Realpolitik, noopolitik and cryptopolitik: on the issue of the Peculiarities of the Russian Foreign Policy Course at the present stage

Ilikaev Aleksandr ORCID: 0009-0003-6773-9053 PhD in Politics Associate Professor, Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, Ufa University of Science and Technology Zaki Validi str., 32, Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan, 450076, Russia jumo@bk.ru Other publications by this author

Introduction. The purpose of the proposed article is to identify the specifics of the application of strategies of realpolitik, noopolitik and cryptopolitics in modern Russian foreign policy, primarily determined by the conduct of a special military operation in Ukraine (SVO). To achieve this goal, it was necessary to solve the following tasks: 1) to review the available scientific and reference literature on strategies of realpolitik, noopolitik and cryptopolitik, including the available definitions of these terms; 2) to make a critical selection of scientific concepts and theoretical and methodological approaches necessary for a comprehensive analysis of these definitions; 3) to analyze the necessary empirical material through a system of developed parameters of relpolitik, noopolitik and cryptopolitik strategies; 4) on the basis of the analysis, formulate refined definitions of realpolitik, noopolitik and cryptopolitik;5) to identify the specifics of the application of these political and information strategies in modern Russian foreign policy.

The object of this study is the specifics of Russia's foreign policy related to the conduct of Russia's special military operation in Ukraine. The subject is the strategies of realpolitik, noopolitik and cryptopolitik, which determine the features of the modern Russian foreign policy course in the context of the acute political and armed conflict in Ukraine.

The relevance of the proposed research lies in the fact that modern information technologies have an ever-increasing impact on the sphere of politics, including international relations, modifying traditional instruments of political struggle, especially in the era of political crises taking on the character of armed conflicts. The practical significance of the research is expressed in the fact that its results can be used to compile training courses in political science, applied in the process of discussing the concepts of foreign policy of the Russian Federation.

The research methodology is based on comparative historical and structural-functional approaches used to analyze strategies of realpolitik, noopolitik, cryptopolitik. The comparative historical approach was used by the author mainly to compare the geopolitical balance of forces of the USSR/USA as of 1990 and the geopolitical balance of forces of Russia/USA as of 2024. At the same time, events of the recent past related to the period of the collapse of the USSR and the period of international political instability that followed 1991, as well as events of distant eras, were chosen as reference historical points for analysis: the reign of Vasily III (the first quarter of the 16th century), the Russian-Swedish War of 1808-1809, the Paris Peace Treaty of 1856. The Russian Civil War of 1917 – 1922 The structural and functional approach was applied mainly in the framework of the analysis of noopolitics and cryptopolitics strategies, highlighting the following structural elements: the presence of a political ideology; an attractive external image of the country; the presence of historically unrealized or potential alternatives, etc. At the same time, the functions of each of the designated structural elements of the strategies of noopolitik and cryptopolitics were highlighted: ideological, creative-integration, intermediary, futuristic, etc. To extract statistical and reference information, the author of the article used the Neuro service based on YandexGPT, capable of processing a significant array of relevant data contained on the Internet.

The novelty of this work lies in the fact that for the first time in political science, the author carried out a comprehensive analysis of the strategies of realpolitik, noopolitik and cryptopolitik, as well as a comparative historical analysis of the balance of geopolitical forces of the USSR./Russia and the USA. The extensive empirical material reviewed made it possible to clarify the definitions of the terms realpolitik and noopolitik available in science, to give a qualitatively new interpretation of the concept of cryptopolitics, as well as to identify various structural and functional elements of these definitions. This made it possible to identify the following features of Russian foreign policy at the present stage in the context of its: 1) the desire to pursue a flexible foreign policy based on the real military and economic capabilities of the country; 2) the departure from the mobilization model of solving geopolitical problems and the desire to preserve and further improve the level of socio-economic development of Russia; 3) the defensive, defensive nature of the information strategy of the Russian media; 4) the insufficient development of Russian analogues of Western media resources; 5) not always effective use of hidden ideology, as well as media discourses with coded messages; 6) successful use of secret diplomacy and the ability to project their foreign policy for a more distant period.

The term Realpolitik, in one form or another, has long been known to the Russian political science literature. For example, the authoritative Political Encyclopedia (1999) contains an article on political realism, which is defined as one of the most important manifestations of politics. Political realism is based not on good wishes, ideological and moral attitudes, but on the interests of political actors. The concepts of enemies and allies within the framework of political realism are relative, since they can change depending on a change of interests ^{[2, p. 324]}. The authors of the encyclopedia point out that the school of realpolitik is a separate trend of Western political thought that emerged after the Second World War. Its main object is international relations ^{[2, pp. 324-325]}. In the report "Realpolitik..." (2012), G. A. Hajiyev notes real politics as "a phenomenon that has recently gained popularity" ^{[4, p. 55]}. The definition of "the concept of the politics of realism (power politics)" is present in the Dictionary of Philosophy and Law (2014) edited by E. N. Moshelkov ^{[24, pp. 154-155]}. The problem of actualizing "realpolitik" (as originally a German doctrine) in relation to modern politics is the content of V. V. Zubov's article (2022) ^[7].

About Noopolitik as a global information strategy, it is stated in the article of the same name (2012) by A.V. Baychik and S. B. Nikonov ^[1]. Initially, S. B. Nikonov defines noopolitik as a media democracy, that is, in fact, the "fourth power" in his article "The Genesis of Transformation ..." (2014) ^[17]. E. G. Kalugina quite rightly points out in the monograph "Noopolitik and Online Media: information confrontation in the network space" (2020) that the term noopolitik It has not yet fully entered scientific circulation, therefore scientists interpret it in different ways ^{[9, p. 33]}. Noopolitik as part of the new media sphere becomes the subject of S. B. Nikonov's dissertation research "Noopolitik in the communication process ..." (2021) ^[18]. In the article by O. A. Subbotina and V. R. Pasikovskaya (2023), noopolitik is considered as an information strategy that has the most direct impact on foreign policy. For example, the authors explore various media texts on the eve of freedom in Ukraine, highlighting "their" and "others'" noopolitik ^{[24, p. 149]}.

The term cryptopolitika (Crypto-politics) should be recognized as not yet established in political science. We have not been able to find any examples of the use of this term in the Russian scientific literature. For example, the above-mentioned voluminous "Political Encyclopedia" contains only an article about the noosphere. The latter is defined as "a special type in the development of the biosphere, in which the spiritual creativity of man becomes crucial" ^{[19, pp. 57-58]}. In English-language political science, this definition is also not considered separately, being mentioned only in the contexts of cryptocommunism (Crypto-communism), cryptofascism (Crypto-fascism) and other forms of covert support for certain political ideologies. Thus, A. Stromas notes that "cryptocommunism among political leaders contributed to the Sovietization of the Baltic countries" ^{[34, pp. 257-258]}.

