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Pris, I. E. About Loar’s Phenomenal Concepts

Abstract: The article is devoted to the analysis of the term ‘phenomenal concept’ offered by Brian Loar. The author of the present article proves that Loar’s concept does not contradict to Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Quite on the contrary, Loar’s concept of the ‘phenomenal concept’ is a necessary stage in solving the problem of the explanatory gap. However, conceptual dualism in Loar’s interpretation cannot be the final solution of the aforesaid problem, it only takes the problem to a new conceptual level. The ‘gap’ between phenomenal concepts and physicalistic/functional concepts must be explained (or covered) materialistically. The conceptionof thin and thick implicit physical and phenomenal concepts offered by Ned Block allows to take a step in this direction. It can be assumed that a better synthesis of Wittgenstein’s second philosophy and metaphysics of phenomenal properties and concepts would completely solve the problem of the explanatory gap. The main research method used by the author of the article is the analytical method of the modern philosophy of consciousness. The author also conducts a brief comparative analysis of different approaches to phenomenal concepts and analyzes the definition of the phenomenal concept offered by Brian Loar as well as the application of that concept for solving the problem of the explanatory gap in terms of other approaches. The author proves that the concept of the phenomenal concept does not oppose to late Wittgenstein’s philosophy, in particular, his private language argument. The author also points out that there is a chance to fully solve the problem of the explanatory gap.


Keywords:

phenomenal concept, theoretical concept, explanatory gap, semantic premise, phenomenal property, phenomenal experience, Brian Loar, conceptual dualism, dualism, a posteriori physicalism.


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References
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