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Law and Politics
Reference:

How to control an official? Personnel supervision in China (political aspect)

Lu Syao

Postgraduate student; Department of Political Science, Sociology and International Processes; Derzhavin Tambov State University

392000, Russia, Tambov region, Tambov, Internatsionalnaya str., 33, office 324

0011vita@mail.ru
Seltser Dmitrii Grigorievich

ORCID: 0000-0002-6187-2748

Doctor of Politics

Professor; Department of Political Science, Sociology and International Processes; Derzhavin Tambov State University

392000, Russia, Tambov region, Tambov, Internatsionalnaya str., 33, office 337

seltser@yandex.ru

DOI:

10.7256/2454-0706.2024.7.71364

EDN:

NSLSWI

Received:

24-07-2024


Published:

31-07-2024


Abstract: The purpose of the article is to determine the place of party supervision in the general course of political control of managerial personnel in the People's Republic of China. In the system of political control of personnel (selection, recruiting, upbringing, education, training, retraining, encouragement, punishment), supervision is the main political function of ensuring the quality and loyalty of a party and state official. The study is based on a wide range of documents of the CPC Central Committee and its supervisory bodies. As a result of the analysis, the authors find the origins of the Chinese surveillance scheme in the control systems “from above” (Yu Shi) and “from below” (Denwengu), but tend to talk about them more as archetypes, philosophy and political tasks of the top management class of the PRC. The authors see the substantial basis of supervision in a set of utilitarian forms of strategic and everyday attention to the work ethic, moral character and political dedication of an official. The authors' conclusions can be expressed as follows: party supervision is above the law; internal party control extends to all spheres of the life of the state and society; the “self-revolution of the party” presupposes its consistent significant improvement. Under Xi Jinping, there have been three major changes in China's surveillance system. Firstly, they are standardized: a) public discourse with the formation of an atmosphere of absolute intolerance to violations in society; b) internal documents of the CPC, extremely harsh against officials; c) legislation that prevents corruption. Secondly, the lifelong responsibility of an official for violations and crimes committed in the course of public service has been introduced (the statute of limitations has been abolished). Thirdly, the policy on corruption has been clarified – an extensive and multi-stage early warning system has been created.


Keywords:

supervision, control, personnel processes, personnel policy, China, the Communist Party of China, Xi Jinping, fight against corruption, responsibility, democracy

This article is automatically translated.

Introduction

How to control an official? The established path in many countries is through elected democracy. Its advantage is that elections provide a mechanism for the departure (turnover) of officials. However, such a scenario has drawbacks: if a politician's inability to govern leads to stagnation, he cannot be removed immediately. How to reduce the "cost of trial and error" is the question facing every large country where the cost of error is especially high. China is a big country. What is the path of personnel replacement chosen there? How does the state control its own official? How does it "insure" him from rebirth – moral and political? How does HR supervision work? These and other questions are answered by the authors of the article.

Review of scientific literature

The proposed article provides a brief overview of the Chinese segment of historiography. People inside the system write about supervision, which is why they know all the control meanings and procedures in detail. Reflections from the outside are more journalistic and largely superficial in nature.

Supervision in literature and political practice refers to "supervision of CPC members" – not legislative supervision, but internal party supervision. The standards of legislative oversight, including in criminal law, are noticeably lower than party standards. For example, the law does not prohibit civil servants from having mistresses, but for an employee of the state apparatus – a member of the CPC – this is unacceptable, because he is subject to party discipline, which implies strict party supervision.

Due to its special – fundamental – importance for the country's political system, supervision has traditionally been discussed primarily by the leaders (top officials) and collective bodies of the CPC. The first persons, in fact, are also the main historiographers of the phenomenon. In the world scientific tradition, it is necessary to refer the statements of state leaders to sources. This is not the case in China: the country's leaders are the first historiographers of party procedures.

The statements of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin on supervision are collected in one book [9]. The normative position on supervision is Xi Jinping's book "Excerpts from speeches on the observance and improvement of the system of party and state supervision" [5]. In fact, this is an anthology of President Xi's position on oversight. The book consists of more than 130 documents, including his reports, speeches, instructions and directives from November 15, 2012 to November 11, 2021. (10 topics, 371 paragraphs).

Articles by China's leading experts on personnel supervision Zhang Lin [11], Liu Shu [8], Cai Yuqing [10], Wang Duanzi [1], Gong Chunxia and Zeng Xiang [3], Ding Yun and Ren Guizhen [4] have been published in top journals and contain the full range of expert assessments of the system control. What questions do the authors raise?

Is supervision effective and what can contribute to its effectiveness? The authors agree that efficiency is a conditional concept. It depends on the degree of perfection of the supervision system, accuracy, legality, institutionalization and regularity, as well as on the effects of its integration with technology. At the same time, the internal nature of supervision emanating from the party itself is an important factor in its effectiveness.

Does oversight fight corruption? It certainly plays an important role, but for more effective suppression of corruption, it requires improvement of the mechanism, innovation of its means and the joint participation of all sectors of society.

In which direction should supervision be improved? In the direction of clarifying its criteria, increasing the efficiency of political supervision, the accuracy of analysis, improving standards, clarifying the subject of responsibility.

