Global Criminal Alliances: The Phenomenon of Interaction between European Union and Latin American Criminal Organizations

Tsimashchenia Viachaslau Andreevich ORCID: 0000-0002-0961-2244 Graduate student; Department of Theory and History of International Relations; Peoples' Friendship University of Russia 6 Miklukho-Maklaya str., Moscow, 117198, Russia v.timoshchenya@gmail.com Other publications by this author

In today's globalized world, the phenomenon of transnational organized crime is one of the most serious threats to international security. Of particular concern is the growing interaction between organized criminal groups in the European Union (EU) and Latin America, which not only increases criminal activity in both regions, but also creates new challenges for law enforcement agencies and security systems at the global level.

The relevance of this study is due to several factors. Firstly, there is a steady trend towards increased cooperation between the EU and Latin American organized crime groups, which leads to the formation of more complex and stable criminal networks. Secondly, this interaction contributes to the diversification of criminal activity and the expansion of its geography, which makes it difficult to combat organized crime using traditional methods. Thirdly, there is an urgent need to develop new, more effective strategies to counter this phenomenon, taking into account the transcontinental nature.

The purpose of this article is to study the phenomenon of the transnationalization of organized crime by the example of the interaction of criminal groups from the European region and Latin America, as well as to identify an approach to the formation of strategies to counter this phenomenon.

The study is based on a systematic analysis that allows us to consider transnational organized crime as a complex, dynamic system interacting with various social, economic and political factors, as well as to identify key elements and connections within criminal networks, as well as their interaction with the external environment.

The paper uses a comparative analysis method to compare the situation in the countries of the European Union and Latin America, which allows us to identify common trends and regional features of the development of transnational organized crime. Statistical analysis is used to process quantitative data on the scale of criminal activity, the volume of drug seizures and other indicators characterizing the activities of transnational criminal groups. The sources of statistical information are official reports of law enforcement agencies, international organizations (UN, Europol, Interpol) and research centers. The case study method is used to study in detail specific examples of interaction between criminal gangs of the EU and Latin America, which allows a deeper understanding of the mechanisms of their cooperation and functioning.

Convergence of criminal flows: from exploitation of natural resources to transnational drug trafficking

Extensive drug trafficking, as well as the legalization of illegal financial assets by transnational criminal organizations, reinforce the actions of organized crime, contributing to a phenomenon of growing concern: merger or criminal interaction. This cooperation and the transformation of disparate single criminal groups into partnerships between criminal communities occurs at three levels: on the routes used ^[1], between criminal organizations (at the local and intercontinental levels) ^[2] and in areas with a low level of governance that are used by non-state threats such as terrorism ^[3].

Various illegal goods are often transported together or moved along the same transit routes, for example, timber and gold are transported across the Atlantic to Europe along with cocaine. The phenomenon under consideration coincides with the development of alliances between criminal groups for mutual benefit, as can be seen from the example of the spread of Mexican and Colombian drug trafficking organizations abroad and their rapprochement with the most significant European criminal organizations such as the Ndrangheta, as well as terrorist organizations seeking to obtain sources of financing. In turn, this merger leads to the emergence of "criminal centers", places where the state is replaced by criminal management. The regions provide criminal organizations with a solid base of support with the assistance of the local population, undermining security and the exercise of State sovereignty.

The diversification of Latin American drug trafficking to other regions (Europe, Asia) has opened up new crossing points for smuggling routes of various goods, including gold and timber of illicit origin, weapons and tobacco. These smuggling routes operate not only in one geographical direction, but usually connect different regions and continents, moving in both directions – from South to North and from East to West.

The numerous and voluminous export routes of goods and the complexity of their control at the local level are used to trade not only drugs, but also illegally mined goods such as gold and timber. The link between criminal organizations involved in drug trafficking and the exploitation of gold and timber is direct, since usually the same areas of Peru and Colombia designated for coca cultivation coincide with areas of mining and exploitation of forest resources. Similarly, the ease of money laundering through gold mines and rising prices in recent years have attracted the attention of drug trafficking organizations that have resorted to this strategy, especially in Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador^[4].

On the route "to the North", especially in search of the United States market, there is a similar phenomenon of displacement and convergence. The Panama-Colombia border has proven to be a vital point of convergence for the cocaine trade in Central America and the United States^[4]. These routes are controlled by the so-called "Clan del Golfo" (Los Urabeños) ^{[5, p. 514]}, an organization that simultaneously manages a large number of illegal mining centers ^[6], especially gold, on both sides of the border. Gold is also used by these organizations to launder financial proceeds from drug trafficking. Venezuela plays a fundamental role as an intermediary country in this illicit traffic. Criminal organizations export gold to destinations with a low level of control over the legality of the origin of the mentioned material, such as the United Arab Emirates, Aruba, Curacao, Bonaire and even Uganda ^{[7, p. 168]}.

