Comparative analysis of current nuclear and military doctrines of Russia and the USA

Ilikaev Aleksandr ORCID: 0009-0003-6773-9053 PhD in Politics Associate Professor, Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, Ufa University of Science and Technology Zaki Validi str., 32, Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan, 450076, Russia jumo@bk.ru Other publications by this author

Fadeev Kirill Vladimirovich PhD in Politics Associate Professor; Higher School of Philosophy and Sociology; Ufa University of Science and Technology 32 Zaki Validi str., Ufa, Kirovsky district, Republic of Bashkortostan, 450076, Russia rodbnafadeev@mail.ru

Introduction. The object of this research is international nuclear security, which is ensured primarily by the authority of both the conventional armed forces of the Russian Federation and its tactical and strategic nuclear arsenal. The subject of the article is a comparative analysis of the current nuclear and military doctrines of Russia and the United States, adopted in 2024 and 2018, respectively. The purpose of the article was to identify the similarities and differences between the nuclear and military doctrines of the world's leading nuclear powers, as well as recommendations regarding Russia's nuclear and military doctrines in order to minimize the risk of nuclear war and effectively realize the national and state interests of the Russian Federation. To achieve the designated research goal, a number of tasks had to be solved: 1) to analyze the scientific literature, mainly of a political orientation, on the concept of nuclear safety, to consider the background of the adoption of existing nuclear and military doctrines of Russia and the United States; 2) to conduct a comparative analysis of the content of the US nuclear doctrine, reformed in 2018, and the new nuclear doctrine of the Russian Federation in 2024, as well as related documents on national and international security. noting the similarities and differences in approaches to nuclear safety in Russia and the United States; 3) propose ways to improve the Russian regulatory framework in the field of nuclear safety in order to minimize the risk of nuclear war and at the same time reliably protect the national and state interests of the Russian Federation.

The methodological basis of this study is an analysis of the regulatory framework, scientific literature and Internet resources related to the problem of nuclear and military policy of Russia and the United States, a comparative historical approach for analyzing the doctrinal attitudes of the nuclear policy of the Russian Federation and their adjustments with the corresponding doctrines of the United States.

The relevance of the work lies in the fact that after the adoption of Russia's new nuclear doctrine in 2024, there was an escalation of the information war related to the intensification of anti-Russian propaganda and attempts to discredit the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, which acutely raises the question of the need to develop a set of measures to counter destructive forms of extremist ideologies aimed at disrupting the international nuclear balance of power and political disorganization of Russians ^[5]. The practical significance of the research is determined by the fact that its results can be used not only to study the problem of foreign policy risks in the context of an increasing danger of nuclear war, but also to develop and implement concrete steps to improve Russian doctrinal installations on nuclear and military security.

The novelty of the research lies in establishing similarities and differences between the nuclear and military doctrines of the world's leading nuclear powers, as well as in formulating recommendations regarding Russia's nuclear and military doctrines in order to minimize the risk of nuclear war and effectively defend the national and state interests of the Russian Federation.

The degree of scientific elaboration of the issue under study so far seems to be extremely uneven. The problems of national and military security in general, as well as nuclear security in particular, have repeatedly been the subject of study by both political scientists and defense specialists (N. I. Bubnova, Ya. D. Vishnyakov, O. G. Karpovich, R. N. Shangaraev, V. I. Mizin, A. I. Podberezkin, P. I. Sevostyanov, A. M. Voronov, A. A. Gromyko, D. Kvasov, P. Lapins, S. V. Lebedev, and others.) ^{[4; 5; 9; 14; 15; 6; 7; 11; 12; 13]}. There are articles that analyze, among other things, the new Russian nuclear doctrine of 2024. Recent works include articles by V. I. Mizin, P. I. Sevostyanov (2024) ^[14], A.V. Matyukhin (2024) and K. V. Bogdanov (2025) ^{[2; 3]}. Articles by such American researchers as C. D. Ferguson (2002) ^[17], H. M. Christensen (2005) ^[18], D. E. Sengler, T. Shanker (2010) ^[21], A. Meta (2018) ^[19] and others are devoted to the review of US nuclear doctrines.

