The transformation of EU migration legislation: causes and consequences

Ryzhov Igor' Valer'evich ORCID: 0000-0002-6417-1517 Doctor of History Head of the Department of History and Politics of Russia of N.I. Lobachevsky National Research State University, Senior researcher at the international interdisciplinary research laboratory “Study of World and Regional socio-political processes” of the Nizhny Novgorod State Linguistic University named after N.A. Dobrolyubov 23 Gagarin Ave., Nizhny Novgorod, Nizhny Novgorod region, 603022, Russia ivr@fmo.unn.ru Tikhomirova Karina Sergeevna ORCID: 0009-0006-4421-431X Student, Department of Foreign Regions Studies and Local History, N.I. Lobachevsky National Research State University of Nizhny Novgorod 23 Gagarin Ave., Nizhny Novgorod, Nizhny Novgorod region, 603022, Russia ariafan1013@gmail.com Ruchina Valeriya Mikhailovna ORCID: 0009-0001-7675-3100 Student, Department of Foreign Regions Studies and Local History, N.I. Lobachevsky National Research State University 23 Gagarin Ave., Nizhny Novgorod, Nizhny Novgorod region, 603022, Russia v.ruchina2016@gmail.com

Maslanov Konstantin Dmitrievich ORCID: 0009-0000-4339-3201 Postgraduate student, Department of History and Politics of Russia, N.I. Lobachevsky National Research State University; Institute of International Relations and World History 23 Gagarin Ave., Nizhny Novgorod, Nizhny Novgorod region, 603022, Russia maslanov152@mail.ru

Formation of the foundations of modern European migration legislation

In the last decade, the migration situation around the EU has been one of the most widespread and discussed topics. Against the background of global socio-economic transformations, the EU is facing multifaceted problems in managing migration processes, acting as one of the most attractive areas of modern migration. Mass migration flows are a natural companion of globalization and the policy of openness promoted by many States.

The surge in migration to Europe was associated with a period of international instability and numerous regional conflicts that forced people from Yugoslavia, African countries and Eastern Europe to seek asylum in Europe ^{[1, pp. 94-96.]}, as a result of which there was an increase in illegal migration. A sharp increase in the migration flow has led to the EU's attempt to protect itself from the undesirable consequences of illegal migration by introducing a "zero migration" policy. According to the decision of the European Council, the member states of the organization were recommended to refuse citizens of third countries entry to the territory of the Union for the purpose of employment ^[2]. However, this decision was quickly revised, and already in 1999, at an out-of-hours summit in Tampere, the pan-European migration policy framework was adopted, which became a continuation of the Amsterdam Treaty declaring the special competence of the European Council in migration issues ^[3]. There, for the first time, ideas about the policy of integrating the population of third countries into the EU structure and their gradual adaptation were declared ^{[4, pp. 87-91.]}.

The EU's desire to settle and pursue a stable migration policy is understandable. In the public's understanding, the vision of migration was formed due to numerous media reports about another shipwreck in the Mediterranean Sea, as well as demonstrations of the activities of illegal migrants-troublemakers. At the same time, few people highlight the useful side of migration as a strategically important resource in the economy of modern states ^{[5, pp. 338-340]}. A stable migration flow can become a natural impetus for economic growth in rapidly developing countries. According to research by the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) ^[6], 90% of migrants are economic migrants, that is, potential labor. Despite the fact that migrants make up only 3.4% of the country's population, their contribution to global GDP today is more than 10%. The statistics of 2015, the time of the most acute migration crisis in the EU, when the contribution of migrants to global GDP amounted to 6.7 trillion US dollars, become indicative. In Germany alone, the contribution of migrants to the country's economy amounted to more than 550 billion US dollars. Migration flows from developing countries to developed ones not only provide migrants with better living conditions, but also significantly increase their productivity in terms of labor capitalization.

Traditionally, EU development studies highlight two important aspects: the shortage of labor ^{[7, p. 51-53]}.  and the rapid aging of the EU population. According to research, by the end of the century, the population of 65+ in Europe, which amounted to 21.1% in 2022, will already amount to 31.3% — almost half of the EU population. Today, Europe is already losing more than a million working-age people annually ^[8]. At the same time, the shortage of labor is becoming a serious challenge today ^[9].  These circumstances present serious challenges for the EU and its development in an era of global economic instability, and migration is becoming a possible response to these challenges. In addition, migrants often occupy low-paid niches in the labor market, supporting the functioning of all sectors of the economy and industry. This is an important circumstance, since many citizens of developed countries do not consider a certain number of professions due to their high labor intensity and low wages.