The term Realpolitik was first used by L. Rochau, a German public figure of the 19th century ^{[29, p. 168]}. Modern researcher G. A. Gadzhiev distinguishes between two types of realpolitik: archaic, providing temporary success, and more modern, capable of realizing advantages in the historical perspective. According to the researcher, Russia is faced with a choice of which of these strategies to use ^{[4, p. 55]}. Speaking about modern realpolitik, G. A. Hajiyev points out that Realpolitik was possible and beneficial in the 19th century, when there was still no "common constitutional and legal intellectual space" in the world. However, S. Frank already considered it necessary to contrast communist utopianism with "Christian realism", which would combine "reasonable gradualism in the implementation of social transformations" ^{[4, p. 55]}.

According to V. I. Shamshurin, the concept of realism (power politics) in current Anglo-American political science is characterized primarily by the denial of "abstract" ideals of altruism and humanism and is guided by a certain set of "realities", which may include both military-economic power and the national interests of the country ^{[24, p. 154]}. The scientist provides a concise but exhaustive historiography of the term realpolitik, finding the prerequisites for its understanding in the works of Plato and Hobbes, but agrees that the authorship of the concept belongs to A. L. Rochau. V. I. Shamshurin especially highlights the book by E. H. Carr "The Twenty-Year Crisis" (1939), which showed that the "idealistic" understanding of politics, divorced from life, led the world to disaster. Therefore, it is important to build international policy "not on the consideration of what 'should be'", but on the study of the "true" state of things, that is, political reality ^{[24, p. 154]}. According to the researcher, the concept of realism in the field of international relations received the most concentrated expression in H. Morgenthau's book "Politics Among Nations.": The Struggle for Power and Peace» (1949). The essence of the American author's concept can be expressed in the following quote: "... the state has no right to allow ... to hinder <successful political actions that are themselves inspired by the moral principle of national survival" ^{[32, p. 165]}. V. V. Zubov in his article devotes considerable space to the history of the origin of the term Realpolitik, while noting, for example, that assessments of politics as "bad" or "good" are subjective, not objective character. It is also important that the ultimate goal of real politics is not the power of the ruler per se, but the good of the state ^{[7, pp. 102-103]}. The mechanisms of realpolitik, according to V. V. Zubov, can be recognized as the requirements of G. Le Bon to formulate simple slogans and perform the simplest political actions, as well as the advice of K. Schmitt did not resort to a formalized liberal policy in conditions requiring urgent measures ^{[7, p. 104]}. V. V. Zubov tries to apply the term realpolitik to the analysis of the international situation that developed after the annexation of Crimea to Russia in 2014. In particular, he points out that although the US administration refused to recognize the fact of Crimea's transfer to Russian jurisdiction, understanding the common threat of terrorism and nuclear war could not but affect another rapprochement between the leading world powers ^{[7, p. 106]}.

Definition of noopolitik (from the Greek. noos "human mind"), given by the Americans D. Arkil and D. Ronfeld, is that noopolitik acts as an international political strategy in the context of the information society, emphasizing the primacy of ideas and values and working rather through "soft" force ^{[26, p. 102]}. Russian scientists A.V. Baychik and S. B. Nikonov consider it necessary to give their definition of noopolitik, which, in their opinion, is an information strategy aimed at manipulating interpretations of international processes in the media in order to create the necessary positive or negative attitude among the general public towards the foreign or domestic policy of the state, as well as giving the necessary evaluation of certain proclaimed political images and ideas ^{[1, p. 208]}. In particular, applying their understanding of the term noopolitics to the analysis of Turkish foreign policy during the presidency of R. Erdogan, A.V. Baychik, S. B. Nikonov note that this policy, for example, consisted of a number of statements and signed agreements, the purpose of which was not the usual promotion of state interests in the spirit of realpolitik, but the promotion of the idea of Turkey as a bridge. between the East and Europe ^{[1, pp. 210-211]}. According to S. B. Nikonov, noopolitik determines the leading role of the media democracy with its "soft" political propaganda in the modern era of manipulation of public opinion. In this case, special attention should be paid to information security ^{[17, pp. 41-42]}.

The most significant studies on noopolitik are the monograph by E. G. Kalugina and the dissertation by S. B. Nikonov. The first paper notes that it is the Internet that currently acts as the main tool for implementing noopolitik, allowing actors active in foreign policy to most actively and widely apply specific information methods to achieve their goals. Political disinformation in order to cause image damage is the most widespread "technology" here ^{[9, p. 239]}. E. G. Kalugina believes that influencing the audience in order to create a certain attitude towards certain political events should be considered not only through various media frameworks (agendas) that form the appropriate political picture, but also through the entire complex of multimedia and hypertext elements, which do not exclude, among other things, the falsification of facts (for example, a link to "blurred" sources of information) ^{[9, pp. 239-241]}.

A significant place in S. B. Nikonov's dissertation research is occupied by the consideration of non-political strategy in the context of new international politics. Moreover, when analyzing the degree of influence of non-politics on foreign policy, the researcher believes that the most significant are "international state and "pro-state" media, which have two or more language versions and, accordingly, act as media tools, that is, resources influenced by one or another political subject" ^{[17, p. 113]}.

The article by O. A. Subbotina and V. R. Pasikovskaya is of undoubted interest because it explores the strategy of noopolitik in relation to the eve of freedom in Ukraine. It is quite accurately stated that the confrontation between the United States and Russia has acquired the character of an "indirect war" (proxy war) since 2014. The researchers successfully noted the difference in approaches to understanding and reporting on the current conflict in Ukraine. If for the United States this is a conflict, a crucial issue of political choice, then for Russia it is a conflict related to the renunciation of one state from common historical, cultural and economic roots with another state ^{[23, p. 150]}. Unfortunately, the main content of the article itself was reduced to arranging in chronological order the events preceding the beginning of the hot phase of the conflict (statements by political leaders of foreign countries and responses to them by representatives of Russia). From all this analysis, it becomes clear only that Russia deliberately misled the world community and its own population, hiding the fact of its preparation ^{[23, p. 158]}.

As noted above, the term cryptopolitics is used primarily in conjunction with definitions such as, for example, cryptocommunism, which, according to researchers, can be defined as secret support or admiration for communism. At the same time, individuals and groups can be labeled as cryptocommunists only for the reason that they reveal links with communists or show signs of sympathy for communist ideas ^{[34, pp. 257-258]}.

Analysis of the strategy of realpolitik. Modern politics in general and foreign policy in particular are qualitatively different from both the traditional dynastic politics of antiquity and the Middle Ages, as well as from the realpolitik of the XVIII – XX centuries, associated with the formation of national states. It is also obvious that the current confrontation between the countries of the conditional "new Eastern bloc" (Russia, CIS countries, BRICS, SCO) ^[4] and the countries of the "collective West" cannot be considered a kind of republication of the former confrontation between the two systems of capitalism and socialism. The situation is often aggravated by an avalanche-like change in the foreign policy environment. For example, the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, which seemed unshakable by the end of 2024, having survived all the waves of color revolutions, its own crisis, and a successful retaliatory offensive by opposition supporters, including the most dangerous in the face of ISIS terrorists (a banned organization in the Russian Federation), fell in a few days.