The results of the study and their discussion. A review of the scientific literature on the concept of nuclear safety. The problem of international security, especially nuclear security, as mentioned above, is well developed in science. For example, E. E. Harman's article discusses the essential characteristics of the concept of nuclear safety. The researcher notes that the concept of nuclear safety is not present in any current international legal act ^{[16, p. 138]}. E. E. Harman rightly believes that the agreements on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons adopted in the 1960s and 1970s are currently, due to increasing uncertainty in international politics, The escalation of military conflicts involving nuclear Powers is clearly not enough. Moreover, the number of countries with nuclear weapons has not decreased and continues to grow ^{[16, pp. 139-140]}. E. E. Harman lists a number of authors who give their definitions of nuclear safety to one degree or another (works by T. V. Verbitskaya, A. P. Matrelov, M. S. Kapilin, K. K. Kozhevnikov, I. A. Krylova, O. G. Paramuzova). Thus, A. P. Zrelov and M. S. Kapilina emphasize the direct dependence of compliance with nuclear safety on the availability of relevant norms in legislation ^{[16, p. 144]}. According to A. According to Krylov, nuclear safety is the most important part of the global and national security systems ^{[16, p. 144]}. The definition of T. V. Verbitskaya is valuable, according to which Russia's nuclear security is determined by a state of security of a power that is guaranteed solely by the non-use of weapons of mass destruction against it ^{[16, p. 144]}.

According to E. E. Harman, T. V. Webritskaya's analysis of the "National Security Strategy of Russia" (2021) ^[7], as well as the "Military Doctrine of Russia" (2010, 2014), ^{[2; 1]} It shows that they do not include the concepts of nuclear safety. The researcher agrees with K. K. Kozhevnikov's opinion on the need to introduce the definition of "nuclear safety" into the specified basic national security regulations ^{[16, p. 144]}. E. E. Harman pays special attention to O. G. Paramuzova's understanding of the concept of nuclear safety in a broad and narrow sense. In a broad sense, nuclear safety means avoiding conditions under which the use of nuclear weapons would be possible. In a narrow sense, nuclear safety should include control over the processes of nucleation and denuclearization ^{[16, p. 144]}.

Analyzing the new nuclear doctrine of the Russian Federation (2024), K. V. Bogdanov sees in it a lowering of the nuclear threshold for the use of weapons of mass destruction, including taking into account Russia's provision of an appropriate protective umbrella over Belarus ^{[2, p. 27]}.

The course of the current armed conflict in Ukraine has revealed nuclear threats, both broadly and narrowly. For example, in a broad sense, they manifested themselves in the risks of using strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, as well as the use of conventional weapons using radioactive elements. In a narrow sense, it is a violation of the safety of nuclear power plants (Chernobyl NPP, Kursk NPP, Zaporizhia NPP, etc.), statements about the creation of a "dirty bomb", Ukraine's resumption of research and testing in the field of nuclear development, etc.

As noted by Ya. D. Vishnyakov and S. P. Vishnyakova, at present (in 2024) human civilization has again reached the threshold when the threat of the death of an intelligent civilization on Earth has become real. Meanwhile, back at the end of the last century, Russian and foreign specialists succeeded in creating a strong understanding in public opinion of the impossibility of any use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, this opinion was also formed by the ruling elites of various countries. The convincing results of the calculations were achieved by two circumstances at once. Firstly, the research was conducted by independent expert groups. Secondly, they were actually carried out by opposing sides at the height of the Cold War. Mathematically, the possibility of irreversible consequences for the entire biosphere associated with the phenomena of "nuclear winter" and "nuclear night" has been confirmed ^{[5, p. 96]}.

Such researchers as V. I. Mizina, P. I. Sevostyanov and A.V. Matyukhin agree with Ya. D. Vishnyakov and S. I. Vishnyakova on this issue. In particular, they note that the problem of nuclear parity between the USSR and the USA has long been an object of scientific interest. They include the studies of A. Wolstetter, R. McNamara, H. Kahn, and K. Waltz among the "classic" works on this topic ^{[14, p. 105]}. According to these scientists, the current state of affairs in the field of nuclear security, especially taking into account Russia's opposition to NATO, is considered in the works of a number of both Western and domestic political scientists.: R. Gottemoeller, L. Kulesh, W. Perry, E. Wolf, J. Acton, S. Charap, S. Bidgood, L. Rusten and M. Melamed. At the same time, according to V. I. Mizina, P. I. Sevostyanov and A.V. Matyukhin, the concept of nuclear security is considered by these political scientists mainly from the perspective of the security of NATO countries ^{[14, p. 105]}.