The next step in the development of a common EU migration policy was the publication of a general proposal setting out the conditions of entry and residence for workers from third countries and self-employed persons by the European Commission in 2001.^[10] This agreement provided for the issuance of a residence permit to a potential employee from third countries before entering the EU. An analysis of the EU labour market and labour needs played a key role in the decision to grant a permit. However, it was extremely difficult for EU countries to agree on a common migration policy due to the unwillingness to transfer the sovereign right to decide who can enter the country into the hands of supranational EU bodies. In addition, the EU labor market has always been characterized by its heterogeneity, and an effective migration policy should be based on this factor and the difference in approaches in the context of each member state ^[11]. Although some success in this area has been achieved previously, and the Commission managed to reach agreement on the Family Reunification Directive, the Long-term Residence Directive, the Student Directive and the Researchers Directive, none of these directives regulate the main areas of labor migration in the EU.

As a result, the Commission's 2001 proposal was withdrawn, and a new 2005 initiative was put forward instead, offering a more comprehensive approach to labor migration: it was decided to divide the labor migration flow into 3 categories: highly skilled workers, seasonal workers, in-house employees and paid interns. (This category will later be excluded and included in the Directive on Researchers). This proposal was adopted by the European Council in 2006. This led to the introduction of several directives aimed at a specific segment of labor migration in the EU (the Blue Card Directive, the Single Permit Directive, the Seasonal Workers Directive, the Directive on Intra-corporate Workers and the revised Directive on Students and Researchers) ^{[12, 13, 14, 15]}.

Despite the general nature of migration issues and the commonality of decisions made due to the decisions in Tampere and the Amsterdam Treaty, the coordination, processing and adoption of all directives took almost 17 years. The last directive on students and researchers was adopted in 2016. In addition, the supranational nature of the EU migration policy remained until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. Then, by a joint decision and vote of a qualified majority, a new article 79 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) was edited. A direct restriction on the EU's exercise of its general legal competence concerning labour migration has been enshrined in article 79(5) of the TFEU. This provision excludes the possibility of adopting quotas for migrant workers at the EU level, and was specifically added at the request of Germany, which agreed to the institutional changes of the Lisbon Treaty only by explicitly limiting the EU's powers in this matter ^[16]. Thus, the system of adopting a common coordinated migration policy at the EU level has become even more complicated, since each State now pursued migration policy in the national interest. This fact still poses a serious problem to this day.

As mentioned earlier, as a result of the adopted proposal of the European Commission in 2006, 4 directives were developed aimed at regulating the labor migration flow. The first two directives on the Blue Card and the Single Permit were adopted in 2009. The Blue Card Directive was conceived as a tool for attracting qualified personnel and aimed at offering an accelerated entry procedure for highly qualified third-country nationals who have already obtained a job in the EU. It regulates the conditions of entry and residence of highly qualified workers from third countries and establishes a union-wide permit for them. However, it was not possible to achieve the goal of creating a single labor market for qualified specialists, since the entry permit was still within the competence of the EU member State, which still had the right to re-verify the validity of issuing a blue card. In addition, the issue of the minimum wage required to obtain a Blue Card remains a subject of debate to this day

The process of adopting the Single Permit Directive was extremely long and difficult. Negotiations on the directive have repeatedly been stalled due to the sharp rejection of some EU member states, which, however, were balanced by the European Parliament and the European Council. After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the negotiations were frozen, and later completely revised in terms of the new realities of European legislation. It took four years of negotiations before the Single Permit Directive was published in December 2011 ^{[18, p. 55-56.]}. This directive establishes a single application procedure for third-country nationals to reside in an EU member State for the purpose of work. This procedure was designed to simplify existing procedures and facilitate the verification and monitoring of the status of migrant workers. The criteria for entry and admission are still determined by the Government of individual Member States. Both migrants admitted for employment reasons and workers admitted for other reasons (such as family reunification or asylum) are subject to this Directive. Despite the fact that this directive declares the equal rights of all third-country applicants to submit an application and undergo a single review procedure, regardless of the purpose and circumstances of the application, categories such as seasonal workers and intra-corporate workers are excluded from the directive. Under these conditions, it is quite appropriate to talk about the inconsistency and fragmentation of migration labor legislation, which significantly burdens the system, since the passage of a single procedure is significantly simplified in comparison with, for example, the procedure for registration of seasonal employment, which we will discuss in more detail below.

