Typologization of modern concepts of metaphilosophy

Mironova Alina Mikhailovna ORCID: 0000-0002-6651-849X Specialist in Educational and Methodological Work, Southern Federal University 344065, Russia, Rostov region, Rostov-On-Don, lane. Dneprovsky, 116, of. a woinova@yandex.ru

        Contrary to the predictions of F. Nietzsche, philosophy did not disappear, ^[1] but, in the XIX -XX centuries, it underwent significant transformations, making a bias in sociology, then in political economy, then looking for itself in phenomenology, then in existentialism and positivism.  The situation of pluralism of theories, trends, schools, separated and each engaged in its own "business", developed with the transition from classical philosophy to non-classical, due to the loss of a single subject field of philosophy, which characterized classical philosophy. In classical philosophy, various philosophical schools and trends "sang in unison", because they had one subject, and even opposing philosophical positions, complementing each other, helped to reveal a single content. Since the XIX century, the paradigm of classical philosophy has been losing its relevance; it has been replaced by non-classical philosophy, in which various philosophical trends focus their attention on individual fragments of the formerly unified subject of philosophy. In the current situation, the idea of "metaphilosophy" becomes relevant, as an integrative phenomenon necessary to bring isolated philosophical trends to the "common denominator".

       Morris Lazerowitz introduced the concept of "metaphilosophy" into scientific circulation in 1940 in order to emphasize the difference between traditional (descriptive) and genuine (reflexive) philosophy, and if the former is trying to "communicate something about the world," then the second task of the latter is to understand why philosophers philosophize at all."^[2]

      In the era of post-non-classical philosophy, the need for metaphilosophy is increasing, because not only new philosophical trends are coming on the scene, but philosophy willingly turns to empirical research, experiments, data from natural sciences. In the post-non-classical era, the integration of scientific disciplines takes place, the dialogue between different types of knowledge is strengthened, and in philosophy there is a need for an integrating, reflecting, structuring, "normative" discipline. In addition, the current situation in philosophy is characterized not only by the pluralism of philosophical theories, methodological diversity, but also by the "vagueness" of the concept of philosophy. In our time, the position or status of philosophy in the modern world is not entirely clear - if earlier "all sciences existed in the bosom of holistic philosophical knowledge, now philosophy has given them all its possessions, itself remaining uncertain. The role of universal ontology has been taken by physics, psychology and neuroscience are engaged in the theory of cognition, sociology is investigating society, etc. Hence the involuntary feeling of the crisis of philosophical knowledge."  ^[3]

         Philosophy can overcome the crisis, regain its former status, or find a new identity, realizing that it exists in the modern world. Metaphilosophy is a phenomenon that naturally appeared in the crisis era, as a response to the request of philosophy about its essence, methods, place in the world and prospects.

       Questions about the relevance and relevance of philosophy have been repeatedly discussed. According to T.I. Oizerman, philosophy helps to comprehend the future not only of philosophy, but also of society. ^[4] J. Deleuze and F. Guattari, pointing to the dynamism of modern philosophy, which keeps pace with the times, reacts to achievements in natural science and other fields of knowledge, write: "The task of philosophy is not to contemplate the eternal and not to reflect on history, but to diagnose current developments... in every present or past" ^[5]     

        Metaphilosophy is not just a compilation of answers to the question "what is philosophy?" different authors, not a selection of the most "successful" or concise answers. Metaphilosophy is the search for answers to the question "how is philosophy possible?", the reflection of philosophy on oneself, the search for identity, the search for one's own limits, comparison with other forms of knowledge and culture, as well as forecasting the future of philosophy.

        The subject of metaphilosophy is philosophy, individual philosophical teachings, author's "philosophies". The subject of the history of philosophy and metaphilosophy is the same – philosophical teachings in all their diversity; so what is the specificity of each of them? According to V. V. Vasiliev, "the history of philosophy ... provides such material that helps to see behind the particulars of philosophical theories certain essential features that a metaphilosophist needs for normative reasoning about philosophy ^[6]. If metaphilosophy is engaged in the development of normative judgments about philosophy, then, in that case, how does it differ from the methodology of philosophy? According to V. N. Porus, the ability of philosophical methodology to self-reflection is realized in metaphilosophy; metaphilosophy is its "self-consciousness". ^[7].