According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, the term Realpolitik does not translate as "real politics", but rather as "the art of the possible" (in the words of O. Bismarck), the ability to adapt to existing conditions, accepting things as they are. This pragmatic and business-like view often leads to disregard for ethical and moral standards. In diplomacy, it is associated with a steady, albeit well-founded pursuit of national interests.

However, it would be wrong to reduce L. Rochau's definition to the "right of the strong". The German politician's speech is only about recognizing that power is subject to certain laws and cannot be carried out at someone's will. The well-known American propagandist Z. P. Blavatsky was an exponent of realpolitik in relation to the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. Brzezinski. As Ch. rightly points out. However, he did not agree with the benefits of traditional anti-communist rhetoric based on the threat of using weapons, and was a proponent of "soft" power, aimed primarily at weakening ties between Russia and its satellites in Eastern Europe. Z. Brzezinski believed that realism consisted in the fact that Russia and its European allies in We have never been civilizationally close to the Communist bloc. Therefore, the Americans should have attracted the intellectual elites to their sides and shown the advantage of the Western way of life. This automatically undermined the strength of the world system of socialism ^{[27, pp. 23-24]}. According to the modern American political scientist R. Mahon, the US policy towards authoritarian regimes in the world was not based on an ideological principle. The United States has always supported those countries and governments that meet their national interests ^{[31, p. 205]}.

According to A. P. Tsygankov, world politics in the modern sense took shape relatively recently, when contradictions between the USSR and the USA were revealed. It was during the Cold War that influence and authority in politics acquired "not only a global, but also a conscious character." International politics began to rely on ideological foundations and use all available resources ^{[20, p. 893]}.

In the concept of the "inside out" of A.M. Salmin's foreign policy, an important place is given to maintaining the superpower paradigm ^{[20, p. 703]}. Other markers of the "wrong side" include: 1) export of energy and raw materials; 2) servicing of external debt; 3) disintegration and integration ^{[20, pp. 708-713]}.

Speaking about the crisis experienced by Russia, A.M. Salmin notes that after 1991 it retained less than two thirds of the territory of the USSR, slightly more than half of its population, its share in world GDP fell from 8 to 1.5%, and the armed forces were reduced threefold ^{[20, p. 703]}. Agreeing with the researcher, we also note that the most important parameter is the size of the main territory of the country, which determines the degree of its security. It is a historical fact that the western border of Russia (with few exceptions: Vyborg, Kaliningrad region, Black Sea region, Dagestan) actually returned to the times of Vasily III and Ivan the Terrible. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia lost the most populated, industrially and agriculturally developed territories, and lost almost half of its population (150 million people versus 290 million people). The ATS unit, created and led by the USSR, was dissolved, and its key member countries became members of the NATO bloc opposing Russia. Instead of a belt of satellites extending in separate directions for thousands of kilometers, Russia received extended borders with NATO: the Finnish, as well as the Baltic. The Baltic Sea, the eastern and almost the entire southern coast of which was controlled by the Soviet Union and the ATS by 1989, actually turned into a "NATO lake".

The composition of the USSR's allies underwent quantitative and qualitative changes/Of Russia. Compared to Soviet times, their number has not only decreased dramatically (at the expense of ATS member countries), but has also begun to include mostly underdeveloped, disorganized countries like Syria (until 2024) or Venezuela. Moreover, political regimes in these countries often turned out to be so unstable that they easily dropped out of the ranks of Russia's allies. Unlike Russia, the United States, on the contrary, not only increased the composition of its client political regimes, but also achieved maximum political cohesion of the world against Russia after 1856. (The Paris Peace Treaty) and 1917-1922 (The Russian Civil War) accordingly. This is evidenced, for example, by the resolutions voted at the UN General Assemblies on April 26, 2023, according to which Russia was recognized as an "aggressor" even by those countries that traditionally adhered to neutrality.

Another key geopolitical parameter of the dramatic change in the balance of power in the international arena was a sharp reduction in the number of Russian military bases. While the USSR had a presence on all continents in different years of its existence, with the exception of Antarctica, South America and Australia, Russia currently has only two bases outside the borders of the former Soviet Union (in Syria). However, their status and future after 2024 remain uncertain. Although the Foreign Ministry, represented by Sergey Lavrov, confirmed the conclusion of agreements on the establishment of Russian military bases in Eritrea and Sudan, this does not mean their actual deployment ^[33]. The databases will need to be created. Meanwhile, to the question "What is the number of countries with US military bases in 2024?" the text generated by Neuro showed that "as of mid-2024, according to declassified data, the United States had at least 128 military bases in 49 countries outside its territory" (Neuro, 2025).

Nevertheless, Russia is currently pointedly avoiding any hint of archaic and inflexible solutions, surpassing even the United States and the EU in many ways. For example, having soberly weighed the available possibilities, as well as respecting the US right to its current national security, Russia still has not attempted to fully recreate its former naval presence in various regions of the world from Latin America to Southeast Asia. Russia's negotiating efforts remain quite flexible (in Syria, Sudan, Mali, CAR, Niger, etc.). The Russian political leadership demonstrates the ability to negotiate with those forces that currently represent a political reality.

A separate group of parameters of the realpolitik strategy consists of the level of gross national income per capita (GNI) and, under consideration, the indicator of consumption of bread and cereals. According to the first position, Russia is showing significant progress compared to the Soviet era. Thus, according to the figures provided by the Neuro service, in 2024 the GNI of Russia was about 4 times less than the GNI of the United States, while in 1990 it differed by almost 10 times (in favor of the United States). In 2024, the Russian economy grew by a total of 1% more than the US economy, although not as much as the USSR in 1990. (Neuro, 2025). However, in the latter case, one should take into account the fact that the growth of the USSR economy took place in a planned loss-making non-market economy and did not always mean an increase in the welfare of citizens. In this regard, such a parameter as the consumption of bread (grains) per person is more indicative. Usually, increased consumption of this type of food indicates a shortage of meat, fish, vegetables and fruits in the diet, which is typical primarily for an autarkic society with little connection to the world market and progressive agricultural production, prone to periodic food crises. If the inhabitants of the USSR in 1990 consumed bread more than in the USA by almost 50 kg, then at present (in 2024) there is practically no difference. According to D. D. Knyazeva, the decrease in the consumption of bread products is explained by the growth of cultural and economic human resources. Wealthier citizens spend less on buying bread than the least affluent citizens ^{[10, p. 72]}.

Obviously, the current Russian government had the opportunity to reduce GNI and other socio-economic indicators in order to overcome the consequences of the geopolitical catastrophe, resorting to the traditional emergency model of overcoming the crisis situation, the total mobilization of the economy and human resources. However, they did not do this, continuing their policy of preserving and even further improving the standard of living of the Russian population.

Table 1. Strategy of realpolitik. Comparison of the power balances of the superpowers of the USSR and the USA in international politics during the Cold War era (1945-1991) and the first quarter of the 21st century (2001-2022).