Nevertheless, in our opinion, the work of American and other foreign scientists should not be interpreted so unambiguously. Thus, W. Perry, assessing the significance of the Caribbean crisis for subsequent generations, for example, comes to the fair conclusion that there are differences between new and archaic ideas about war. As W. points out. Perry, there were people in both the Soviet and American leadership who did not represent a qualitatively different global nature of nuclear threats. These people continued to think in terms of victory and defeat in conventional, non-nuclear military conflicts and almost brought the world to the brink of a nuclear catastrophe ^{[20, p. 5]}.

As for the protection of Russia's national interests in terms of strategic stability and nuclear parity, they are primarily expressed by the works of predominantly modern Russian scientists: A. I. Antonov, A. G. Arbatov, A. A. Kokoshin, V. Z. Dvorkin, V. I. Batyuk, S. K. Oznobishchev, L. Sokolshik and D. Suslov ^{[14, p. 105]}.

Nevertheless, the problem of analyzing and comparing the current nuclear and military doctrines of Russia and the United States is still a relatively unexplored area of political science knowledge. For example, there are no works devoted to the issue of developing the main policy directions related to the adoption of the new nuclear doctrine of the Russian Federation (2024).

Analysis of the background of the adoption of the existing nuclear and military doctrines of Russia and the United States. The history of the adoption of Russia's current nuclear and military doctrine is of interest. Despite the fact that the USSR was one of the two nuclear superpowers, its leadership never publicly declared the use of nuclear weapons. The only document of this kind can be considered the joint declaration of the Warsaw Pact countries (1987), which proclaimed the principle of renouncing the first use of a nuclear arsenal. The Nuclear Posture Review, a document that is an analogue of the Russian Federation's nuclear doctrine in the United States, was first prepared in 1994 ^[9]. However, in our opinion, it cannot be fully recognized as an independent document, since, in this version, it rather sums up a peculiar outcome of the cold war, defines the preservation of old challenges and dangers for the United States and its allies, as well as new points of tension.

An analytical article by H. M. Christensen is devoted to the review of the US nuclear doctrine in 1994. According to the American analyst, initially this doctrine was aimed at deterrent rather than combat capabilities of using nuclear weapons. However, since the purely military component has always been an integral part of the deterrence policy itself, the military departments and the "hawks" in the government insisted on maintaining the militaristic nature of Nuclear Posture Review 1994. Thus, according to H. M. Christensen, instead of a fundamentally new document, the world received a reduced, softened version of the American position during the Cold War ^[18].

Thus, it can be noted that nuclear doctrines were absent not only in the USSR, but also in the USA until the 90s of the twentieth century. There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, the main risks and threats of the use of nuclear force were determined exclusively by bilateral treaties between the USSR and the USA. As a rule, they were resolved on the basis of compromise (the Caribbean crisis of 1962) and the recognition of spheres of influence with the division of the world into the camp of socialism and capitalism (the Helsinki Accords of 1975). Secondly, US-Chinese relations were still at the stage of mainly trade and economic ties. In the context of the existing confrontation between the Eastern Bloc and NATO, China was not considered an ideological and military-political enemy of the United States. Moreover, given the unresolved Soviet-Chinese relations, China continued to be considered a kind of "Trojan horse" in the camp of socialism and, if not an ally of the United States, then clearly not a "pro-Soviet" force. Thirdly, in conditions of strict control over nuclear arsenals by governments, insufficient development of technologies that could be used by terrorist and rebel groups, the issue of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, including the use of the so-called "dirty bomb" (low-power nuclear weapons capable of causing radioactive contamination of the area) was not acute in the international the agenda. Fourthly, the USSR, at least officially, proclaimed the principles of peace, the fight against the arms race, the condemnation of war, and militarism, and in this sense, any document that regulated even the justified use of weapons of mass destruction would violate communist ideological attitudes and negate the image of a country fighting for global detente.

On November 2, 1993, immediately after the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet, President Boris Yeltsin approved the "Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation." Unlike the US Nuclear Policy Review (1994), the document was completely closed to the public. At the moment, it also remains virtually inaccessible to the general public. All the results offered by search engines lead only to the text of the relevant decree, which is accompanied by a laconic note: "Without the text of the "Main provisions"" ^[6].

As A. D. Kachalkov points out with reference to A. Y. Baluyevsky, in these "Basic provisions ..." the abbreviation of NATO was not even mentioned. Russia's foreign policy and military threats were described in general terms. Although it was noted that there was a "build-up of groups of troops near the borders of Russia to the limits that violate the balance of power," this conclusion was completely discounted by the declaration that Russia "does not treat any state as its opponent" ^{[10, p. 843]}.