       Despite its relative "youth", metaphilosophy has already acquired many concepts in which we encounter contradictory interpretations of philosophy, its essence, and tasks. Metaphilosophy is reflexive in its essence and unity in its understanding is impossible, and pluralism is necessary; pluralism of concepts is "an objective condition of its existence, and not at all the result of the delusions of individual authors." ^[8] On the other hand, the abundance and inconsistency of the material create certain difficulties in comprehending it.  In order to streamline the existing concepts of metaphilosophy, the author made an attempt to compare the metaphilosophical concepts of domestic and foreign authors (T. I. Oizerman, M. K. Mamardashvili, J. Deleuze and F. Guattari, N. Rescher and T. Williamson) according to certain criteria. Soviet and European philosophers worked at about the same time (with the exception of their younger contemporary T. Williamson), and they are united by the fact that in their works philosophy again "becomes philosophy", integral, comprehensive, (as in the days of classical philosophy); although its methods vary among the authors.  The circle of scientists investigating the issues of metaphilosophy is very wide, and the choice of the listed personalities is explained, among other things, by the presence in their concepts of points of intersection (as well as collisions) regarding the place of philosophy in the modern world, its methods and prospects. In addition, the interpretation of the concept of philosophy by the listed authors and their methodology is of research interest. Within the framework of the tasks set, it is supposed to identify the essential characteristics of the concept of "metaphilosophy" of the listed authors and propose a variant of the typology of modern concepts of metaphilosophy.

        The typologization of philosophy and metaphilosophy are related, and the choice of grounds for typologization is determined by the objectives of the study. Philosophical teachings are classified according to historical basis (ancient, medieval philosophy), regional (eastern and western), national characteristics (Russian, German, French). There are fewer grounds for classifying metaphilosophical teachings, and they are determined by its specifics as a meta-discipline. The range of her questions is not so wide: what is philosophy? (what is its nature, essential features), how should one philosophize? (what are the methods, principles of philosophy), where is the boundary between philosophy and science? (literature, poetry, religion, culture), why should one study philosophy? and finally, what are the prospects of philosophy? (is there progress in philosophy, what is its future, is there an accumulation of knowledge?).

       Sufficient grounds for the typology of metaphilosophical teachings, according to the author, are the following:

1. division by conceptual basis – as an answer to the question "what is philosophy?" and related questions ("what is not philosophy?", "where is the boundary between philosophy and other forms of spiritual culture?"),

2. division by methodological basis, - as an answer to the question about the method, principles and norms of philosophical research and

3. in relation to the possibility of progress in philosophy and its prospects.

     In the works of researchers, as a rule, there is a division of metaphilosophical concepts according to conceptual and methodological features ^{[9, 7, 6]}. It seems appropriate to the author to single out another feature for possible typologies of metaphilosophical concepts, namely, if possible, progress in philosophy. The expediency of highlighting the above–mentioned basis for typology is explained by the fact that the possibility of progress in philosophy, the accumulation of knowledge in philosophy is the most important issue of metaphilosophy, without which it would not be a meta-discipline reflecting the present and past of philosophy and predicting its future. In addition, the question of the life and development of philosophy (or its death), the possibility of the accumulation of philosophical knowledge (or the non-cumulative nature of philosophy) and its prospects is a stumbling block of various metaphilosophical concepts. Different researchers (T. I. Oizerman, T. Williamson, N. Rescher, D. Stoljar, W. Renz, etc.) have contradictory positions on the possibility of the development of philosophy, the accumulation of philosophical knowledge and the future of philosophy as a whole. The question of the future of philosophy is especially relevant today, since philosophy has delegated most of its powers to other sciences. Is philosophy in demand, or can ideology, psychology, and anthropology take its place? Are the traditional methods of philosophical research modern, or should philosophy turn to the methodology of natural and social sciences? The attitude to the possibility of progress in philosophy is the key to understanding the authors' positions not only on the topic of the historical path of philosophy, but also to their interpretation of metaphilosophy as a whole.

