Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: Aesthetics Inside and Outside of Transcendental Aesthetics

Kormin Nikolai Aleksandrovich Doctor of Philosophy Leading Scientific Associate, Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences 109240, Moscow, Goncharnaya str. 12, p. 1, room 507 n.kormin@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

Introduction                 

The concept of "aesthetics" begins to be drawn by Kant in the "Critique of Pure Reason" primarily through the opposition of its structures to the logical use of reason. In contrast, aesthetics is thought of as "the science of the rules of sensuality in general" ^{[18, p. 139 (In 76)]}, even the "artist-mind needs rules" ^{[27, S. 58]}, which are "the application of the law in the concrete" ^{[27, S. 128]}, although they are problematic and they are used when necessary, but they are never without exceptions. Subsequently, Kant will directly say that "aesthetics is the philosophy of sensuality" ^{[26, S. 492]}. Therefore, this discipline is initially presented as having entered the orbit set by philosophy and science; the characteristics of this orbit are related to the parameters of the cultivation of knowledge (they, according to Kant, are one of the perfections) related to the business of reason, while there is a special sphere of reason described not only by the highest principles of morality, but also the sphere of technically-a practical mind connected with skill and art. And the question is, in what dimension are the main lines of reason drawn in aesthetics. It is difficult to say whether there is an aesthetic mind (Edmund Husserl, at least, pointed out the problematic nature of such a concept), but if we understand aesthetics as a self-reflection of creativity, then within the framework of such an understanding, what Kant calls creative reason is quite appropriate, which, in essence, is identical to aesthetic reason. If so, then it is logical to ask the question: is it possible in aesthetics to get out of a metaphysical difficulty in which the mind itself is not its fault. Kant speaks about this difficulty at the very beginning of the preface to the first edition of the Critique: "the fate has fallen to the human mind in one of its forms of cognition: it is besieged by questions from which it cannot evade, since they are imposed on it by the nature of the mind itself; but at the same time it cannot answer them, since they exceed everything that the human mind is capable of." Does reason and aesthetics share this fate? After all, it also starts from principles, the use of which, for example, in the course of explaining the experience of art, is inevitable, but starting from them, it ascends, as Kant would say, to more distant conditions, although here reason itself realizes that with such elevation its work remains unfinished, and its own principles transcend experience, guiding him along the wrong path, which, if his own principles were applied in the field of beauty science, would lead to the fact that aesthetic principles rejected the criteria of art experience. Kant calls the arena of such endless disputes metaphysics as the general geography of an unknown land of reason, as "the science of a priori knowledge" ^{[27, S. 324]}, and it is important for us to find out whether aesthetics is involved in these disputes.

At first glance, her participation in these disputes is quite problematic. After all, if aesthetics is the science of rationing sensuality, then in this sense it coincides with psychology. In the case of such a coincidence, this problematic is removed, since in the "Critique of Pure Reason" psychology itself is thought of as a metaphysics of thinking nature (meaning not empirical psychology, but psychologia rationalis). In addition, the construction of aesthetics as a science is impossible without reason, and "all sciences that require reason have their own metaphysics" ^{[27, S. 326]}. Therefore, it is quite reasonable to raise the question: what kind of metaphysics does aesthetics have? The only unclear question is how aesthetics and metaphysics relate, if we consider the latter as a relational cognition of objects accessible through sensuality. Moreover, if we talk about empirical psychology, then in Kant's view it is just an episode in the matter of metaphysics, only a kind of "alien who uses shelter until he creates his own home in a thoroughly developed anthropology" ^{[18, p. 1063 (In 877)]}. But here immediately arises a collision of attitudes aimed at understanding the relationship of sensuality and reason, nature as an object of feelings and history, as it manifests itself, according to Kant, in sensually perceived nature, containing the supersensible as a substrate, and possessing "laws that govern mastery" ^{[27, S. 129]}. Concluding his analysis of Kant's critical philosophy, Gilles Deleuze points out the tricks that are used in the disputes of followers of theoretical positions considering the concepts of sensual and supersensible nature. The first trick is hidden by the very design of nature, which consists in "empirically ensuring the development of reason within the human species. History should be condemned from the point of view of this species, and not from the point of view of personal reason. So there is a second trick of Nature, which we should not confuse with the first (both together they constitute history). According to the second trick, the supersensible Nature wants the sensually perceived to act according to its own laws, even in man, and to be able to achieve, finally, the effect of the supersensible" ^{[13, p. 225]}. The above sophisms demonstrate the scale of the philosophical conversation about aesthetics as a science of sensuality. The question is whether aesthetics itself has a language for expressing this metaphysical scale, the scale of what the late Kant metaphysics specialis, which is based on sensuality. And how, in this case, to understand the very image of sensuality in relation to the supersensible (and the goal of philosophizing is "to strive from the sensuous to the supersensible" ^{[27, S. 685]} and interpret it as a subject of aesthetic science?

Another question is whether there is some internal tension between metaphysics and aesthetics. On the one hand, "metaphysics ... favors the beauty of knowledge (den Sch?nen Wissenschaften), promotes the flowering of inner knowledge about man" ^{[26, S. 561-562]}. Aesthetics is related to metaphysics because, to paraphrase one Kantian expression, it is able to build hypotheses of the heart in the presentation of beauty. Philosophy, understood by Kant as the organon of wisdom, can guide aesthetic research not by some "instructions, but by certain concepts, not assumed, but established by observation laws, not by imagination inspired by metaphysics or feelings, but by a broad-minded, but prudent mind in application" ^{[26, p. 50]}. On the other hand, aesthetics presupposes not only the structure of the imagination inspired by metaphysics, not only the virtuoso execution of reason, but a completely different structure of reason itself (the philosophy comprehending it is "not the artist of reason, but the legislator of the human mind" ^{[26, S. 562]}), already daring, as Kant says, to fly on its own wings, and in this metaphysical flight to embrace artistic reality. In addition, aesthetics itself, as part of philosophy in the true sense, inevitably shares its fate, which consists in "putting everything in connection with wisdom" ^{[18, p. 1063 (In 878)]} (by the way, the word "artist" itself, according to some interpretations, comes from Gothic terms meaning "wisdom"and the hand"), but since the connection itself, first of all, "the connection of all rules from the concept, that is, from the concept, namely from the concept" ^{[27, S. 342]}, implies an act of spontaneity of the subject, then such a purpose of it is associated with the aesthetic weaving of the cognition of reason on the basis of concepts, which Kant understands precisely as metaphysics. The aesthetic facet approaches metaphysics in the Kantian interpretation, which characterizes it as the completion of the entire culture of the human mind. But aesthetics itself is the underside of culture. The aesthetic facet also manifests itself when we are immersed in disputes about changes in metaphysics, primarily related to methodology. Describing the historical movement from the naturalistic method to the critical, the boundaries of the thinking of the naturalist of pure reason, Kant introduces an aesthetic category of the sublime to characterize this type of thinking, which hopes to "achieve more in solving the most sublime problems that constitute the task of metaphysics" ^{[18, p.1069 (B 883)]}. And let this hope act as a misology, but the problem of appeal to the aesthetic tasks of metaphysics has been posed. It is only important to understand whether it has a solution in the field of dogmatic, skeptical or critical attitudes of thinking. As for the scientific methodology, here again the paths of aesthetics and metaphysics intersect, since the aesthetic principle is introduced into the work of metaphysics as "censorship", which vouches for harmony and harmony in the world of science. But, as K. emphasized, Jaspers, Kant's awareness that "he creates the metaphysics of metaphysics remained with the majestic unconsciousness of the forms and methods of his thought" ^{[45, p. 405]}. Is it possible to create metaphysics when forgetting the methodological culture of thought?

If we talk about aesthetics itself as a science, it should be borne in mind that the empirical statements found in it may be theoretically loaded, but they cannot serve to establish a priori legislation required by metaphysics as the science of the first principles of human knowledge, the whole sphere of which is divided by Kant into science and art. Or, if we talk about the modern intellectual state and correlate aesthetics with the processes of relativization of the Kantian a priori carried out by the creators of quantum physics (Kant would call their research the search for quantum substance), should we not admit that the concepts of classical aesthetics themselves are modified in new theories, so that aesthetic science, striving to understand new facts of art, "he is learning anew what the word "understanding" can mean" ^{[8, p. 389]}. But having learned only this, whether we can talk about the Kantian a priori aesthetic reality is a big question.

However, let's return to Kant's reflections. Having discovered the problematic nature in the description of aesthetic thinking, the philosopher, while remaining committed to the terminological research of A. Baumgarten, nevertheless suggests either returning to the language of ancient philosophers who separated aesthetic knowledge from noetic knowledge, or switching to the language of speculative philosophy, using "the term aesthetics partly in a transcendental sense, partly in a psychological meaning" ^{[18, p. 93 (In 35)]}. The language of psychology is, of course, important for aesthetics, but, as Wittgenstein will once remark, "psychology connects the experienced with something physical, but we are the experienced with the experienced" ^{[6, p. 104]}, and this way of working with experience is much closer to aesthetics. This is Kant's point of view as it is stated in The Critique of Pure Reason. Whether this dual meaning of the term aesthetics will continue in the future will become clear only after the creation of the "Critique of the Faculty of Judgment". But still it should be recognized that the first "Criticism" contains a rich material for the construction of aesthetic knowledge.

Thus, in the "Critique of Pure Reason" we discover several levels of development of problems related to aesthetic terminology. The first concerns transcendental aesthetics, which reveals the transcendental doctrine of principles and contains a metaphysical interpretation of the concepts of space and time (later Kant will say, "the fact that time is expressed through a line (which is still space) and space through time (an hour of walking) is a schematism of rational concepts" ^{[27, S. 687]}). For aesthetics, the question of the necessity of space is important, which is connected with the fact that "it is what the very possibility of feelings is based on" ^{[26, S. 641]}. The next level involves understanding the structures of classical aesthetics. But both levels are connected with the definition of the place of aesthetics in the system of metaphysics. So, it is quite appropriate to talk about a kind of aesthetics of transcendental aesthetics - this teaching about space as the form of all phenomena of the external senses and time as the form of all phenomena of the internal senses, a form supplemented by internal affiction through a sense of pleasure, revealing the similarity of the structures of transcendental aesthetics and purely aesthetic ideas. After all, "the aesthetic is laid down in Kant at the very beginning, in the very core of the definition of form. It can even be shown that the so–called concepts of space, time, and other concepts are not concepts, but ideas of the mind, similar to aesthetic ideas… The very formulation of the definition of space as an idea in one place and the definition of aesthetic ideas in another place of the Kantian text are crystallizations and expressions of the same beating thought" ^{[30, pp. 127-128]}, which arises from the experience of these ideas, the adequate content of which cannot be determined. It is in this sense that it is permissible to assert that Kant's philosophy itself opens with aesthetic analogies of metaphysical experience.

New European philosophy and aesthetics of color.

When considering transcendental aesthetics, Kant touches on two topics that are directly related to classical aesthetics. This is the problem of the philosophical premises of the aesthetics of color and the problem of pleasure. Aesthetically perceived color is seen perfection, but how to approach its understanding philosophically, how to grasp the vision through the visible. As V. V. Bibikhin wrote, "from the moment we saw the coloring of the world, it becomes not an object, but a subject, we stop taking it into the grid of forms. In reality, we do not see forms, only arrays of color, forms are introduced by imagination. Previously, we drew the world with schemes of unknown origin, now its harmless color does not belong to us, and we are colored by the mood in the tones of the world" ^{[38, p. 814]}. Indeed, in art the world becomes a subject, but this is nothing more than a metaphorical gesture. If we approach this problem metaphysically, then one thing is clear – if the world turned into a subject, then there would be no problems at all, and no science, no philosophy would be needed. No less problematic is what, in fact, does the non-belonging of color to a person and its embedding in the mood mean? In modern world literature there is a variety of consistent and inconsistent interpretations of color experience: physicalist-realistic, subjectivist, eliminativist, representationalist, projectionist, fictionalist, dispositionalist, relational: each of them has its own strengths and weaknesses, and it must be admitted that they are quite difficult for philosophical analysis. As K. noted in his work . Hardin "Color for philosophers: unwinding the rainbow", the question of the ontological status of colors is about the same as it was in the XVIII century, and the "questions about the similarities and differences of colors have reached a dead end. In addition, the general understanding of how color perception relates to color language is mired in confusion" ^{[20, p. 21]}. Recently, structures closer to the aesthetics of color have also been built, for example, art criticism models of coloristic analysis, artistic perception of color and color style, prerequisites for "understanding color in art and consciousness" are revealed ^{[8, p. 11]}.  In aesthetics, it is necessary to take into account the relevant properties of each of them. An aesthetic approach to colors is always an approach to colors–as-we-perceive them. It is extremely important for understanding the meaning of a work of art and painting, their spiritual meaning (the Orthodox St. Basil's Cathedral on Red Square is a whole prayer in color). Philosophy itself has long comprehended the peculiarities of the changes taking place in the art of color.

In Kant, such an understanding is based on deep intellectual and ideological attitudes, the philosopher seeks, following Descartes, to make the concept of color so transcendentally clear that it is impossible not to know it. What do we actually find in the immediate color datum? Turning to the problems of the Cartesian cogito, Husserl emphasized that it "takes (like everything real in the surrounding world) a well-known linguistic expression: "I see a tree of green color; I hear the rustle of its leaves, I smell its flowers"... We find nothing else here but "consciousness about..." - consciousness in the broadest sense, which has yet to be explored in all its breadth and in all its modes" ^{[10, p. 308]}. From Cartesian cogito to Husserl's intentionality, the path lies through Kant's transcendentalism. In order to understand more deeply how the renewal of the essential foundations of the historical unity of knowledge about the various versions of the visible coloring of the world took place in Kant, it is necessary to start from the philosophical and aesthetic analysis of light and color in Descartes, Locke, Berkeley and Hume.