As our analysis of the strategy of realpolitik has shown, it includes both geopolitical and socio-economic parameters. The geopolitical parameters include: 1) the size of the main territory and the degree of its security; 2) the presence and quality of allies; 3) the presence of military bases outside the country. Among the socio-economic: 4) the level of gross national income per capita (GNI); 5) the level of consumption of bread and cereals. The final balance of these parameters is determined by the final balance of forces. Compared to 1990, the total geopolitical strength (power) Russia's share fell sharply in 2022-2024. At the same time, on the contrary, the socio-economic parameters demonstrated a clear positive qualitative and quantitative dynamics in comparison with the indicators of the USSR.

Thus, the following definition of realpolitik can be given. Realpolitik (realistic politics) in modern Russian foreign policy is a strategy for achieving political (including geopolitical) goals based on the state's real economic and military-diplomatic capabilities in a given historical period, rather than recognizing the exclusivity of its national interests, which may be more long-term.

The analysis conducted above makes it possible to identify the following features of Russia's realpolitik strategy in the context of its implementation: 1) the desire to pursue a flexible foreign policy based on the country's real military and economic capabilities; 2) the departure from the mobilization model of solving geopolitical problems and the desire to preserve and further enhance the level of socio-economic development of Russia.

Analysis of the strategy of noopolitik. The second most important definition for analyzing the features of Russian foreign policy at the present stage, especially in connection with its implementation, should be recognized as the term noopolitik. If using the definition of realpolitik seemed to us a more convenient comparative historical method, then in this case the structural and functional approach looks preferable, which allows us to compare the positions of all three participants in the current conflict in Ukraine: Russia, Ukraine and the countries of the collective West.

After the reunification of Crimea with Russia in 2014, and especially after the outbreak of the conflict in February 2022, there was an illusion of a return to the days of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. However, currently Russia: a) it is not in absolute political isolation, b) it is not a country behind the "iron curtain". Also in Russia, despite the appeals of a certain part of the radical intelligentsia (for example, A. Dugin), the restoration of any form of ideocracy has not been noted. Article 13 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation remains inviolable. Nevertheless, during a certain period of its implementation, especially after the incorrect and provocative statements of former US President D. Biden addressed to the current Russian leader V. V. Putin, the policy of tightening sanctions, and the decisions of the so-called "international criminal court" (ICC), some public figures had an opinion about the irreversible nature of Russia's isolation. It was assumed that support for Ukraine, and in particular for the administration of V. A. Zelensky, would only increase, while V. V. Putin's isolation would intensify. Analysts noted a fundamental restructuring of international relations, which consisted in the fact that even Sweden, which had adhered to a position of strict neutrality for two centuries, joined the NATO military-political bloc. From a geopolitical point of view, this meant the beginning of an actual revision of not only the balance of power that had developed after 1991, but also much earlier, as a result of Russia's access to the Baltic Sea at the beginning of the 18th century and following the Russian-Swedish War of 1808-1809. Once again, although on an unofficial level, there have been calls to remove Russia from Europe, calling into question its possession of Crimea and even the Kaliningrad region. Moreover, in Estonia, for example, it was suggested that the navigation of Russian vessels in the Baltic Sea should be restricted.

Nevertheless, despite unprecedented pressure, the administration of Russian President Vladimir Putin has shown a high degree of restraint and responsibility, not succumbing to emotional responses and statements associated, for example, with a complete rupture of relations with the United States, further escalation of tension, and an increase in the "stakes" in the foreign policy game.

Noting the termination of traditional Russian-American ties, the Russian leadership has repeatedly stressed that it always remains ready for direct dialogue between the two world superpowers, while regretting the unacceptably low level of relations with the United States, and continues to respect the national interests and security of the United States and the Syrian Republic (after the overthrow of the friendly regime of Bashar al-Assad). and even those EU countries that pursue an openly unfriendly, hostile policy towards Russia.

With the advent of the administration of the new President D. Trump, this calculation of the Russian government has shown its full validity and compliance with the highest criteria of the principles of noopolitik as a "soft" force. In the first half of February 2025, almost immediately after the inauguration of Donald Trump and the transfer of affairs by the former administration, direct Russian-American contacts at the highest level began. The new President of the United States, D. Trump specifically noted that Russia has never lost respect for his country, even if, thanks to the actions of some politicians, it had the right to take some kind of countermeasures. The US President also noted that Vladimir Putin's Russia could have used its arsenal to completely destroy Ukraine, but did not do so. Here, D. Trump probably meant Russia's commitment to one of the principles of non-politics, according to which priority should always be given not to "hard", but to "soft" power.

Indeed, we must agree that the Russian leadership has shown a high degree of professionalism, making it clear that it is not fighting against Ukraine, but is actually conducting a special military operation aimed at pinpointing the enemy's armed forces and military facilities, avoiding massive destruction of the civilian sphere. Thus, Russia has demonstrated that it focuses not on brute force, but on the desire to show the population of Ukraine that it has never considered Ukraine as a foreign state, and its population as a foreign population. This may currently be evidenced, for example, by information from the Reuters news agency that Russia is ready to finance the restoration of infrastructure destroyed during the conflict (and not only in the new regions that have become part of Russia).

Thus, assessing the current state of international relations through the concept of non-politics, the following parameter should be highlighted: the presence of a political ideology among the parties. Since it has been difficult to talk about any clearly defined ideology in the countries of the collective West since at least the late 1970s, it is necessary to compare the presence of ideological imperatives in Russia and Ukraine.

At first glance, both Russia and Ukraine adhere to the same rejection of the mandatory prevailing political ideology. This principle is fixed in the constitutions of both countries. However, the same Ukrainian constitution is supplemented by a clause that actually proclaims a course towards creating a geopolitical threat to Russia by renouncing its neutral and non-aligned status, and breaking with the CIS countries in the form of a declared desire to join the EU and NATO (Article 85). Additionally, attention is drawn to the fact that, for example, in Russia there are no Nazi slogans or those that could be interpreted as such. The greeting "Glory to Russia!" that is sometimes used on the territory of the SVO. Not only does it have no official status, but it is often not perceived by the population. Thus, according to the results of the survey, the slogan "Glory to Russia!" received the least votes (17%), giving way to other slogans, where the emphasis was not on glorifying the country of Russia, but rather on wishing it prosperity. For example, "Long live Russia!" (61%) ^[21]. According to the German historian K. Struve, the slogan "Glory to Ukraine!" was originally used by Ukrainian nationalists. Its official recognition (since 2018 as an official greeting in the police and army) was initiated "from above" and currently expresses precisely the nationalist narrative, shaping the state policy of Ukraine ^[30].

Nevertheless, according to YandexGPT, one of the most important functions of the media is ideological, which consists in helping to "socialize a person, master certain experiences, knowledge, norms and traditions" (Neuro, 2025). It should be recognized that if the structural element of the "presence of political ideology" in Ukraine and in the countries of the collective West in the form of adherence to the ideas of nationalism and the nation-state works in full, performs its functions, then in the Russian noopolitik strategy it is "turned off", inactive.