The Seasonal Workers Directive defines the conditions of entry, stay and access to the labour market for a limited period of time for unskilled and low-skilled workers from third countries in EU member States and defines their rights to decent working conditions. A seasonal employee stays in the EU temporarily to perform certain activities, while maintaining the official status of residence in the country of origin. Seasonal workers are excluded from the directive on long-term residence, and therefore do not have the right to create a migration history for long-term residence, including the period of the contract. The maximum time spent under the contract is 9 months, after which the employee is obliged to return to the country of residence for 3 months.  The possibility of renegotiation of the contract is provided, which allows for the circulation of migration. The preamble of the Directive refers to the key sectors of seasonal migration, namely tourism, agriculture and horticulture as areas where seasonal work is usually required ^{[19, p.105-107]}. It should be noted that the level of rights under this directive is significantly lower than the level of rights provided by the Single permit Directive, which in the future may lead to fragmentation of migration legislation in different EU countries, since member states can provide their own interpretation of the concept of "seasonal worker". Negotiations on this directive were also extremely difficult, largely due to the economic crises of 2008-2012, when many Member States questioned the prospects of controlling migration.

The Directive on internal corporate employees was designed to facilitate the process of moving specialists from enterprises and multinational corporations to their branches or subsidiaries in the EU. The Directive regulates the temporary movement of specialists or interns from a company outside the EU to a division of the same enterprise or group of enterprises within the EU, while remaining on the basis of an employment contract in their home country ^[20]. The Directive was partially justified because it implemented bilateral and multilateral trade agreements that the EU member states were already bound by, in particular, the General Agreement on Trade in Services ^[21]. Such agreements usually contain immigration-related provisions that aim to facilitate the mobility of service providers. The Directive includes special provisions for EU member States to ensure the "temporary stay" of these workers so that they cannot remain in the EU upon completion of the contract. These employees are also not given the opportunity to obtain long-term resident status in the host Member State ^[22].

The migration crisis of 2015 became a turning point for the concept of EU migration policy and led to a significant shift in focus from the importance of controlling and ensuring stable labor migration to the issue of asylum and refugee admission ^{[23, p. 11-12]}. It should be noted that the existing EU legal framework for accepting refugees at that time became an indirect cause of the crisis and humanitarian catastrophe for the countries of Southern Europe. The Dublin III Regulation was based on the principle of non-proliferation of illegal migration flow deep into the EU. Instead, the regulation prescribes that the EU member State in which the asylum application was first submitted or in which the fingerprints of the relocators are located is responsible for the refugee and his further accommodation and provision. This circumstance created enormous pressure on the states of southern Europe, which had to be subjected to migration pressure. It was necessary to find a new approach to regulating illegal migration, more flexible than the Dublin Regulation, which could not be reformed due to the sharp disagreement of the Visegrad Group countries. The proposal on the European Migration Agenda, presented by the European Commission on May 13, 2015, contained a chapter on the "New Policy in the field of legal migration", but did not contain novelty in relation to the existing EU labor immigration regime ^[24]. The increase in migration pressure on member states, as well as the outright skepticism of countries regarding any new initiatives in the field of labor migration, spoke of an impasse in EU migration policy. In 2016, the Commission began to "verify compliance" with the Directives adopted in the field of legal migration ^[25]. Nine directives were covered, although only those that had been in effect for several years were evaluated in terms of effectiveness: family reunification (2003); long-term residents (2003); students and researchers (2004, 2005; updated in 2016); EU Blue Card (2009) and one-time permit (2011) ^[26]. The suitability test is a comprehensive assessment of the Legal Migration Directives concerning their implementation by the EU Member States.

The results of the suitability test were used in the New Migration and Asylum Pact 2020 to announce some initiatives to revise the Long-term Residence Directive and revise the Single Permit Directive.

Thus, the process of adopting all directives without exception was complicated and faced contradictions from individual Member States. It is extremely difficult to achieve a unified consensus in an environment where each State proceeds from its own needs and interests. As a result, the system created by the policy makers turned out to be extremely cumbersome. The directives on seasonal workers and internal corporate employees have deepened labor migration legislation, making it more substantive, but they remain not very cost-effective in comparison with the General admission directive, which provides migrants with much broader rights, which remains a serious problem in terms of migration control and diversification of the labor migration flow. The issue of controlling legal migration during the crisis and the need to protect their own borders further complicated the negotiation processes between EU states and delayed the possible unification of migration legislation. As a result of the current stagnation, the European Commission decided to reform migration legislation not only from the point of view of the labor aspect of migration, but also from the point of view of legal migration [27. p. 5-9].

The new migration pact of the European Parliament

In September 2020, the European Commission put forward a proposal for a new Migration and Asylum Pact, which would allow countries to reach consensus on accepting migrants. The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, said that migration is an inevitable reality for the EU, and the old system regarding migration does not work. The Pact was designed to strengthen trust between EU member states by addressing aspects of migration such as border control and verification, asylum and relations with external partners ^[28]. The EU needed to develop new legislation in the field of regulation of the migration process in connection with the crises described in the section above.