The coloristic mode of the world and its light code are conceived by Rene Descartes both as a manifestation of the aesthetically supersensible, appearing in the image of the boundless beauty of divine light, and as being in a complex relationship to the colorful world, to the "admirable structure of the visible world" ^{[12, p. 386]}, described no longer in the language of aesthetics and its poetic dimension, and in the language of physics and other natural sciences, in the language of searching for structures of perceptual truth of color that affects our senses.  He gives color such characteristics of space as figure and length, which opens up the possibility for us to see something in this space. The construction of the very concept of color is associated with certain difficulties. In one of the letters to K. M. Mersenne, Descartes admits that even "the explanation of the colors of the rainbow was given to him more difficult than the explanation of all other questions and all sublunar phenomena in general" ^{[12, p. 585]}. At the same time, they reveal a certain duality in the interpretation of color. There is a huge difference in the way we judge color as something perceived in objects and as something unknown that causes us to feel it clearly. "We easily make the mistake of making a judgment that what we call color in objects is something completely similar to the color that we feel, and thereby believing that a thing that we do not perceive in any way, we perceive with sufficient clarity" ^{[12, pp. 343-344]}. The description of this similarity is associated with the language of color, which is spoken by common sense, and it is impossible to refuse this linguistic recognition. Nevertheless, if we examine color as an ideal objectivity, trying to figure out what, in fact, reveals the perception of color that is given to us by a colored object, then we are forced to admit that the very manifestation of color is unknown to us. Therefore, it is so important to understand aesthetically where, to paraphrase Descartes, the impression of a color that causes amazement is located. At the same time, the philosopher understands the color system as actually a structure for projecting the unity of the world, its spatial extent. The artistic installations of the New Time largely depend on this understanding. In the twentieth century, in fact, how the extension will characterize the color of Paul Klee, complementing its characteristics with concepts such as measure, boundaries and contour. Both contemporary art and its visual structures are influenced by new interpretations of space and movement, focusing on the cognitive approach to color, on how things look at us with their colors. The world itself for a modern artist is a field of colors, semiotically modified.

Although color, as Descartes emphasizes, has nothing to do with the problem of the essence of things (n i la couleur, etc.... constitue la nature du corps, mais l'extension seule – not color, etc. ... constitute the nature of the body, but only extension), and when comprehending this relationship it is not necessary to resort to an a priori argument, nevertheless color as such represents the immanent structure of our relationship to the world, which, according to Descartes, is an object of pure mathematics. In this capacity, he fits them into the structural combination of a thinking thing with a corporeal one. In modern literature, the analysis of the Cartesian ontology of color is not a frequent phenomenon, we find it, for example, in the book by K. Romano, in which he subjects "the fascinating field of chromatic phenomena to philosophical doubt" ^{[35, p. 15]}, while showing how the problem of color was solved through the redefinition of philosophy, starting with Descartes and Locke [see: 35, p. 37-38]. Along with this, modern philosophy finds out which invariants the perception of color itself is aimed at, how consciousness and the status of color in memory correlate, how the form of color logic is possible. So, for Wittgenstein, the arguments of Gestalt psychologists that, say, the impression of white arises in a certain way are not so important, for him it is more meaningful to answer the question: what is the impression of white, what is the logic of the concept of white?

Color is described by Descartes not only in the categories of natural sciences, but also as a state of consciousness, as an intuition of the mind, which is always thinking up-to-date. In the perceptual act, color, which in modern terminology can be understood as qualia (in Kant it corresponds to qvalitaet), seems to be a simpler event, and therefore we sometimes aesthetically admire it as something easier for the discretion from which secret knowledge should be derived. But this lightness is the result of a deceptive impression, because the aesthetic properties themselves are sometimes presented by people as something more intricate: it is "difficult that seems to them more beautiful" ^{[12, p. 106]}, the love of which Descartes calls pleasure. In reality, color is no less difficult to understand than the mode of thinking, the thought itself, which Descartes in some texts likens to color (lumen (the Latin term lumen was used, as a rule, figuratively and to denote color: lumina civitatis – the color of society) cognitionem can be understood in the sense that light is the design of thinking; and the natural light itself given to us has a purely intellectual nature, commanding us to judge what we are able to know about color as a tangible quality). We are aware of what gives us the perception of color, which, with the assistance of memory, is "transferred to the power of imagination." Therefore, there is nothing strange in the fact that through the movement directed to our eyes, we are able to "see all kinds of colors and that the latter in bodies called colored are nothing but different ways by which these bodies perceive light and reflect it to our eyes" ^{[11, p. 71]}, and aesthetic experience in the form of joy, for example, makes the complexion more refined. Light as a sensual element (and in the mind, Descartes believes, there is nothing that would not have been contained in the senses before) means cognition, an equally important act of creativity for the disclosure of our topic – instantaneous action. Therefore, it is not surprising that even scientific knowledge acquires aesthetic characteristics in the Cartesian representation. "Modern sciences wear masks; if these masks are removed from them, they will appear in all their glory" ^{[12, p. 573]}. It is possible to point out a kind of dualism in the interpretation of the nature of color perception – some perceptions are performed in the soul, others in the body, as a result, thanks to the most subtle of all senses – vision, which "gives the soul sensations of all shades of light and colors" ^{[12, p. 412]}, although it does not catch anything except the drawing, we create what Descartes calls intentional images (species intentionales) of flowers, "we get pleasure from beauty and color" ^{[12, p. 302]}. The color is completely determined at the moment of its perception, it excites us to the depths of our soul, and at these moments, in fact, the germs of the truth of the cognition itself appear, as it were, for us. The perception of color is initially reflexive, but our idea of it gives vague outlines: color affects only such a mode of thinking as feeling, and "is imprinted in our imagination in the form of one very vague idea, why our thinking cannot comprehend its essence" ^{[12, p. 416]}. Moreover, it is difficult for us to imagine what the feeling of color in a painted object shows us. At the same time, the reality of the idea itself (or objective perfection) is compared with the objective creation of art, and Descartes finds the reason for the idea itself in the great knowledge of the master existing in his intellect, or in the great sophistication of his mind.

In the philosophy of J. Locke's problem of color gets new accents and a new form of expression. He connects his concept of color, which differs from Cartesian, with sensualistic epistemology, with the interpretation of the epistemological role of primary and secondary qualities. In the "Experience of Human Understanding", the philosopher defends the interpretation of the genesis of human knowledge from sensory experience. At the same time, as Kant emphasized, when encountering pure rational concepts in experience itself, he "deduced them from experience; at the same time, he was so inconsistent that he ventured with these concepts into the field of knowledge that went beyond all experience" ^{[18, p. 197 (In 127)]}. Such an illustrative approach to concepts encountered in experience has its own aesthetic implications. D. Townsend generally believes that it was "Locke's empiricism that laid the foundations of what we now call aesthetics" ^{[42, p. 250]}. In Locke's view, color refers to the so-called secondary qualities. And the idea of beauty involves a certain combination of color and shape. The mode of pleasure also exists in the acts of perception of various shades of color, and the visible colors themselves have mixed modes, consisting "of ideas of various kinds, i.e. of form and color, for example, beauty, rainbow, etc." ^{[28, p. 276]}. As for the existence of the ideas themselves, they do not remain unchanged, over time they fade aesthetically, therefore they need sensual exercises, and without this they are erased, acquire faded colors. The mind itself resembles a painter, for whom only one aspect of the intensity of color is important, when at a certain stage he uses only dull shades. Locke even likens the mind to graves: marble tombstones are durable, but the inscriptions on them are erased from time to time, similarly, "the pictures in our mind are painted with fading colors: if they are not refreshed from time to time, they are erased and disappear" ^{[28, pp. 200-201]}. Locke connects these manifestations with the work of memory, as a result of which all his ideas are sometimes pushed out of the mind, images that seemed solid, as if a sculptor had once carved them out of marble, are destroyed.

Locke's epistemology had a noticeable influence on the philosophy of J. Berkeley, although this influence is difficult to assess unequivocally. He interprets the very feeling of color completely subjectively. As I. S. Narsky emphasized, "at the level of perception, it really turns out that geometric shapes, movements, etc. exist for us insofar as they are isolated by contrasting sensations of colors of different tonality, saturation and brightness… But this is only at the level of perception! Berkeley distorted Locke's point of view, in fact refrained from giving a definitive answer to the question of the degree of subjectivity of the content of colors" and "attributed to Locke a categorical denial of their objectivity" ^{[1, p. 13]}. All the differences in the structure of colors for Berkeley are the essence of the differences inherent in different symbols of visible reality, color cannot reproduce some properties of things, color is a cast of the color itself. For aesthetics, the idea of representative representations put forward by him has a certain significance, although it should not be forgotten that some of his noteworthy epistemological positions are associated with solipsistic attitudes. Berkeley's aesthetic ideas are rooted not only in his theory of knowledge, but also in his ethical teaching. To get to the root of knowledge and morality, he wrote, "it is necessary to understand that there is an idea of beauty inherent in the human mind ... A person does not need to prove in order to see and approve what is beautiful: it strikes at first sight and attracts to itself without being conscious. And while this beauty is in the shape and form of bodily things, so there is a similar beauty of another kind – order, symmetry and comeliness in the world of morality. It is the feeling, talent or ability of the noblest minds to be the most alive and pure. Therefore, just as with the help of sight I distinguish the beauty of a plant or an animal, so the mind perceives moral perfection, beauty and decency of justice and moderation" ^{[1, p. 452]}. Berkeley presupposes aesthetic reflections on color judgments about what conditions are possible for the soul to have an idea of color, whether an abstraction of a spiritual order is possible, giving a generalization of the visible form that does not contain any color. Without light and color, the world is, as it were, closed to our view, to our perception. By the way, modern researchers associate the understanding of perception with the fundamental philosophical problem of such perception, which is redundant in relation to perceived objects. "This problem bothered Berkeley, and it was she who stood behind the principle of his philosophy esse est percipi [(to be is to be perceived)], so ridiculed. Although his conclusion turned out to be extravagantly idealistic, there is a living problem behind him in the movement of this philosophical experiment" ^{[31, pp. 210-211]}, which refers us to judgments about the indivisible uniqueness of what is, about the absence of any determination of it. In this sense, to be aesthetic means to be aesthetically perceived, and the aesthetic act itself cannot be "after", it either exists or it does not exist. As for the perception of color itself, its sensory idea, they open up a broader horizon before consciousness: "through light and colors, other ideas, completely different from them, are suggested to my spirit" ^{[1, p. 112]}. But the very idea of the complete subjectivity of color perception does not correspond to the understanding of a person's ability to transform light radiation of a certain spectral composition into a sensation, which also generates a kind of aesthetic psychologization of the visible world, coupled with nominalistic concepts and leaving open the question of the conditions for the possibility of what Berkeley calls the possibility of perception in imagination (in imaginatio). The eye perceives the beauty of color corresponding to it; and in order to enjoy it, a subtle taste is necessary, and it is more or less characteristic of all conscious beings, who, as Berkeley emphasizes, are "by nature social." Both domestic and foreign literature have long been arguing about the relationship between Berkeley's immaterialism and Kant's transcendental idealism – the philosopher himself calls his idealism seeming ^{[27, S. 179]}.  The most interesting works on this topic in Russian literature: ^{[5, p. 42]}, in foreign literature – ^{[2, p. 51],[42, p. 10],[43, p. 109],[45, p. 157]}. The content of this dispute is important for understanding the philosophical premises of the doctrine of color, without which it is impossible to understand the intricacies of the aesthetics of color itself.

Berkeley's philosophy has made, as D. Hume, one of the forerunners of positivism and phenomenology, emphasized, a significant step forward in the speculative sciences. True, in Kant's view, Hume's philosophy is a step only in the direction of empirical deduction, which the Scottish thinker was carried away by, just as Locke was carried away by it at the time. For Hume, this step is connected, in particular, not with the justification of the principle of objectivity, which, as for the area of interest to us, should be attributed to the coloristic passport data, for example, to what Hume calls a beautiful palace, but to the subject to whom this passport and this palace belong, to his perceptions of the palace itself, to the perception of our spirit with its attractive features. Colors for Hume are not properties of external objects, but structures of perception in the mind. Perception itself is interpreted today as the ability to perceive the objective world through the senses, for example, the ability to distinguish colors. The question here is first of all how to think about feeling itself, the idea of aesthetic sensuality, beauty as an emotion. D. Townsend rightly believes that an adequate interpretation of the relationship between the concept of feeling, as it was developed in the first half of the XVIII century, and its aesthetic side, it is necessary to avoid reducing it to modern forms of relativism and subjectivism, who understand the ways of psychological and epistemological proofs of the possibilities of perceptual knowledge in different ways. The aesthetics of the twentieth century proceeds precisely from this understanding, accepting the differentiation of the methods themselves as fundamental, and in accordance with this "divides its problems. For example, the emotional response to fictions differs from the epistemological question of whether such reactions are coherent. Hume and other taste theorists do not make such a division. For them, the formulation of this question is carried out in terms of individual and universal, substance and randomness. The rejection of universals and substance transfers the evidence to the individual and to what seems random. Appealing to feelings is part of accepting this shift. Then there is the problem of how to avoid accusations from both theologians and rationalist philosophers that reason and judgment are lost, that the baby named “Proof” is thrown out of the bath along with metaphysical water. Attacks on feelings occur from opposite sides, sometimes simultaneously" ^{[41, p. 11]}. These attacks are also conducted on aesthetic emotions, on the interpretation of impressions in our mind with its "supreme beauty of thought".