Another marker of noopolitics in the current foreign policy environment is the attractive external image of the country. As in the case of the existence of a political ideology, the position of the countries of the collective West in this sense is characterized by a certain inertia. Due to the peculiarities of the political history of the second half of the twentieth century and the first quarter of the twenty–first century, neither the EU nor the USA have to "prove" the advantages of their social system. Traditionally, not only the exaltation of the "Western" way of life and the promotion of the advantages of "European" civilization (cultural eurocentrism) continue to work for the collective West, but also the return to the image of the defender of modernizing peoples fighting despotic and archaic regimes observed since the early 1990s. For example, back in 1993, a kind of "manual" by D. Sharpe was published, also called the "bible of the Orange Revolution" ^[24]. At the same time, since the early 2000s, there has been a disillusionment of the European elites of the United States and the need, according to G.-P. Martin and H. Schuman, to build a united Europe with a market of half a billion people ^{[13, p. 307]}. Having emerged victorious from the Cold War, the collective West, as it were, received an image alibi by default. At the same time, Russia, like the USSR, once again has to work on an attractive external image of the country, which was largely discredited both during the Soviet period and during the geopolitical and socio-economic acute crisis of the 1990s.

According to YandexGPT, the creative and integration function of media is to expand "knowledge about the world from different points of view, human adaptation to the environment," as well as to unite "states, countries and peoples, to help in mutual understanding of different cultures and traditions" (Neuro, 2025). In this case, it is worth noting that all three parties to the conflict (Russia, Ukraine, and the collective West) actively use this functionality.

It is worth noting that Russia and Ukraine have chosen diametrically opposed strategies since 2014. If before the coup that brought the current political elite to power in Kiev, Russia and Ukraine positioned themselves as post-Soviet republics opening up to the world, then later Russia emphasized continuity with the image of the USSR and pre-revolutionary Russia. Ukraine, which has no deep roots of statehood (or constructs it from the phantom quasi-historical "Kievan Rus" and "Cossack Ukraine") began to promote itself as a part of Europe, opposing the aggressive age-old despotic Russia.

In our opinion, mistakes were made by both sides here. For example, Russia's appeal to its nuclear arsenal and the image of the largest predatory mammal in Europe (the brown bear) may not always be justified from the perspective of the concept of noopolitics as a "soft" force, even if this animalistic code had cultural and historical roots and was firmly associated with the country. If Russia's position in some cases seems somewhat masculine, then Ukraine's position is obviously subordinate, poorly fitting into the traditional East Slavic image of not knowing any owners of the "Russian Land". Nevertheless, so far Ukraine has managed to create a more attractive symbol of the country in the image of a beautiful woman allegedly suffering from a rapist (see, for example, numerous actions of Ukrainian feminists around the world).

Another parameter characterizing adherence to the principles of noopolitics in modern conditions, we would call the diplomatic qualities of political leadership. It has already been pointed out above that Russia, despite unprecedented external pressure and outright provocations, has shown maximum diplomatic restraint and tact. In particular: 1) the mechanisms of the UN Security Council were not curtailed and destroyed, as well as diplomatic relations were interrupted even with those countries that actually carried out acts of armed aggression against Russia; 2) with the available military opportunity, the entire arsenal of conventional strategic weapons was not used to create large-scale destruction of civilian infrastructure in Ukraine; 3) Russia consistently refrained from noisy PR campaigns, including in response to the provocative actions of not only the Ukrainian, European, but, first of all, the American side during the presidency of D. Biden; 4) Russia continued to send signals to the West that it was ready for reasonable compromises and agreements based on the principle of recognizing the "realities on earth"; 5) Despite calls from radical patriotic circles, the Putin administration has made it clear that it does not seek to destroy Ukraine's existence as a sovereign state and recognizes the entire range of basic international agreements concluded since 1991. At the same time, even realizing the injustice of many of the documents signed and adopted during the presidency of Boris Yeltsin, Russia has not declared in any official statement its desire to "restore" the USSR or the Russian Empire.

Thus, it should be recognized that the mediation function of "establishing contacts between different social groups" (Neuro, 2025), from the point of view of the diplomatic qualities of the country's political leadership, is being implemented by Russia as fully and effectively as possible within the framework of the nopolitical strategy.

The main objections of some public figures, for example, D. L. Bykov (recognized as a foreign agent in the Russian Federation), are that supposedly Russia, having experienced sobering up, realizing its weakness, is forced to try to be restrained and peaceful. Nevertheless, it is a historical fact that in 2014 Russia had the opportunity to take control of the entire territory of Ukraine, including the state border with Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania, but did not do so, obviously not wanting to unilaterally bring down the established world order in 1991-1994.

The striking contrast between the behavior of the heads of state of Russia and Ukraine was vividly illustrated by the scandal that broke out during Vladimir Zelensky's visit to the White House on February 28, 2025, related not so much to the failure of negotiations as to a blatant violation of diplomatic ethics. But even in this case, the main Russian officials retained the necessary restraint. For example, Vladimir Putin did not speak in any way about the style of negotiation of his counterpart. In general, Zelensky's arrogant and undiplomatic behavior did not benefit from strengthening Ukraine's foreign policy position.

Against this background, Russia continued its policy of combining the use of necessary direct military force with "soft" force. The latter obviously includes elements of: a) creating import-substituting clusters in the economy; b) supporting science and education; c) using the capabilities of information and network technologies.

Perhaps for the first time since the beginning of the twentieth century. Russia did not become a truly closed country and itself became a source of all kinds of narratives, sometimes of an extremely informal nature (for example, the broadcast of the Sigma Boy video on social networks). This could not cause concern among certain circles in the West, who were constantly pushing Russia towards traditional responses: declaring a full-scale all-out war, creating a harsh ideology, "tightening the screws," total censorship, searching for "friends," etc.

S. B. Nikonov consistently identifies the following composite functional levels of noopolitical media: 1) hypertext level (headings, links to other materials); 2) multimedia level (photos and videos); 3) interactive level (user comments) ^{[18, pp. 113-115]}. Nevertheless, it is difficult to agree with the statement of A.V. Baychik and S. B. Nikonov that an "information operation is fleeting" because the old information is quickly "erased" by new information or information noise ^{[1, pp. 207-208]}. Perhaps the inaccuracy of the authors' conclusion stems from the fact that they analyzed the predominantly peaceful period of Russian foreign policy. The course of the current CBR demonstrates quite extensive (since the beginning of 2022) PR campaigns from both Ukraine and Russia.

The most objective and at the same time summing up the four above-mentioned parameters (the presence of a political ideology; an attractive external image of the country; the diplomatic abilities of leaders; the presence of "hyped" information resources) seems to us to be the last indicator, that is, the presence of influential media covering the maximum gender and age active audience. The importance of this indicator is dictated by the fact that the very essence of noopolitics involves the active use of modern media, primarily Internet resources, social networks, various communication programs, search services, etc. In the conditions of the SVR, it is not the official channels of information that have become more widespread than ever, but the media sphere, the messages of various bloggers that form the composition, quality and number of actors in the ongoing information war. There is often a situation when the messages of military enlistment officers and bloggers turned out to be much more complete, more accurate and, most importantly, fresher than the picture reported by the traditional media. According to modern researchers, new media have become an operational "source of photo and video content from the scene", when the possibility of online broadcasts is noticeably more often used in various political events, including for transmitting the most relevant, "fresh" information ^{[5, p. 165]}.