It is obvious that the Nuclear Posture Review 1994, adopted in the United States a year later during the presidency of B. Clinton, which marked the peak of warming relations between Russia and the United States, was characterized by a much lower degree of uncertainty and pacifism. First, Russia's nuclear potential continued to be heralded as the main threat to U.S. national security. Secondly, the Clinton administration emphasized its readiness for further negotiations on the reduction of offensive weapons only on condition that the Russian leadership would maintain its commitment to "democratic values" ^[9].

Despite the full support of the United States announced by the new Russian leader, Vladimir Putin, in the fight against international terrorism after the attacks of September 11, 2001, Nuclear Posture Review 2002, published during the presidency of J. George W. Bush has already named Russia among the "potentially dangerous countries", which also included China, as well as the countries of the so-called "Axis of Evil". In addition, he proclaimed the right of the United States to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries.

An extensive article by C. D. Ferguson (2002), a scientific consultant and fellow in science and technology at the J. Martin Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation Studies, is devoted to the analysis of this document. According to the scientist, the US nuclear doctrine, adopted during the presidency of George W. Bush, was included as a special part in a more significant study of the US armed forces, namely the Quadrennial Defense Review, conducted every four years. Although the key points of the Nuclear Posture Review 2002 were published, the full test of the report remained classified. This served as the basis for the spread of rumors in the public that the United States plans to develop such nuclear weapons, which will significantly lower the threshold for their use. In view of this, the administration of President George W. Bush hastened to declare that the Nuclear Posture Review of 2002 largely represents a continuation of past nuclear policy ^[17].

In connection with the mention of the Quadrennial Defense Review, it is worth noting that in the United States there are a number of documents defining the military strategy of the state: The already mentioned Quadrennial Defense Review, the US National Security Strategy, the US National Defense Strategy, and the US National Military Strategy. The National Security Strategy ("National Security Strategy") is the fundamental regulatory legal act. This document is adopted by the U.S. Congress every four years. The National Security Strategy, adopted in October 2022, is currently in effect.

According to C. D. Ferguson, the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review reflects the political patterns of the administrations of W. Clinton and George H.W. Bush in its fundamental provisions. First, although he agrees with the significant warming of relations between the United States and Russia, this review recognizes that the United States' nuclear doctrine must take into account the fact that Russia is the only state on the planet with nuclear weapons that could potentially destroy the United States. Moreover, the uncertainty in expectations about the future course of Russian foreign policy motivates the United States to maintain a huge reserve force of nuclear weapons. Secondly, the Nuclear Posture Review of 2002 is not limited to Russia alone and points to six other states as potential targets for a possible US nuclear strike. Thirdly, the Nuclear Posture Review in 2002 emphasizes that its goal is to maintain and increase the military flexibility of the United States ^[17].

According to C. D. Ferguson, the Nuclear Posture Review of 2002 basically differs from the nuclear doctrine of the previous administration, rejecting arms control agreements such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The new document also significantly reduces the time required to prepare for the resumption of nuclear testing from two to three years to one year ^[17].

The Nuclear Posture Review of 2009, proposed during the presidency of Barack Obama, somewhat reduced the bellicose rhetoric of previous statements, emphasizing the commitment of the US administration to the complete destruction of nuclear weapons worldwide. The focus shifted from Russia and China to Iran and North Korea, turning the latter into a kind of rogue state that does not fit into the realities of the new world. It is important to note that the adoption of this document coincided with the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev (2008 – 2012), when the illusion of a stable warming of relations between Russia and the countries of the collective West, led by the United States, was re-established. Even the recent Five-day War between Russia and Georgia in 2008 had virtually no real impact on the state of international relations. Mikhail Saakashvili's government not only lost the war, but was also forced to leave under the yoke of internal contradictions. Currently, the former President of Georgia is imprisoned on charges of abuse of office (embezzlement of public funds). Up to the events of March 2014, Russia continued to be a full participant in the prestigious G8 (G8) summit and even managed to serve as chairman of the club of the world's leading states in 2006 and in the first two months of 2014.

Nevertheless, it is characteristic that already during this period, according to the domestic military analyst Yu. Baluyevsky, there was a pronounced desire of the United States to dictate the will of Russia and consider the whole world as a zone of its national interests ^{[1, pp. 35-36]}.