       "Thought always feels the need to find a truly proportionate expression for its true intention," G.-G. Gadamer wrote about the concept ^[10]. The division of concepts according to the conceptual basis is the most common, because the concept gives us in a concise form the most valuable information about the subject being studied. The concept is a necessary logical form, it allows us to represent any object abstractly. Metaphilosophical concepts can be systematized by definition and essential characteristics. A variant of the definition is the comparison of philosophy with other forms of spiritual activity and culture. The oppositions "philosophy and religion", "philosophy and literature", "philosophy and art", "philosophy and reflection", "philosophy and communication", which we meet in the works of researchers, allow us to delineate the boundaries of philosophy, to understand what philosophy is not, and the pairs "philosophy as science", "philosophy as a worldview" offer a positive definition, i.e. describe what it is. ^[4,5]

The division of definitions into positive and negative has a long history and comes from "apophatics" and "cataphatics" as ways of describing the One, First Principle, God. The apophatic method goes back to Plotinus, Philo of Alexandria, Dionysius the Areopagite and assumes that God is incomprehensible, so the predicates used to describe Him are always negative (negative). The cataphatic method was actively used in the Middle Ages by Christian thinkers and is a description of the divine in the positive definitions of "all-good", "all-seeing", "God is love", etc. A positive definition is, as it were, the essence, the clot of the entire philosophical system. A positive definition allows a scientist to crystallize the main content of the entire system and "present it" in a concentrated form. A negative definition, in turn, looks like a shadow that covers up what is superfluous (what the object being defined is not) and leaves what is needed in the light. Nowadays, apophatics and cataphatics, as ways of defining concepts, have not lost their relevance and continue to be actively used by modern scientists. A.D. Elyakov suggests separating groups of metaphilosophical concepts through the definition and essential features of the approach: "Two approaches to understanding its essence have been formed in philosophy: rational (conceptual) and irrational (intuitive) ^[9]. Yelyakov cites M. K. Mamardashvili's position as an example of an intuitive approach. Mamardashvili believed that since "philosophy cannot be defined," and "these attempts obscure, dispel clarity," it is necessary to go the following way, the essence of which can be drawn by analogy with the house: "...why...it is purely verbal to describe the interior of the house, if you can enter ... by the hand and show? Moreover, we have such a hand, namely intuition" ^[11]. According to M. Mamardashvili, "philosophy cannot be defined"; it is possible to understand what it is only through intuition, personal experience, "experiment". Mamardashvili says: "philosophy is not a system of knowledge that could be passed on to others and thereby teach them," ... "the path to philosophy ... runs through our own trials, thanks to which we gain irreplaceable unique experience" ^[11]. He notes that usually such an "experience is accompanied by a detached view of the world." The Soviet philosopher is categorically against textbooks on philosophy, according to Mamardashvili, one can study philosophy only by reading philosophical treatises. Mamardashvili's comprehension of philosophy is a two-level act. On the one hand, it is a phenomenon akin to insight, an internal act, "which flares up, mediating other actions." At some point, "the world seems to push you out of yourself at the moment of experience, alienates you, and you suddenly clearly feel something, realize. This is the meaningful, true possibility of this world... In this state, much can be revealed to you." At the same time, "along the other half of the arc, the philosophy of already existing concepts is coming towards us" ^[11]. That is, on the one hand, the philosopher must, as it were, go halfway down to the experience itself, including his personal experience, which I called an experiment, and not just an empirical experience. And on the other hand, philosophical concepts allow us to continue this path of knowledge, since it is no longer possible to experience further without their help."  Thus, in order to comprehend philosophy, it is necessary to experience personal experience, and then clothe it in existing concepts and terms.  Mamardashvili offers a "negative" definition of philosophy (philosophy is not a system of knowledge) and focuses on the intuitive way of comprehending it.