The Pact provides for strengthening control in relations with transit countries located in the immediate vicinity of the EU borders, building a stable architecture for the security of the EU borders (especially strengthening the coast guard) and strengthening solidarity between countries.  The new 2020 pact includes the following sections: verification of identity, health and safety; new asylum rules; "solidarity mechanism in search and rescue, pressure and crisis situations"; risk analysis of a possible crisis; effective return policy; partnership with key third countries of origin and transit; etc ^[29].

A key change in the EU's policy regarding the admission of migrants is the development of a mechanism for the verification procedure and the asylum procedure. In this context, the Commission will be guided by the political agreements already reached on the Qualification Regulations and the Directive on Admission Conditions ^[30]. The cornerstone of the document is the creation of a solidarity mechanism, different from the Dublin Regulation, which means the formation of a system to ensure solidarity on a permanent basis among all EU countries. The system is designed to help the EU identify the Member State responsible for reviewing an application for international protection through effective measures proposed by the Commission. The formation of this system will significantly limit the provisions on termination of liability and the possibility of its redistribution between Member States due to the actions of the applicant. This step significantly reduces the time required to send requests and receive responses, which guarantees that applicants will have a quick response from the responsible Member State and, consequently, equally effective access to international protection procedures ^[30]. Following the guidelines of the European Court of Justice, solidarity implies that all Member States must contribute to the newly returned sponsorship. In this case, EU States should provide the necessary financial or non-financial support to a member State that is under pressure in order to return migrants quickly. In this regard, the State providing support assumes full responsibility if the return of the relocant is not carried out within the prescribed period.

However, what specific steps does the Pact propose for the formation of this system? First of all, it is worth focusing on asylum procedures. In this regard, the Commission proposes to establish a single procedure that will be applicable to all citizens of non-EU countries crossing the border without permission. The procedure, first of all, should include a check before entry. Migrants will have to undergo identification, health and safety checks, fingerprinting and registration in the Eurodac database. This check will ensure transparency, and screening will speed up the process of determining a person's status. The asylum procedure and the rapid return procedure will be combined by common legal acts, within the framework of which the process of considering asylum applications from citizens from countries with low chances of approval will be accelerated and will not require legal entry into the territory of an EU member State. It will also be necessary to work out the process of moving an asylum applicant to another country, which will allow the procedure to continue. The accelerated procedure will be applied in cases where the applicant wants to bypass the admission procedures in a country with a "low level of asylum" or when he poses a security threat to EU countries. If the application is rejected, the return procedure will be applied to the applicant in order to limit unauthorized movement. This will make it possible to integrate all the steps that were previously so disparate, and to determine the responsibility of the receiving party for accepting migrants.

An additional step is also to amend the Directive on Long-term Residents so that beneficiaries of international protection have an incentive to remain in the Member State that provided international protection, with the prospect of obtaining long-term resident status after three years of legal and continuous residence in an EU State ^[31]. 

The Pact also pays special attention to the section on integrated border management, as it is an essential aspect of asylum and return policy. According to the pact, border management will be carried out by the European Border and Coast Guard, which includes the Frontex agency, which is the first law enforcement agency fully subordinate to the supranational bodies of the European Union. In addition, to ensure integrated border management, countries need to establish full compatibility of their IT systems, which would allow monitoring the right to legal residence of all third-country nationals in EU countries and identify violations. It is also proposed to create a digitized Schengen visa by 2025. The European Commission also proposes the development of a coordinated EU approach to search and rescue practices based, again, on the principles of solidarity.

The document also focuses on ensuring the stable functioning of the Schengen Area. Due to the fact that the EU introduces temporary internal border controls in the early 2020s in connection with the crisis caused by the large influx of migrants, it is also necessary to develop a strategy that would allow the creation of an integrated Schengen area. A practical response to the provisions described in the pact is the message published by the European Commission on June 2, 2021 on a new Strategy for the future of Schengen ^[32]. It includes a proposal to amend the regulation on the Schengen Assessment and Monitoring Mechanism ^[33]. and the Schengen Border Code. The strategy includes such elements as: ensuring effective and modern management of the external borders of the EU; strengthening the Schengen area from the inside; improving governance in order to increase trust between EU countries, etc.

The Pact also provides for the creation of a New EU Action Plan to Combat Migrant Smuggling for 2021-2025 ^[34], which focuses on combating criminal networks, migrant smuggling and human trafficking. The new document also focuses on tougher penalties for employers who employ illegal migrants.