Scientists are now talking about strengthening internal party supervision. On May 5, 2015, Secretary General Xi Jinping made an important speech at the 12th meeting of the Central Steering Group for Comprehensive Deepening of Reforms, where he proposed the concept of self-revolution: "How to break out of the historical cyclical rule and chaos, the CPC has always thought and researched this. After a hundred years of struggle ...our party gave the answer, which is the constant promotion of samoregulacji party" (关于党的自我革命的重要思想,阐明了三个重大问题 // 共产党员网 [An important thought about the self-revolution of the party clarifies three main issues // The network of the Communist Party. URL:https://www.12371.cn/2024/01/13/ARTI1705122295118918.html]). He introduced the concept of "self-revolution in a new era". Self–revolution is the internal attitude and actions of the party in the fight against formalism, bureaucracy, and corruption in its ranks. The concept considers internal party supervision differently, emphasizing its importance for the purification of the party.

Sources

The sources of the article were collections of documents of the Central Committee of the CPC (. 中共中央文件选集(第1册). 北京: 人民出版社, 2013: 676 [Central archives, Office of document of the Communist party of China. Selected documents of the Central Committee of the Communist party of China vol. 1. Beijing: People, 2013. 676 S.]), the reports of the secretaries of the Central Committee (Jiang Zemin (江泽民在中国共产党第十五次全国代表大会上的报告 // 共产党员网 [Jiang Zemin's report at the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China // The network of the Communist Party. URL:https://fuwu.12371.cn/2012/09/27/ARTI1348726215537612.html]) and XI Jinping (习近平:决胜全面建成小康社会 夺取新时代中国特色社会主义伟大胜利–在中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会上的报告 // 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网站 [XI Jinping: the conquest of the great victory of socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era by building of the welfare state – a report to the 19th Congress of the CPC // Website of the Central people's Government of people's Republic of China. URL:http://www.gov.cn/zhuanti/2017-10/27/content_5234876.html])), resolution (中共中央关于党的百年奋斗重大成就和历史经验的决议 // 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网站 [Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on the main achievements and historical experience of the centennial struggle of the party // Website of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. URL:https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2021-11/16/content_5651269.html]), solutions (关于加强党的监察机关的决定 // 中国共产党新闻资料库 [The decision to strengthen the party supervision bodies // The news database of the Communist Party of China. URL:http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0904/c75234-22804679.html]), communiqué (中国共产党第十九届中央委员会第四次全体会议公报 // 共产党员网 [Communique of the Fourth Plenum of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China // The network of the Communist Party. URL:https://www.12371.cn/2019/10/31/ARTI1572515554956816.shtml ], "The Charter of the Communist Party of China (中国程程))" (中国程程程 // 中国新新新库库库 [The Charter of the Communist Party of China // The news database of the Communist Party of China. URL:http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0904/c75234-22804679.html]), "Rule of the Communist party of China on inspection work (中国共产党巡视工作条例)" (中国共产党巡视工作条例 // 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网站 [Rules of the Communist Party of China on inspection work // Website of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. URL:https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/202402/content_6932866.html ], legislative acts ("The Constitution of the People's Republic of China" // The Constitution of the People's Republic of China [Constitution of the People's Republic of China // Website of the National People's Congress. URL:http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/npc/zt/qt/gjxfz/2014-12/03/content_1888093.html]), "law on the supervision of the people's Republic of China (中华人民共和国监察法)" (中华人民共和国监察法 // 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网站 [the law on the supervision of the people's Republic of China // the Website of the Central people's government of people's Republic of China. URL:https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018-03/26/content_5277463.html])), essays summarizing Supervisory practices (全面推进依法行政实施纲要 // 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网站 [An essay on the implementation of administration in accordance with the law // Website of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. URL:https://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2004/content_70309.html]), (建立健全教育、制度、监督并重的惩治和预防腐败体系实施纲要 // 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网站 [An essay on the implementation of the system of punishment and prevention of corruption // Website of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. URL:https://www.gov.cn/zwhd/2006-02/06/content_179119.html])), statistical reports about punishment (新华社十八届中央纪律检查委员会向中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会的工作报告 // 中华人民共和国中央政府网站 [Xinhua News Agency. Report on the work of the 18th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection for the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China // Website of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. URL:https://www.gov.cn/zhuanti/2017-10/29/content_5235228.html]).

The origins of control:

supervision "from above" (Yu Shi) vs supervision "from below" (Denwengu)

The modern Chinese surveillance system has its roots in the ancient Chinese system. In the pre-Qin period, the emperor, vassals, Dafu and county magistrates had secretaries "Yu Shi (head of the censor)". During the Qin Dynasty, China created a centralized state and established "Jian Jun Yu Shi (监郡御史)" in 36 counties across the country, creating a system of supervision from the center to the local level. Thus, Yu Shi became an official position of a supervisory nature, responsible for overseeing the officials of the court. The Han Dynasty inherited the system of supervision from the Qin Dynasty, and Emperor Hui issued the "Nine Articles on Yu Shi (监御史九条)", which became the first supervisory law in Chinese history. During this period, Yu Shi's powers were expanded, and in addition to overseeing officials, they were responsible for their certification and local court proceedings. The Tang Dynasty expanded the powers of the supervisory authority and Yu Shi, while the central link of the supervisory authority, Yu Shi Tai (御史台), was given the right to oversee trials throughout the country. The Tang Dynasty established a system of advisers (谏官) to oversee the emperor's actions and government policy. During the Song Dynasty, due to Yu Shi's greater power and in order for them to have more experience in politics, it was established that Yu Shi could not be persons who had not served two terms as county magistrates.

