Library
|
Your profile |
Law and Politics
Reference:
Bagandova, L.Z. (2025). The development of the prohibition of warfare in the religious movements of the Middle Ages. Law and Politics, 3, 112–125. . https://doi.org/10.7256/2454-0706.2025.3.72577
The development of the prohibition of warfare in the religious movements of the Middle Ages
DOI: 10.7256/2454-0706.2025.3.72577EDN: YHTNMBReceived: 04-12-2024Published: 03-04-2025Abstract: The subject of this study is the consideration of the prohibition of warfare in various religious movements during the Middle Ages. The author has chosen such confessional movements as Christianity and Islam for analysis. Special attention is devoted to the study of theological literature to substantiate the position on the differences between war and aggression. Thus, the author notes that at all stages of historical development, people sought to limit violence, including such a legalized form of it as war, because violence contradicts the nature of human civilization. At the same time, the religious movements under consideration have always had features that characterize the war as justified and just. The novelty of this study lies in the fact that for the correct interpretation of the term "war" and "aggression" at the present time, as well as determining the evolution of the prohibition of warfare, a comprehensive review of the formation of the institution of war in religious movements of the Middle Ages is conducted by the author using such methods as historical, formal dogmatic, comparative, as well as methods of analysis and induction. The main conclusions of this study are that just war and aggressive war are two opposite concepts that represent an important aspect of international relations and the rule of law. Within the framework of the moral foundations and principles of a just war, there is a certain system for assessing the legality and moral permissibility of military action. An important aspect here is the compliance of the war with certain criteria, such as necessity, proportionality, inadmissibility of violations of human rights and the principles of humanity. All denominations opposed aggressive wars, and paid special attention to the classifications of the causes of wars in order to establish their justice. The author's special contribution to this study is to turn to foreign theological sources, as well as to the philosophy of canon law for a more detailed consideration of the relevant topic. Keywords: aggressive war, history of law, theory of law, war, prohibition of war, waging war, Canon law, philosophy of law, theology, crimeThis article is automatically translated.
At all stages of historical development, people have sought to limit violence, including its institutionalized form, such as war, because violence contradicts the nature of human civilization. For a long time, these were the norms of customary law, which were based on religious postulates: peoples belonging to the same cultural environment and worshipping the same gods observed these rules, but they were quickly forgotten when it was necessary to fight enemies who spoke a different language and worshipped other gods. The novelty of this study lies in the fact that for the correct interpretation of the term "war" and "aggression" at the present time, as well as determining the evolution of the prohibition of warfare, a comprehensive review of the formation of the institution of war in religious movements of the Middle Ages is conducted, and through the use of formal legal, historical methods, as well as methods of analysis and induction, it is proved It is shown that the differentiation of the two above-mentioned concepts was carried out even before the period of Hugo Grotius and his work On the Law of War and Peace. This topic has been the subject of scientific research by a number of authors (A. Kumankov, G. Kyung [1], I.P. Dobaev, S.V. Reznik). The analysis of the essence, contradictions and tendencies of the doctrine of war and peace was an integral part of religious beliefs in the Middle Ages. Wars were viewed in their own way by various confessional movements, while religious postulates can be called flexible in many ways, since attitudes towards war changed at different stages of the formation of society and canon law in general. A distinctive feature of this period is that proponents of certain positions resorted to two–pronged argumentation - legal and theological. The attitude of early Christians towards war can be divided into two assessment periods: the first is the negative attitude of the early Church towards the conduct of military conflicts; the second is a more flexible position towards war. We will try to give a brief overview of these two periods, trying to determine the place of aggression in each time interval. In the initial period, the church rejected the idea of war in general, and according to the new religion, war was considered a sinful procedure. Thus, Christians were not allowed to