Illegally harvested timber also provides drug traffickers with an additional source of financing and a means to conceal drug shipments. Illegally harvested wood is often washed and provided with documents that legalize it, which allows it to be sold to the rest of the world. Timber transported by rivers and roads was used to transport cocaine across South America. This is especially typical for the transportation of timber along the Amazon River to the port of Belem do Para in Brazil ^[8]. Legal or illegal wood is used to conceal (disguise) cocaine ^{[9, p. 84]}. This technique also takes place in transatlantic timber transportation. For example, in 2010, 1.3 tons of cocaine were found hidden inside a container with wooden briquettes shipped from Brazil to Hamburg, Germany ^{[10, p. 38]}, and a shipment of 7.2 tons of cocaine was found hidden in wood inside a container in Antwerp ^[11].

The need for weapons by criminal organizations also contributes to the convergence of drug and other trade routes with arms trade routes. The link between illegal arms trafficking and drug trafficking is direct, since criminal organizations need them to confront other organizations, establish internal control, and sometimes to confront government agencies. For example, in 2018, an illegal arms trafficking operation was revealed from the United States and Europe to Argentina, and from there to Paraguay and Brazil to supply the Brazilian criminal group Primeiro Comando Capital (PCC), using the same routes for transporting cocaine and marijuana ^[12].

Expansion of cross-border criminal alliances from regional cartels to international criminal syndicates

Criminal organizations in Colombia were among the first to begin to get closer to others at the regional level. For example, in the 80s, Colombian cartels relied heavily on the help of other entities located in Bolivia and Peru ^[13]. Currently, Mexican cartels dominate the region, moving closer to local actors, especially in those countries located along the Andean Range. In Colombia, the Mexican Sinaloa cartel entered into an alliance with the "Clan del Golfo" (Los Urabeños) to send shipments of cocaine to Europe and other regions ^{[14, p. 134]}. This cartel also operated in other South American countries. For example, in 2008, an operation was revealed to create a methamphetamine production laboratory in Argentina ^{[15, p. 20]}.

Such interaction takes place not only at the local level, but also strengthens the rapprochement between criminal structures from different continents, which have decided to create alliances, strengthening their capabilities instead of fighting for control over criminal flows. The case of the Italian "Ndrangheta", which not only created a strategic alliance with the Colombian cartels, but also recently established close relations with the Brazilian First Capital Team (Primeiro Comando da Capital) ^[16]. Two of the most famous members of the Calabrian organization were arrested in Sao Paulo in 2018, and the "capo" of the organization (a representative of one of the highest "steps" in the criminal ladder) Domenico Pelle visited Brazil twice in 2016 and 2017 to meet with Deputy Director Gilberto Aparecido ^{[17, p. 2]}. In 2020, the Brazilian Federal Police unit in Sao Paulo arrested Nicola Assisi and Patrick Assisi, suppliers of the "Ndrangheta" and another head of one of the clans ^[18]. Rocco Morabito was arrested in Uruguay, from where he managed to escape, and eventually he was arrested again in Brazil ^[19]. This presence of the Calabrian mafia is directly linked to the export of cocaine and explains the alliance of the "Ndrangheta" with local groups that act as suppliers.

In a similar case of transatlantic relations in Ecuador, Albanian criminal organizations operating in Ecuadorian ports and coordinating the supply of cocaine smuggled from Colombia by local organizations were identified. One of the main Albanian drug traffickers, Arber Cekai, was responsible for 108 shipments of cocaine disguised in bananas sent to Albania ^[20]. The organization has strengthened ties with groups operating in the Colombian border area, especially in Sukumbios. The anarchic situation in this region contributed to the arrival of international criminal organizations, mainly Albanian and Mexican cartels ^{[21, p. 2]}. The cocaine routes from Putumayo to Sukumbios are controlled by an alliance between the local group La Constru and other former groups of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). La Constru controls the entire cocaine supply chain locally, starting with the processing of coca leaves and ending with the transportation of cocaine hydrochloride to Ecuador. The various mafia organizations of the ex-FARC are not limited by the rigidity of a unified command, which leads to periodic clashes between them in order to control the most important areas of drug trafficking. The largest of these organizations is the one headed by Miguel Botache Santillana, aka "Gentil Duarte", and which often clashes with the 48th Front of Colombia (FARC Southern Bloc) ^[22]. Corrupt local officials play an important role as "local intermediaries", facilitating rapprochement by providing forged documents, settling court cases and allowing the supply of illegal goods to the area. Other significant local criminal groups include the 32nd Front, the Armed Peasant Guard and Nuevo Horizonte. According to a report by the Office of the Ombudsman of Ecuador, these criminal organizations control local cocaine supply routes, illegal gold mining and drug trafficking ^[23].