Regarding the development of philosophy, Mamardashvili's position is categorical: "there is no history of philosophy." For him, only the acts of philosophizing themselves are important, and not their symbolic expression (treatises, articles, etc.), which is why we can understand the works of a philosopher only if a response occurs in us, if we are able to reproduce his act of philosophizing ^[12].  According to  Mamardashvili, philosophy is comprehended, first of all, intuitively, irrationally; the scientist does not formulate a classical definition of philosophy and even opposes it…

       In T.I. Oizerman's metaphilosophical concept, the definition of philosophy is formulated very clearly.  T. I. Oizerman's definition is "positive", describes what philosophy is: "Philosophy is a system of beliefs forming a general theoretical worldview that comprehends, critically analyzes, summarizes scientific knowledge, everyday practice, historical experience, explores the diversity of forms of universality inherent in nature and society, developing on this basis the principles of cognition, evaluation, behavior and practical activity in general, with which people in various historical epochs associate fundamental vital interests." ^[4]

T.I. Oizerman emphasizes that the concept of philosophy is very changeable; in different historical periods, philosophy took on different "faces" that corresponded to each specific socio-historical moment. In the work "Metaphilosophy. The theory of the historical and philosophical process, he gives ten definitions of philosophy of different eras and authors (ancient Indian, ancient Chinese philosophy, philosophy of Modern times, German classical philosophy, neo-positivism, etc.). It is noteworthy that even in the works of eminent philosophers, the criteria of typologization are not always met…The author of the "Theory of the Historical and Philosophical Process" focuses on the fact that "the definitions of philosophy given differ from each other in what they take into philosophy and what they exclude from it ... (theory, science, method, worldview, etc.) ^[4]

      Oizerman asks the question, "is it possible to distract from everything that distinguishes definitions among themselves and highlight what is common to them"? He answers himself that it is possible, but such a definition will be extremely general. Such a general definition of philosophy will be the definition of it as a worldview. ^[4] Every philosophy is a worldview, but not every worldview is philosophy, the scientist emphasizes, because the worldview can be religious, atheistic, optimistic, etc. Nevertheless, philosophy always has a worldview character, the philosopher asserts and substantiates the principles of human existence – ethical, scientific, political, etc. ^[4]

    Oizerman, emphasizing the pluralism of philosophy, says that its diversity is manifested, first of all, in the variety of methods.  "Philosophy, unlike any science, ... exists as an indefinite set of philosophical doctrines that oppose each other, deny each other and at the same time complement each other..." ^[13].

       Cumulative knowledge in philosophy is impossible, says T. I. Oizerman. "All philosophers, building their system, destroy the previous ones – they re-pose all the same questions that have been raised since its inception ..." ^[14]. Oizerman argues that in other sciences, truth usually defeats error fairly quickly, but "the historical and philosophical process does not know such a pattern." Many philosophical truths have not changed in hundreds of years... The reasons for this lie not so much in philosophy as in historically defined socio-economic conditions."^[14]

        The positions of both considered Soviet scientists (Mamardashvili and Oizerman) represent opposite approaches, rational and intuitive, and can be used mutually, for a deeper insight into the essence of philosophy. Reflection on the philosophical treatises of philosophers of past centuries and the works of contemporaries is the most familiar way of philosophizing; but one should not discount the irrational way of comprehending phenomena, it has shown itself in a worthy way in history (the phenomena of mystical experience, sudden insights in science, the inspiration of artists have revealed great works of literature, scientific discoveries and artistic masterpieces to the world).