Migration is a cornerstone on the agenda of the EU's interaction with external partners. This issue will be considered most relevant in relations with developing countries in Asia and Africa, since the largest number of migrants to EU countries originate from there. However, this aspect will also be important in relations with Ukraine, from where a stream of refugees has been arriving in EU countries since 2022. The regulation of external interactions implies the continuation of humanitarian assistance and investment in response to the effective management of migration by other countries. Thus, by creating conditions for reducing poverty and promoting democracy in transit countries, the EU is trying to eradicate the underlying causes of illegal migration, thereby reducing the number of migrants.

The concept of a "crisis situation" is introduced in the document. If there is a migration surge in the EU, EU countries will be able to receive expanded powers by decision of the European Commission. They will also include the ability to keep refugees at the border for up to 20 weeks during the consideration of their application.

Despite the desire to limit the flows of illegal migrants and the desire to control them, one should not forget about the benefits of labor migration for the European Union. There is a shortage of highly qualified personnel in most EU countries, so it is necessary to develop a strategy to maximize opportunities for legal migration in order to ensure an effective entry procedure. Since there is an increasing shortage of qualified labor in the EU countries, especially in the field of health and medicine, the Commission proposed to revise the Directives on Long-term residence and the development of the EU personnel reserve. This directive was published in October 2021 ^[30] and repealed Council Directive 2009/50/EC.

In this regard, the reform of the EU Blue Card is also proposed, which "should bring real added value to the EU in attracting qualified personnel." EU countries should ensure the necessary level of rights and guarantees provided to EU Blue Card holders and their family members, comparable to the level of rights of holders of residence permits. When implementing the Directive, EU countries should not forget about the inadmissibility of discrimination, in accordance with Council Directives 2000/43/EC and 2000/78/EC. According to the Directive, Member States have the opportunity to accept applications for an EU Blue Card on the basis of a certificate of higher professional skills, confirmed by professional experience at a level comparable to higher education qualifications related to the profession or industry specified in the employment contract. This directive thus consolidated the new EU legislation regarding the admission of highly qualified labor and became the first step towards attracting talent to EU countries. The document stipulated the conditions for obtaining a Blue Card, the responsibility of the employer, and the regulation of wages. Thus, the document established the framework for the admission of qualified personnel, legally consolidating the provisions on aspects of the migration process.

Summarizing the provisions of this pact, it is worth saying that it is a continuation of the reforms initiated back in 2016. It should be noted that the majority of EU states highly approved the new proposals. And the EU was able to achieve some results on the way to its adoption: an early warning and forecasting system was developed, a recommendation on cooperation in search and rescue was developed, 23 EU countries agreed to provide support to member states under pressure (Italy, Cyprus, Greece, Malta). Nevertheless, the project has repeatedly faced criticism regarding all its points (especially in the spring of 2021), so the 2020 pact has not entered into force. And while some countries considered the measures of "mandatory solidarity" insufficiently radical, others opposed "coercion" on migration regulation issues. The issue of establishing a special mechanism for rescue operations at sea was also criticized by some countries. Some EU member states advocate countering secondary movements of migrants, and some are afraid of being overloaded with the responsibilities of accepting applications ^{[35, pp. 72-77]}. On April 27, 2021, the "Strategy for the Voluntary Return and Reintegration of Illegal Migrants" was published, which set itself the task of harmonizing standards for counseling on return ^[26]. However, this strategy did not achieve its goals, and discussions around the adoption of the Pact continued.

Throughout 2023, the countries tried to agree on a common policy regarding migration rules. Frontex recorded a 17% increase in illegal border crossings over the year, with a total of 355,000 cases registered. The growth on the West African route is particularly visible: 32,400 cases, which is an absolute record. The busiest migration route in 2023 was the Central Mediterranean, where 152 thousand cases were registered. But on the English Channel routes and in the Western Balkan direction, on the contrary, there was a decline. The problem of illegal migration, therefore, has now widely affected the EU countries. And disagreement with measures to protect the coastline by some countries only exacerbates the current situation ^[37]. EU countries need to find a compromise and develop a common policy for accepting migrants. Otherwise, as Josep Borrel argues: "migration can become a dissolving force for the EU" ^[38].

Finally, in December 2023, the EU countries agreed on a decision on migration policy, which had been in development for so long. In a successful scenario, after the next elections to the European Parliament, the reform will still take place in the summer of 2024. Before that, the pact will have to be voted on in the European Parliament and the EU Council. Since the vote is conducted according to the rule of qualified majority, where no EU country will have the opportunity to veto, it should not cause difficulties.