The work of D. E. Sanger and T. Shanker (2020) is devoted to the analysis of the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review at the stage of its preparation. According to researchers, President Barack Obama's nuclear strategy prescribes the United States to refrain from developing new nuclear weapons, including "nuclear bunker bombs", which were promoted by the previous administration of George W. Bush. At the same time, foreign scientists note that the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review focuses on reducing the nuclear potential of the United States in favor of optimizing it and eliminating "unnecessary" nuclear weapons. Researchers make an important point that as of the early 2010s, American nuclear weapons (our italics - I.A., F.K.) were located in countries such as Germany, Italy, Belgium, Turkey and the Netherlands ^[21].

We believe that the presence of nuclear weapons in Turkey (more precisely, about 200 B-61 bombs) in the immediate vicinity of Russia's borders is comparable to the presence of Russian nuclear missiles in Cuba during the Caribbean crisis. This once again dispels the myth of jingoistic propaganda that allegedly as a result of negotiations between the administrations of D. Kennedy and N. Khrushchev, a compromise was reached and the status quo was returned. Indeed, American missiles were withdrawn from Turkey, as were Soviet missiles from Cuba. However, one should not forget that at present not only Russian nuclear weapons in any form, but also any significant Russian military forces on a permanent basis near the borders of the United States are completely absent. In our opinion, this situation cannot be considered normal and ensures a real balance of nuclear and conventional weapons in the world. Undoubtedly, in order to achieve full parity, Russia should deploy military bases in Cuba and Nicaragua in Venezuela.

According to D. E. Sanger and T. Shanker, certain hopes were inspired by the fact that the Obama administration raised the issue of the possibility of removing tactical nuclear weapons from the above-mentioned European countries, where they played a more political than military role ^[21].

In the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review and the corresponding Quadrennial Defense Review, support was expressed for a new class of non-nuclear weapons called Prompt Global Strike, a "rapid global strike" that could be launched from the United States and hit a target anywhere in less than an hour. This innovation was justified by considerations of countering radical actions by fundamentalists in Pakistan and missile launches in North Korea. At the same time, it was assumed that the "rapid global strike" missiles would be available for Russian and Chinese inspections to confirm their non-nuclear nature ^[21].

Despite the proposals of a number of congressmen to soften the goal in the Nuclear Posture Review in 2009, under pressure from Pentagon officials and the White House itself, a rather ambiguous wording remained, according to which the main goal of the US nuclear doctrine, but not the only one, is to deter a nuclear attack (emphasis ours. – I.A., F.K.). The United States The United States thus reserves the right to use nuclear weapons against opponents who "could threaten the United States with biological or chemical weapons or transfer nuclear materials to terrorists" ^[21].

D. E. Sanger and T. Shanker conclude that the Obama administration has generally maintained continuity with the military policy of George W. Bush. For example, in the development of unmanned aerial vehicles for bombing terrorists, the continuation of the operation of the military base and prison in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba ^[21].

Analysis of the content of the US nuclear doctrine (2018) and the new nuclear doctrine of the Russian Federation (2024). Proposals for improving the nuclear doctrine of the Russian Federation. The new Nuclear Posture Review in 2018 emphasized the need for Russia's nuclear deterrence. In addition, it was announced that the United States considers Russia and China to be its key opponents. The DPRK and Iran were also singled out separately ^{[8, pp. 8-13]}.

A detailed analysis of the Nuclear Posture Review 2018 is presented in the article by N. I. Bubnova. In particular, the researcher notes such innovations compared to previous doctrines as the proclamation of the resumption of great power rivalry, the possibility of using nuclear weapons and non-nuclear threats. At the same time, the emphasis on the right of the United States to be the first to use weapons of mass destruction remains unchanged. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that N. I. Bubnova opposes the widespread opinion among some Russian propagandists that the document states the desirability of such a development of events ^{[4, pp. 22-23]}. In our opinion, the researcher's objection, which is essentially correct, in turn does not take into account the fact that the reservation contained in the text of the Nuclear Posture Review 2018 does not change much in the essence of the document itself and gives the impression of a certain diplomatic convention.

The analysis of Nuclear Posture Review 2018, which is of undoubted scientific interest, was carried out by A. Mehta. According to the American researcher, the new document largely continues to follow the patterns put forward in the 2010 review conducted by the Obama administration. For example, in terms of further support and implementation of nuclear modernization projects, as well as the confirmation of obligations under the treaties on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction ^[19].