participate in any kind of war. They were even forbidden to enlist as soldiers. The writings of church leaders promote nonviolence, which is characteristic of the Gospel. In his treatise On Idolatry, Tertullian emphasizes the prohibition of participation in war as an impermissible act for Christians: "... although soldiers came to John, and they adopted some form of piety, and the centurion even believed, the Lord abolished all subsequent military service by disarming Peter" [2]. After Christianity became the state religion of the Roman Empire in the fourth century, the Church's positions on pacifism and nonviolence were revised. Ambrose of Milan and Aurelius Augustine created the Christian doctrine of just war (bellum justum), which explained when and for what reasons Christians can turn to military force and how it should be used. The Bishop of Milan introduces the idea of a God-sanctioned war. An example for him is King David, who "did not start a war except by asking advice from the Lord." It is precisely this kind of war, waged with God's blessing and literally led by him, that is acceptable to Christians. Violence is not condemned when it becomes a means of serving others, a way of ensuring the life of the political community to which Christians belong. In war, however, not everything is allowed: the "athlete of Christ" receives a crown "only if he fights lawfully." Military pragmatics must be consistent with Christian morality. Mercy, meekness, and moderation are no less important than bravery [1]. The categorical attitude of the church towards war, which persisted for three centuries after the Birth of Christ, gradually changed, and under the influence of Christian philosophy, a theory of justification for war appeared and developed. According to this theory, war was recognized as necessary under certain conditions. The concept of fair warfare was put forward and developed at this stage of history either by theologians and canonists, or by scholastics. In a sense, by limiting the state's ability to resort to war, the Church expressed the opinion that "a war involving the use of weapons and the sacrifice of countless lives can only be justified if its purpose is just"[3]. Therefore, according to the Christian worldview, no war will be just and lawful (bellum justum) unless it has a compelling reason (usta causa). Based on this summary of the Church's attitude to war in the early stages, the following questions should be asked: 1. What is a just cause in the understanding of Christian doctrine? and by what criterion can one determine whether a war is just? 2. Who should decide whether there is a just reason to wage or start a war? Who has the authority to do this? St. Augustine, one of the founders of the ideas of just war, gives an answer to the first question, saying that: "A just war is usually described as a war of retribution for wrong done, when a nation or state must be punished for refusing to repair damage caused to their subjects or return what they have unjustly seized." Therefore, in order for a war to be fought on a fair basis, it is necessary that someone be defeated. Regarding the second question, Augustine says: "The natural order, which is best suited to ensure the peace of mankind, requires that the authority to wage war and its expediency be in the hands of a sovereign prince." Since nations did not have an international court that could determine the justice of a case, each state had to make a decision from within; that is, the prince had to make a decision after consulting with his advisers." Thomas Aquinas continued to transmit the Teachings of St. Augustine on just war. He argues that in order for the war to be just, the following conditions are necessary:: First, the authority of the sovereign, on whose orders the war is being waged. After all, declaring war is not the business of a private individual... Secondly, a just reason is required, namely that those who are being attacked are attacked because they deserve it because of some kind of guilt. Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents have legitimate intentions, so that they strive to promote good or prevent evil. is The views expressed by Thomas Aquinas on peace and war were very similar to those of Augustine. From the above, we can conclude that during the period under review, a boundary was drawn between defensive and deterrent wars. The first was considered justified only for the compensation of the harm caused, and its goal should be to establish peace, while the second, which is aggressive in nature, conducted for the sake of personal glory, political interests or territorial expansion, is a "great latrosynium" and cannot be justified [3]. The theological study of just wars continued in the 14th century. In the XV and XVI centuries. The active development of the philosophical science of just war was caused by the processes of the Spanish occupation of Indian territories. Francis de Vitoria dealt with the problems of