The impressions themselves are copied in ideas, including in such a variety of ideas, which is a fictional unity, thanks to which, for example, a set of multi-colored paints mentally turns into a gestalt. Due to the fact that beauty itself is an emotional phenomenon, it is thought of in Hume's empirical aesthetics as an unanalyzable internal impression created by individualization, and the natural beauty of a flower that causes this impression does not imply special structurality. The question of the theoretical characterization of the image of beauty, which we find in Hume, needs special research. One thing can be said with certainty - "the perception of relationships is not beauty" ^{[41, p. 155]}, the idea of it, described in terms of pleasure, can be associated, as the author emphasizes, only with the effect that the perceived object produces. And the implicit aesthetics of color is nothing more than a manifestation of the impression left by both external and internal feelings. By developing an epistemological principle, Hume "will implicitly create a stronger foundation for aesthetics than anyone before Kant... The first step in understanding the consequences of Hume's epistemology for the aesthetics of the XVIII century is his understanding of the representative power of using impressions and ideas" ^{[41, p. 86]}. The idea of color (the so-called simple idea of color) as the expressiveness of an impression with its ineradicable metaphoricity, the choice of the "seat of color" is completely "turned off" from ontological attitudes (perhaps with the exception of the attitude to the contemplation of the most perfect object, which is the eternal beauty of the universe), and the colors themselves as properties of an object always require a real substrate as their basis; initially their value is the same as it is contained in pleasure, in the testing of which the nature of beauty consists. We are talking about the pleasure derived from some actual states, so it is impossible to make an adequate judgment about the degree of color, liveliness and brightness of its shades, to invent the art of its exact measurement, which will turn out to be nothing but a fiction of our mind. "The artist," writes Hume, "forms the same fiction in relation to colors," in his imagination, light and shadows "allow such an exact comparison and achieve such equality that are not accessible to the judgments of our senses" ^{[44, p. 107]}. Aesthetics itself (or in Hume's language – criticism, theory of taste), which contributes to the adornment of the human mind, is one of the modes of our thinking about ourselves, a special side of the introspection method, this discipline forms a section of the science of the spiritual nature of man, and the structural form of this science – the idea of beauty or perfection gives an example of the synthesis of modes; despite on this, it makes no sense, as Hume believes, to look for genuine beauty. Nevertheless, criticism itself creates a model of the harmony of affects, which can be different: for example, the Humean interpretation of aesthetic experiences is analyzed today in connection with the problems of calm affects [see: 4, p. 100], the perception of the natural beauty of a flower can also be correlated with this problem, the explanation of which cannot be approached with the attitudes of a structural approach. If we talk about aesthetic views in general, it should be noted that in Hume they fluctuated between approaches to them, developed within the framework of European classicism, and the doctrine of affects opposing them, in the justification of which he included the idea of reflective thought or perception.

Kant was also influenced by Hume's philosophy. Various aspects of this influence are being investigated today. Thus, in one of the last such studies, the article by E. Shellekens reveals how important the paradox of taste found in Hume and Kant is for understanding the essence of modern metaphysical disputes in aesthetics ^{[37, p. 734]}. It is important for us to reveal to what extent Kant's understanding of color is influenced by the empirical aesthetics of color developed by Hume.

So, a relevant solution to the transcendental problem of color is impossible without understanding the explanatory models created in the New European philosophy and aesthetics of color, primarily by Descartes, Locke, Berkeley and Hume, who continue the old, but still unresolved dispute between realistic and opposing concepts of color. Berkeley and Hume consolidate a subjectively oriented approach to these concepts. The aesthetic perception of color, despite the subtle differences in the theories of these philosophers, is set, as Wittgenstein would say, on the border of logic and experience, even, one might say, is connected with the search for a certain theoretical logic (it can be called color logic, although not all color concepts that this logic operates with are, as Wittgenstein will emphasize logically equal), included in the structures of the revision of philosophical attitudes, with the study of the constructions of the language of coloristics (or, as K. Jung would later say, this "native language of the subconscious"), the forms of this logic serve as the basis for both the development of a subjective interpretation of color, and for individual elements of its objective interpretation. Descartes, the founder of the New European philosophy, came closest to the transcendental solution of the color problem found by Kant, but no less important is the understanding of the ways of such a solution by Locke, Berkeley and Hume. We can say that, for example, Locke, if we start from the Kantian characteristics of his philosophy, although he opened the way of ascent from single concepts of color to general concepts, nevertheless sensitized them, introduced them into the structures of philosophical empiricism. In addition, he suspends philosophical statements that allow to fundamentally solve the problem of the subject-object understanding of color. As for Hume, Kant refers to his philosophy in the context of considering the general task of pure reason, related to identifying the possibility of a priori spontaneous synthetic judgments, on the result of which the fate of metaphysics depends. Hume came a step closer to solving this problem, although "according to his conclusions, everything that we call metaphysics seems to be reduced to a simple illusion, mistaking for the discretion of reason what is actually borrowed only from experience and has acquired the appearance of necessity due to habit" ^{[18, p. 73 (In 20)]}. At the level of such an illusion, as is clear from the previous analysis, there is an artistic attitude to color in Hume's interpretation, and he, in fact, considered all the supposed a priori principles to be equally illusory. Kant refers Hume to the supporters of the skeptical scientific method, which sets sensualistic research attitudes, according to which only objects of the senses are valid, which include both meanings and color codes, "and everything else is just a figment of the imagination" ^{[18, p. 1067 (In 882)]}. In general, these attitudes, like the ideas of Locke and Berkeley, do not go beyond psychological associanism.

Philosophical prerequisites of aesthetics within transcendental aesthetics (color).

Kant's approach to the analysis of color as a psychological phenomenon proceeds from the transcendental concepts of the "Critique of Pure Reason". The philosopher tries to synthesize the attitudes of rationalism and empiricism, to find an intermediate form of thought between the methodology of criticism and Hume's skepticism: if in rationalistic constructions the image of cognition is derived mainly by deductive means, laid down with the help of structures of a purely conceptual apparatus that ignores the fabric of experience, then Hume was mistaken about the discretion of reason, taking for them what it seemed he is "nothing more than a habit arising from experience and its laws" ^{[18, p. 965 (in 793)]}. Thus we find ourselves in the realm of imaginary objects.  But what, in fact, does this visibility indicate? Is it possible to work philosophically in some way with this figment of the imagination, with these Humean illusory categories, and how, finally, to find the way to this synthesis? Such a possibility appears in transcendental aesthetics, which, as it were, brackets sensuality, while separating from empirical contemplation everything that belongs to sensation, and allows for a dual consideration of the subject. Then the origins of visibility itself are revealed to us. Kant considers not only the mental proximity of the phenomenon of an object, but also the empirical way of its manifestation, which should be treated purely transcendentally, as an a priori handing over to the subject of the manifold in contemplation for possible knowledge. Even ideal representations "are aesthetically or logically" ^{[27, S. 145]}. It is in the mode of manifestation that color is revealed to us for the first time, the feeling of which should be affected by external objects. The question is whether these objects have color, or are they colorless objects. If we answer these questions in the negative, then it turns out that the sense of color should be affected by something else that has nothing to do with the real object. Although, if we follow Kant's logic, it turns out that when we talk about color, it should be not so much about the affixation of sensuality, as about its modifications. At the same time, the sense of color has nothing to do with the a priori nature of pure contemplation of space and time. A priori representation of color is impossible. It is impossible to deduce an a priori synthetic position from the idea of color, this idea can only be attributed to particular conditions of sensuality, namely, to changes in our subject, to the subjective properties of the sense of color with all their changes, which may be different for different people. As Kant writes in the first edition of the Critique in one paragraph that was not included in the second edition, colors "are not properties of the body, in the visual representation of which they are included; they are also only modifications of the sense of vision, which is subjected to some action from the side of light...Color is not at all a necessary condition under which only objects can to become objects of feelings for us. It is connected with the phenomenon only as a randomly joining action of a special organization" ^{[19, p. 61 (A 28-29)]}. But Kant does not explain what kind of organization it is and what kind of joining action it is. It is unlikely that this organization can be understood as the organization of spatial relations. Color is not an aesthetic attribute of an external object, its analysis is possible only on the territory of consciousness, and the sense of color itself is a property of our soul that conveys the multivariate nature of the modification of visual perception. It is an external feeling through which the red color of the rose bush appears to us as if it is outside of us. If we characterize color in terms of "Criticism of Pure Reason", then it should be treated as something empirically random, and randomness, as Kant notes, cannot be proved. Let's say we have a red rose bush in front of us, if we considered this color as a property that we can attribute to a rose bush, then this would indicate mistakes made when considering the color, in this case the fact that the red color depends on the form of a direct relationship – this, according to Kant, pure the concepts of mind – consciousness refer to a colored object (a rose bush) by itself, and its color can vary in the field of perception. "... That which itself is originally only a phenomenon, for example, a rose, is considered in an empirical sense to be a thing in itself, which, however, in relation to color, can appear differently to every eye" ^{[19, pp. 61, 62 (A 29-30)]}. Unlike subjective attitudes, an objectively oriented understanding of color sees in it a property that objects themselves possess, regardless of the nature of human perception. We can talk about the aesthetics of color when we mean, for example, the creation of paintings, the objective prerequisite of which is the coloring of the canvas surface, for which paints made in a wide palette of colors are intended, which is served by color index studies, colorometry work. The very color of the painting is built through the image of volume, space, shape, degree of illumination, materiality of objects, but for aesthetics, the most important thing here is the beauty generated by the harmony of colors, the development of pictorial language in fine art, the concept of an artistic image, the understanding of color as an independent form of expression, its symbolic and emotional meaning, and so on. All these are subjective facets that are described by aesthetics and art history. But the problem is that no artist is able to paint a picture out of nothing, cannot create color and tone, for example, in works written in tempera, without paint, without ingredients (pigments and dyes) that give color to the paint. Kant's interpretation clearly departs from the objective picture of color, which is often reproduced in modern Western literature. So, D. Hilbert offers an original way of conceptualizing color, defending a realistic idea of it. He defends "a form of objectivism that identifies color with the physical property of surfaces-their spectral reflectivity."… This color analysis provides a more adequate representation of the features of a person's color vision than his subjective competitors" ^{[23, p. 16]}. In our opinion, it would be more correct to speak about the relative truth expressed in the attitudes of representatives of the subjective and objective approach to the analysis of the aesthetics of color.

When people talk about color today, they mean a feature of electromagnetic radiation of the optical range, but this feature does not express any objective properties of color, but gives its qualitative subjective characteristic. The whole problem is how to comprehend subjectivity itself, and so far no one has succeeded. Therefore, the mystery of color remains a mystery.   In essence, we distinguish such an object as the red color as a phenomenon given to us in the sensual contemplation of a rose bush from the same object, as if it were thought of as an object in itself. "The predicates of a phenomenon can be attributed to the object itself, if it is a question of a relation to our sense, for example, a rose – a red color or a smell; but visibility can never be attributed to an object as a predicate, precisely because in that case it would attribute to the object itself what is inherent in it only in relation to the senses or even to the subject" ^{[18, pp. 131, 133 (B 69)]}. Consequently, if redness were attributed to the rose itself and at the same time no attention was paid to a certain relation of the rose to the subject contemplating it, moreover, if we also went beyond this relation in our judgment of the red color, then it would be then that the mirage itself would arise in perception. In addition, it would be a mistake to turn into a coloristic appearance what should be counted only as phenomena of color.

Outside of transcendental aesthetics, Kant addresses the problem of color in the Critique of Pure Reason and in the transcendental doctrine of method when he considers the question of the difference between philosophical knowledge and mathematical knowledge ("mathematics itself is nothing but what can be given a priori in contemplation" ^{[26, S. 706]}).. Within the framework of the latter, we can construct the concept of magnitude, that is, create a representation of it in a priori contemplation, which is impossible for representations of quality, which we are able to demonstrate only in empirical contemplation. Thus, "we can make a conical figure visual simply on the basis of a concept, without any help from experience, but the color of this cone must be given in advance in some experience" ^{[18, p. 907 (In 743)]}. Color is an empirical phenomenon, and only in this capacity can it be considered in aesthetics, but already as a generally significant phenomenon.

The attitudes of transcendental aesthetics and the transcendental doctrine of method are the basis for constructing the aesthetics of color in the "Critique of the Faculty of Judgment". This construction of the theme of coloristics brings us back to the place of synthesis of natural science (optics of L. Euler) and, in fact, aesthetic and practical understanding of color (interpretation in the third "Critique" of attractive color, that charm (die Reize) in the beauty of nature that refers to color modifications of light: this kind of fusion with a beautiful form is "the only sensation that allows not only sensory perception, but also reflection on the form of these modifications of the [external] senses, and thus nature seems to say something through it that seems to have a higher meaning" ^{[17, p. 397]}. The hidden meaning of color variations generates a kind of symbolic language. True, the idea of an attractive color is closer to the understanding of pleasant in Kant's practical philosophy, later he will even introduce the concept of aesthetically practical judgment. The objective picture of color is reduced by Kant as soon as he enters the territory of aesthetic ideas and judgments about the art of coloristics. In general, the concept of aesthetic judgment about color is set by the epistemological harmony of the "Critique of Pure Reason".  In modern Western literature, special attention is paid to the doctrine of color in the context of the theory of cognition, in the light of which difficulties regarding the interpretation of Newtonian and Goethe's understanding of the essence of color are analyzed ^{[14, 31]}. Such a comparison is important for the analysis of modern problems of physics and philosophy of color, because, as L. Wittgenstein noted, "a physical theory (like Newton's theory) cannot solve problems that interested Goethe, even if he did not solve them himself" ^{[6, p. 98]}. Of no less interest in German studies is the consideration of color concepts in the epistemological context of the "Critique of Pure Reason" ^{[18, 19]}, as well as the transcendental prerequisites of the double perspective in which coloristics is built in the "Critique of the Faculty of Judgment". Color, considered from the point of view of cognition, is an empirical concept from which it is necessary to abstract in order to build aesthetic knowledge in the form of mathesis universalis, knowledge based on a priori principles. Not only the conceptual apparatus of the theory of color, but also all Kant's aesthetic constructions are consistent with the transcendental attitudes of the "Critique of Pure Reason": since the structures of transcendental aesthetics are forms of contemplation that precede any experience, it becomes obvious that the fabric of aesthetic experience in the third "Critique" is given by the concept of the organization of space-time forms that determine the structures coloristic experience, and the structure of aesthetic perception that depends on it. Even in the materials for the Critique of Pure Reason, the philosopher turned to the topic of coloristics in connection with the analysis of the logical structure of judgment, using the example of color, he illustrated the provisions on disjunctive judgments – so, the soul can be considered either as a phenomenon or as a noumenon. "Since both propositions can be true, the opposition is illegitimate, and totality is present in it not as a phenomenon, but perhaps as a noumenon relative to the phenomenon. The flower is either red or blue, or neither: yellow, or both: purple" ^{[16, p. 270]}. It would be interesting to compare these disjunctive judgments with the analysis of color in the context of the disjunctivist approach to describing the perception of color experience found in modern Western literature. According to this approach, we do not have empirical data obtained in the case of accurate perception, which would allow us to assert about an object that it has color. For this reason, we must think of color qualities as depicted in the consciousness of the subject in the process of experiencing the experience itself. At the same time, the experiences of color themselves can be subjectively very similar, but fundamentally different.