To gather public opinion, the Song Dynasty simultaneously created the Deng Wen Gu Institute, which was responsible for receiving appeals, complaints, petitions and proposals on public policy from the people, allowing them to bypass officials at all levels and contact the central government directly. During the Ming Dynasty, the supervision system was gradually improved, and during this period, the Yu Shi were appointed directly by the emperor, were distinguished by low rank, but great power, and in addition to exercising supervisory powers, they also had the right to judge major cases. As a result, the Ming Dynasty was very strict about the selection of Yu Shi, and when they committed crimes, they were punished more severely than ordinary officials. During the Qing Dynasty, China's industry and trade flourished, so Yu Shi was established in some important industries, for example, Xun Yan Yu Shi (巡盐御史), whose duties included collecting taxes on salt and overseeing salt merchants.

Thus, Yu Shi "from above" and Deng Wengu "from below" formed the control system of ancient China, actively involved in the supervision and deterrence of officials, and had a profound impact on the entire Chinese surveillance system.

Supervision in 1949-2012:

movement towards a unified system of party-state supervision

Since 1949, the surveillance system in China has been created in the model of "internal party supervision". After the formation of new China, the CPC Central Committee adopted a "Decision to establish disciplinary inspection committees of the Central Committee and all levels." It was formed Zhu De and was responsible for "...the test of disciplinary violations, acceptance, consideration and decision or cancellation of penalties and strengthening the disciplinary education, and implementation of party-political judgments and orders" (中央档案馆,中共中央文献研究室.中共中央文件选集(第1册).2013: 72 [Central Archive, Document Management Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Selected documents of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Vol. 1. Beijing: The People, 2013. p. 72].

In 1950 The Politburo of the Central Committee approved the "Rules of Procedure of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection", which established the composition of the commission, the procedure for reviewing cases, the system of meetings, reports and workshops. Disciplinary inspection committees were set up at the central level for the party, government, military bodies and organizations (the Committee for Editing Documents of the CPC Central Committee. Selected works of Zhu De. Beijing: Narod, 1983. p. 279]). By February 1952 nationwide committees were formed by the disciplinary inspection military and local party committees at all levels above the County regiment (中央档案馆,中共中央文献研究室.中共中央文件选集(第8册).2013: 54 [Central Archive, Document Management Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Selected documents of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Vol. 8. Beijing: The People, 2013. p. 54]). This marked the establishment of a surveillance system within the ruling CPC.

In March 1955 The Central Committee decided to create a "Supervision Committee" instead of the former "Discipline Inspection Committee", expanding its supervisory powers to include not only investigation and consideration of cases, but also supervision of compliance with the law by party organizations, members and cadres of the party. In September 1962, at the tenth plenum of the Central Committee of the Party of the eighth convocation, a "Decision was made to strengthen the organs of party supervision." After the beginning of the "cultural revolution", in April 1969, the Ninth Party Congress adopted amendments to the Party Charter, which abolished many provisions of the original charter concerning party discipline and abolished the Control Committee. The system of internal party supervision was completely abolished.

In December 1978, the 3rd Plenum of the CPC Central Committee of the eleventh convocation re-established the party's Disciplinary Inspection Commission and disciplinary inspection bodies in the Central Government and ministries, commissions and bureaus of the State Council. In September 1982, 90% of the party committees at the county level and above established disciplinary inspection bodies. In September 1983, in accordance with Article 91 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, the Audit Office of the People's Republic of China was established to audit and control the financial income and expenses of all departments of the State Council, local people's governments and their departments. In 1987, at the suggestion of the State Council and on the recommendation of the National People's Congress, the Ministry of Supervision of the People's Republic of China was recreated, which resumed administrative supervision. The control model has changed from "intraparty supervision" to "intraparty supervision + administrative supervision".

In 1992, due to the duplication of supervisory functions, the party disciplinary bodies and the bodies of state administrative supervision were merged. In December 1997 the report of the 15th Congress of the party was made basic statement on the management system and the mechanism of the anti-corruption: "the Committee of the party will implement a unified leadership, the party and government will work together, the Commission for discipline inspection will organize and coordinate departments to perform their duties, and we rely on the support and participation of the masses in strong suppression of corruption" (江泽民在中国共产党第十五次全国代表大会上的报告 // 共产党员网 [Jiang Zemin's report at the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China // The network of the Communist Party. URL:https://fuwu.12371.cn/2012/09/27/ARTI1348726215537612.html (date of access: 09/25/2022)]). In March 2004 The State Council issued the "Basic Provisions for the implementation of Comprehensive Assistance to Governance in accordance with the Law", stressing that great importance should be attached to the supervision of the press and public opinion, and that issues reflected in the media should be thoroughly investigated, verified and resolved in a timely manner ([An essay on the implementation of administration in accordance with the law // Website of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. URL:https://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2004/content_70309.html]). In January 2005 The CPC Central Committee issued the "Basic provisions for the implementation of the system of punishment and prevention of corruption with equal emphasis on education, system and supervision", which calls for the creation of reliable working mechanism of receiving communications from the public about violations of discipline and law, as well as for timely resolution of problems (建立健全教育、制度、监督并重的惩治和预防腐败体系实施纲要 // 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网站 [An outline of the implementation of the system of punishment and prevention of corruption, in which equal attention is paid to education, institutions and supervision // Website of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. URL:https://www.gov.cn/zwhd/2006-02/06/content_179119.html]).