substantiating the legality of such a process. He developed a list of legitimate and illegitimate titles by which the barbarians of the new set could come to power over the Spaniards. He attributed to illegal titles: the universal rule of the emperor, the universal temporary power of the Roman pontiff, the refusal of Indians to change the Christian faith, the sins of Indians professing Christianity, the alienation of sovereignty, divine predestination. To the legitimate grounds of F. Vitoria identified the right to a natural society, the preaching of the gospel, the protection of converts to the Christian faith, human sacrifice and anthropophagy, true and voluntary choice, and the failures of the alliance. Vitoria argued that free mission and free trade are the legal foundations of a just war, and therefore the right to occupy to oppress the Indians. At the same time, Vitoria does not limit the definition of a just war solely to religious reasons: the fact that the Indians do not profess Christianity does not give the Spaniards the indisputable right to seize the lands of non-Christian sovereign peoples. The right to seize land arises only indirectly through the argumentation of a just war. The latter would take place in the context of the opposition of the Gentiles to preaching and free trade, since the above was equated to an insult, and the insult justified the outbreak of war. Exploring the justice of war, he was of the opinion that every state has the right to declare war. In this respect, the prince has the same power as the state, and where there are already legitimate princes in the state, all power is in their hands. Other minor rulers and princes who are not at the head of a perfect state, but are parts of another state, cannot wage war. There is only one good reason to start a war, and that is the damage done. Another important feature of Vitoria's work on war was the distinction between offensive and defensive wars: "it is not just the actions of the enemy aimed at harming us that should be prevented-or, if the enemy has already succeeded in committing them, then they should be repaid by inflicting equal damage on him and forcing him to compensate from his own resources for what he has done." He deprived us first. This is not enough, because the goal of war - peace and security - is not achieved in this way. It is achieved only when the enemy is not only deprived of the opportunity to commit his plans against us, but is also intimidated by our actions: in this case, fear will keep him from committing outrages in the future" [4]. Vitoria, along with other theologians, developed the theory that war in some cases can be fair on both sides. According to this theory, the so-called probabilistic approach, a distinction is made between true or objective justice and subjective innocence. In this regard, Vittoria explained that "perhaps, on the side where true justice reigns, war is just in itself, while on the other hand, war is just in the sense that it is justified by good faith, because insurmountable ignorance is a complete justification" [5]. The religious and legal doctrine of Islam also developed the doctrine of permissible and unacceptable wars - the "Islamic concept of Jihad." When interpreted literally, the term "jihad" means "effort, striving for a goal" or "trying to make an effort" [6]. According to Sharia, such efforts are made only in the name of God. Thus, the true purpose of jihad is to use one's power in the name of God to spread faith in him and to make the word of God supreme in the world. Usually, the term "jihad" is used to refer to a holy or religious war, however, this interpretation is not true. It is a struggle with property, life, language and other things in the name of God. A believer can fulfill his duties in the process of jihad with his hands, his heart, his sword and his tongue [7]. Therefore, from a legal and technical point of view, the concept of "jihad" is broader than war. War is one of the ways to spread Islam and, consequently, jihad. The study of the evolution of Islam as a religion shows that at the time of the Revelation, Muslims had no territorial claims outside the Arabian Peninsula. Their primary goal was to eradicate polytheism and establish Islam on the peninsula. After monotheism was established, the doctrine of jihad, which was limited to the struggle between Muslims and infidels, underwent changes. Since then, the concept of "jihad" has come to mean a just war in the same sense as the bellum justum doctrine was perceived in European law. Legal theologians have divided the world into two parts: the first, Dar al-Islam ("the world of Islam") It belonged to territories where the population professed Islam and where Sharia norms applied. The second part is Dar al–Harb ("the world of war") – enemy territories or territories outside the world of Islam. Theoretically, the first part should have been in a state of permanent war with the second part until the second part also turned