The above Kantian coloristic illustration of the relationship between the phenomenon and the noumenon is supplemented in the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment by considering color in the context of the analysis of the beautiful, the formal structure of which can be presented as expediency without purpose, which does not require referring to the concept of the subject. The problem is how to move from these attitudes to artistic experiments with color, to understanding the history of the art of color, to understanding how color is revealed by art through a dialog box in all its variety of shades and meanings, from the delightful harmony of colors in painting to what Yu. S. Stepanov calls a color conflict in literature: a typical example – the language of color in Chekhov's play "Three Sisters".

In the third "Critique", the position of aesthetic coloristics as a kind of psychological dominant is supplemented by the fact that J. Derrida will call it parergonal (from Lat. parerga – minor decorations, additions, details) with a dual sense of color. If you look at the green color of the meadow, it causes a pleasant feeling. As Y. emphasizes. Haag in his article "The shape of color. To parargon in Kant's Critique of the Faculty of Judgment, the fact that Kant refers to the opinion of the majority of people who consider this color to be beautiful in itself raises the question of whether "the experience of the beauty of color can be transcendental and, therefore, fall under the jurisdiction of a pure judgment of taste" (II). But such jurisdiction is impossible due to the fact that such an opinion is based only on the so–called matter of representation (pleasant sensation), and understanding color in this way poses a problem that E. Escubas described as the problem of "non-perceptual perception" (das Nichtwahrnehmbare der Wahrnehmung) - perception of the world, which was understood by Heidegger as ontological sensuality. This type of perception or "confused sensations that we bring with us at birth," as Cezanne said, refers "to the world before man; the world is always already existing" ^{[15, S. 534f]}. If we look into it, the aesthetic phenomenon of perception will be considered when pure sensations of color appear, which Kant associates with a formal, not with a complete definition of the unity of the manifold in these sensations, because a complete definition would contain proof of the reality of color. Subsequently, Wittgenstein will refer the concept of "pure" colors to points in space, and the problem for him will be how to compare the colors of two such points. Nevertheless, we do not have a clear criterion by which to judge the preference of certain colors, there is no understanding of how to apply this criterion to the analysis of color duality. The criterion for the difference between different structures of the color space is also not defined. Only pure color can be considered beautiful, but pure representation belongs to the category of transcendental, in which there is nothing of sensation, perception. And if we abstract from them, then from the empirical contemplation of color there remains only the extension of the color spot and a coloristic image or an emotional assessment of the color environment. Does this mean that it is impossible to represent pure color? On the one hand, in the third "Critique" purity itself, as a kind of universal, should have a transcendental source, being at which one fundamental position should be clarified. Despite all the differences in the perception of the range of colors, which can be "taken" in the context of assessing intellectual and aesthetic expediency (it is captured respectively in the essence of things or purely subjectively, formally), this range nevertheless causes surprise and delight. But the range of color perception and impression itself is set on the basis of space-time structures that determine any type of perception. Each color chosen from the "catalog" of colors can cause us admiration, but color consciousness corresponds to a certain a priori harmony that turns us to the idea of space as a way of representation in the subject, and the "admiring surprise itself is a completely natural consequence of the observed expediency in the essence of things (as phenomena), which therefore cannot be blamed for the agreement between this form of sensory contemplation (which is called space) and the ability to [give] concepts (reason) is not only inexplicable to us from the point of view of why it is exactly this and not another, that it also enriches the soul, allowing it to guess about something that lies beyond sensory representations, in which the last basis of the specified correspondence, even if unknown to us, can be found. Although we do not need to know this basis if we are talking about the formal expediency of our a priori ideas, but still, the need to look there excites our surprise before the subject that prompts us to do this" ^{[17, p. 543]}. But space itself is not just a concept, it is a transcendental singularity, absorbing a variety of ideas originally synthesized in the same composition of consciousness. And so the sensuous contemplation understood in the form of space defines pure color as a form of color [see: 17, p. 203]. It is through form, that is, through the ordering of the manifold in a phenomenon, that color can receive the characteristic of pure contemplation. On the other hand, the question arises how the phenomenon of color can be given an aesthetic characteristic, why it can be called beautiful. Beauty in a sense conveys the peculiarities of color, it too, as Kant notes in another work, cannot become an object of knowledge, it is only perceived as an indefinite object of empirical contemplation and benevolence, that is, as a phenomenon. But since in all phenomena the form is common, which, as Kant says, is ready in the soul a priori, it is "known in accordance with the general rule of coordination; thus, what corresponds to the rule of coordination in space and time is necessarily liked by everyone and is beautiful" ^{[25, S. 298]}.

When the judgment of taste comes into its own, it is constructed only as a single judgment about the aesthetic properties of the object we see, as a judgment about significant phenomena related to the modification of light in the color scheme, for example, about delicious tulips, about the beautiful shape of a wild flower, and the reading of such a judgment can be considered a genuine reading of the which nature figuratively speaks to us with its beautiful forms" ^{[17, p. 395]}. Such a judgment should be distinguished from a logical universal judgment, such as: all tulips are beautiful, while avoiding the transformation of the flower's relationship to taste into a predicate of the flower itself. "The judgment of taste will be only the judgment according to which I find a particular tulip beautiful, i.e. I find that my favor for it is universally significant" ^{[17, pp. 355, 357]}. We have two types of universality before us – the logical universal judgment and the relative universality of the aesthetic judgment, which is related only to the significance for all subjects, but this judgment does not acquire the status of an objective judgment. Color is a kind of aesthetic language of the world, which consciousness processes into structures of symbolic expression: the soul finds some amusement in its reflections on the beauty of nature, and this amusement itself is close to manifestations of moral interest and mental attitude. "A person turns to the beautiful in nature in order to find here, as it were, a joy for his spirit in that system of thoughts that he can never fully develop in himself" ^{[17, p. 391]}.

Kant pays special attention to the problem of color in connection with the consideration of fine art, distinguishing among its types the art of color, which he thinks of as a kind of "the art of the beautiful play of sensations." All of them characterize the tonality of perception itself. We are talking about visual sensations, color perceptions and a special susceptibility to impressions, although they are received by the subject from the outside, but their play, like all aesthetic phenomena, has universal communicability – this is the condition for the possibility of a common feeling. At the same time, there is some uncertainty in the very method of aesthetic justification of this susceptibility, since it is unclear whether it is carried out through feeling or through reflection. "It is impossible to say with certainty whether there is a color ... only a pleasant sensation, or whether it in itself is a wonderful game of sensations and how such a game causes favor to the form when making an aesthetic judgment" ^{[17, p. 453]}. In the aesthetic consideration of color, neither objective characteristics (the speed of light fluctuations measured in physical optics, the response time to radiation of the visible range of receptors located in the retina of the human eye), nor pragmatic characteristics (pleasantness of color, color as a pleasant art in various cultural samples) should be taken into account. True, Kant considers even the judgments about the aesthetic properties of color problematic, since "the beauty of their composition" is not associated with paints, but then it is unclear why it was necessary to attribute the art of color to the art of an elegant play of sensations, the properties of which reveal the essence of the sequence in time as conditions of inner feeling. But if, as Kant believes, "to make a judgment about shades of color by analogy with music" (note that examples of the presence of analogies between the form of time and the form of color are given by the "light symphony" in A. N. Scriabin's Prometheus, experiments with light music in P. Boulez's electronic studio, and landscapes by some French artists sometimes are characterized as singing), then we will have to consider visual impressions "as an action rendered due to the fact that a judgment is made about the form in the play of many sensations" ^{[17, p. 453]}. Kant refers to aesthetic images and forms of color, which are revealed in time, manifested in the rhythmic pattern of a musical work.

Speaking purely theoretically, the rhythm of color is the rhythm of the ether through which Euler described color, and the main thing for Kant here is how the soul perceives this rhythm: if we agree with the description of the "correct play of impressions by reflection (hence, forms in connection with various representations), then color and sound were it would be not only sensations, but already formal definitions of the unity of the manifold in them; then they themselves could be ranked among beauty" ^{[17, p. 203]}.  The art of color, in essence, is excluded by Kant from the aesthetic analysis of painting, understood by the philosopher as an image of sensory visibility of spatial extent, creating visible images to express aesthetic ideas as they are figuratively "drawn to the eye", in this kind of art "the very essence is a drawing in which the basis of all prerequisites is not that what is pleasure in the sensation, but only what is pleasant because of its shape. The colors with which the drawings are colored belong to the attractive; they themselves, it is true, can enliven an object for sensation, but they cannot make it worthy of contemplation and beautiful, rather, what a beautiful form requires, for the most part very limit them, and even where attractiveness is allowed, it is ennobled only by the beautiful form" ^{[17, pp. 205, 207]}. Consequently, Kant draws a line between the external perception of color, which performs an effective role (to color), and the conceptualization of the form of color, which contains an aesthetic meaning. In the third "Critique" Kant continues the line of transcendental aesthetics, representing color as an empirical phenomenon that can be understood artistically only as ways of working on the layout of the drawing or creating the drawing itself, for example, the technique of drawing with lessirovki in watercolor painting, which consists in making subtle color adjustments to the details of painting, which is possible due to the laws of optical displacement.  The question of the purity of colors is for Kant not a question of the imagery of the painting, they only contribute to the fact that the form of the work itself becomes more refined and clearer. It would be interesting to analyze whether the transcendental intuitions of color in Kant's philosophy were realized in the artistic practices of the last three centuries, in their so different coloristic projects (cf.: 13, S. 261; 16, S. 171).

So, this fragment shows how difficult the philosophical and aesthetic problems associated with understanding such a phenomenon as color are. Disputes over this issue have not subsided to this day. And, as the analysis shows, it is still very far to the synthesis of various concepts of color or to the unity of its actions as a manifestation of the creative ability of the imagination. Therefore, the concept of color, included in the terminology of philosophical and aesthetic discourse, historical and philosophical interpretations of it, are relevant for the conceptual analysis of color in modern philosophy in general, and in aesthetics in particular. In this section, Kant's aesthetics is considered in the form as it was set by transcendental attitudes towards color, analysis of its own foundations of color thinking, clarification of how the recognition of coloristic integrity structures was carried out. For aesthetics, Kant's indication is of fundamental importance, according to which "judgment should begin with the whole and strives for the idea of the work together with its foundation" ^{[27, S. 64]}. These attitudes were formed in the "Critique of Pure Reason" and were supplemented and enriched in the "Critique of the Faculty of Judgment" and subsequent works of the philosopher. What is the truth of color? Is it a kind of self-evidence through which consciousness builds the visual world, adopting something from its coloristic structures, or is it just an index of the work of consciousness itself? What are the limits of applicability of coloristic concepts? The world lies before us like a woven multicolored carpet. And the problem is not only whether such a carpet actually exists or not, but also that if it exists, then by whom and how it is woven – by some world structures or by a person contemplating this world. And how to fit the color itself not into a metaphorical, but into a metaphysical picture of the world, how to comprehend its experience? On what basis do we distinguish in the contemplation of this carpet the dispositions to see its red or blue "threads"? Disputes about the metaphysical foundations of color experience, about the philosophical status of colors, about their physical or psychological nature are among the most unusual in the history of thought, today they are conducted at the level of interdisciplinary research – at the intersection of philosophy itself and research in physics, psychology, cognitive science and neuroscience. And this status is extremely important for understanding the creative nature of the mind itself. "The intentional content of visual experience presents external objects as having color qualities that actually belong only to ... the field of vision ... "Coloring all natural objects with colors borrowed from the inner senses," as Hume put it, the mind "in some way creates a new creation"" ^{[5, p. 96]}, and for in this case, it is extremely important for us to understand what aesthetic meaning this creation is filled with. In Opus postutm, the question of the relation of vision and light, which should be a priori anticipated, will be repeatedly raised. Vision itself will be thought of as something preceding light, admitting multiplicity in colors, and making it possible, even deceiving light (why vision needs time), it means what it calls the inner affection of definitions in space. "They see in space through light, not light" ^{[16, p.565]}. Vision is a kind of touching the world, examining an object from all sides, feeling it with the eyes, as something "repulsive like feeling" ^{[16, p. 546]}, and in this sense, a person as a cosmo-viewer at the same time himself a priori "creates elements of cognition of the world, from which he makes a picture of the world in the idea" ^{[16, p. 546]}. 548].