        The idea of the special role of the philosophical function of philosophy, which is emphasized by Oizerman, is also expressed by Zh. Deleuze and F. Guattari. Philosophy for them is the art of forming, inventing, making concepts. In addition, it is necessary to "put a gloss on them [concepts] and convince people to use them."^[5] It is noteworthy that "next to" the positive, they give a negative definition: "Philosophy " is neither contemplation, nor reflection, nor communication" and explain it: "Philosophy is not contemplation, since contemplation is the very things considered in the course of the creation of the corresponding concepts. Philosophy is not reflection, because no one needs philosophy to think about something"; philosophy is not communication, dialogue, which only lead to "consensus" and do not produce concepts."^[5]

        The work of Deleuze and Guattari illustrates that the search for one's own limits in philosophy can be carried out through negation, comparison and differentiation – the work of philosophers under consideration is full of negative definitions of philosophy. The authors compare philosophy with what it is not, but they also have positive definitions: "philosophy is three elements that correspond to each other, but are considered separately: a pre-philosophical plan that it should draw (immanence), a profilosophical character that it should invent and bring to life (persistence), and the philosophical concepts that it should create (consistency)."^[5] Scientists explain in detail the content of each element. The philosopher, first of all, is engaged in the production of concepts (concepts and concepts), which he extracts from the "ocean" of the immanence plane, which is the reservoir of concepts. French authors cite a number of figurative metaphors and epithets so that readers can understand what a plan and concept are, as well as their relationship. "Concepts are like a multitude of waves that rise and fall, whereas the plane of immanence is the only wave that rolls them up and unfolds." The plane of immanence appears as a metaphysical construction, similar to Spinoza's substance, which is a receptacle of concepts, "which they inhabit without separation." ^[5] Concepts are events, and the plan is an event horizon, a reservoir of purely conceptual events. A conceptual character is a "private thinker opposed to a public professor," thinking independently and in an original way, an "Idiot" who always asks "uncomfortable" questions. Examples of conceptual characters are Plato's Socrates, Nietzsche's Dionysus, and Nikolai Kuzansky's Idiot. Philosophy, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is not a purely rational act, it contains an element of intuition. The position of the French philosophers echoes the position of M. Mamardashvili, they, like him, emphasize that it is not necessary to oppose "cognition through concepts" and through experience (intuition) to each other. ^[5]

          Despite Deleuze's statements about the fallacy of dialectics, the scheme of philosophy development presented in the book looks quite dialectical: the ideas of philosophers of the past do not go into oblivion, they remain, although they serve as a starting point for the formation of new ones.^[5] The development of philosophy according to Deleuze and Guattari looks like this: integral philosophical systems crack, concepts disperse in chaos, and then they "have to be extracted again, searched for, dived for them." ^[5] Philosophy develops due to crises and concussions, and only the sequence of such crises allows us to judge “progress". Development is a struggle against chaos, during which from time to time there is a rapprochement with the enemy.

      For Mamardashvili, Oizerman, Deleuze and Guattari, philosophy looks like an integral worldview system, although philosophers use different methods (rational, irrational, dialectical,). Oizerman and Mamardashvili deny the possibility of cumulative development of philosophy, (philosophy has been asking the same questions anew for centuries, philosophy is separate acts of philosophizing). According to Deleuze and Guattari, there is progress in philosophy and it is realized as a struggle against chaos – thanks to crises, the old system is destroyed, a new one comes to replace it.

          A clear sign for the division of philosophical concepts is their distribution by method. Each science has a methodological apparatus. It is the method that makes some philosophical teachings unique, but, on the other hand, and this nuance is emphasized by A.D. Elyakov, "not all philosophers have explicitly formulated their methods."^[9] Some philosophers, such as T. Williamson, N. Rescher, emphasize the method, while others do not recognize any and this is their uniqueness (for example, P. Feyerabend).

         K.D. Skripnik draws attention to the contrast between the representatives of "systematic" and "instructive" philosophy (so named by R. Rorty) ^[15].  Rorty designated the first by the name of philosophers whose work is constructive, and the second by the name of philosophers whose work is reflexive. Skripnik refers to researchers Overgaard S., Gilbert P., Burwood S., who distinguish implicit and explicit metaphilosophy. Implicit metaphilosophy assumes that "the whole philosophy is internally metaphilosophical, its understanding of itself is included in the understanding and solution of all those controversial questions, the answers to which it seeks, and the problems that it solves. Explicit metaphilosophy is "an open discussion of what is the nature of philosophy, what are its methods, etc."^[15].