So, a unified system of party-state supervision was formed in China.

Supervision since 2013:

From "beating tigers and flies" to "cumulative surveillance power"

In January 2013, held its second plenary session of the 18th Central Commission for discipline inspection, where XI uttered the famous slogan of the anti-corruption campaign "Beat and tigers and flies" (习近平在十八届中央纪委二次全会上发表重要讲话 // 中国共产党新闻网 [XI Jinping delivers important speech at the second plenary session of the Central Commission for discipline inspection of the 18th convocation // The Chinese Communist Party News Network. URL:http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0122/c64094-20289660.html ]) – to combat abuses by officials at all levels, regardless of the person. In the 5 years after the 18th Congress, an average of 842 people were punished daily in China, 140 people were punished for violating the rules of the "eight points", 32 people were convicted and imprisoned. On average, 7 officials in the central office were fired every month, and 148 at the department and bureau levels, 1,050 at the county level were disciplined [6]. The rules of the "eight points" of December 4, 2012 on the conduct of officials and holding official events. These are Xi Jinping's demands for party discipline: such as banning officials from drinking alcohol during working hours, behaving immodestly, and living beyond their means. Since 2013, the "eight points" rules have been introduced. After the style requirements of Chinese Communists, who were not allowed to have privileges, became popular in Chinese society, it was decided to expose officials through the media. For example, one provincial official got on the Internet because he was wearing a very expensive watch. Subsequently, the Discipline Inspection Commission found out about his corruption schemes, and the court sentenced him to 14 years in prison for involvement in corruption and possession of assets of unknown origin [Yang Dachai was sentenced to 14 years in prison // Internet version of the People's Daily. URL:http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2013/0830/c1001-22745708.html]). This principle of equality of all made it possible to establish the authority of the system. On this basis, in August 2015 The CPC Central Committee has published the "Regulations on the Inspection Work of the Communist Party of China", summarizing and institutionalizing the practice of anti-corruption work ([Rules of the Communist Party of China on inspection work // Website of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. URL:https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/202402/content_6932866.html].

In October 2017 XI Jinping first proposed the "improvement of the system of supervision of the party and state" in the report of the 19th Congress of the CPC "to Build a surveillance system with a single party command, comprehensive scope, authority and performance, and to connect the internal supervision of the party with the supervision of public authorities, democratic oversight, judicial supervision, the supervision of the masses and the supervision of public opinion, to strengthen the collective power of supervision" (习近平:决胜全面建成小康社会 夺取新时代中国特色社会主义伟大胜利–在中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会上的报告 // 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网站 [XI Jinping: The conquest of the great victory of socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era by building of the welfare state – a report to the 19th Congress of the CPC // Website of the Central people's Government of people's Republic of China. URL:http://www.gov.cn/zhuanti/2017-10/27/content_5234876.html (date of access: 30.09.2022)]).

In November 2021, the sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of the nineteenth convocation adopted a "Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on major achievements and the historical experience of a century of struggle of the party" (中共中央关于党的百年奋斗重大成就和历史经验的决议 // 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网站 [Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on the main achievements and historical experience of the centennial struggle of the party // Website of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. URL:https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2021-11/16/content_5651269.html]). The need to improve the system of control of the party and the state, the establishment, regulation and restraint of power, supervision of power in accordance with discipline and the law was once again emphasized. The system of supervision of the party and the state has become one of the main themes of public administration under Xi Jinping – his political line.

Xi Jinping's Line

Under Xi Jinping, there have been three major changes in China's surveillance system.

1. The legislation is standardized.

2. Lifetime liability has been introduced.

3. The policy on corruption has been clarified.

Standards of requirements

Supervision is a general term for the supervision and discipline systems established by the CPC. It consists of the internal supervision of the party and various supervisory bodies [7]. As stated by XI Jinping at the 19th Congress, this system includes 6 forms of supervision: internal oversight of the party, the supervision of public authorities, democratic oversight, judicial review, oversight of the masses and the supervision of public opinion (习近平:决胜全面建成小康社会 夺取新时代中国特色社会主义伟大胜利–在中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会上的报告 // 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网站 [XI Jinping: the conquest of the great victory of socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era by building of the welfare state — a report to the 19th Congress of the CPC // Website of the Central people's Government of people's Republic of China. URL:http://www.gov.cn/zhuanti/2017-10/27/content_5234876.html]).

