conclusions are made about the recognition of authorship on the result of artificial intelligence, based on the creative contribution to its creation and work, the emergence and transfer of exclusive rights.

Abstract: The relevance of the conducted research is conditioned by the absence of legislative stipulation of the procedure and criteria of evaluation of the creative contribution of co-authors in the single result of their creative activity, as well as by the inconsistency of some cited court arguments, including the impossibility to create a photograph by several authors. In fact, the legislative definition of the notion of co-authorship, given in art. 1258 of the Civil Code of Russian Federation, is not substantial and functional: it lacks the essential and distinctive features and does not reflect the essence of this phenomenon, which makes it difficult to determine the contribution of each author and to evaluate it. In this paper we explore the notion of co-authorship, both in terms of its semantic meaning and in terms of the creative process. Co-authorship is examined using the example of the creation of a photograph as an object of copyright. In fact, the subject of the study is the relationship of established co-creation in photography and exclusive rights to it. The methods of analysis, inductive and comparison with the legislation of foreign countries were used. The main attention is paid to the analysis of judicial practice in the settlement of disputes on the violation of exclusive rights to photographic images, judicial explanation concerning the co-authorship and other similar in nature relationships arising in the process of creating an intellectual creative product (photography). Conclusions are drawn on the relationship between court-established infringement of exclusive rights and the recognition of copyright, legal dualism as the relationship between exclusive and copyright in the court's recognition of co-authorship or lack thereof.