Nevertheless, according to A. Mehta, there are significant discrepancies between the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review and the previous US nuclear doctrine. First of all, the Obama-era document emphasized the goal of reducing nuclear weapons worldwide (albeit through American leadership). The doctrine adopted during D. Trump's first term focused on building up military potential "to match Russia's level" ^[19].

Further, A. Mehta notes, although the current nuclear doctrine of the United States has sections dedicated to To North Korea, China and Iran, the main focus is obviously on Russia and what is required to ensure a balance of military forces with Moscow ^[19].

According to American analysts, Russia has invested heavily in low-power tactical nuclear weapons in recent years (apparently, we are talking about 2014, when Crimea was returned to the Russian state). It can allegedly be used by Russia during a clash with NATO before the United States can use its large strategic nuclear weapons. According to A. Mehta, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review suggests using two types of nuclear forces in the US arsenal: a low-power warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles, as well as a new underwater-launched cruise missile. The last resort will be used to keep Russia from thinking that the United States will not be able to respond to the use of tactical nuclear weapons ^[19].

However, the most significant point in the overall strategy of Nuclear Posture Review 2018, according to A. Mehta, which we can only agree with, is the desire to put Russia in front of the fact that it allegedly has no right, without violating global nuclear security, to try to compensate for the superiority of the United States and NATO in conventional weapons with means of nuclear destruction ^[19].

O. G. Karpovich and R. N. Shangaraev, analyzing this strategy, noted that Russia, China and "other authoritarian states" were named among the main rivals of the United States. At the same time, the role of the last two powers is different. If Russia remains determined to strengthen its "global influence" against the United States, then China becomes the main threat due to the fact that it has not only the "assertiveness" in pursuing its policy, but also the ability and opportunity to combine its existing economic, diplomatic, military and technological resources, challenging the prevailing position after 1991. The United States in international politics ^{[9, pp. 26-27]}.

Describing the current state of the negotiation process between Russia and the United States in the field of nuclear weapons control, V. I. Mizin, P. I. Sevostyanov and A.V. Matyukhina indicate that, in their opinion, it is characterized by renewed attempts by the United States to use various methods of bargaining and pressure on Russia in order to achieve more beneficial results. Moreover, according to researchers, such a policy, in general, even in the era of the cold war did not produce tangible results ^{[14, p. 108]}. However, we would like to disagree with this assessment. The fact is that the economic situation of modern Russia is fundamentally different from the economic situation of the USSR, which experienced a chronic shortage of food, which, as is well known, is a matter of primary necessity in the hierarchy of needs of any society according to A. Maslow. The actual failure of the sanctions policy against the Russian Federation and the beginning of a new rapprochement between the positions of the two leading world powers indicates that a kind of "market" approach to foreign policy is now becoming characteristic not only of the collective West, but also of the new capitalist Russia.

V. I. Mizin, P. I. Sevostyanov and A.V. Matyukhina in their article do not directly address the problems related to the nuclear doctrines of Russia and the United States. Nevertheless, their recommendation in the field of weapons of mass destruction control policy is of interest. First of all, we are talking about the confirmation of the 1967 ban on the inadmissibility of the militarization of outer space and the use of any type of weapons in near-Earth orbits ^{[14, p. 110]}. A. I. Podberezkin pays great attention to the analysis of the military doctrines of the United States and NATO in the context of the acute armed conflict in Ukraine (since 2022). In his article, he points out the specifics of the current confrontation, which consists in the impossibility of one of the parties to win a traditional war involving a nuclear power. Despite some differences in the strategies of the United States and its allies in the anti-Russian coalition, the conditional camp of supporters of the collective West is united by the desire to use the military forces of Ukraine as a tool to weaken Russia and curb the growth of its power ^{[15, p. 31]}.

While the United States has regularly adopted documents defining its strategy for the use of nuclear weapons since 1994, there has been no separate regulatory legal act of this kind in Russia. The only documents defining the military policy of the Russian Federation remained the military doctrines of Russia in 2000, 2010 and 2014, as well as the "National Security Strategy of Russia" (2021) ^[8], which, as mentioned at the beginning of the article, could not be called full-fledged nuclear doctrines, although the issues of nuclear weapons, their nature There are several sections devoted to the terms of use. The military doctrines of the Russian Federation in 2000, 2010 and 2014 overlap a lot. At the same time, they note the increased threat from NATO ^{[7; 1; 2]}.