The internal supervision of the party is the supervision carried out within it. Supervision of State bodies is the supervision of all officials exercising State power. In the "Law on the supervision of the people's Republic of China" is clearly spelled out 6 categories of objects supervision (中华人民共和国监察法 // 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网站 [the law on the supervision of the people's Republic of China // the Website of the Central people's government of people's Republic of China. URL:https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018-03/26/content_5277463.html ]), including not only government officials, but also some employees of state-owned enterprises, budgetary institutions and grassroots self-government organizations. Democratic oversight means external political oversight of the CPC's activities by the NPC (People's Political Consultative Council of China) through the presentation of opinions, criticism and suggestions. Judicial supervision is carried out by State judicial bodies – people's courts and prosecutor's offices – over State administrative bodies in accordance with the Constitution and laws. The objects of supervision are various government agencies and their employees, including the judicial system itself. Mass supervision is the supervision of the exercise of State power by party and state administrative bodies and their employees by citizens and self–government in accordance with the rights granted by the Constitution and other laws. Public opinion supervision is the supervision of the exercise of administrative power by party and government bodies and their employees by the media.

Online surveillance zones are being created on the official websites of the discipline supervision and control bodies. They have become the main way to monitor the network. For example, the website of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection teaches the masses to submit "key information". What is meant by key information? According to the website of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the State Supervision Commission, it is best if the application letter contains specific information: time, place, work, main episodes, the name of the person being claimed, his position and working unit. As far as possible, indicate the location of evidence and the presence of witnesses. Applicants can leave their own name, address, age, contact phone number and address so that the relevant departments can contact them in a timely manner and conduct an inspection.

The Wuhan Commission for Discipline Inspection received a message about Zhang Huojing, former Vice-chairman of the Political Consultative Conference of Xinzhou District, Wuhan City, Hubei Province. He repeatedly traveled to Macau to gamble. The Municipal Disciplinary Inspection Commission immediately checked the immigration records: he visited Macau 17 times a year. On July 21, 2014, he was sentenced to nine years in prison for misappropriation of public funds (The Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection: Message, do it to be effective! // News Van I. URL:https://www.163.com/dy/article/F0GAEIQF05455BAL.html (date of access: 03.10.2022)]). Today, tip-off messages via the Internet are quite common in China, the keywords "real estate", "luxury car", "high expenses", "gambling", "mistress" make "everyone's supervision" a reality.

Table 1. The system of supervision of the party and the state

Forms of supervision

Subjects of supervision

The object of supervision

Party supervision

Internal supervision of the party

All party members

Party organs and personnel

State supervision

Supervision of government agencies

Government agencies

All officials exercising State power

Judicial supervision

Courts, prosecutor's office

Party and state bodies and their employees

Supervision of the company

Democratic oversight

People's Political Consultative Council of China

Party and state bodies and their employees

Supervision of the masses

Society

Party and state bodies and their employees

Supervision of public opinion

Traditional media and the Internet

Party and state bodies and their employees

Lifelong responsibility

In China, there was a common example of corruption – the "phenomenon of 59-year-olds." Some officials, when they were close to retirement, found an opportunity to "hit the jackpot." A number of regulations have been adopted to combat this type of corruption. The key decision is the lifelong responsibility of an official. The movement in this direction began in the first year of Xi's presidency.

Table 2. The system of lifelong responsibility

Year

Laws, norms, rules

2013

Political and legal Commission of the CPC Central Committee issued the "regulations on the effective prevention of unfair, false and illegal Affairs (关于切实防止冤假错案的规定)" (关于切实防止冤假错案的规定 // 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网站 [Regulations on the effective prevention of unfair, false and unlawful cases // Website of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. URL:https://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2013-08/13/content_2466100.html ]), where it obliged judges, prosecutors and the people's police to bear lifelong responsibility for the quality of the consideration of cases.

2015

The Ministry of public security issued the "Decision on the implementation of the spirit of the fourth plenary session of the Central Committee of the party eighteenth convocation, deepening the standardization of law enforcement and comprehensive public security in accordance with the rule of law (关于贯彻党的十八届四中全会精神深化执法规范化建设全面建设法治公安的决定)" (关于贯彻党的十八届四中全会精神深化执法规范化建设全面建设法治公安的决定 // 人民网 [The decision to implement the spirit of the fourth plenary session of the Central Committee of the eighteenth convocation of the Party, to deepen the standardization of law enforcement and comprehensive public safety in accordance with the rule of law // The online version of the People's Daily. URL:http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2015/0319/c1001-26720837.html ]), where it proposed to introduce a system of lifelong responsibility for reviewing cases and bringing to justice for offenses.

2015

The CPC Central Committee and the state Council issued the "Opinions on accelerating the construction of ecological civilization (关于加快推进生态文明建设的意见)" (关于加快推进生态文明建设的意见 // 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网站 [Opinions on accelerating the construction of ecological civilization // Website of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. URL:https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2015-05/05/content_2857363.html ]), where it was proposed to create a system of personal responsibility of senior personnel for the construction of an ecological civilization, and those who go against the requirements of scientific development and cause serious damage to resources, the environment and the environment, to be entered in the dossier and held accountable for life.