According to YandexGPT, among the functions of the media, an educational and reference function stands out, which is expressed in the publication of "useful content that increases the level of education of the audience within a certain market segment", as well as ensures "satisfaction of users' information requests regarding the products offered by the brand" (Neuro, 2025).

The assessment of Russian, Ukrainian and Western functionals in the analysis of "their" media is contradictory. As a constant, the unconditional leadership of English-language content, that is, content managed by the countries of the collective West, should be accepted. Despite the facts of mutual blocking of various media, including in the United States, the very number and mass nature of the relevant sites obviously puts Western countries in a winning position. Broadcasting in English and aimed at an English-speaking audience, RT (formerly Russia Today) has been recognized in the West as a propaganda channel. After February 2022, its broadcasting was paralyzed in the EU and the USA. In the conditions of the SVR, both in Russia and in Ukraine, the number of blocked decisions of the authorities has increased significantly (in violation of the constitutions of both countries) online resources. Although the blocking is incomplete in many cases and is quite easily circumvented by using appropriate special programs, nevertheless, it must be recognized that Russia's position as a whole is defensive, which means that it is strategically or at least tactically losing. Thanks to the support of the collective West, Ukraine as a whole has managed to make such powerful network projects as Wikipedia*, YouTube*, Facebook* and Google* its information weapon (hereafter, if marked with a*, the resource is recognized in the Russian Federation as foreign, violating the law, extremist or prohibited). The only successful Russian counter-resource so far should be recognized as the VK social network, as well as, with reservations, the Telegram messenger* (largely analogous to WatsApp*, but not in terms of, for example, video calls and conferences). Although Telegram* is of Russian origin, its servers and head office are currently located outside of Russia.

Instagram Facebook* and Instagram* have been blocked in Russia, according to the analytical company Mediascope, as a result of the increase in the audience of the VK social network. Facebook Instagram users* decreased eight-fold from January to July 2022, and Instagram* decreased almost four-fold. Telegram* has benefited the most from the current state of affairs. The daily audience of this resource in Russia increased by 66% in six months, to 41.5 million people ^{[5, p. 165]}.

Although political strategists note that a number of Telegram channels* have ceased to be taken seriously by the audience, due to the increase in the number of unreliable, fake information, in general, Telegram as a media resource retains its leadership. At the same time, services based on visual content are becoming increasingly popular: Yandex Zen, Rutube, YouTube* and Instagram*. Researchers explain this fact by the fact that most people are visual artists who perceive reality better through a picture or video rather than through text ^{[5, pp. 166-167]}.

Recently, the importance of posts and statements by senior government officials posted exclusively online has been sharply increasing in foreign policy. For example, during the ongoing verbal sparring between President D. Trump and V. A. Zelensky, the former regularly uses his own Truth Social network for ironic comments on the loud statements of the Ukrainian leader. At the same time, it should be noted that Vladimir Putin still does not have his own media resource or even an account on the Internet, explaining this situation by his heavy workload. This position clearly does not fit into the concept of noopolitics. It would not be a big exaggeration to say that a political subject does not exist in non-politics as an actor if it does not have its own virtual "copy". Although Vladimir Putin's reluctance to have a network account may be explained by security issues and the president's conservative beliefs, given the increasing role of Internet resources, such tactics are unlikely to promote Vladimir Putin's point of view and popularize it, including among young people.

The weak side of the Russian media remains the lack of a full-fledged analogue of Wikipedia*, at least in terms of information related to Russia. A number of Russian platforms have existing functional problems. For example, video conferencing and video calls in VK and Telegram* are still less convenient than in Zoom* and WatsApp*. Rutube video hosting, due to its ill-conceived advertising component and low content content, is clearly losing YouTube* in popularity and audience reach, especially abroad. The achievements of the Russian media include a sharp decline in the popularity of the social network Facebook*, the Google search engine* in Russia and the strengthening of the positions of VK, Telegram* and Yandex*.

Table 2. The strategy of noopolitik. Analysis of the effectiveness of information warfare conducted by the parties to the conflict during their conflict period.

Special attention should be paid to the information channels: the Russian Tsargrad and Novorossiya (presented mainly on the platforms Yandex.dzen and Rutube) and the Ukrainian UNIAN* (presented, in addition to the main site, on the YouTube platform*). As the study of statistics obtained with the help of the YandexGPT resource shows, the number of views of the Tsargrad channel on the most popular and internationally important YouTube platform* is much lower than the number of corresponding views of the Ukrainian UNIAN* (389 thousand views against 5 million views).

Additionally, a content analysis of the headlines of the materials of the Novorossiya Internet channel revealed their often provocative and unfavorable nature for the Russian side as a whole. Thus, the materials of Novorossiya are often characterized by provocative names. For example: "The Ukrainian Armed Forces have achieved their main goal near Kursk, the second round is being prepared..." (02/07/25). At the same time, as follows from the article, we are talking about the statement of the military blogger R. Alekhine, who writes that the Armed Forces of Ukraine, despite heavy losses, managed to achieve a slight increase in the buffer zone. However, this opinion not only does not reflect the meaning of the entire article, but also misleads readers. The collage at the beginning of the material depicting the breakthrough of tanks under Ukrainian flags and the inscription in a running line "offensive on Kursk" is also completely inappropriate. According to some headlines, it is impossible to determine which of the parties to the conflict the author of the article was referring to. For example, "After the call to Putin, the whole front began to move. The trains are carrying troops. Northerners: “There will be a new breakthrough. The direction is known."

In total, we analyzed 96 titles of materials. In January 2025, there was almost a balance between negative and positive articles regarding the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. In February 2025, the number of positive attitudes towards the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation increased dramatically and in fact they began to prevail. Nevertheless, almost 2/3 of the headlines continue to be ambiguous, and not in favor of the Russian side.

The analysis of Russia's noopolitical strategy suggests that, significantly inferior to Western media in the ability to influence world public opinion, as well as the opinion of Ukrainians, Russia, to a lesser extent than its opponents, can use the possibilities of manipulating public opinion and creating the right images (practical non–use of the ideological function, weak - creative-integrative). The Russian strategy of noopolitik is still generally defensive and defensive in nature. Broadcasting of "their" content is severely limited not only by the blocking of Russian information resources in the West (RT TV channel), but also by the insufficient development of Russian analogues of some popular Western media resources (reference and educational functionality in need of development). Positive examples are relatively rare, although they are quite effective (for example, the dissemination in the media of the song "Sigma Boy", associated with the "soft" power of Russia).

Thus, noopolitik should be defined as a global information strategy for broadcasting certain ideological, cultural and historical narratives, including through diplomatic art and special media resources.