In the end, 5 key proposals of the pact were formulated. It is proposed to create uniform rules for identification upon arrival of citizens from non-EU countries, which will increase the security of the Schengen area. The common Eurodac database will be upgraded to detect unauthorized movements. Asylum, return and border control procedures are faster and more efficient. A new solidarity mechanism is being created for all 27 EU member states in order to balance the existing system, in which several countries are responsible for most asylum applications, and clear rules of responsibility will be formulated. If the member states of the European Union decide to refuse to accept migrants, they can pay an allowance of 20 thousand euros for each rejected person. Finally, the EU will ensure that it is prepared to deal with crisis situations in the future, including changing the procedure for reviewing asylum applications from low-rated countries. The accelerated procedure will take up to 12 weeks ^[39].

However, the pressure to adopt these initiatives on the EU countries was so strong that not all states agreed with the existing provisions. And even in 2023, some countries took measures to introduce their own migration bills. It is not so realistic that the new pact will already show visible changes by the time of the EU elections. However, in order to finally achieve significant results in the future, the EU countries need to come to a consensus on this issue, in connection with which we will next consider the attitude of some EU countries to migration policy issues.

The position of the EU Member States on the migration issue

The concept of a unified migration policy in the spirit of European solidarity is becoming extremely difficult to implement, primarily due to the rejection of it by some EU countries. And it is not just about the difference of interests of the EU member states, which has accompanied European policy since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, but about the formation of two different poles of opinion in the principles of the formation of the Union's migration policy. When the "old Europe" makes all possible attempts to resolve the situation, developing directives to regulate more and more layers of migrants and seeks to adapt newcomers to the EU structure, the Visegrad Four countries ^[40] and Northern Europe advocate a U-turn towards strengthening external borders and striving for zero migration. This circumstance speaks not just about the contradictions between the EU countries on the issue of migration, but about a full-fledged bloc policy that does not allow us to act reactively and in the spirit of European solidarity on this issue. Of course, it is impossible not to identify the socio-economic reasons for such rejection in the countries of the former Eastern Bloc: the economies of these states are still insufficiently independent and vulnerable to increased socio-economic pressure, which implies the admission of migrants.

The most ardent opponents of relaxation in the migration principles of the Union, as well as the introduction of a quota system for asylum, are Hungary and Poland. Despite the fact that the B4 countries are not the ultimate goal of the migration movement, but rather are transit countries on the migration route from the Middle East and East Asia, during the migration crisis of 2015, migration pressure on these countries was extremely high. According to Eurostat data in 2015 Hungary accepted about 110 thousand migrants, while Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic accepted less than 300 people ^[41]. Thus, Hungary's harsh position is quite understandable. After the start of the CBO, there has also been a significant migration flow from Ukraine to the B4 countries, which is not recorded in the official Eurostat register as "migration". At the same time, to date, the number of Ukrainian refugees who have arrived in Poland has amounted to about 16 million people ^[42].

Tightening the internal migration policy of these countries and defending their own interests in these circumstances looks quite natural. During the migration crisis in Hungary, the conditions of stay of migrants were complicated, border controls were tightened, the constitution was amended that "foreign population should not settle in the country" ^[43], a law was introduced banning the activities of organizations helping migrants in the country. In Slovakia, the tightening began even earlier, in 2011, border controls were tightened and the requirements for migrants to apply for work and obtain entry permits were increased, the emphasis was shifted to the admission of qualified labor, which was reflected in the migration strategy until 2020 ^[44]. Similar measures have been taken in Poland and the Czech Republic.

The most striking manifestation of the disagreement of the B4 countries was the process of agreeing on the idea of quota redistribution ^[45] Within the framework of this initiative, the relocation and redistribution of refugees by EU states on a mandatory basis was assumed, which caused a sharp rejection of the B4 countries. After a number of joint statements by the B4 countries on the categorical refusal to comply with such distribution agreements on a mandatory basis, arguing this with the issue of national sovereignty, the deputy from Hungary put forward a completely nationalistic thesis "Europe for Europeans" ^[46]. Although the decision was not supported by the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, it was adopted by a majority vote. In 2017 Hungary and Slovakia also appealed to the European Court of Justice with a claim about the illegality of the redistribution policy on the territory of their countries. The claim was also supported by Poland, which, along with Hungary, refused to accept the redistributed refugees. It must be said that the Czech Republic and Slovakia took a more flexible position by accepting refugees, but in much smaller numbers than they should have ^[47].

