Abstract: The subject of the research is a philosophical model of mind based on the primacy of essential characteristics over structural ones. The object of research is the essential characteristics of intelligent cognition, considered in the context of this model. The author explores such aspects of the topic as: the existence of common philosophical grounds for defining reason as an entity, the substantive and conceptual difference between the theoretical model defining reason as an entity and the structural model of reason. Special attention is paid to the disclosure of such characteristics of rational cognition as: the comprehensive and self-identical nature of reason; the immutability of the nature of reason as an entity; the relationship between the essential and teleological aspects of reason; the phenomenon of accumulation and optimization of rational experience as an essential attribute of reason; the problematic philosophical understanding of rational cognition as a process of achieving a supernatural goal. The typological method was applied to classify the epistemological models under consideration. The method of system analysis was used to identify the basic provisions of each model. The main conclusions of the conducted research are. In the "essential" model, the mind is understood as a self-identical form that has no supernatural purpose. The connection between the essence of reason and its teleological character represents the identity underlying the progressive movement of cognition. The "essential" model of mind in its basic positions has a theoretical priority over the "procedural" model, which defines the mind as a structure. The theoretical conclusions obtained are consistent with the practical goals of reason. The essential understanding of the nature of rational cognition should be recognized not only as a philosophically sound, but also as a constructive concept. The author's special contribution to the research of the topic is an attempt at a detailed analysis and reasoned justification of the basic provisions of the "essential" model of reason. The novelty of the research lies in the fact that the topic is raised in the context of bioethics, which defends the primacy of the natural essence of man over ideas in which the possibility of its structural transformation is allowed.

Abstract: The subject of the study is the practical philosophy of Diogenes of Sinope, considered as a material for the objectification of the philosophical categories "to be" and "to have". The object of the study is the attributive meaning of the categories "to be" and "to have", taken in the meaning of the basic modes of human existence. The author examines in detail the following aspects of the topic: the dichotomy of "to be" and "to have" in the context of the opposition between human values and self-existence, the difference between the categories of "to be" and "to have" in terms of determining their attributive meaning, the correlation between the man and the culture, the possibility of interpretation of practical the philosophy of Diogenes of Sinope as a visual embodiment of the human "being". Special attention is paid to the disclosure of the attributes of the category "to be" in relation to the specifics of the teachings of Diogenes of Sinope. The research uses the method of philosophical analysis, which made it possible to categorically interpret the practical philosophy of Diogenes. An axiological method was used to analyze issues related to the problem of values. The main conclusion of the conducted research is that the practical philosophy of Diogenes of Sinope, being an example of the embodiment of the human "being", provides support for identifying the attributes of "being". Such attributes, the conceptual expression of which is found in the categories of "self-affirmation", "self-overcoming", "integrity" and "universality", constitute the essential basis of human existence. This conclusion reveals the depth and consistency of Diogenes' position when correlated with the central question for philosophical anthropology, "what does it mean to be human?". The novelty of the research lies in an attempt to show a two-way connection between the theoretical and practical aspects of the problem under consideration, where, on the one hand, the use of the categories "to be" and "to have" allows categorically comprehending the teachings of Diogenes, and, on the other hand, the philosophy of Diogenes makes it possible to reveal these categories in their effective meaning.

Abstract: The subject of the study is the cognitive relationship between the concept of responsibility and the idea of freedom. The objects of research are the philosophical categories of responsibility and freedom. The author examines in detail such aspects of the topic as the epistemological disparity of these categories, the difference in their specificity as concepts, as well as the features of responsibility and freedom in the role of effective phenomena. Particular attention is paid to the problem of the possibility of defining or objectifying freedom through the concept of responsibility in those areas where such interaction is most evident, namely: at the intellectual, metaphysical, social levels and in the field of personal being. The main conclusion of the study is: responsibility is a psychological modification of the category of necessity, which returns to the classical antinomy "necessity-freedom" and does not allow making responsibility an epistemological correlate of freedom. This theoretical conclusion is supported by an analysis of the effect of responsibility on freedom in all spheres of human existence considered in the study, where responsibility does not define freedom, but, on the contrary, levels it. The main contribution of the author to the study is that responsibility is considered not as a moral category, but as a structural phenomenon defined through the concept of "whole". The novelty of the research lies in the author's attempt, being in the field of ethics, to separate responsibility and freedom as essentially different and not having a linear cognitive connection concepts.

Abstract: The purpose of the work is to identify and comprehend the essential attributes of human existence, which are found to be conceptually opposite in relation to the eugenic doctrine of the foundation. The subject of the study are such attributes of human existence as universality, stability, self-existence, self-identity. The arguments put forward by eugenics as a positivist concept, on the contrary, are based on the idea of human nature as a biologically strictly determined and changeable material for the implementation of artificial transformation. The criticism of this premise undertaken in the work, as well as the criticism of the likely consequences of the use of positive eugenics, reveals the destructiveness of the eugenic doctrine. Applying the method of critical analysis, the author raises the question: "Is positive eugenics possible at all?" - and within the framework of philosophical anthropology answers it. The author comes to the conclusion that the implementation of the doctrine of positive eugenics threatens with distortions incompatible with the existence of man. The main conclusion of the study is: the essential moment of human existence is the fundamental basis that establishes the anthropological prohibition on the implementation of eugenic transformations. As a result, the attributes of a person's essential being - universality, stability, self-existence, self-identity - are revealed as quite effective conditions for human existence, which gives these attributes an additional degree of conceptual significance and cognitively concretizes their being. The results of the study of the causes of the failure of positive eugenics can be applied in the field of anthropology, ethics, bioethics, axiology.

Abstract: The subject of this research is the ethical categories of “good” and “evil”, analyzed in the context of modern moral consciousness. The object is the metaphysical aspect of ethics, examined as one of its most essential grounds. The author meticulously explores such aspects of the topic as the interrelation of the utilitarian-pluralistic, imperative, and creative concepts in comprehension of the basic notions of ethics, conceptual contradictions between them, as well as identifies the rational and metaphysical foundation for the theoretical understanding of the categories of “good” and “evil” applicable to the modern moral culture. The author applies axiological method as the key for defining the content of the study, as well as the method of structural analysis. The following conclusions were made: the biosocial perception of the categories of “good” and “evil” that forms the common moral consciousness, cannot serve as substantial grounds for ethical consciousness; ethics originates from metaphysics, and the basic notions of ethics are defined in terms of the metaphysical ideas of inherent value and freedom of an individual. Author’s special contribution consists in analysis of the creative concept in comprehending the categories of “good” and “evil”. The scientific novelty lies in the attempt to rationalizes the conceptual component of the ethical consciousness regarding its metaphysical content.