The symbiosis of terrorism and drug trafficking

One of the most disturbing variants of criminal interaction between groups occurs when organizations involved in drug trafficking unite with cells associated with terrorism. In Paraguay, drug trafficking groups operating from Ciudad del Este also have close ties with money laundering and terrorist financing ^{[24, p. 18]}. The criminal nature of the Triple Frontier and the extensive opportunities for money laundering have contributed to the creation of criminal groups specializing in other types of criminal activities, including Hezbollah, which has been present in the Three Borders since the mid-1980s. Hezbollah's operations in the area include drug trafficking, currency counterfeiting and organized crime to finance operations throughout to the world ^[25].

In 2018, Paraguayan authorities arrested Nader Mohammad Farhat, a currency trader from Ciudad del Este being investigated by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) for drug trafficking and money laundering. His operations included the use of the Unique SA exchange office and at least eight banks in Paraguay, from where money was transferred abroad ^[26]. During the arrest, $1.4 million in cash was confiscated from his home. In August 2021, local authorities in Ciudad del Este arrested Kassem Mohamed Hijazi, a Brazilian of Lebanese origin, accused of laundering money for drug trafficking organizations ^[27]. The link between money laundering and drug trafficking participants is most obvious in the case of Hezbollah, which began trafficking cocaine in the region ^{[28, p. 127]}. The expansion of Hezbollah required the cooperation and collaboration of national organizations that could ensure the supply of cocaine, which is done by providing money laundering services to less sophisticated criminal organizations such as the Brazilian PCC, which have access to the cocaine supply chain. The relationship with PCC goes beyond money laundering. Hezbollah also acted as a shadow intermediary, helping the PCC acquire firearms to protect Hezbollah fighters imprisoned in Brazilian prisons ^{[29, p. 28]}.

Shadow enclaves: the expansion of zones of 'impunity' in Latin America

In many parts of Latin America, criminal activity contributes to the development and creation of zones of "impunity", which naturally displace the power of the State. Consequently, a vicious circle arises in which criminal groups strengthen and the state weakens, which further strengthens the actions of organized crime, thereby contributing to criminal interaction in these areas ^{[30, p. 99]}. These spaces or areas are usually places located on borders, as well as vulnerable neighborhoods in large cities. However, it is not only large geographical areas that contribute to the rapprochement of criminal gangs, since today prisons and ports also function as factors contributing to such rapprochement.

In recent years, some border crossings in Latin America have become places where government is diffuse and organized crime is entrenched. Criminal organizations, trafficking routes and the seizure of territories converge in these places. The two most prominent sites are located on the border between Ecuador and Colombia, as well as on the Triple Border between Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay.

In 2021 Ecuador confiscated a total of 116 tons of cocaine ^[31]. Currently, Ecuador is an exporter of a third of the cocaine produced in Colombia, and thousands of Ecuadorian citizens living in a country with 52% poverty are exploited by criminal organizations as cheap labor, especially at the border ^[32].

Cocaine produced in Narinho is smuggled into Ecuador via the Pacific route, and cocaine produced in the Colombian region of Putumayo is smuggled along routes deep into the Ecuadorian Amazon ^{[33, p. 143]}. Recently, there has been a significant increase in cocaine flows in the Ecuadorian province of Sukumbios, which has also led to a flourishing criminal economy in the border areas. The fact that Ecuador uses the US dollar as its national currency has made it an attractive country for money laundering operations and the smuggling of large sums of money, usually from neighboring Colombia along the same routes as cocaine and from Europe ^[34]. Drug trafficking converges in this area with illegal deforestation, which is also a serious problem, since it uses existing smuggling and "laundering" networks, encouraging the mass shipment of cash, corruption and commercial fraud ^{[35, p. 49]}. In addition, gold is another commodity that is illegally mined in the area. The Buenos Aires region in northern Ecuador and some areas near Sukumbios are known for attracting illegal groups that mine gold worth up to $500,000 per week ^[36].

Another region where criminal interaction has increased in recent years is the three-way border between Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil. Paraguay is the largest cannabis producer in the region and one of the largest in the world, exporting most of its products to Brazil, Argentina and Chile ^{[37, p. 14]}. This industry exploited the networks created by the illegal tobacco trade and benefited from poor governance and corruption. Ciudad del Este, a Paraguayan city that forms part of the triple border along with the cities of Puerto Iguazu (Argentina) and Foz do Iguazu (Brazil), became a criminal center where numerous types of criminal activity converged, facilitated by porous borders and easy access to resources and weapons ^[38]. The area is plagued by money laundering, terrorist financing, smuggling and drug trafficking, especially in Ciudad del Este. According to a 2010 study, between $12 and $13 billion in cash is generated annually in the city, and $12 billion per year is laundered in the three-border zone ^[39].