2019

The state Council issued a "Provisional rules on the procedures for making major administrative decisions (重大行政决策程序暂行条例)" (重大行政决策程序暂行条例 // 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网站 [Provisional Rules on procedures for making basic administrative decisions // Website of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. URL:https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2019-05/08/content_5389670.html ]), where he provided for lifelong responsibility in two situations: 1. when the decision-making body violates the rules and makes serious mistakes in decision-making, 2. when late decision-making leads to significant losses or negative consequences.

2019

The office of the CPC Central Committee issued the "measures for the supervision, inspection and accountability in the selection and appointment of personnel (干部选拔任用工作监督检查和责任追究办法)" (干部选拔任用工作监督检查和责任追究办法 // 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网站 [Measures for supervision, verification and accountability in the selection and appointment of personnel // Website of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. URL:https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2019-05/27/content_5395173.html ]) on lifelong responsibility for the selection and appointment of personnel.

2020

In the "Opinions of the Supreme people's court on the improvement of the system of liability of judges of the people's courts (最高人民法院关于完善人民法院司法责任制的若干意见)" (最高人民法院关于完善人民法院司法责任制的若干意见 // 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网站 [Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on improving the system of responsibility of judges of people's courts // Website of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. URL:https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2015-09/22/content_2936397.html ]), issued by the Supreme People's Court, states that judges should be held responsible for their actions in the performance of judicial duties for life and be responsible for the quality of the consideration of cases.

2020

In the "Opinions to improve the system of justice of the people's procuratorates (关于完善人民检察院司法责任制的若干意见)" (关于完善人民检察院司法责任制的若干意见 // 人民网 [Opinions on improving the system of judicial responsibility of the People's Prosecutor's offices // The Internet version of the People's Daily. URL:http://society.people.com.cn/n1/2024/0725/c1008-40284902.html ]), issued by the Supreme People's Prosecutor's Office, states that prosecutors should consider cases at the forefront of justice and be responsible for the quality of their cases for life.

In addition, supervision of dismissed and retired employees has been strengthened. In 2013 The Central organization Department issued the "Opinions on further regulation of the activity leading cadres of party and government positions in enterprises in combination" (关于进–步规范党政领导干部在企业兼职(任职)问题的意见 // 共产党员网 [Opinions on the further regulation of the issue of the employment of senior personnel of the party and the government of positions at part-time enterprises // The network of the Communist Party. URL:https://news.12371.cn/2013/12/11/ARTI1386764247969196.shtml]). In 2017 The Central organization Department and four Department issued the "Opinions on the regulation of the practice of public servants after leaving public office" (关于进–步规范党政领导干部在企业兼职(任职)问题的意见 // 人民网 [Opinions on the regulation of the practice of civil servants after leaving public office // The online version of the People's Daily. URL:http://dangjian.people.com.cn/GB/136058/427510/428084/428612/428618/index.html]).

It is stipulated that retired former civil servants who were previously members of the governing bodies of all levels, as well as other civil servants holding positions at the county level or higher, should not accept appointments from enterprises, intermediaries or other commercial organizations in the field and field of activity falling under the jurisdiction of their former positions, for three years years after retirement from public office/retirement, and should not personally engage in profit-making activities directly related to the business falling under the jurisdiction of their former positions. Other civil servants should not accept appointments from enterprises, intermediaries or organizations directly related to their previous employment, or engage in activities directly related to their previous work, for two years after resigning from public office/retirement." These decisions have gone down in history as an obstacle to the corruption of the revolving doors.

Systemic prevention

In January 2020, the fourth plenary session of the 19th Central Commission for discipline inspection, XI Jinping, has offered "...to ensure that officials do not dare, can not and have no desire to engage in corruption" (不敢腐、不能腐、不想腐) (习近平在十九届中央纪委四次全会上发表重要讲话 // 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网站 [XI Jinping delivers important speech at the fourth plenary session of the 19th Central Commission for discipline inspection // Website of the Central people's Government of people's Republic of China. URL:https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-01/13/content_5468732.html]). In China, corrupt officials have been subjected to extremely severe punishment since ancient times: waterboarding, castration, lumbar slashing, body tearing, quartering, and execution with "a thousand incisions." The method of execution varied from era to era, but the goal was to cause the victim a slow and extremely painful death. Zhu Yuanzhang, the founder of the Ming Dynasty, even invented a "skinning system" in which corrupt officials were skinned, filled with hay and placed in front of their offices as a warning to their successors. The principle of "cannot engage in corruption" refers to the creation of a reliable oversight system. The authors carefully examined the documents issued by the Central Organizational Department from 2012 to 2021, including 24 documents in the category "education and training", which is 23.5% of the total number of documents. Training in China is similar to the training of doctors and scientists, as it is a step-by-step promotion. Cadres go from passing the civil service exam to becoming a senior official, just as a graduate student goes from associate professor to professor, and huge social resources are spent on training each senior official. From the point of view of caring for talents, the fight against corruption cannot simply kill corrupt officials. Instead, an early warning system has been created to detect minor corrupt actions of officials in time, which is also a kind of talent protection.