Disputes about the metaphysics of color touch upon the most important problems of natural philosophy, epistemology, aesthetics and semantics. It is impossible to build a visual picture of an object outside of color, to comprehend the identity of the world. It is doubly important to coordinate the scientific and aesthetic theory of color, although here, if you follow Wittgenstein, you should focus not so much on the theory of color as on the logic of color concepts. Kant continues Descartes' tradition of philosophical analysis of color perception. To this day, the question of what role color plays in the development of the aesthetic perception system remains relevant. The central place here is occupied by the question of why we realize that something is aesthetically experienced as blue, yellow, and so on.  Kant's philosophy marks the most important intellectual transition from the development of the ontology of color to its epistemology, to the construction of coloristics as a branch of human science and as the most important facet of artistic comprehension of the world. In this sense, it is interesting to trace the influence (explicit or indirect) of Kant's transcendentalism with its propaedeutic course on the philosophy of color on the artistic culture of the Enlightenment and subsequent eras. The transcendental principle of dual consideration of an object is transformed in Kant's aesthetics of color into an analysis of it as specific structures of consciousness, manifested both in the simple charm generated by it and in the form of color. Comprehending the history of the formation of Kant's concept of color, special attention should be paid to the aesthetic aspects of coloristic practices in painting. Unfortunately, Kant excludes color from the system of expressive means of painting, reducing their diversity only to drawing. This reveals gaps in the interpretations of the expressive possibilities of painting. Perhaps any modern artist could argue with Kant, for example, P. Cezanne, for whom color and drawing are equivalent phenomena. These expressive means are side by side with the ideas through which "the sky of the spirit is colored in a different color" (M. Merleau-Ponty) Kant's philosophy of color influenced many of his philosophical interpretations. Let us note here only the philosophy of perception of M. Merleau-Ponty. Considering the perception of the world itself as an extension of the field of the presence of the "I", he emphasizes that Kant fixes the world unity present in this field in transcendental dialectics, but forgets about it in transcendental analytics. But, note that Kant does not forget about it in transcendental aesthetics, although it is in it, the French philosopher believes, that we should not adhere to its categories, carrying out the deduction of a single space. But Kant's metaphysical interpretation of space is not a deduction of space. At the same time, Merleau-Ponty reproaches Kant for confining himself to a reflexive understanding of transcendental apperception. As for color, according to the French philosopher, it tells about the properties of things in the world even more than geometry. The universality of coloristic perceptibility as a mirror of transcendence is manifested in the fact that "it is precisely due to the same property that color, yellow, is given simultaneously as a certain being and as a certain dimension, an expression of every possible being" ^{[35, p. 296]}. Reflections on color constancy in connection with the interpretation of the pre-reflexive layer of experience and conventional symbolization lead Merleau-Ponty to the conclusion that judging about this feature of color perception allows us to conclude that the object's own color "turns out to be inconsistent with itself every time. The weakness of empiricism, as well as intellectualism, consists in the fact that they do not recognize colors other than those unchanging properties that are the result of a reflexive attitude, whereas color in living perception is a kind of introduction to a thing. It is necessary to part with the illusion that physics supports, as if the perceived world consists of colors-properties. As the artists have noticed, there are few flowers in nature" ^{[36, pp. 391-392]}. Although this is rather not an introduction to a thing (true, Merleau-Ponty admits that there are no absolute colors in things themselves), but an introduction to what the philosopher calls intentional flesh, the idea of which allows us to consider the world of colors as a secondary formation that is present in perceptual consciousness: so, the philosopher emphasizes, the apparent color may change depending on our memories of it. Therefore, "the first perception of colors proper is associated with a change in the structure of consciousness, with the establishment of a new dimension of experience, the unfolding of a certain a priori… It is necessary to acquire color as quality, and the previous data due to this alone turn out to be a kind of quality preparation" ^{[36, p. 58]}. At the same time, the color experience expands, the shades arising in this process indicate the intention of color, and thanks to the sound order built up in the art of cinematography, the color images themselves are transformed. If we talk about the experience of art as a whole, about its current state, then we should emphasize the position about the relationship between the subject perceiving color and the coloristic picture of the world, which is becoming more and more fluctuating. The analysis of Kant's philosophy and aesthetics of color is important not only for drawing coloristic lines in modern Western philosophy, but also for understanding the events of color in the history of Russian philosophy. It is enough to recall, for example, the dispute between Vladimir Solovyov and Vasily Rozanov about the meaning of the beauty of forms and colors in nature.

Aesthetic Reason in the materials for the "Critique of Pure Reason".

An important step for the construction of the science of beauty in the "Critique of Pure Reason" is associated with the interpretation of the ratio of intuitive and aesthetic. Highlighting the idea of the kind of clarity given through contemplation, Kant points out in the "Preface" to the ambiguity of intuitive and aesthetic clarity, while being aware that "the means that promote clarity help, it is true, the understanding of individual parts, but often delay the understanding of the whole, preventing the reader from quickly reviewing the whole, and with their own too bright colors obscure and hide the dismemberment or the structure of the system, whereas it is the structure of the system that mainly determines judgments about its unity and thoroughness" ^{[19, p. 23 (XIX)]}. But what is hidden from the tools of achieving clarity cannot be hidden from such a unique creator, which is the mind itself, which has both the ability to give principles of cognition a priori, and the purely aesthetic ability, as it were, to create entirely from itself and apodictically create itself. And this evidence "is revealed by the mind itself as soon as the general principle of everything created by it is found" ^{[19, p.23 (XX)]}. But such a general principle of everything created is precisely what aesthetics is looking for, and it is to some extent significant for transcendental philosophy, which makes the intuitive its principle through the ability of judgment, without which it is impossible to realize what E. Husserl calls the epochs, and Kant himself calls abstinence from judgment. One might even say that the study of reason itself turns into a task of aesthetics, because, as Kant believes, it is the study of reason that, in its ultimate goal, is more sublime than the entire enterprise of the understanding. But what this analysis of the sublime is, Kant does not say in the Critique of Pure Reason, perhaps it should be attributed to the mathematically sublime, which will be discussed in the third Critique, since only it correlates with the ability of cognition.

In Russian philosophy, first of all in N. O. Lossky and V. N. Ilyin, reason itself appears as a modification of intuition, the essence of which reveals the truth to us. Intuitionism itself has a long history in European philosophy. Its origins can be found in Platonic ideas about the spiritual contemplation of the eidos, these ideas develop in Cartesian characteristics of the intuitions of the mind, without which our knowledge cannot gain greater certainty. Subsequently, the event of intuition is read differently by Spinoza and Leibniz, in a completely different register - the register of contemplation – it is located in Kant's philosophy, fitting into the horizon of the work of schematic, symbolic representation. A. A. Novikov rightly emphasizes: "as a "pure contemplation" intuition loses its purely epistemological status and acquires, according to Kant, Fichte and Schelling, aesthetic status" ^{[37, p. 140]}. Thus, the aesthetic itself acquires a more universal meaning. But for aesthetics, another aspect of Kant's interpretation of intuition is no less important. It is a prioriism that translates a posteriori, sensual intuition into pure contemplation. But a priori is not just an order, to some extent it presupposes aesthetic activity: after all, "to define a priori is to construct" ^{[26, S. 653]}, to build, to create. In this sense, a priori coincides with a creative act, the nature of which aesthetics has always sought to comprehend. The sensory form of intuition is only a prerequisite for cognitive activity, but not the cognitive act itself. At the same time, it is a potency in the sense of creative ability, and here Kant's idea of potency itself echoes the Neoplatonic idea of the perfect potency of the actual, allowing the creator to realize himself. So, the power of intuition is fundamentally creative, allowing knowledge itself to be not just reproduced, but produced anew. "Kant's sensory intuition is not the intuition of knowledge, but the intuition of the ability to create knowledge" ^{[27, p.49]}. This allows us to approach aesthetic eventfulness from a new perspective.

If we ignore Kant's early works, then metaphysical approaches to solving the question of the possibility of aesthetics can begin with a critical analysis of pure reason, independent of sensuality. It already contains the foundations of aesthetic theory, which is woven into a concise outline of the entire metaphysical system. Therefore, it is so important to understand how the system of Kantian metaphysics itself is configured. It would seem that what is the point of talking about metaphysics in this context, if the transcendental doctrine of principles recognizes the empirical rather than a priori character of aesthetic criteria. Even if we introduce aesthetics into the circle of speculative philosophy, the term denoting this discipline can be interpreted both transcendentally (or as a new transcendental aesthetics justified by Husserl) and psychologically. However, this is still a convention that manifests itself in a disjunctive judgment expressed in one fragment from Kant's transcendental doctrine of principles. Therefore, what the term aesthetics actually implies remains unclear. It turns out that the topic of aesthetics in the "Critique of Pure Reason" can be closed on this. But let's not jump to conclusions. Since ancient times, aesthetics has been correlated with the reflexive awareness of the picture of the creative process, which Kant inscribes into the structures of both theoretical and practical consciousness. After all, "creativity (the beginning) stems from freedom" ^{[26, S. 431]} – this fundamental structure of theoretical and practical reason, but the problem here is that when creating something, we are always already outside the beginning and inside it, because to be free (that is, the third, what "exists between nature and chance" ^{[27, p. 163]}) and means "to be the creator of oneself" ^{[16, p. 560]}, that is, it means to be an aesthetic subject. And the practical application of reason itself occurs only when it enters the path of freedom with aesthetic properties – at least Kant will talk about the sublime quality of noumenal freedom. Art also follows the same path, constantly encountering the complexities of metaphysical consciousness. This also applies to contemporary art, which is often characterized as the art of flow. In him, "the spasm of constraint with the idea of producing a masterpiece, some kind of unit containing everything perfect, containing everything in general, has disappeared. People are trying more to organize the flow in which something happens, and, moreover, even the very idea of world-building, world-building, absolute ideal, or a carrier of the spirit, an intellectual, has disappeared. This can be seen in art. The explanation of this fact itself is the explanation of metaphysical consciousness as consciousness in its actual form" ^{[32, p. 528]}. If we knew how to produce a masterpiece, then there would be no problem at all. In addition, for aesthetics, it is important to clarify what the intention of this flow is. The science of beauty itself as a practice of working, first of all, with the meanings of art, as a discipline focused on the free creation of meaning, arose simultaneously with metaphysics in antiquity. And it represented, in fact, the concept of creativity as a whole. That is why it is so important to find out whether there is something in Kant's transcendentalism that can be considered as a metaphysics of creativity.

At one time Immanuel Kant, considering the structure of the transcendental method, asked questions: how is cognition possible, what are its limits, are we able to cognize objects a priori? In his view, "the most perfect object is the great unity of knowledge" ^{[27, S. 415]}. He found the solution to epistemological problems not only on the path of scientific understanding of knowledge itself (and the metaphysics of science is conceived by him as something that is actually philosophical in philosophy), which is laid in relation to the essential and unconditioned goals of the human mind that determine all sides of the cultural horizon, but also through the introduction of the concept of metaphysical anthropology into epistemology. Indeed, only a person carries out cognition, and since "every person has metaphysics in himself, although usually in a rather vague form" ^{[21, p. 51]}, it is impossible to develop epistemology outside of this metaphysical in us, outside the dimension of not only transcendental anthropology ("a nthropologia transcendentalis", which can be represented as self-consciousness reason and reason ^{[25, S. 395]}), but also pure aesthetics, developed in the "Critique of the faculty of Judgment". In general, the aesthetics of cognition is the elegance and drama of problem solving, and not what is sometimes called the luxury of half–knowledge. Some Kantian intuitions express the coincidence of epistemology, morality and the sphere of art – each of them is a manifestation of an indivisible spiritual feeling and equivalent. Revealing the meaning of the schematism of the faculty of judgment, the critical study of this faculty – the school that the understanding passes through in its application, bringing the special under the universal, it is important to understand what, in fact, is drawn in it regarding the Kantian problem as a whole. The following range of questions corresponds to this study: "Is empirical experience possible according to the transcendental law? Is there something necessary in our very sensuality, in empirical synthesis (and not just in reason and reason), that gives it a moment of necessity? Does not the pleasure of the forms of things mean the expediency of the subject in relation to things (and not just things – to judgment)? That is, just “for what?”, “what's the point?". To the "tested" or "untested"" ^{[33, p. 1032]}. All these questions can be concretized in relation to the reflexive ability of judgment, when the universal is sought for this particular, to the analysis of the theory of art, if we consider it from the point of view of what for Kant was something inscribed by reason according to its own plan. For example, the conditions of a work of art – this apparent conceivability– are congruent with the a priori feasibility of feelings. But then how to pave the matrix path for the work itself, after passing through which the world turns out to be Aeschylus or Shakespearean? Therefore, the contour of the world itself is drawn aesthetically, but such a drawing is carried out not inside the world, but inside sensory representations, causing us a harmonious play of imagination and reason.

All these problems are connected with the study of the origin of the fundamental acts of reason, which also contains the rubrics of aesthetic thinking. After all, "the ideas of speculative, aesthetic and morally //practical reason in one system (ens summum, etc.)" ^{[16, p. 563]} constitute the content of transcendental philosophy, in which the mind indulges in a purely aesthetic occupation – creates for itself a portrait of the whole. The metaphysical design of these headings gives rise to a disciplinary beginning for understanding why, for example, "theology leads to aesthetic criticism" ^{[16, p. 295]} in a transcendental sense – and outside of this semantic construction it is impossible to understand how truth and beauty relate, how an artist thinks of a work or how what a philosopher calls divine is possible art. In all this disciplinary framework, the metaphysical sound of aesthetic thought is felt. And "although nothing looks less attractive than metaphysics, but the jewelry sparkling on the beauty lay at first in gloomy crypts or at least passed only through the poorly lit workshop of the craftsman" ^{[16, p. 77]}, the late Kant will add through the artist's workshop. Despite the fact that the aesthetic is inaccessible to direct observation on the metaphysical surface, however, it forms an expressive subtext to the metaphysical text, is imperceptibly worked out under this surface in a kind of universal non-perceptible workshop of discriminative consciousness, in which art is taught, learning how to "make the world" (Kant).