      The opposition of "experimental –cabinet" philosophy has become the epicenter of metaphilosophical discussions. Timothy Williamson, as an apologist for the method of "armchair philosophy", argues that philosophy takes into account achievements in the field of natural science and other sciences, but is not experimental. Williamson counters the attacks of empiricists on theoretical philosophy, asserting that "philosophy can become truly rigorous only by adopting the "empirical" methodology of the natural and social sciences." He believes that this conclusion is erroneous, because the most rigorous science of all, mathematics, neglects empiricism. The philosopher defends the rights of the "cabinet" way of thinking as a full-fledged research. He argues his position by the fact that mathematics, the most accurate of the sciences, is "paradigmatically cabinet-like."^[16] Mathematics proves its theorems without relying on experiments, it relies on axioms, the first principles that are accepted without proof. The philosopher stipulates that the epistemological status of these axioms needs to be explained.  As B. Russell pointed out, "... we tend to believe the premises because we see that their consequences are true instead of believing the consequences because we know that the premises are true. But the deduction of premises from consequences is the essence of induction; thus, the method of investigating the principles of mathematics is indeed an inductive method and in essence."^[16] Williamson calls this operation "the conclusion to the best explanation", she points out that in mathematics explanations are not causal, rather, they combine many concrete, mathematical facts. The example of mathematics, writes Williamson, shows that abstract methodology is applicable not only in the natural and social sciences, it is also applicable to desk thinking. By analogy with mathematics, philosophy, according to Williamson, appears as a "clear and well-formulated ... theory", which may consist of "several general principles, as informative, simple and elegant as they can be consistent"; such a theory is capable of providing unifying explanations of many specific, at first glance controversial issues."^[16]  

           Williamson's definition of philosophy is positive, he says that philosophy has a worldview and is the most "successful" theory that is able to give satisfactory explanations on various issues at this historical stage of society's development.^[16]

          Regarding the progress in philosophy, T. Williamson argues that it consists in creating more and more perfect models. "The formal models available in epistemology and philosophy of language are much better than those available in 1950; they provide a deeper and more complex understanding of the underlying structure of knowledge and meaning."^[16] Philosophy, according to Williamson, develops, moreover, it is guided by the principles of pragmatism and efficiency.

         The development of philosophy is one of the main topics for N. Rescher.^[17] Rescher examines the circle of "eternal philosophical problems", the methodology of philosophical research and the driving forces of progress in philosophical knowledge. The history of philosophy shows that even when a new idea (philosophical system) arises, which is perceived as most adequately meeting the needs of society, people do not stop philosophizing, because there are always facts, ideas, teachings that contradict it, i.e. "aporia". The role of "aporias" (inconsistencies, exceptions, controversial points) in the development of philosophy is difficult to overestimate – philosophy "feeds", according to Rescher, such conflicts, because because of them in philosophy there is a constant need for further clarifications and extensions. None of the philosophical systems that have ever existed is perfect, and philosophy is inherently aporic. "Any philosophical position, at any particular stage of its historical development, faces inconsistencies and it is this circumstance that is the motivator for further development.^[17] Rescher calls dialectical the main method moving philosophy forward. The philosopher distinguishes "discriptive philosophy" and "normative". As the name implies, the first type is a descriptive philosophy, i.e. a description of how the authors understand their subject, tasks and methods. The second type, "normative philosophy", is a theory that has a regulatory, prescriptive nature and sets research standards. In the Rescher concept, the emphasis is on normative philosophy, it is thanks to it, as a reflection of philosophy on itself, that progress occurs. It is the normative philosophy that allows us to see the shortcomings of the system of ideas, and searches for solutions. According to Rescher, philosophy develops dialectically, new complexities require more and more subtle and complex solutions; his position echoes that of Williamson, who also talks about the constant improvement, expansion and deepening of knowledge (however, he does not claim that the path of development of philosophical knowledge is strictly dialectical). Rescher repeatedly emphasizes the inadmissibility of dismissive attitude to the criticism of philosophical ideas, because it slows down progress."^[17] The mission of metaphilosophy, according to Rescher, is "to give us the opportunity to orient ourselves in thoughts and actions." Rescher postulates maxims, methodological rules for adequate philosophical practice. Maxims are a guide that a philosopher should follow in his work and are represented by three principles:

-the principle of information adequacy to facilitate understanding,

-the principles of rational persuasiveness to ensure a convincing argument and

- principles of rational economy to prevent unnecessary labor. ^[17]

Philosophical principles should be based on their effectiveness.  Metaphilosophy thus appears as a set of functional, effective principles.

The principle of information adequacy is not to ignore (and even more so, not to deliberately circumvent or conceal) facts that contradict the theory. ^[17] The principle of rational persuasiveness states: "Be able to give a convincing reason for every doctrinal statement that you adhere to..."

And finally, the principle of rational economics consists in the following maxims:

1) "Never explain something that is unclear with something else [more unclear]." A satisfactory explanation should make the situation clearer than it was from the beginning.

This principle has obvious consequences:

2) "Never complicate the situation more than it is" and finally,

3) "Never use inaccessible means to achieve your goal if you can achieve it with the help of ordinary ones (we are talking about the principle of rational economy). This principle, in turn, has a further consequence:

"Entities should not multiply beyond necessity." ^[17]

So, following the listed principles, not ignoring "aporias" (contradictions), but starting from them, arguing your position and not confusing the situation with unclear definitions, you should philosophize.

Rescher says that the list of principles of philosophical research can be continued, this is not the final number of them; principles, like philosophical truths, are formulated with necessity, principles cannot contradict each other; principles are conditions for the successful development of philosophy; although the development of knowledge is historical, the principles are not "epoch-specific", they are absolute, timeless".

The goal of philosophy according to Rescher is to convincingly resolve the basic questions about reality and our place in it. "... The scientific issues of the future — at least partially — must be solved," the author optimistically sums up.^[17]

           Metaphilosophy is pluralistic, the authors' concepts are diverse and contradictory. Typologies, classifications, taxonomies are needed to systematize the studied information, to organize concepts and to facilitate navigation in the variety of theoretical material. In the article we have divided the metaphilosophical concepts into three groups (adding to the division on conceptual and methodological grounds the third - as far as possible progress in philosophy).

        From a conceptual point of view, we can distinguish two approaches to understanding philosophy: rational (positive) and irrational (intuitive, negative). The answer to the question "what is philosophy?" for Oizerman is affirmative and asserts that "philosophy is a worldview, a system of knowledge, a variety of theories." Philosophy, according to Williamson, appears as a "clear and well-formulated ... theory", it has a philosophical coloring and is able to give satisfactory explanations on various issues at this historical stage of the development of society. According to the intuitive approach (Mamardashvili), philosophy is, first of all, a personal experience, an experiment, based on which a theoretical system is built. Deleuze and Guattari give both positive and negative definitions of philosophy. French authors emphasize the ideological function of philosophy, which creates "concepts" and convinces people to use them. Thus, philosophy for the above-mentioned authors appears as a single ideological base, a holistic vision of the present situation, reflecting the past and predicting the future.