Based on this concept and with the spread of digital government in China, a new trend in preventing corruption is combining anti-corruption with big data technology. Many regions in China have started the practice of fighting corruption using big data. Scientists have provided many research results based on these practices. Although there are still debates on these issues, such as the choice of indicators, the subject of supervision, legislation, the direction of development of the monitoring platform using big data has been determined, and the workflow looks like this. The first step is to create a database of personnel, then various indicators to monitor and assess the risk of corruption, and finally, appropriate measures are taken. Taking as an example a risk assessment system for leading personnel based on big data, Guo Yun and Yang Xiaokui presented the necessary indicators (Table 3) [2].

Table 3. Indicators for assessing the risk of dishonesty

An indicator that requires attention.

The manifestation of the indicator.

1. There may be falsification of personal information.

Falsification of basic personal information in personnel files, including name, gender, date of birth, education, etc.

2. There may be abuse in key positions.

Violations related to public procurement, contracting, organization and personnel, financial management, etc.

3. There may be abuse in key positions when approaching retirement age and when working in one place for a long time.

Preparing for retirement: forming communities of interest through networks of relationships.

4. Perhaps there is a sharply dissonant behavior of an official.

Some personnel may exhibit anomalies in their work that require the closest attention from the supervisory authorities. For example, Huang Huahui, the former deputy head of the land preparation department of the Guangzhou Land Management Center, resigned when he was supposed to be promoted to deputy county level, which attracted the attention of the discipline inspection department. This is due to the fact that, according to the relevant rules, the heads from the county and above are required to declare their personal affairs. It later turned out that he had indeed committed a disciplinary offense.

5. There may be violations of the rules of entry and exit from the country or frequent trips abroad for personal purposes.

Cadres conceal their departure for personal purposes or often enter and leave the country for personal purposes. This may be a harbinger of escape or transfer of assets.

6. There may be emigration of a spouse and children abroad.

In the "Rules on the selection and appointment of leading cadres of the party and government" clearly States that cadres, whose wife and children moved abroad can't be focused on the increase (党政领导干部选拔任用工作条例 // 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网站 [Rules on the selection and appointment of senior personnel of the Party and the Government // Website of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. URL:https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2019-03/17/content_5374532.html]).

7. Perhaps there is a business occupation for the spouse and children of senior staff.

The central Government has clearly demanded that relatives (spouses, children, their spouses) of senior personnel should not engage in business within their jurisdiction. The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection published a report on disciplinary actions against 34 senior personnel in 2015, showing that 21 of them (62%) violated discipline through abuse of relatives (2015年34位中中中中中, 近2/3违纪涉亲属 // 人民网网 [In 2015, 34 vice-provincial cadres were under investigation, almost two thirds disciplinary offenses related to relatives // The online version of the People's Daily. URL:http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0105/c1001-28013040-3.html]).

8. Assets may significantly exceed the family income level.

The total amount of assets, such as property, shares and funds owned by the cadres, clearly exceeds the level of their family income.

9. It is possible that management personnel have been repeatedly reported.

If the personnel has been repeatedly reported, then most likely there are problems with integrity or work style.

10. It is possible that there are senior staff with low indicators in the field of integrity and self-discipline based on the results of the certification for the year.

When certifying each department at the end of the year, the low score of the head may reflect the presence of risks.

11. It is possible that current or former subordinates of senior personnel are found to have committed disciplinary violations.

According to the "Rules on the selection and appointment of senior personnel of the party and the government," if a subordinate or secretary of the senior staff has disciplinary problems, then he may have negligently managed the employees around him or even showed signs of corruption.

They also developed an early warning model response mechanism for management supervision based on a score assessment of indicators (table 4).

Table 4. Mechanism of managerial personnel supervision and early warning

Early warning level

Mark

Early warning response

Blue Early Warning

Personnel are rated as "low" by most integrity risk indicators

No

Yellow early warning

Personnel are rated as "average" in assessing the risk of honesty among several indicators.

Interviews with HR staff to check the situation and strengthen daily control.

Orange Early Warning

Personnel are rated as "average" in the assessment of integrity risk by several indicators or as "high" by one indicator.

Interviews with HR staff to check the situation and strengthen daily control. The promotion and appointment of personnel should be carried out with caution.

Red Early warning

Personnel are rated as "high" on many indicators of integrity risk.

Interviews with HR staff to check the situation and strengthen daily control. The promotion and appointment of personnel will not be considered in principle, and if necessary, a case will be opened for investigation.

Conclusion

After the founding of the country in 1949, the supervision system in China was mainly based on the "internal supervision of the party" model. In April 1969, under the influence of the "cultural revolution", the supervision of the party was completely abolished. It was only in 1982 that the disciplinary inspection bodies were mostly reinstated in the party committees from the county level and above. In 1987, the Ministry of Supervision of the People's Republic of China was restored, and the model changed from "internal supervision of the party" to "internal supervision of the party + administrative supervision". In December 1997, at the 15th CPC Congress, the working mechanism for combating corruption was reviewed anew and the system of supervision of the party and the state was formed. Subsequently, decisions were made to complement the main supervisory bodies in the supervision system of the party and the state. In general, in 1949-2012, the development of China's supervisory system was characterized by the diversification of supervisory subjects – from one subject at the beginning of the country's foundation, two subjects during the period of reforms and openness, to many subjects during the period of deepening reforms and openness.

