Abstract: The subject of this research is the separate results of experiments conducted by the foreign scholars – representatives of neuroscience, which refute the freedom of will of an individual. Within the framework of integration process in law, an attempt is made of the systemic understanding of the impact of separate directions of neuroscience upon the further development of continental criminal law and its key institutions. The author comes to the conclusion that as a result of the use of non-juridical tools by the representative of neuroscience alongside the disregard of fundamental formulizations and traditions of the continental doctrine of criminal law, there are negative attempts of rejecting the free will of an individual, as well as possibility of substitution of the abstract construct of guilt and the element of subjective judgment. However, certain achievement of neuroscience, such as peculiarities of the human neural activity preceding his behavioral acts and gravitation towards popular opinion, fortified by results of the experiments, enrich the general scientific knowledge and have an applied value for the criminal law. The following conclusions are made: 1) the integration process in criminal law, in private cases must at least consider the special scientific (juridical) methods of research; otherwise, by means of using the non-juridical tools, dilutes the very essence of the criminal law, as well as unreasonably diminishes the importance of the developed and tested with time criminal-legal mechanism of its realization; 2) the achievements of neuroscience, dedicated to the new coverage of specificities of the activity of individual and willed factors of a person in basic questions of crime and punishment, must carry a supporting character for the criminal law, rather than substitute its regulatory and defense function.