Thus, despite minor discrepancies, we can talk about a common position of the B4 countries regarding the EU migration policy, which was formed back in 2016, at the height of the migration crisis. The position of these countries has not changed today. Almost immediately after the announcement of the plan for a new EU migration pact in 2020, representatives of the B4 countries at a meeting with Ursula Von Der Leyen announced their disagreement with the pact and their sharp rejection of its main provisions ^[48]. Hungary and Poland have announced their intention to block the decision on the adoption of the pact and its potential danger to the migration situation in the EU. Jadwiga Wisniewska, a member of the European Parliament from the Polish Law and Justice Party, stated that "the launch of the migration pact and the principle of forced resettlement included in it legalizes illegal migration to the European Union. Legalizes illegal criminal activity" ^[49] According to the head of Hungary, Viktor Orban, "Brussels legally raped Poland and Hungary by imposing a migration pact on them. There will be no compromise on migration" ^[50]. To date, Hungary has become the only B4 country that has officially refused to follow the migration pact adopted at the end of December 2023 ^[51]. It is very likely that Poland will soon come up with a similar initiative.

If the states of Central Europe, or "young Europe", have traditionally been characterized by their insubordination and disagreement with the policy of Brussels, then the disagreement of the Nordic countries, which stood at the origins of European Integration, is much more worrying. Denmark stands out first of all for its extremely anti-immigration policy. For more than 7 years, the official concept of the country's migration policy has been the pursuit of "zero migration". In 2020, a decree was introduced in the country, according to which jewelry and any expensive property worth more than 10 thousand crowns are charged from visiting migrants. Funds from the sale of jewelry are used to pay for the residence of migrants in the country. In 2021, a decree was also introduced, according to which all refugees living in Denmark on benefits are required to carry out socially useful activities in the form of cleaning streets and beaches. In addition, Denmark is actively implementing an initiative for the forced resettlement and resettlement of third-country nationals from certain neighborhoods where the percentage of migrants living exceeds the percentage of the indigenous population. Refugees are forcibly resettled in other areas, and their homes are destroyed ^[52]. Denmark is also actively negotiating with third countries to set up camps on their territory for refugees awaiting a response on an application to enter the country. The financial maintenance of the camps is provided by Copenhagen, while the responsibility for refugees lies with the countries where the camps are located. Denmark also initiated the creation of the Alliance of Nordic States to facilitate the deportation of arriving illegal migrants, which includes Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Norway and Sweden ^[53].  Of course, it should be mentioned that Denmark has long limited its involvement in the European migration field by refusing to participate in the third edition of the Dublin Regulation, but it is becoming a serious regional example for other Nordic countries that are in opposition when making decisions on migration and the new migration pact.

For many countries in Western Europe and Southern Europe, migration remains one of the most important internal problems. Considering the example of France, it can be noted that the country is extremely interested in tightening migration legislation and strengthening control over the arrival of illegal migrants. Migration has been on the agenda for French politicians since the 1980s, and continues to be relevant to this day. By 2022, about 12.8% of migrants from the total population of the country lived in France, and by the end of the year about 500 thousand new cases of migration were registered. The main reason for migration is education, as well as job search, which is why there is an increase in illegal labor migrants in France. At the same time, it is quite difficult to calculate the total number of illegal immigrants. In the light of the summer pogroms of 2023, this topic caused a wide resonance among the political elites, prompting the French leadership to tighten measures to control illegal migrants.

On December 20, 2023, France adopted a new immigration law, according to which the residence permit for illegal immigrants employed in sectors of the economy where there is a shortage of workers was canceled ^[54]. "Scarce workers" can obtain a residence permit for a period of one year only in special cases. The repeal of the article, which previously provided for the immediate issuance of a work permit when applying for asylum to visitors from some States. The procedure for processing an application for asylum will also be accelerated, and this is done in order to quickly return to their homeland illegal immigrants who cannot apply for it. This point, we note, correlates with the Migration and Asylum Pact agreed by the EU. And despite such drastic measures to build France's own policy immediately before agreeing on the provisions of the Pact, it is still possible to trace some similarities with the directives approved by the EU. Also, in the case of a significant threat to state security, migrants who arrived in France under the age of 13 or have been living in France for more than 20 years will not be subject to previously applied measures of protection against expulsion. Social benefits for migrants who have been in the country for less than 5 years without work or 3 months for working migrants have been canceled. The criteria for obtaining French citizenship have also been revised, which include a higher level of knowledge of the French language, and an increase in the time limit for legal stay in the country from 5 to 10 years ^[55]. This law is expected to facilitate the expulsion of illegal migrants to their homeland, because in 2023 France returned about 5 thousand foreigners in 2023.

France is also trying to limit the flow of migrants from Italy, a country for which the problem of migration has remained more than relevant for several decades. The situation on the Italian island of Lampedusa has become one of the most high-profile cases of illegal migration in 2023. In September, 11 thousand migrants landed on the island, after which almost 500 people rescued by an NGO vessel were taken to Puglia. Migration waves have widely swept Italy, and in 2023 the number of migrants increased by another 127 thousand people. This figure is 2 times higher than in 2022. The Lampedusa incident caused a real crisis: Sicilian reception centers were overcrowded. Some migrants tried to make their way to the border with France, but very unsuccessfully, as France tightened control over trains running between border towns.