Ports and prisons with weak management control and accountability systems are also an environment conducive to the interaction of criminal gangs. Ports such as Santos (Sao Paulo State, Brazil) have become the main points of cocaine export to Europe and Africa ^{[40, p. 49]}. Brazil's legal exports to Africa increased from $64 million in 2000 to $800 million in 2021. This growth in legal trade between Brazil and the African continent has been used by organized crime to send cocaine to African coasts ^[41], with the most common method being "Rip-on/Rip-off" technology, which is a method of smuggling in which legitimate cargo, usually containerized, is used to transport contraband goods (in particular, cocaine) from the country of origin or port of transshipment to the country of destination, where neither the shipper nor the consignee know that their cargo is being used to smuggle prohibited goods ^[42]. The port of Santos plays a vital role on the route under consideration. The volume of cocaine seizures increased from 1.6 tons in 2013 to 27 tons in 2019 ^{[43, p. 140]}.

Thus, zones of "impunity", including border areas, individual urban areas, prisons and even large ports, become key nodes in the network of transnational organized crime. Of particular concern is the fact that these enclaves not only contribute to the flourishing of traditional forms of criminal activity, such as drug trafficking, but also create favorable conditions for the development of new criminal practices and strengthen ties between various criminal groups. The situation is aggravated by the weakness of State institutions, high levels of corruption and socio-economic problems in the region.

Conclusion

In this paper, it was shown that the main features of transnational organized crime in the 21st century indicate a complex and developing landscape of criminal activity with global consequences. First, transnational organized crime is becoming more diverse and adaptable, taking advantage of advances in technology, global connectivity, and the rapid movement of goods and people. Criminal networks have taken advantage of these opportunities to expand their operations across borders, engaging in a wide range of illegal activities such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, cybercrime, money laundering and smuggling of contraband goods.

Latin America is experiencing a golden age of interaction between transnational organized groups. Just as the old smuggling channels allowed for the expansion of cocaine trafficking, today they strengthen and make possible the trade of other illegal goods. In this scenario, the role of local intermediaries ensures the interconnection between them. The convergence of criminal organizations forces us to reconsider theories in which criminal organizations are considered as subjects inclined to confront others in the struggle for dominance in a particular market. Large criminal organizations sometimes boldly choose a reasonable international division of labor, as do Brazil's Primeiro Comando da Capital and the 'Ndrangheta, to the detriment of confrontation through violence. The role of amplifiers of organized crime offered by low-level areas, whether border towns or prisons, allows criminal organizations to increase the use of armed violence by penetrating and co-opting the institutional structures of States. These places are used by parastatal structures, terrorist organizations and drug traffickers, strengthening their positions.

The involvement of transnational criminal groups from Latin America has led to the creation of extensive drug trafficking networks spanning all continents. These organizations use their knowledge, resources and established routes to transport drugs from production regions in Latin America to consumer markets in the EU. The transnational nature of these criminal cells allows them to quickly adapt to changes in law enforcement and market requirements. They show amazing flexibility in adjusting their strategies, routes, and trading methods to avoid detection and maximize profits. Their ability to exploit vulnerabilities in border control systems, as well as to activate corruption networks and apply advanced technologies further facilitates activities.

The problem of convergence between Latin American organized criminal groups and representatives of the criminal world of the European Union is due to the mutual benefits that Latin American organized criminal groups and their EU partners receive from cooperation. The former seek to gain access to the lucrative markets of European states using established smuggling routes, corrupt networks and the exploitation of transport and financial systems. At the same time, criminal organizations from EU states benefit from the experience of Latin American groups in the field of drug trafficking, money laundering and other illegal activities. The consequences of such criminal cooperation are far-reaching: It exacerbates drug trafficking, which leads to increased availability of drugs, substance abuse and related social and medical problems in both Latin America and the EU. In addition, it fuels corruption, undermines governance structures and perpetuates violence, posing a threat to public safety, social stability and the rule of law ^{[44, p. 65]}.

One of the most alarming trends is the rise of European mafias thanks to the wealth generated from the cocaine trade, as well as the expansion of European criminal networks throughout Latin America. For example, the rise of the 'Ndrangheta in Italy (and around the world) is closely linked to the cocaine trade, and the rise of the Balkan mafia is also linked to cocaine. The threat to national security posed by these criminal structures is obvious and growing. The damage caused by the cocaine trade in Latin America and the Caribbean should be of serious concern in Europe as well.

The search for synergy in the coordination of police and judicial authorities, an attempt to speak the same language with the harmonization of criminal and procedural legislation, the promotion of international recognition of arrest and extradition procedures for detained and convicted criminals, as well as the rejection of legal and tax shelters are the measures that the authorized law enforcement agencies and politicians of the two regions need to work on in the medium term.