The "Russian National Security Strategy" (2021) is distinguished by a much greater degree of certainty regarding potential adversaries, which explicitly states that "against the background of the development of the potential of the global missile defense system, the United States of America (USA) is pursuing a consistent course towards abandoning international obligations in the field of arms control" (paragraph 36) ^[8]. Nevertheless, in this document, the United States or any other country was not mentioned as a potential adversary.

For the first time, the topic of nuclear safety was independently mentioned only in the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated 06/02/2020 No. 355 “On the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the field of nuclear deterrence” ^[3]. According to this document, Russia considers nuclear weapons solely as a deterrent. The use of means of mass destruction is declared possible only when the very existence of the Russian Federation as a State is threatened. At the same time, the entire six-page document does not say what exactly should be considered a threat to Russia's existence. There is also no mention of specific countries and military-political blocs in the text of the decree. In general, the document is replete with extremely general and streamlined formulations ^[3].

On November 19, 2024, a new version of the Russian nuclear doctrine was approved. It received the official name – "Fundamentals of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the field of nuclear deterrence." The document in its general form has not undergone radical changes, retaining its rather general, declarative character. The latter was manifested in the fact that the text still lacks any mention of the United States, NATO and other states and military-political blocs with the possibility of using nuclear weapons. The changes primarily affected the expansion of the category of states and military alliances that may pose a threat to Russia's security. In addition, it was recognized that a nuclear response is possible if a critical threat to Russia's national independence arises ^[4]. That is, in this case, in our opinion, the situation in which nuclear weapons can be used has finally been clarified. We are talking about the threat of the loss of sovereignty, territorial integrity, etc. by the Russian Federation, which is usually associated with the concept of national independence. Participation in aggression against the Russian state of a non-nuclear country with the support of a nuclear power began to be interpreted as a joint attack. Another new provision was the inclusion of the possibility of a nuclear response to a massive attack by unmanned aerial vehicles. At the same time, Russia's commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the prevention of nuclear confrontation was once again confirmed ^[4].

Thus, it should be recognized that conceptually, to this day, Russia's nuclear and military doctrines continue to tacitly inherit the spirit of the "Yeltsin" doctrine of 1993, according to which Russia "does not treat any state as its opponent" ^{[10, p. 843]}.

Conclusion. The analysis of the history and content of the closely related nuclear and military doctrines of Russia and the United States allows us to come to certain conclusions.

As it was shown in the article, the problem of international security, primarily control in the field of nuclear weapons, is quite developed in science. The works directly analyzing the definition of nuclear safety, for example, include the article by E. E. Harman. In it, the author, agreeing with other researchers, points out the need to introduce this concept into the "National Security Strategy of Russia" and the "Military Doctrine of Russia."

K. V. Bogdanov writes about the problem of lowering the thresholds for the use of weapons of mass destruction, including in connection with the need to ensure the sovereignty of the Union State of Russia and Belarus.

In our opinion, nuclear safety issues have become particularly acute due to the outbreak of the acute armed conflict in Ukraine. The special military operation revealed a number of risks associated with the use of nuclear materials.

It is worth agreeing with the point of view of Ya. D. Vishnyakov and S. P. Vishnyakova that at present the world is once again on the verge of a nuclear catastrophe.

As the study of the history of the adoption of the nuclear doctrines of Russia and the United States has shown, the leading powers of the world did not have the relevant documents until the early 1990s. This was explained by a whole range of reasons, the main one being that international conflicts during the Cold War era were resolved mainly on the basis of compromise and recognition of spheres of influence with the division of the world into two opposing camps.

Until 2010, Russian military policy was determined by a document called "The main provisions of the military doctrine of the Russian Federation", adopted back in 1993. Although its authors noted the growing military danger from certain "groups of troops", the document as a whole was devalued by the statement that Russia does not consider any state its opponent.

The first nuclear doctrine was the Nuclear Posture Review 1994, adopted in the United States. However, based on the analysis of the document and the opinion of experts, up until 2009, this regulatory legal act was rather a kind of summing up of the Cold War, rather than a document defining a new nuclear policy of the United States. In contrast to the Yeltsin doctrine, the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review explicitly named Russia as a likely opponent of the United States.