In this regard, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni promised that she would not allow the country to turn into a migration pit, saying that "the future of Europe is under threat" if the EU countries do not work together to find "serious solutions." J. Meloni became one of the key figures of the agreement signed between the EU and Tunisia has reached an agreement worth 100 million euros to stop illegal migration. However, so far it has not brought tangible results, and the number of migrants has increased, and the delegation of the European Parliament has been refused entry to Tunisia. Nevertheless, there are still positive changes, and J. Meloni continues to adhere to her chosen course ^[56]. Italy plans to tighten the system for asylum seekers to stop illegal migration. Italy needs to ensure the safety of the population in times of crisis by increasing the transport capacity for the transportation of migrants, create obstacles for the illegal business of delivering migrants, while providing for the creation of legal humanitarian corridors ^[57].

The fight against illegal migration is the leitmotif of the foreign policy of the EU member states. Germany, the Netherlands, and Greece adhere to the policy of tightening migration control (as France and Italy are doing). In Germany, for example, in November, new measures were prepared to regulate illegal migration, which make it possible to speed up the procedures for processing asylum applications and reduce benefits to applicants, as well as increase financial assistance for federal states and municipalities to solve problems with the influx of migrants ^[58]. In general, in many EU countries today we can also see anti-immigrant sentiments.

Thus, in the EU, there is a confrontation between two approaches to the adoption of migration ideas, where some countries advocate strengthening control over external borders, while others advocate strengthening migration control within the borders of EU states. However, the main reason why the EU has been unable to develop a unified migration policy for so long is the disunity in building internal policies of EU member states regarding migration. And while the Visegrad Four countries strongly reject the provisions of the pact, many Western European countries, on the contrary, advocate actions to strengthen control over migrants and agree with the principles of common solidarity ^{[59, p. 143-145]}.  Before the pact was agreed in December, a diplomatic scandal occurred at an informal summit of the European Political Community in October, which once again showed the differentiated approach of EU countries to migration issues. The Hungarian Prime Minister even compared attempts to force the country to make immigration decisions to "rape." Hungary was also supported on this issue by its Polish counterpart, Mateusz Morawiecki. In turn, Georgia Meloni and Olaf Scholz also entered into a dispute regarding the transfer of migrants from the Mediterranean to Italy, and not to Germany ^[60]. These disagreements only highlight the failure of the EU to develop a common policy on migration. Immigration is a stumbling block for EU countries, which can really become a divisive factor. And despite efforts to adopt a new pact based on the principles of common solidarity, a unified policy towards this problem, the EU countries have not been able to achieve.

Conclusion

As a result, it can be noted that the process of transformation of migration legislation in the EU countries is a very complex process. It is extremely difficult to reach a consensus in an environment where each State proceeds from its own needs and interests. The directive system turned out to be extremely cumbersome and inconvenient for the EU. The issues of controlling legal migration during the crisis and the need to protect their own borders have further complicated the negotiation processes between EU states and delayed the possible unification of migration legislation. As a result of the current stagnation and shortage of workers, but at the same time the desire to control illegal migration, the European Commission decides to reform migration legislation not only from the point of view of the labor aspect of migration, but also from the point of view of its legalization. The 2020 Migration and Asylum Pact is the practical result of a deep process of transformation of EU legislation. The Pact proposes the creation of a system of common European solidarity and a number of other important initiatives for the EU. However, from the point of view of the issue we are considering, it is more important to create a unified legislative framework that would help control migration processes. It took a very long time to agree on the latest versions and provisions of the Pact, because not all member countries agreed with its provisions. As a result, we can notice the division of countries into several so-called blocs, in one of which countries advocate the adoption of the provisions of the Pact and increased control over migration flows, while others express disagreement with the policy of Brussels. Despite significant progress in the negotiation process in 2023, the countries have not been able to reach consensus on this issue. The solidarity so imposed by Brussels only highlights the disunity of the EU countries on migration legislation. And countries have not yet been able to achieve such unified results on this issue. The ideas proposed by the European Commission on the division of responsibility, improvement of information bases, strengthening of the coast guard, etc., are certainly very reasonable and logical. However, real data on migration flows to the EU do not yet allow us to see the effectiveness of this policy, and some countries even form their own course without waiting for a response from Brussels. Thus, until the EU countries reach a consensus on the migration crisis and ways to control it, the transformation of migration legislation will remain a long, uncoordinated process without any significant results. And only some progress in this direction (in the form of the agreement of the pact in December 2023) gives some chance to regulate the migration crisis by the EU countries.