        Considering metaphilosophical concepts from a methodological perspective, we find the following pairs among the authors: "systematic and instructive" philosophy, "implicit and explicit", "experimental – cabinet", "descriptive- "normative", which can be generalized as two oppositions: "experimental-cabinet" and "descriptive-normative" philosophy. The opposition of the "experimental-cabinet" philosophy is discussed by Williamson, who defends the priority of the "cabinet" way of thinking as a full-fledged study.  Rescher introduces the terms "descriptive-normative" philosophy, which seem to be very successful and describe the specifics of each of these "philosophies". It is the "normative" philosophy that is the true method that sets the standards of research, allows you to see the shortcomings of the system of ideas, and searches for solutions, and thanks to it, progress is made. The opposition of descriptive and normative philosophy is, in essence, the opposition of philosophy (descriptive, systematic, "ordinary") and metaphilosophy (normative, reflexive philosophy). Rescher's position echoes Williamson's ideas about the principles of pragmatism and efficiency that drive the development of philosophy.  Philosophers substantiate the relevance of metaphilosophy as a normative discipline that has at its disposal a set of functional, effective principles necessary for successful and "legitimate" rather than "descriptive" philosophical research.

              In the concepts of metaphilosophists, much attention is paid to the topic of the future of philosophy. The allocation of this basis for typologization is reasoned by the fact that the prospects of philosophy in the modern world are not clear – its necessity, "necessity" are not sufficiently substantiated. The authors discussed above put forward different models of the progress of philosophy – dialectical development (Rescher), the creation of more and more perfect models (Williamson), pluralistic coexistence of philosophical doctrines (Oizerman). Deleuze and Guattari, without calling their model of the development of philosophy dialectical, nevertheless describe the formation of philosophy as a struggle with chaos, during which a rapprochement with the enemy periodically occurs (dialectical unity and the struggle of opposites). In defiance of all models of the development of philosophy, Mamardashvili declares that "there is no history of philosophy." Philosophy is acts of philosophizing, local flashes of awareness, valuable in themselves, without reference to teaching, geography, epoch…

        The essential characteristics of metaphilosophy in the concepts of the authors under consideration reveal interesting parallels. The essence of metaphilosophy lies in its ideological function; we find a similar understanding in Oiserman, Deleuze and Guattari, Williamson, Rescher, as well as Lebedev, Ilyin and Porus. The philosophy of philosophy performs a worldview function, and although it has long abandoned the role of the "legislator of sciences", it is a theory that substantiates the principles of human existence (including scientific and cognitive).   According to Williamson, metaphilosophy is "armchair", has a philosophical coloring and is guided by the principles of pragmatism and efficiency. It is a theory that is able to best answer various questions at a given historical moment. A distinctive characteristic of metaphilosophy according to Oizerman is its diversity, pluralism. It is noteworthy that Oizerman, who initially adhered to the dialectical-materialistic worldview as a true teaching, departed from it and recognized the truth of philosophical pluralism.  The essential characteristic of metaphilosophy, according to Rescher, is its "aporicity". Philosophy develops because aporias, controversial issues, inconsistencies arise – they require the search for new solutions and lead to the creation of new models. Rescher argues that philosophy develops dialectically, thanks to self-reflection. Deleuze and Guattari, although they criticize Hegel and dialectics, themselves propose a model for the development of philosophy based on the principle of struggle and rapprochement with the enemy. Philosophy, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is not a purely rational act, it contains an element of intuition and in this their position echoes the position of M. Mamardashvili. Mamardashvili places the main emphasis on the intuitive way of comprehending philosophy. The Soviet philosopher and the French authors emphasize that it is not necessary to contrast cognition with each other through concepts, concepts and through experience (intuition).

        So, according to the concepts of the authors considered, philosophy has not lost its relevance these days. Philosophy is needed, it exists not only in textbooks, as a monument to the thought of bygone centuries, it is necessary to build a modern picture of the world, to comprehend the present and to predict the future. However, philosophy must be "correct", and in this it is helped by metaphilosophy, critical, aporic, developing, result-oriented, with an arsenal of rules (guidelines, maxims) of philosophical research. At the same time, metaphilosophy cannot be called an auxiliary, secondary discipline, it is rather regulatory and self-reflexive. The modern discipline of metaphilosophy revives the approach of classical philosophy, in which various philosophical schools and trends, entering into a polylogue, interacting, revealed a single philosophical content.