The analysis of the strategy of noopolitik, in relation to the Russian foreign policy course at the present stage in the context of its implementation, allowed us to identify its following features: 1) the defensive, defensive nature of the information strategy of the Russian media; 2) the insufficient development of Russian analogues of Western media resources.

Analysis of the cryptopolitical strategy. We have already pointed out that the term cryptopolitics, which exists in the literature, needs to be clarified in accordance with the changed agenda. In our opinion, cryptopolitics can be understood not only as a secret sympathy for any political ideologies (communism, Nazism, liberalism, etc.) while externally following the generally accepted attitudes in this society, but also the implicit use of various unofficial or semi-official narratives, including those building political identity. For example, the role of the Soviet legacy remains very significant in the conduct of its activities in Ukraine. The facts of the conditional exploitation of the former ideological resource include, among other things, the use by certain parts of the Russian Armed Forces of the red banner of Victory, an appeal to victory in the Great Patriotic War, to unity and friendship of peoples within the USSR, an indication that "decommunization" in Ukraine actually resulted in a struggle against all Russians, etc.

The cryptopolitical strategy, as applied to SVR, is implemented in Ukraine primarily through adherence to a hidden ideology and the use of secret diplomacy. Adherence to one or another doctrine (communism, nationalism, the ideology of "globalism" and "color revolutions") by each of the parties (Russia, Ukraine, the collective West) is often masked. The most significant and successful event for the Russian side in the framework of secret diplomacy should be recognized as the fact that preliminary negotiations between Russia and the United States were held in Saudi Arabia in 2025 (according to the parties). An example of extremely unsuccessful secret negotiations and diplomatic steps for Ukraine is the negotiations with Russia in 2022 in Istanbul and the "Victory Plan" by V. A. Zelensky. The collective West in this situation discovers a wide range of possibilities, from attempts by individual European countries to build an independent foreign policy, to the beginning of some rapprochement between the positions of Russia and the United States.

In the context of much more severe persecution of dissidents in Ukraine, due to both the greater aggressiveness of nationalist ideology and martial law, the anonymity of netizens is becoming more important. Researchers note that the very specifics of the Internet space are characterized by virality, anonymity and confidentiality ^{[5, p. 167]}. Citizens often have to hide their true political beliefs in order to avoid being subjected to repression.

Attention should also be paid to the relationship between the concepts of noopolitik and cryptopolitik. This link between them is represented by various media, as well as the concept of political identity. According to D. Mathison, advertising media messages and discourses may contain hidden text ^{[14, p. 67]}. Political identity is also not innate, but acquired, built up under external influence. At the same time, it is important that often the technique and form of information delivery is even more important (in terms of the effectiveness of the message) than the narrative itself ^{[14, pp. 93, 131]}.

The effectiveness of media discourse ultimately, according to researchers, depends on the ability to build a story, the presence of a "prehistory" in it, which forms the right mood for the audience and facilitates the assimilation of the final judgment in the form of "scientific truth" ^{[14, p. 126]}. Based on this principle, it should be recognized that Russia has so far managed to build its "prehistory" with much less success than Ukraine. Thus, Ukraine has quite successfully "privatized" the history of Russia, using the ancestral sign of the Rurikovich family (the so-called "trident") as state symbols, and at the same time demonized its opponent Russia as a peripheral civilization affiliated with Kiev. An example of the implementation of a far-reaching cryptohistorical strategy was, for example, the fact that, at the request of the Ukrainian diaspora in France in 1996, the original inscription under the statue of Anna Russian was replaced by "Anne of Kiev, Queen of France" ("Anne de Kiev Reine de France").

Our analysis of the content of Ukrainian textbooks (grades 5 and 7 of the general education school of V. S. Vlasov, as well as V. A. Smoliy and V. S. Stepankov) on the history of Ukraine revealed the facts of manipulation of historical facts. For example, mentioning the achievements of the period of the Ukrainian SSR without any indication that this was done as part of the Soviet Union, the active use of the quasi-historical term "Kievan Rus", the silence about the entire historical periods of cohabitation of Russians and Ukrainians in one state, the construction of never-existing "states" ("Hetmanate"), the rehabilitation of obsolete and the unscientific constructions of M. Hrushevsky , etc . ^{[8, p. 158]}. Unfortunately, in the standard textbook on the history of Russia for 6th grade by T.V. Chernikova, legendary information about the beginning of the history of the Russian state is practically absent, or the legendary story of the vocation of the "Varangian" Rurik with Sineus and Truvor is presented (in contrast to the Ukrainian legendary version of "their" Cue, Cheek and Horiv), which only further stimulates the spread of the "Ukrainian myth" of appropriation and usurpation of the heritage of Ancient Russia ^{[15, pp. 183-185]}. A rather unfortunate figurative component in Russia's cryptopolitical strategy should be recognized as the use of the double-headed golden eagle as a state symbol, which is mainly associated not with the "imperial", but with the pre-Petrine period of Russian history and, thus, legitimizes in the ordinary consciousness the borders of Russia during the time of Vasily III and Ivan the Terrible.

As for the collective West, it still successfully continues to use the myth of "Western civilization" opposing the "hordes of the East." A striking example of the use of this narrative was the designation of Russian soldiers as "orcs", which is a reference to R. Tolkien's epic "The Lord of the Rings" popular among young people and P. Jackson's film trilogy of the same name (2001-2003).

Within the framework of the use of media discourses, it is necessary to single out such a sub-parameter as the use of special political technologies to promote ideological narratives. The above analysis of Russia's noopolitical strategy has shown that it is defensive, responsive, rather than offensive, proactive. In Russia, the development of peculiar technologies to combat various forms of manipulation of society has been developed: the doctrine of "controlled chaos", "color revolutions", "strategies of indirect action", cyberterrorism, etc. ^{[3, pp. 35-82]}. At the same time, there are no analogues of Soviet and modern Western political technologies that make it possible, using primarily creative youth, to bring political regimes pleasing to Russia to power and support them. For example, Russia has not formulated "its own" "conceptual foundations of liberation" like those contained in the work of D. Sharpe. Meanwhile, back in 1993, this brochure was repeatedly published in Ukraine, where long before the events of the "orange coup" it became a real "bible of nonviolent revolution" ^[25]. It is characteristic that the 2005 Russian edition of D. Sharpe's work was published with comments by the right–wing oppositionist E. Limonov and the liberal I. Yashin (recognized as a foreign agent in the Russian Federation). It still has not received any adequate Russian equivalent. Perhaps the reason for this is that the teachings of the Eurasians, the teachings of I. A. Ilyin, national Bolshevism (until the early 2000s), and the concept of "sovereign democracy", which are positioned as new ideologies in Russia, are either archaic, elitist, or, unlike, for example, communism of the Soviet era, they are not used. influence in Western intellectual circles ^{[12, pp. 5-9]}. In general, like the noopolitical strategy, Russia's cryptopolitical strategy continues to be reactive rather than proactive.

In addition to using media discourses with encoded messages, it is necessary to highlight the presence of historically unrealized or potential alternatives within the framework of the cryptopolitical strategy.