Some softening of the rhetoric against Russia, with a shift of attention to Iran and North Korea, took place in the Nuclear Posture Review in 2009, although in general continuity with the military policy of previous American administrations was preserved.

The events of 2014, related to the return of Crimea to Russia and the actual beginning of the Ukrainian-Russian confrontation, became a turning point in American nuclear policy.

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review consolidated the position that Russia and China are key opponents of the United States.

Unfortunately, all three military doctrines of the Russian Federation (2000, 2010, and 2014, respectively), including the "Russian National Security Strategy" of 2021, turned out to be documents that reacted belatedly to the unfriendly foreign policy moves of their opponents. Nevertheless, it was in these regulations that the NATO bloc was first identified as a specific source of growing threats to the security of the Russian Federation.

For the first time, the topic of nuclear safety was raised independently only in the decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the field of nuclear deterrence" (2020). According to the document, Russia considers nuclear weapons solely as a deterrent. The use of means of mass destruction is declared possible only when the very existence of the Russian Federation as a State is threatened. At the same time, the entire six-page document does not say what exactly should be considered a threat to Russia's existence. There is also no mention of specific countries and military-political blocs in the text of the decree. In general, the document is characterized by general and streamlined formulations.

Actually, Russia's first nuclear doctrine was approved only at the very end of 2024. Compared to the previous "Fundamentals ..." the document expanded the categories of states and military alliances that could pose a threat to Russia's security. In addition, it was recognized that a nuclear response is possible if there is a critical threat to Russia's national independence. Participation in aggression against the Russian state of a non-nuclear country with the support of a nuclear power began to be interpreted as a joint attack. Another new provision was the inclusion of the possibility of a nuclear response to a massive attack by unmanned aerial vehicles. At the same time, Russia's commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the prevention of nuclear confrontation was once again confirmed.

Thus, it should be recognized that conceptually, to this day, Russia's nuclear and military doctrines continue to tacitly inherit the spirit of the "Yeltsin" doctrine of 1993, according to which Russia "does not treat any state as its opponent."

A comparative analysis of the nuclear and military doctrines of Russia and the United States allows us to note the following: 1) it is necessary to recognize the foreign policy reality, especially in the light of the current special military operation (SVO) in Ukraine, and list the countries that are carrying out an act of indirect aggression against the Russian Federation, as well as the countries and international organizations that most actively support Russophobic sentiments. 2) It seems that the correct, symmetrical answer to the relevant points of the US nuclear and military doctrines would be to indicate the United States, as well as its key NATO allies – Great Britain, Germany, etc. as key opponents of the Russian Federation. 3) In order to achieve real, rather than imaginary, parity with the United States, Russia should consider the possibility of deploying military bases in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, that is, in close proximity to the borders of the United States. 4) We also believe that Russia's new nuclear doctrine should include a separate section on strengthening and developing the principles of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.

{1} Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (as amended on December 25, 2014) // Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. URL: https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/official_documents/1584621 / (date of request: 03/31/25)

{2} Military doctrine of the Russian Federation (approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated February 5, 2010 No. 146) // <url>. Information and legal portal. URL: https://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/97383 / (date of request: 03/31/25)

{3} Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated 06/02/2020 No. 355 “On the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the field of nuclear deterrence" Official publication of legal acts. URL: http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202006020040 (date of request: 04/22/25)

{4} On the approval of the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the field of nuclear deterrence: Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 991 dated 11/19/2024 // Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 2024. November 19th.

{5} The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation: Federal Law No. 63-FZ of 06/13/2024, as amended and supplemented, intro. effective from 08.01.2025. On amendments to art. 280.3 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. "Public actions aimed at discrediting the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation ..." Consultant Plus. URL: https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_10699/?ysclid=m7k70hoibs238506951 (accessed 31.03.25)

{6} Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated 02.11.1993 No. 1833 On the Main Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation URL: http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/4747

{7} Decree of the President of Russia "On the Basic provisions of the military Doctrine of the Russian Federation" dated 04/21/2000 N 706. URL: http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/4747

{8} Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated 07/02/2021 N 400 "On the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation" URL: https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_389271 / (accessed 04/07/25)

{9} Nuclear Posture Review Final Report 2018. Office of the Secretary of Defense 75 p. URL: https://media.defense .gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018

{10} Review Recommends Reduction in Nuclear Force // News Release, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 22.09.1994 URL: https://nukestrat.com/us/reviews/dodpr092294.pdf 18.04.2025.