Under Xi Jinping, China's surveillance system has been reformed in three main areas.

Firstly, the legislation on the system of supervision of the party and the state was clarified, the use of relevant terms was standardized, the subject, object and forms of supervision were clarified.

Secondly, a system of lifelong accountability was established based on the principle of "term of office is limited, but responsibility is not".

Thirdly, a new model of supervision "education + punishment + prevention" was introduced, especially in the field of corruption prevention, with an emphasis on the use of new technologies, big data, which made it possible for "everyone to exercise supervision (supervision of everyone)".

The article was written in the days of the 3rd Plenum of the CPC Central Committee of the 20th convocation, held 15-18 July 2024 July 18, he was made the "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist party of China on further comprehensive deepening of reform and the promotion of modernization in the Chinese style" (中共中央关于进–步全面深化改革 推进中国式现代化的决定 // 共产党员网 [The decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on further comprehensive deepening of reforms and promotion of Chinese modernization // The network of the Communist Party. URL:https://www.12371.cn/2024/07/21/ARTI1721551217863166.shtml]). The document consists of 60 sections, of which the 59th is devoted to supervision. It seems to us that the main focus here is on three topics: 1. combating collusion between business and government; 2. combating the practice of privilege; 3. arresting corrupt officials fleeing to foreign countries. In this, we see a logical continuation of Xi Jinping's line to promote the political control of a Chinese official.

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Peer Review

Peer reviewers' evaluations remain confidential and are not disclosed to the public. Only external reviews, authorized for publication by the article's author(s), are made public. Typically, these final reviews are conducted after the manuscript's revision. Adhering to our double-blind review policy, the reviewer's identity is kept confidential.
The list of publisher reviewers can be found here.

The subject of the peer-reviewed study is administrative and political supervision over the activities of an official. Given the eternal problems of the bureaucracy in its pursuit of usurpation of power, corruption, and the use of office for its own purposes, as classics from K. Marx to M. Weber wrote a lot about, the relevance of the topic chosen for research should be recognized as enduring and very high. As a case study, the authors chose institutionalized (intra-) party supervision in the People's Republic of China. Unfortunately, having sufficiently thoroughly disclosed the conceptual foundations of the study in the literature review, having described in detail the empirical source base, the authors did not say a single word about the methodology used in the research process. From the context, it can be understood that normative and institutional methods were used (in the analysis of specific institutions regulating control over the activities of officials in the PRC), historical (in the study of changes in these institutions in history), as well as conceptual (in the study of basic documents - declarations and theoretical works of politicians, administrative regulations, reports, etc.). The correct application of these methods allowed the authors to obtain results that have not only scientific reliability, but also signs of scientific novelty. Despite the fact that the topic of bureaucracy, corruption related to it, as well as control over the activities of officials, has been studied many times, a detailed description of the organization of state and party control over the bureaucracy in China, as well as the history of the transformation of these institutions, is quite of scientific interest. The authors' conclusions on systemic prevention in China, as well as new technologies used in this prevention, also deserve attention. Structurally, the work also makes a positive impression: its logic is consistent and reflects the main aspects of the research. The following sections are highlighted in the text: - "Introduction", "Review of scientific literature" and "Sources", where the conceptual and empirical foundations of the research are revealed, but, unfortunately, the methodological aspect is missed; - "The origins of control: supervision "from above" (Yu Shi) vs supervision "from below" (Denwengu)", which describes the first concepts of control over the activities of officials, implemented in Ancient China; - "Supervision in 1949-2012: the movement towards a unified system of party-state supervision", which reveals the features of the formation of a unified Chinese system of party-state supervision over the bureaucracy in modern China; - "Supervision since 2013: from "beating tigers and flies" to "the combined power of supervision"" and "The Xi Jinping Line", which presents the results of conceptual and institutional changes in the specified supervision system since 2013, with special emphasis on the proposals of the current General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Xi Jinping; - "Conclusion", which summarizes the results of the conducted research, draws conclusions and outlines prospects for further research. The style of the article is scientific and also does not cause significant complaints. There is some (admittedly, vanishingly small!) content in the text. There are a lot of stylistic and grammatical errors, but in general it is written quite competently, in good Russian, with the correct use of scientific terminology. The bibliography includes 11 titles, including sources in foreign languages, and adequately reflects the state of research on the subject of the article. An appeal to opponents takes place when analyzing the scientific literature on the subject of the article's research. Among the special advantages of the reviewed work (in addition to the logical structure and good literacy), one can note the use of illustrative material (four tables), which greatly simplifies the perception of the author's conclusions. GENERAL CONCLUSION: the article proposed for review can be qualified as a scientific work that meets the basic requirements for works of this kind. The results obtained by the authors will be interesting for political scientists, sociologists, lawyers, sinologists, specialists in the field of public administration, as well as for students of the listed specialties. The presented material corresponds to the subject of the journal "Law and Politics". According to the results of the review, the article is recommended for publication.