In connection with the above, we should recall, for example, such a historical fact as V. V. Putin's proposal to B. Clinton to consider Russia's possible accession to NATO. According to the Russian president, this conversation took place at a meeting between the two presidents back in 2000, that is, at the peak of the warming of relations between the two superpowers. It is believed that this alternative was impossible, since in this case Russia would have acted as a Trojan horse, aiming not to actually join the North Atlantic Alliance, but to sabotage its activities and undermine it from within. In addition, one should take into account the discontent of Eastern Europeans and some former Soviet republics, who still believe that they "deserve" membership in a prestigious military bloc, while Russia, as the successor to the empire that oppressed them, does not.

Nevertheless, it seems doubtful that Russia would be able to undermine the unity of NATO, even by becoming a full member. To do this, she would first have to go through a significant transformation of the armed forces, the economy, and in fact voluntarily give up part of her foreign policy sovereignty. Although, indeed, as K. notes In particular, there is no article according to which a state can be excluded from the North Atlantic Treaty even for violating its rules, it is obvious that such an exception, according to article 8 of the Washington Treaty of 1949, can still take place after appropriate consultations ^[35].

In any case, it is obvious that there is no evidence or evidence that even the hypothetical possibility of Russia joining NATO has ever been considered by anyone as a serious political alternative. The very meaning of the existence of the North Atlantic Treaty was originally to resist the influence of the Soviet Union and then Russia in Europe in the conditions of peace after the defeat of the military-political and ideological machine of Nazism.

It is also worth pointing out the new post-imperialist world order described by I. Wallerstein and S. Amin. It consists in the existence of a center, a semi-periphery and a periphery. Russia, as the most pronounced semi-periphery, is not granted the right to be a member of the privileged club of the "golden billion" countries here, since this contradicts the very logic of the system that ensures a higher standard of living in the states of the capitalist center at the expense of the economic exploitation of the rest of the world. Moreover, it can be assumed that in some form Russia's participation in NATO would indeed have taken place, but it could actually mean falling into a kind of new ghetto ^{[2, p. 85]}. For example, it is known that the Biden administration has identified a range of countries with which the United States can most actively share important technologies (category of countries Vol.1). Not a single Eastern European country, much less any of the former Soviet republics, was included in the "prestigious" category of Volume 1.

A number of public figures, for example, D. L. Bykov (recognized as a foreign agent in the Russian Federation), make statements to the effect that the recent rapprochement between the positions of the United States and Russia is purely situational, accidental, explained by D. Trump's "voluntarism", as well as that there is no unity in society in Russia regarding foreign policy. state policy. D. L. Bykov (recognized as a foreign agent in the Russian Federation) believes that the youth of Russia already thinks differently and does not dream of restoring the "empire". It seems to us that here it is worth talking more about the sense of confusion of the relocants from the fact that the anti-Russian front turned out to be not homogeneous and endless in time, and that the relocants' own plans to return to Russia as moderators, vested with the power to judge Russians who made the "wrong" choice, failed. Thus, according to the Levada Center (recognized as a foreign agent in the Russian Federation), the support of ITS among young people (persons under 24 years of age) in January 2025 amounted to 65%, which cannot be considered a low indicator ^[11].

Table 3. Cryptopolitical strategy. Analysis of the degree of commitment to the principles of cryptopolitics.

Thus, as part of the analysis of Russia's cryptopolitical strategy, we have identified the following structural and functional elements: 1) adherence to a hidden ideology (ideological function); 2) the use of secret diplomacy (mediation function); 3) the use of media discourses with encoded messages (integrative-creative function); 4) the presence of historically unrealized or potential alternatives (futuristic feature). Above, as part of the analysis of Russia's noopolitical strategy, we have already defined ideological, as well as intermediary and integrative-creative functions. In this case, it is necessary to characterize a function that we would define as futuristic. According to the results of a search query using the YandexGPT database, this function stands out only "in the context of futurism as an artistic trend" and is characterized as an activity to bring "a man-made era with a socially active creative personality at the center" (Neuro, 2025). Thus, in political terms, the futuristic function should be considered the ability of policy actors to project their efforts towards the implementation of various alternatives both in the long term and in the near historical perspective.

As the analysis of Russia's cryptopolitical strategy has shown, it is quite successfully implemented in terms of using secret diplomacy tools, but at the same time it is much inferior to the cryptopolitical strategies of its opponents (Ukraine and the collective West) in terms of adherence to secret ideology and the use of media discourses with encoded messages. In other words, the mediation function of Russian foreign policy is fully involved, while the ideological and integrative-creative functions are clearly insufficient. Nevertheless, Russia, unlike Ukraine, has so far managed to project its foreign policy over a more distant period, trying to implement a variety of historical alternatives and, thus, effectively implement futuristic functionality.

Based on the above, we formulate the definition of cryptopolitika. The strategy of crypto politics in the current conditions of Russia's confrontation with the collective West is a strategy that is expressed not only in secret adherence to a particular political ideology, but also in various media discourses, a special case of which are, for example, secret coded messages hidden from the general public, negotiations (secret diplomacy), as well as various political alternatives. including those that have not been implemented, but can still be implemented if certain conditions are met.

This makes it possible to highlight the following features of the Russian cryptopolitical strategy at the present stage in the context of ITS implementation: 1) the not always effective use of hidden ideology, as well as media discourses with encoded messages; 2) the successful use of secret diplomacy and the ability to project its foreign policy for a more distant period.

Conclusion.

A comprehensive analysis of the strategies of realpolitik, noopolitik and cryptopolitik allowed us to identify their structural and functional elements, to clarify the definitions of these definitions available in the literature.

Realpolitik (realistic politics) in modern Russian foreign policy is a strategy for achieving political (including geopolitical) goals based on the state's real economic and military-diplomatic capabilities in a given historical period, rather than recognizing the exclusivity of its national interests, which may be more long-term.

Noopolitik should be defined as a global information strategy for broadcasting certain ideological, cultural and historical narratives, including through diplomatic art and special media resources.

The strategy of crypto politics in the current conditions of Russia's confrontation with the collective West can be expressed not only in secret adherence to a particular political ideology, but also in various media discourses, a special case of which are, for example, secret coded messages hidden from the general public, negotiations (secret diplomacy), as well as various political alternatives, including There are also those that have not been implemented, but can still be implemented if certain conditions are met.

Based on the clarified concepts of realpolitik, noopolitik and a qualitatively new definition of cryptopolitics formulated for the first time in science, we have identified the following features of Russian foreign policy in the context of its 1) the desire to pursue a flexible foreign policy based on the real military and economic capabilities of the country; 2) the departure from the mobilization model of solving geopolitical problems and the desire to preserve and further improve the level of socio-economic development of Russia; 3) the defensive, defensive nature of the information strategy of the Russian media; 4) the insufficient development of Russian analogues of Western media resources; 5) not always effective use of hidden ideology, as well as media discourses with coded messages; 6) successful use of secret diplomacy and the ability to project their foreign policy for a more distant period.