into the "world of Islam". Thus, the Muslim theory is based on the fact that Islam and polytheism cannot exist together, therefore, adherents of polytheism must convert to Islam either peacefully, through persuasion, or through jihad. However, religion forbids all secular wars. War for the sake of self-aggrandizement at the expense of others, even non-believers, is prohibited, as these wars are unfair and prohibited by Muslim law. A war waged to repel an enemy attack, on the contrary, is just and permissible. Due to the relevant interpretations, questions remain unresolved about which reasons for jihad are just, and who is responsible for jihad and has the necessary authority to declare it. M. Hamidullah classified the causes as follows: 1) Continuation of the existing war, that is, jihad, which was suspended for one reason or another earlier; 2) Defensive, by repelling enemy attacks; 3) A sympathizer, by providing assistance to Muslims of another nationality in matters of religion, if they turn to the Muslim state for it.; 4) Punitive, directed against hypocrisy, apostasy, rebellion, violation by one party of an agreement, serious disagreements with the current government and insistence on the optional nature of an additional property tax or any other debt of a religious nature; 5) Ideological, aimed at spreading religion [8]. Buddhism is categorically opposed to war. The Dhammapada stipulates that hatred does not stop with hatred: "For never in this world does hatred stop with hatred, but with the absence of hatred it stops. This is the eternal dhamma"; "Victory breeds hatred; the defeated lives in sorrow. A calm person lives in happiness, refusing victory and defeat." At the same time, another document states that the ruler of a state must have an army that provides protection and security for the people of the country from internal and external threats. The King must ensure the protection, security and safety of his possessions: "Arrange for yourself according to the dharma protection, protection and defense of your people, military forces, kshatriyas, princes, brahmins and householders, townspeople and villagers, sramans and brahmins, animals and birds" (Chakkavatti Sihanada sutta Lion's Roar of the Ruler of the World [Electronic resource] // URL: https://www.dhamma.ru/canon/dn/dn26.htm (date of request - 12/12/2024)). Thus, it seems appropriate to agree with M.S. Ulanov's point of view that "The Buddha did not deny or prohibit military service as a profession or occupation, including the right of a ruler or government to maintain an army to protect the state and its citizens. On the contrary, the Buddha recognized the need for an army, and the protection of the state and its subjects was considered by the Buddha to be the priority task of the ruler of the state."[9] Buddhism as a religion emerged in response to the violence that existed in the regions of East Asia at that time. Buddhism originated in the context of armed conflicts on the subcontinent, and early Buddhist writings contain detailed descriptions of wars and their consequences [10]. The century before the birth of the Buddha, traditionally considered 563 BC or 480 BC, seems to have been particularly turbulent: tribal states gradually gave way to rival monarchies, and the military organization became more and more systematic [11]. Shakya, the republic to which the Buddha is believed to have belonged, had to go through a war during his lifetime, and became a vassal of Kosala [12]. According to legend, when the Buddha was old, King Vidudhabha of Kosala massacred the shakyas, "starting with the babies at the mother's breast." This act of genocide is reminiscent of recent war crimes. It was in response to the escalation of wars and violence, as well as the Brahminical animal sacrifices, that the Buddha and his contemporary Mahavira, the founder of Jainism, developed their nonviolent ethics of renunciation and self-control. Since both of them belonged to the Kshatriya caste, they expressed these ideas in the language of the martial spirit in which they were raised./ The war was more than just a metaphor for both men, who in a sense never stopped being warriors, redirecting their energy from external battles to the development of their inner world [13]. The Buddha rejected dharma yuddha and the traditional military idea that war is righteous or beneficial. Thus, Buddhism criticized the Brahmin or Hindu rules of warfare, softening and adapting their provisions to prevent war or further limit its brutality. The text links indicate that this had a significant, albeit episodic, humanizing effect. It is important to note that the Buddha also rejected the Brahmin caste system as an indicator of spiritual purity. His transformation of Dharma into a universal law or truth that applies equally to all living beings and regulates the natural and moral order in the cosmos was a historic humanitarian breakthrough, most vividly manifested in his formulation of the golden rule.: "All creatures tremble before the scourge; all fear death." Seeing their likeness to yourself, you should neither kill nor force them to kill. Thus, the Buddhist dharma is also the equivalent of natural law, which is so important for the development of international law in the West. The recognition of our common humanity and human dignity is fundamental to both Buddhism and international humanitarian law, and underscores the duty of the warring parties to respect each other and care for the victims of war impartially. Buddhism's radical empathy towards all living beings still seems fundamental, and the recognition of a "common mind" beyond our species exposes the chauvinism of humanism. Although Buddhism gives preference to humanity, since rebirth in a human body provides a rare opportunity for spiritual development, it nevertheless emphasizes the interconnectedness of all beings who are constantly reborn in new forms. This is supported by Buddhist doctrines such as the absence of a permanent self (Pali anatta, Sanskrit anatman), according to which beings have no permanent identity, impermanence (Pali anicca, Sanskrit anitya) and equality (samat). In contrast, the provisions of international humanitarian law aimed at protecting the environment appeared only recently, after the United States widely used herbicides during the Vietnam War. An analysis of the religious postulates of the world's confessional movements, widespread in the world in antiquity and the Middle Ages, showed that a just war and an aggressive war were two opposing concepts, representing an important aspect of international relations and the rule of law. This study has shown that people drew a distinction between wars and reflected this in their legislation and general principles of public life long before the development of international law and the appearance of the works of Hugo Grotius. Within the framework of the moral foundations and principles of a just war, there is a certain system for assessing the legality and moral permissibility of military action. An important aspect here is the conformity of war with certain criteria, such as necessity, proportionality, and the inadmissibility of violations of human rights and the principles of humanity [14]. References
1. Kyung, G. (2005). Religion, violence and "holy wars". International Journal of the Red Cross, 858, 27-46.
2. Tertullian. (1994). About idolatry. Translated from Latin by I. Makhankova. Selected Op. Moscow: Progress. 3. Scott, J.B. (1934). The Spanish Origin of International Law. Part 1. London. Pp. 181-182. 4. Franciscus de Victoria. (1917). On the Law of War. The Classics of International Law. Washington. 5. Ivanova, Yu.V. (2014). Ad Marginem socialitatis: the logic of war by Francisco de Vitoria. Articult, 1(13), 10-25. 6. Nawaz, M.K. (1959). The Doctrine of “Jihad” in Islamic Legal Theory and Practice. 8 Indian Tribe. of Int. Affairs, Madras. 7. Khadduri, M. (1955). War and Peace in the Law of Islam. Baltimore. 8. Hamidullah, M. (1945). Muslim Conduct of State. 9. Ulanov, M.S. (2015). The religious and philosophicalview of Buddhismon the problem of warandpeace. Bulletin of the Kalmyk University, 4(28), 53-58. 10. Harris, E.J. (2021). BuddhistempiricalRealismand the conduct of armedconflict. Modern Buddhism. 11. Singh, U. (2017). Political Violence in Ancient India. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 12. Bodhi, B. (2014). War and Peace: A Buddhist Perspective. Inquiring Mind, Spring 30, 2. 13. Jenkins, S. (2017). Once the Buddha Was a Warrior: Buddhist Pragmatism in the Ethics of Peace and Armed Conflict. In The Nature of Peace and the Morality of Armed Conflict, edited by F. Demont-Biaggi, 159-178. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 14. Bunyon, F. (2002). Just war, aggressive war andi nternational humanitarian law. International Journal of the Red Cross, 845-847, 205-233.
First Peer Review
Peer reviewers' evaluations remain confidential and are not disclosed to the public. Only external reviews, authorized for publication by the article's author(s), are made public. Typically, these final reviews are conducted after the manuscript's revision. Adhering to our double-blind review policy, the reviewer's identity is kept confidential.
Second Peer Review
Peer reviewers' evaluations remain confidential and are not disclosed to the public. Only external reviews, authorized for publication by the article's author(s), are made public. Typically, these final reviews are conducted after the manuscript's revision. Adhering to our double-blind review policy, the reviewer's identity is kept confidential.
Third Peer Review
Peer reviewers' evaluations remain confidential and are not disclosed to the public. Only external reviews, authorized for publication by the article's author(s), are made public. Typically, these final reviews are conducted after the manuscript's revision. Adhering to our double-blind review policy, the reviewer's identity is kept confidential.
|