The development of aesthetic discipline is connected with the identification of conditions for the possibility of the "miracle of beauty" (Pushkin), which has already happened, and further, into the depth of this amazing phenomenon, thought is not able to penetrate, cannot decompose it, when faced with the space of inexplicable ideas. It is possible to describe some inherent properties of the beautiful (to build its analytics), expressing, for example, the relation of its proximity to what is presented without concepts, and so on, but this is nothing more than the specifications of beautiful phenomena (Kant considers intellectual functions as giving rise to appregension, although only the specification gives us the rule of its application, nevertheless, in aesthetics, the specification itself does not give an answer to the Platonic question – what is beautiful in itself; in fact, the beautiful remains indefinable), beyond which we cannot go in our quest to comprehend the mystery of beauty. It is equally important to consider how to understand the category of beauty under the sign of the aesthetic intention of cogito (in the materials for the Critique of Pure Reason, it is even said about its cognition: "for cognition of something as beautiful, etc., a special ability is needed in us, and not in the subject" ^{[16, p. 151]}). In the aesthetic works created under the same sign, we can feel the pathos of the theory of art, which allows us to get closer to how an artist can extract an experience that cannot be introduced by assumption, but it is necessary to establish the event of such extraction every time (that is, the very obvious fact that there is someone whom we can call an artist with his consciousness of his own rightness and one can only be born an artist, and only then assert that a miracle of art has happened, to begin the work of the soul and consciousness, which, as Marcel Proust wrote in "Found Time", "art will remake anew, this is a movement in the opposite direction, this is a return to the depths where everything that existed in the past reality, it remains unknown to us, and now it must be rediscovered"). We are talking about the necessary semantic prerequisites of aesthetic creation and perception (as Paul Valery said, "we live in what we see, but we only see what we think about"), flashing the reflection of the invisible on the visible, they happen when the subject anticipates the state of creativity, when he is endowed with the talent of the way of thinking. Starting from these presuppositions as from some further unanalyzed points from which the aesthetic world with its works comes into motion – a kind of transparent substances of beauty, these aesthetic aspects of the thing in itself – the artist connects incommensurable worlds in a work of art, reproducing, according to Valerie, the relations that define his work in the same way as several axioms make up the whole "geometry". Here the talent itself appears in the image of a charioteer of a soul full of feelings, that is, "a charioteer who keeps passions in check: he does not coddle them, but does not allow them to harden" ^{[16, p. 578]}. The soul method reveals the transcendental prerequisites of how we can contemplate the world and ourselves at all, see something in it: and "we do not see anything except what we can do ourselves. We must, however, first make ourselves" ^{[16, p. 432]}.  But how is this possible? And when creating ourselves or our work, are we dealing with some kind of beginning or semantic basis? Maybe the aesthetic is groundless at all? Answering these questions philosophically, it is impossible not to recognize that the aesthetic, if we have a meaningful conversation about it, exists in a kind of universal space, which is set by the transcendental as the "last foundation", glowing with meaning. Therefore, we cannot escape from the transcendental a priori aesthetic meaning, from the search for an a priori basis for a reflective aesthetic judgment.

In his comments on the materials for the Critique of Pure Reason, V. V. Vasiliev suggests that Kant's transcendental anthropology "is built from the sum of the main theses of his three "Critics", considered from the point of view of the ultimate goal of human existence" ^{[16, p. 616]}. But since the critical analysis of the faculty of judgment is the final consonance of all Kantian metaphysics, then aesthetics itself can be thought of as one of the ways to substantiate transcendental anthropology. The philosophy of beauty will also be structured in the process of metaphysical substantiation of the theory of cognition and morality, assessment of the mood on the basis of which it is necessary to perform actions, to identify the methodological culture of science. In the very basis of our reasoning about them, one way or another, we must put the concept of the aesthetic faculty of judgment, without which it is impossible to build a system of philosophy, although this ability is unknown to us in its basis. Unlike other philosophical disciplines, aesthetics has to build a whole drama of its foundations, the art of which seeks to reveal the meaning of the boundary between the invention of foundations and the realism of foundations. Here, "grounds are needed for something for which there are no grounds "by nature"" ^{[34, p. 245]}. After all, all the cognitive, aesthetic abilities and moral forces of the soul, all the studies of nature and man teach us that "the inscrutable wisdom, thanks to which we exist, is just as worthy of reverence in what it denied us, as in what it gave us (was sie uns zu Teil warden lie?)" ^{[20, p. 693]}. That is why it is so difficult to correlate a moralizing and a non-moralizing view of art. It can be said that the foundations themselves in their aesthetic part are both inscrutable and endless.

Aesthetics beyond transcendental aesthetics (perfection)

Thematization of transcendental perfection ("unity, truth and completeness (transcendental perfection)" [Kant. 1996-18, S. 339]), as we will see later, seems rather strange precisely in Kant's aesthetic system. The concept of perfection or perfectionism (from Latin per facere or per-factum, which means "done to the end"; nihil est simul et inventum et perfectum – no invention can become perfect immediately; hence the renaissance idea of the work of great artists, each of whom is perfectissimus - the most perfect in his style) it refers to certain completed (as the circle whose form Andrea Palladio considered the most perfect of all is completed) or integral results of activity, regardless of who is the author of the action itself – an absolute being or a man (Kant will reflect on "godlike in the idea of a perfect man" ^{[27, S. 598]}), as well as to the normative synthesis of nonempirical principles, which, along with accuracy, constitutes the distinctive features of the definition. In the current situation, the discussion of the problem of perfection becomes quite acute, it is enough to give an example from the field of bioethics – how to ethically solve the question: is it possible to genetically perfect a person? Perfection itself does not so often become the subject of philosophical analysis (the exception in Western studies are works ^{[3, 7]}), the main emphasis in the study of perfection belongs to works on psychology, religious-mystical and ethical teachings, in foreign literature it is: ^{[4, 21]}, in domestic - ^[40]. Kant is occupied by the idea of "perfection of perfection". From an epistemological point of view, perfection can be characterized as an idea that is found under the general form of the idea of ultimate completeness (the perfection of a thing "is "the agreement of its reality with the idea" ^{[27, S. 322]}, or as an ideal in comparison with which we describe the world (this will be a property of the objective embodiment of the concept of perfection; by the way, Kant characterizes perfection even as a mathematical concept), world structures may be imperfect, but in their integrity they are one perfection. M. Heidegger will later think of perfection as a condition of ontology, define reality itself as something perfect in itself. There is nothing akin to perfection, it is impossible to give it a metaphorical meaning, or empirically rise to its level. It is difficult to call the concept of perfection even an aesthetic category, it has a more universal, perhaps even substantial meaning for aesthetics – about the same as the concept of truth in philosophy. 

Kant introduces the concept of perfection in transcendental analytics – this logic of true knowledge, as it is stated in the Critique of Pure Reason. At the same time, he takes this concept beyond the transcendental table of categories or, as the late Kant also calls them, thought forms (Denkformen) (quantities, qualities, relations, modalities through which we think of the object of contemplation) and analyzes it along with the concepts of unity and truth, seeing in them, as can be seen from the materials to the "Critique of Pure Reason", the requisites of all knowledge concerning our higher abilities, which in moral philosophy will take the shape of culture (including the culture of will), this manifestation of the perfection of humanity, are the requisites necessary in the course of the representation of reason (assuming apodictic certainty or complete truth), reason and judgment. And the image of culture itself cannot be conceived outside of art. This reduction is due to the fact that perfection is for Kant one of the imaginary transcendental predicates of things, which represent only a logical criterion of the possibility of cognition, which was mistakenly erected into a property of things in themselves. This criterion works according to the quantitative principle of synthesis categories, including the concepts of unity, multiplicity and totality, transforming them so as to synthesize different parts of cognition in one consciousness. Therefore, "in every cognition of an object there is perfection, consisting in the fact that this multiplicity as a whole is reduced back to the unity of the concept and is fully consistent only with the concept; this can be called qualitative completeness (totality)" ^{[18, p.183 (In 114)]}. Consequently, the requirement of perfection presupposes a kind of recursive procedure provided for by the requirements of unity and multiplicity, when fulfilling this requirement, these concepts constantly pass into each other. The substantiation of the hypothetical-deductive method is carried out by procedures for the synthesis of everything that can be extracted from the concept. In this case, the structure of what was assumed synthetically a priori is depicted a posteriori. "The concepts of unity, truth and perfection do not complement the transcendental table of categories at all, as if it were insufficient; they only – completely leaving aside the relation of these concepts to objects – bring the way of applying categories under the general logical rules of correspondence of cognition with itself" ^{[18, p. 185 (In 115-116)]}. These criteria somewhat resemble aesthetic criteria, also assuming only a subjective correspondence, but not with categories, but with ideas (it should be noted that "an object is given in an idea, which is therefore only possible. This is perfection" ^{[26, S. 675]}), the synthetic activity of consciousness. Moreover, since such an approach to the interpretation of perfection is associated with the concepts of unity and diversity, it is a favorable place to move to the philosophical and aesthetic category of harmony. In general, perfection is commensurate with the criteria of beauty and what G. V. Leibniz called spontaneous harmony, which is a kind of space-time operator connecting the future with the past and the present with the absent.

Even in the precritical period, Kant thinks about what can be called a perfect act, seeks to comprehend the perfection that lies in mutual love; the soul is involved in all these acts of perfection, which fulfills the ultimate goal-setting. Kant develops Plato's idea of the soul as the center of feelings, believing that it, being "full of feeling, is the greatest perfection. In speech, in poetry, in public life, such a soul does not always happen, but it is the ultimate goal" ^{[23, p. 189]}. And we are not talking at all about the state of a person imbued with a strong feeling, we are talking about something else – about that state of the soul that contains all the properties for its own integrity, the utmost completeness, Kant sees here a range of saturated perception, the maximum concentration of emotional excitement and movement, even the incomprehensibility of its achievements, which have something different as their premise from the content of contemplation, observation (today extremely important questions are raised about the very "nature of observation and the inclusion of culturally significant information in artistic representations" ^{[10, p. 10]}). And although this range is aesthetically accidental, as poetry testifies, but if it happens, it always speaks of the perfection of the soul itself, because, as Kant will note, the same chance, which is existential, increases with perfection.

Kant also refers to the concept of perfection in transcendental dialectics, mainly in connection with the understanding of the supreme being, which he calls the author of world perfection, the concept of this being allows us to substantiate the regulatory principle of the study of nature. Thanks to this concept, we are able to think of the cause of the world in the image of the unconditionally necessary and all-encompassing perfection of the primordial being, which is the source of all causality; we present it as a condition of every possible action, as having reason, experiencing pleasure and manifesting will, that is, we endow it with structural relations of the most refined anthropomorphism, therefore "we have the right to attribute to it the infinite perfection, therefore, far surpasses that perfection, to the assumption of which empirical knowledge about the order of the world gives us the right. Indeed, the regulative law of systematic unity requires that we study nature as if systematic and expedient unity were infinitely found everywhere with as much diversity as possible. For although we can recognize or discover only a small fraction of this perfection of the world, nevertheless, it is inherent in the legislation of our mind to seek and assume it everywhere" ^{[18, pp. 889, 891 (In 728-729)]}. In this sense, judgments about the perfection of the world and about divine wisdom have long been led to an almost equivalent expression. And the very expression "as if" (als ob) cited in this fragment testifies to the movement of Kantian thinking towards metaphysical symbolism, without which it is difficult to imagine the existence of specific acts of aesthetic consciousness. In addition, Kant, in fact, shares the Cartesian interpretation of wisdom as a perfect knowledge of everything that a person is able to know. And when we talk not only about wisdom, but even about the systematic unity of scientific knowledge, we mean, according to the German philosopher, its logical perfection. Through the concepts of completeness and perfection, Kant depicts the mind itself, although he has not yet drawn a line under the perfectionist idea of reason.  A special place in the structure of the mind is occupied by transcendental ideas, which "may be nothing more than forces of cognition for an object or representations in general in relation to them" ^{[27, S. 229]}, and value ideas and principles that evaluate knowledge about the world and the world itself, looking for the meanings of human existence in it. At least, all subjective principles (and the principle of aesthetic judgment is connected with them), since they are taken "not from the nature of the object, but from the interest of reason in relation to some possible perfection of this object" ^{[18, p. 851 (In 694)]}, Kant calls the maxims of reason. He likens his idea to a scheme of sensuality, the subject field of which cannot be imagined outside of symbolism. After all, for Kant, the very "sensual representation is a symbol (symbolum) of the intellectual" ^{[26, S. 456]}. And in relation to reason and sensuality, Kant sees a certain aesthetic moment associated with harmony, with the harmony of substantiality. "Sensuality and reason do not define each other, but each of them acts according to its own laws, but they conduct each other (harmony)" ^{[27, S. 258]}, and Kant will constantly write an orchestration of higher cognitive abilities. The mind is a kind of intermediary, within which there is reason and experience, a variety of practical attitudes, which later, for example, P. Feyerabend, will also be thought of in the context of imperfection / perfection. Reason and practice are considered by him as not different types of practical activity itself, which can be improved through the intervention of reason; although the parts of this opposition are not equivalent, "however, both are imperfect and changing products of human activity, but as a confrontation, on the one hand, of such an imperfect product, and on the other – a stable measure of perfection" ^{[43, p. 483]}.

Already from the materials for the "Critique of Pure Reason" it becomes clear why in the "Critique of the Faculty of Judgment" there is such a tense relationship between the perfect and the aesthetic. Aesthetic emotion, as a rule, is accompanied by joy, but is it possible to characterize it as perfect? Higher abilities are good for a person, but does this mean that they are perfection? The late Kant emphasizes that "our higher powers are directed to unity, truth and perfection through reason, judgment and reason" ^{[27, S. 230]}. But it all depends on whether a person practices these abilities in a perfect form, which only pave the way to goals, but are not themselves good.  The predicate of a work expressing an aesthetic sense of pleasure is conveyed by the predicate of affinity with the object, and when we recognize this feeling as a form of cognition of perfection, we do not realize that "perfection is not a feeling of beauty and pleasure, but the completeness of the object. And although it is true that every completeness is pleasant, and we have the ability to apply the idea of perfection to everything and depict everything as complete, however, the knowledge of completeness, i.e. the perfection of an object is not the knowledge of pleasure, because the question still remains whether it is connected in some cases with pleasure and displeasure. If we assume that an object is an object of pleasure, then perfection is also liked, and then completeness is not always even required for pleasure. With pleasure and displeasure, it is not about the object, but about how it affects the soul. Pleasure and displeasure are the ability to distinguish objects, but not with respect to what is in them themselves, but how the idea of them is imprinted in our subject, and how our feelings are affected by this" ^{[16, p. 152]}.

Kant will return to the question of the relationship between perfection and the feeling of pleasure as an intermediate ability to focus on receptivity to the definition of the subject as an a priori principle for the ability to judge in the first introduction to the Critique of the Ability to Judge. At the same time, he will distinguish between logical and aesthetic perfection, the first is built by the consistency of cognition with the object, the second by the consistency of cognition with the subject (it is not easy to coordinate them, because there is, for example, "subjective opposition of the partiality of sensuality and the integrity of reason in the definition of cognition" ^{[26, S. 710]}), but these structures of cognition are not they pass into each other, and if we keep in mind the clarity of both, then, Kant emphasizes, we should keep in mind that logical clarity will differ from aesthetic clarity, like heaven from earth. "Cognition by contemplation is aesthetic, logical by concepts" ^{[26, S. 651]}. Let's say that the pleasure of a work of art is a sensual representation of perfection, identical with expediency. Proceeding from this, aesthetic reflection should presuppose cognitive judgment, but since perfection belongs to the class of objective concepts (Kant sees in it an ontological concept that means the completeness of the complex), then in this case the distinction between perfectionist judgment and logical judgment would be washed away, so that rational and rational conclusions would also have to be called aesthetic, and judgment through pleasure would not be sensual, but intellectual or teleological. Therefore, "the sensuous idea of perfection contains an obvious contradiction, and if the consistency of the manifold brought to [the concept of] One must be called perfection, then the latter must be represented through the concept, otherwise it cannot bear this name" ^{[17, pp. 899, 901]}. Reason describes perfection in a thing, feeling grasps the pleasant in it, aesthetic reflection alone, which does not take into account the concept, discovers beauty in it, but makes a judgment only about subjective expediency, and not about the perfection of the thing itself. But is the idea of it connected with the feeling of pleasure as a state of mind? In the first introduction, Kant does not give an exhaustive answer to this question.

In the text of the third "Criticism" itself, the question of the relationship between perfection and pleasure takes on a different form when the pleasure of beauty comes to the fore. Aesthetic pleasure itself is regarded as something mysterious and unknown in the principle of the faculty of judgment, which has an intermediate meaning associated with generalization to more general topological spaces – the domain of the concepts of nature and the domain of the concept of freedom. "If, in relation to the practical basis of the definition, pleasure precedes the law, then this basis of the definition is aesthetic (sensual), but if the law precedes and pleasure follows it, then the basis of the definition is moral" ^{[16, p. 567]}. But in the analysis of the aesthetic faculty of judgment, the question of the ratio of pleasure and perfection is not raised when discussing the first two points of the judgment of taste – in quality and quantity. It arises only when considering the third moment of this judgment – in relation to goals, but in a different form, problematizing the relationship of the judgment of taste and perfection. When it comes to objective expediency, we mean either external (usefulness of the subject) or internal expediency. It is the latter that is described by the concept of perfection. Singling out acts of perfection as such, Kant believes that beauty approaches perfection, but it is impossible to approach it – perfection either exists or it does not exist. "That benevolence towards an object, thanks to which we call it beautiful, cannot be based on the idea of its usefulness, because then it would be a direct benevolence towards the object, and it is precisely this benevolence that constitutes the main condition for judging beauty. Objective internal expediency, i.e. perfection, is already closer to the predicate of beauty, and therefore eminent philosophers identified it with beauty, however, adding: if it is thought vaguely. In the criticism of taste, it is extremely important to solve the question of whether beauty is really soluble in the concept of perfection" ^{[17, p. 209]}. It goes without saying that these irreducible meanings of beauty and perfection are conceived by Kant as an addition to the position of the "Critique of Pure Reason" about perfection as qualitative completeness, by which, in the transcendental exposition of aesthetic judgments, the agreement of the manifold in a thing with the concept of purpose, that is, their reciprocity, will be understood. This addition marks a return to non-empirical origins, which are at the same time conditions for the possibility of the thing itself, its identification in the structures of thinking. Further criticizing erroneous ideas about perfection, Kant wrote in the Metaphysics of Morals that "sometimes it is understood as belonging to transcendental philosophy the concept of the totality of the manifold, which, taken as a whole, constitutes a thing, and [sometimes] as belonging to teleology, it is also understood that it means the agreement of the properties of a thing with a certain purpose. In the first sense, perfection could be called quantitative (material), in the second – qualitative (formal) perfection. The first can only be the only one (after all, the totality of the inherent thing is one). There may be several qualitative perfections in the same thing" ^{[22, p. 39]}. If in the Metaphysics of Morals Kant will reflect on qualitative perfection, then in the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment we are talking about internal objective expediency, which presupposes such a concept of goal, which is produced by the act of substantiating the possibility of a thing, and teleological judgment will set its perfection according to the goal. From qualitative perfection in the text of the third "Critique" differs the founding meaning of quantitative perfection – this totality (magnitude) of a thing in its own form, when it is already explicated in advance what the thing itself should be. If we abstract from such explication and think only of the expedient form, then we should recognize the limitations of the installation on the formally represented harmony in the thing (felt in the play of mental forces) outside of the idea of its quantitative perfection, because this formalized consistency of the manifold as one does not reveal any objective expediency and, as it were, comes across in itself only the unintentionality of subjective expediency: "it does not indicate the perfection of any object that is not thought of here through any concept of purpose... If I see in the forest a clearing surrounded by trees, and at the same time I do not imagine any purpose, for example, that this clearing should serve for the dancing of the villagers, then the shape alone does not give the slightest idea of perfection. But to imagine formal objective expediency, i.e. [to imagine] only one form of perfection (without any matter and the concept of what the coordination is being made for, even if it were only an idea of regularity in general), means to fall into a real contradiction" ^{[17, p. 211]}. Since expediency as a regulatory concept of the faculty of judgment, attributed to the aesthetic field, sees in aesthetic judgment, possible according to some universal rule, something proceeding from subjective grounds that always make themselves felt through beauty, but leave in the shade both the expediency itself and the property of the object, the possibility of such expediency is regarded at best as doubtful, and, in fact, unpromising for understanding perfection even as a formal objective expediency. Therefore, Kant insists with such insistence that the principle of perfection, which is revealed only to reason, cannot sanction the essential reading of aesthetic taste. Beauty, with the exception of dependent beauty, can be neither a vague concept (about perfection) nor an objective judgment (about it), moreover, even the inner perfection of nature (here it must be borne in mind that, "the order of nature differs from the order according to the rules of perfection" ^{[26, S. 547]}), embodied in its organisms, which are at different stages of increasingly perfect formation and are possible only through a goal, their sensory configuration is evidence of the essential uselessness and inappropriateness of likening them to art. True, the opposition of beauty to perfection became less obvious in the first introduction to the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment, where Kant reflected on a kind of artistic technique of nature (in a later period he would even raise the question of whether God has an instrument of nature or an instrument of art), when "they are not looking for the principle of the beauty of art or some artistic perfection although nature, considered as technical (or plastic), in its mode of action can be called technical, i.e. acting as if with art, by virtue of the analogy by which its causality should be represented together with the causality of art. Indeed, we are talking about the principle of not determining, but reflecting judgment ability (underlying all works of art created by man), in which expediency should be considered as unintentional and, therefore, can only be inherent in nature" ^{[17, p. 955; translation slightly changed]}. The most important thing here is to understand what the union "or" ("oder") actually means, connecting the principle of beauty and the principle of perfection in art: does it imply the opposition of these principles, or the combination of different names of the same concept (by type – airplane, or airplane). The text of the "Critique of the Faculty of Judgment" testifies in favor of the opposition, but whether such an interpretation will be final, further research will show.

In moral philosophy and in the interval between the "Critique of the Faculty of Judgment" and Kant's last work, the concept of perfection acquires a more universal meaning associated with understanding even those features of human development ("the ideal of humanity in its full perfection" ^{[27, S. 598]}), which serve as the basis for the teleological representation of humanity in personality (according to Kant, "perfection is what determines the value of personality" ^{[26, S. 256]}) of each person, the universal ideal as the ideal of moral perfection. This ideal, concepts as the embodiment not of anthropology, but of anthroponomy, sets the aesthetic attitudes, the attitudes of aesthetic ethics. "Virtue, taken in all its perfection, therefore appears not as if a person possesses virtue, but as if virtue possessed a person… An expression embodying both is an aesthetic mechanism that nevertheless points to a moral meaning" ^{[22, p. 81]}. But the philosopher does not explain how this aesthetic mechanism works. The semantic unity of aesthetics and ethics, as it is proclaimed in the Metaphysics of Morals, should not be confused with a concept focused on its thematic field, it sets only its subjective reading, which can be productive, builds some "hypotheses of the heart in the presentation of morality" ^{[26, S. 593]}, introduces moral norms as some kind of active directions of the will to fulfill the moral law. Such development can be described as a movement towards the highest possible perfection. In the ethical doctrine of the elements, Kant specifically considers the question of subjective and objective aspects of understanding a person's duty to himself, which implies an increase in his own moral perfection. If the first aspect refers to what Kant calls the purity of the mindset of duty, then the second indicates another way of regulating this duty; here it objectively refers to "the whole moral goal that concerns perfection, i.e., the whole duty of a person and the achievement of the completeness of the moral goal in relation to himself; the commandment here would be: "Be perfect”; but striving for this goal always means for a person only progress from one perfection to another… This duty to oneself is in its quality a narrow and perfect duty...The fact is that perfection, the pursuit of which, but not the achievement of which is a duty (in this life) – the fulfillment of this duty can, therefore, consist only in continuous movement forward - is, however, in relation to the object (the realization of which we should make a goal for ourselves) is a narrow and perfect duty, but in the reasoning of the subject it is a broad and only imperfect duty to oneself ... to be perfect" ^{[22, pp. 167, 169]}. Even certain states of affect can be considered as perfection accessible to everyone, and in human nature there is a tendency to improve their skills to the degree of science, the discoveries of which, as Descartes emphasized, do not immediately reach the last stage of perfection. Another question is how to think of such a movement of humanity, whether it needs any evidence, how to identify these makings themselves, the realization of which as an aesthetic work (and not just longing for unattainable perfection, characteristic of some representatives of the novel genre) can occur only under the sign of a priori creativity of reason and moral perfection as the meaning of the divine creations. This sign is also connected with the Christian idea of perfection, while the idea itself is also understood as a concept of perfection, the correspondence of which cannot be empirically detected; it is a concept "to which one can approach all the time, but it is impossible to achieve it completely" ^{[25, p. 225]}. As an archetype of practical perfection, the moral ideal can provide the right direction for moral behavior. The moral attitude of the soul indirectly attributes aesthetic benevolence to virtue. It goes without saying that the concept of perfection cannot serve as a condition for moral phenomena, but its analogies with the moral ("there is the most perfect world (moral)" ^{[28, S. 16]}) are in the metaphorical focus of metaphysical thinking, moreover, it can be considered as a way of symbolizing rational constructions with the help of sensory representations, pointing out at the same time the presumption of the connection of the former with the blurred contours of moral volition, which does not find semantic equivalents for itself. Bearing in mind the moral goals concerning perfection, the completeness of moral perfection possible for the individual, it should be recognized that "this perfection is the goal of the absolute will in it, the goal of creation is the universal perfection of all reasonable wills" ^{[41, p. 125]}.

The categories of perfection and the specific processality given by it are perfection in general, which presupposes the harmonious union of certain structures, all–encompassing perfection, the main perfection, transcendental perfection, scholastic perfection, practical perfection, the perfection of man himself, the perfection of human nature, in which lies the secret of education, moral perfection, the meaning of which for man Kant sees in the performance of him their duty, the perfect act, the idea as perfection, perfection as a predicate of talent, teleological perfection, in the explanation of which even analogies with a work of art are limited, clarify why the system of freedom has as its counterpart the system of nature, turn to the identity of this letter of noumenal substance in transcendental apperception, on which creative imagination, genius is aesthetically formed and the taste. Kant considers transcendental perfection in the context of the question of the relation of the part and the whole. "Transcendental perfection [presupposes] that all the parts belonging to the being together constitute the whole being" ^{[27, S. 700]}. And in his "Logic" there is an interpretation of aesthetic perfection in the sense of genuine beauty. Despite its usefulness for logical perfection, Kant records a completely irremediable confrontation between these two perfections. True, there are also aesthetic boundaries in the interpretation of perfection, at least Kant points out that it is unacceptable for a person to consider certain feelings as pleasure from the perfection of other people. Perfection, which has truth as its condition (reproduction on a new level of the idea of "Criticism of Pure Reason"), can be understood as the ultimate experience that takes place in contemplation, crowned with beauty. At the same time, it is thought in close connection with the idea of humanism, the purpose of which, according to Kant, is to present the world to us as a beautiful moral whole, in all its perfection. Modern research often focuses on the social aspects of this problem. Thus, A. R?diger reveals "the tension between the ability of infinite perfection (unendlicher Perfektibilit?t) and revolutionary completion in the form of Enlightenment thinking, as well as its influence on the formulation of various subject models" ^{[36, S. 133]}.  But any history of social facts will be problematic if, naively concluding from the facts, it will not be on the semantic ground on which all its provisions arise, will not investigate in advance the enormous structures inherent in it. The deepening of the aesthetic interpretation of perfection presupposes its application to art. Art is a part of culture, but culture itself is also conceived by Kant as "active perfection" ^{[22, p. 107]}, therefore it is possible to consider art itself in this capacity, namely as a form of active perfection, active personified humanity.

The "critique of pure reason" creates the concept of the infinite necessary perfection of primordial essence, that is, the idea of God created by man and containing analytically all concepts, God in a transcendental sense ("there is a reason to represent God by analogy with reason" ^{[27, S. 717]}). This idea contains not only the ideal of the most real essence, which is personified by virtue of the completion of the highest unity, which is higher in degree of perfection compared to all others. We can achieve an understanding of this supreme unity "only in the form of vague outlines of an abstract concept if we imagine all possible perfection united in it as in some single substance" ^{[18, p. 801 (In 651)]}, and we will consider this being itself as "possessing the highest perfection and absolutely necessary by nature" ^{[18, p. 873 (In 714)]}, as an intelligentsia, "in which the morally most perfect will, connected with the highest bliss, is the cause of all bliss in the world, since it (the intelligentsia – N.K.) is in exact correlation with morality" ^{[18, p. 1017-1019 (In 838)]}. In this connection, perfection itself is interpreted as a complete expedient unity, firstly, and secondly, the interpretation of this relationship in the religious spirit can be authentic only if we realize, as Kant emphasizes, that God himself is an interpreter in us. Aesthetic moments inevitably fit into the idea of the most perfect being, associated with the image of him as an unattainable limit of perfection, as an exalted cause, as the creator of the world through will.

These attitudes of the "Critique of Pure Reason" Kant will follow in the later period of his work, in the Opus postumum, the general provisions of which give the key to understanding the main aesthetic problems that Kant reflected on in his last work. And today it acquires special significance, taking into account the fundamental research of E. Adikesz, G. Lehman, V. Mathieu and others ^{[1, 32, 33]}, which shows how difficult, and sometimes vague, ambiguous and sketchy the idea of the transition from metaphysics to physics is executed in it. Analyzing transitional projects not only in theoretical philosophy, but also in practical philosophy, O. Thorndike explains why an accurate assessment of Kant's critical philosophy requires a new understanding Opus postumum, while emphasizing that the manuscript itself "should be considered at the center of his critical philosophy" ^{[40, p. 260]}. In Opus postumum, Kant sees in transcendental philosophy itself not only the philosophy of philosophy, not only the teaching of reason as the ability to judge autonomously, freely; it is a teaching that "documents itself in analysis" and at the same time is a kind of art of reason, since one can "conclude from art in this world to the master of the work, which is the mind" ^{[27, S. 719]}. Transcendental philosophy is also engaged in some kind of aesthetic activity, since it "is the idea of the structure of the whole that the mind draws for itself" ^{[16, p. 536]}, therefore, the picture drawn by it is a picture of what is not just given to us in experience or in a phenomenon, but given through what we have created, since it is revealed to us. We have perceived what we have done ourselves, therefore, such an important picture of perception for aesthetics is written by the phenomenon of a phenomenon or an indirect phenomenon, and the act of putting it can lead to the creation of special meanings in cognitive traditions. The mind inevitably creates objects for itself: "the idea that the human mind itself creates from the universe is an active representation of God. Not as a special person, a substance outside of me, but thoughts in me" ^{[16, p. 585]}, and as a pure philosophy, transcendentalism will be defined by Kant as a product of genius. This does not mean that transcendental philosophy can be transformed, as Kant says, into a kind of rhapsody, because it is a system of pure reason.

Even in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant repeatedly stressed that we cannot extract anything from experience except what we ourselves have invested in it. In Opus postumum, this idea acquires a more voluminous appearance, becomes, as it were, an aesthetic stereo image, as if extended into the depths of contemporary physics. Even reason itself, as noted in the comments to Opus postumum, appears here not just as a "lawgiver of nature" not naturally, but creatively. Fragments of this work related to the problem of the correlation of apperception (Kant's interpretation of apperception in modern research is scaled, for example, by adding judgments that "all human experience is inherently self-referential, [it] is part of self-reflexivity of thinking or what is called transcendental apperception in the Kantian understanding, which is first found in the works Christian Wolf and became the basis of all German idealism" ^{[38, p. 10]}) and affiction, sometimes interpreted as a new deduction or a new schematism, "should connect, as S. A. Chernov notes, the "shores" of physics and metaphysics. It already deals with the idea of the need for free fiction, conscious invention or composition (dichten) those mentally imagined “objects” of physics that are necessary for the unity of experience. Physics as a science should invent such "things" that, in principle, cannot be directly perceived by the senses" ^{[16, p. 707]}. And this is best evidenced by the experience of modern physics, which is constantly inventing tools for operating experience as a work, or, as Kant would say, inventing means to create experience. Today, physical experience problematizes the basic aesthetic categories of content and form, and requires their rethinking. As P. Valeri wrote, modern physics has its subject matter "such small masses that even light has nothing to do with them, and their images that we receive have and cannot have any connection with what they supposedly represent. The concept of form is meaningless and so inapplicable to such tiny objects that it is impossible even to think that they can be enlarged, since magnification implies the presence of similarity" ^{[3, p. 450]}. The experience of modern quantum art requires such a rethinking. When describing the works of quantum painting, the images of which are revealed by color, new concepts appear – fields, states, entanglements, but how to move from them to the language of aesthetics. And if we talk about modern biophysics, then to a certain extent Kant's words about bodies that are internally and externally formed as works of art can be attributed to its subject area. To some extent, such works can be considered as attributed to the first founder of the world with all its possible perfections, they cannot be clearly formulated, because, as Kant writes, "on the empirical path (of physics), the concept of God always remains not a strictly defined concept of the perfection of primordial essence, so that it can be considered to correspond to the concept of the deity" ^{[20, p. 671]}.

Transcendental ideas, according to Kant, also create themselves, although they are problematic, nevertheless they are thought of as possible "mind-affecting forces" - God, the world, man's duty in the world. The understanding of one of these forces, God, appears in the manuscript very contradictory. One can interpret Kant's formulations in different ways, but most likely, when clarifying the question of what gave rise to such inconsistency, S. A. Chernov will be right of all researchers, believing that Rilke, who told God: "You are a forest of contradictions," is much more productive in this regard. In the study of this problem, we will be interested, first of all, in aesthetic aspects related to the concretization of the concept of "special" as one of the basic concepts of "Criticism of the ability of judgment", and with a new deduction of the concept of perfection.  

The synthetic a priori judgment itself from concepts postulates the existence of a single entity connecting one and all, as such it is an idea "that should be thought subjectively as a rule of the highest perfection of some being" ^{[16, p. 580]}, which is not perceived by the senses, therefore the problem is: is it possible to think it aesthetically? After all, our ability to understand is surpassed by the idea of this perfection as the highest creation and act, except to represent it symbolically (which also has to do with aesthetics) as an ideal of power and wisdom: "we see artistic wisdom in physical things" ^{[27, S. 724]}. Philosophy also creates a transcendental unity itself, which is introduced into the concepts of God and the world and synthetically binds them under one principle – the principle of man as an intermediary between these absolute entities (for Kant, the world is also something absolute, since space and time are one), as a person connecting the sensuous and the supersensible, and in this sense the doctrine of such a connection can be aesthetic – after all, the aesthetic itself is based "on a feeling associated with some teaching (since feeling does not serve as an objective principle, it is only subjectively significant and cannot form the basis of a general law; it can only be a pious sensation of some supernatural suggestion" ^{[25, p. 76; the translation is slightly changed]}. This philosophical structure completes the construction of a transcendental theology that answers the question: what is God? It is impossible to find practical proof of its existence, and even belief in it means a state when ideas are taken for perceptions. Nevertheless, the position of its existence should be honored, seeing in it an ideal being that the mind creates for itself, without crossing the boundaries of transcendental philosophy, by which Kant understands the act of consciousness, through which the self–creation of subjectivity is born - this, in essence, an aesthetic process that fits into the system of ideas, through which "the subject constructs himself synthetically and a priori as an object of thought and becomes the creator of his own being" ^{[16, p. 570]}. Transcendental philosophy establishes knowledge that clarifies the "possibility of the possibility of experience", while knowledge itself is divided into objectively and subjectively oriented knowledge: if the former are distinguished by accuracy as the principle of formal aesthetic perfection of knowledge that coincides with the object, then the latter by refinement as the principle of agreement of knowledge with the subject, assuming a special sensuality, agreement with the laws of contemplation. And this will be the principle of aesthetic perfection, "forming the basis for subjectively universal pleasure. This is beauty, what the senses like in contemplation" ^{[26, p. 292]}.

Considering knowledge as perfect in quantity, quality, from the point of view of its truth and modality, Kant builds a sequence of aesthetic perfections according to the moments of logical perfection: objective universality, clarity in the concept, objective truth and reliability:

"1) aesthetic universality. It consists in the applicability of knowledge to a variety of objects that serve as examples on which its application can be carried out, and thanks to which, at the same time, knowledge becomes suitable for the purposes of popularization;

2) aesthetic distinctness. It is a distinctness in contemplation in which, by means of examples, an abstractly conceived concept is depicted or explained in concreto;

3) aesthetic truth. This is only subjective truth, which consists only in the agreement of knowledge with the subject and the laws of sensory visibility and, therefore, is nothing but universal visibility.;

4) aesthetic authenticity. It rests on what is necessary by virtue of the testimony of the senses, i.e. on what is confirmed by sensation and experience" ^{[26, pp. 294-295]}. All these varieties of aesthetic perfection are formed by the synthesis of unity, the basis of which is truth, and diversity, which requires a priori judgment for its implementation. Beyond the boundaries of transcendental philosophy, thinking revolves around a transcendental principle, as a result of which it finds itself in a state in which any aesthetic propositions are lost, and even "the spoken word has no meaning." Transcendental philosophy, the highest principle of which is the proposition about the existence of God, turns to spiritual corporeality and "deals not with what is accepted as existing, but exclusively with the spirit of man, who [is] his own thinking subject" ^{[16, p. 563]}. Unlike absolute being, the being of a thing is given by form. By the way, in Kant's view, form alone constitutes the essence of beauty (but what exactly this essence consists of is a rather controversial question).

Kant understands God as a principle through which thinking constitutes a certain initial unity as an object, as the ideal of a being who knows in the hearts and is the object of the idea of pure reason and the principle of moral attitude in us, which develops exactly where it can only be sought - an object taken in its "greatest perfection". This is the principle of the beyond incomprehensible to us, about which it is possible to say something in an aesthetic language designed to make judgments about the architect of the world, about the most perfect being, which are present in every purely conceivable quality; for aesthetics, it is important that this supreme being is commensurate with all true goals, not only reason and reason, but also the ability judgments. At the same time, the very idea of God is not a fiction, but something conceivable – the mind also acquires purely aesthetically, since it creates it for itself. The philosopher quite traditionally thinks in the concept of God "a being of the greatest perfection, an omniscient and omnipotent being, possessing in his self-consciousness a personality (Ens summum, summa intelligentia, summum bonum), the creator of all other things" ^{[16, p. 553]}. In a certain sense, philosophy itself is for Kant a perfect replenishment of spiritual tension, which finds its place in the image of a complete whole; outside of perfection, it is difficult to characterize even reason and wisdom, which is "a property of perfect reason" ^{[16, p. 577]}. The manuscript gives an aesthetic interpretation of the moral creator of the world as a set of sensually perceived entities as a whole. The metaphysical relation itself is interpreted as the relation of the coordination and ordering of "the manifold in empirical contemplation into one experience" ^{[16, p. 389]}, and such harmony is thought of as a synthesis of phenomena produced by the subject for possible experience, as a synthesis through the construction of concepts. At the same time, the aesthetic is also an intellectual structure, but after all, "the intellectual concept of the world is ... the concept of perfection" ^{[26, S. 484]}. Here it is fundamentally important to draw a distinction between a phenomenon and a thing in itself – this principle of possibility, which gives a person access to the practice of making himself, of constituting himself into an intelligible object, to an aesthetic way of thinking about the creation of himself, which, in reality, is impossible. A thing in itself is "a thing generated by thinking (ens rationis) [for] binding ... a diverse whole into a unity into which the subject constitutes itself. The item itself = x is an object of feelings in itself, but not as another object, but [as] another way of representation... The subject is here a thing in itself, since it contains spontaneity. The phenomenon is receptivity. A thing in itself is not another object, but another way of making itself an object. Not a noumenal object, but the action of the understanding, which makes the object of sensory contemplation a simple phenomenon, is an intelligible object" ^{[16, p. 465]}. For aesthetics, it is extremely important to determine how the receptivity of a phenomenon is understood, that is, the relation of an object to sensuality: metaphysically or physically, as something that we ourselves a priori introduce into it (and present an image of what we have introduced), or as something that is given to us a posteriori. If the latter is a direct phenomenon, then the former produces a metaphysical description of the phenomenon of the phenomenon (as a product of our own cognitive ability, a priori receptivity, "indirectly forming a perception system for the possibility of experience as a subjective combination of driving forces for the unity of experience, which, however, is not yet experience itself, but only directs it" ^{[16, p. 431]}). This connection is conceived in a kind of aesthetic style, since it is an indirect, indirect or symbolic description.  In addition, harmony itself (its understanding as an intuitive universality grasping many things in one; diverse, spontaneously united according to the form of a certain system, should be distinguished from the discursive universality, which sees unity in many ways) characterizes the transition from the metaphysical principles of nature science to physics ("reality itself is an endless series of transitions" ^{[27, S. 158]}), the transition of philosophy to a system between nature and freedom, which establishes the division of bodies into works of art and works of nature: in the system of its driving forces, a priori not cognizable without the principle of teleology, the forces of animate organized beings manifest themselves and on the way of understanding organic life, the idea of harmony is penetrated to a new level of development, completely unforeseen, – "who would have thought that in nature there are bodies that are internally and externally formed as works of art" ^{[16, p. 433]}. Moreover, a whole range of aesthetic acts of creativity is assumed here (with the exception of time, the transcendental definition of which the philosopher only likens to categories, because "the time of creation does not allow itself to be grasped" ^{[26, S. 550]}): from knowing how to start creating experience, as if asking nature about its intricate secrets, how to synthesize logical and aesthetic perfection, the highest degree of which "affects the character and art of genius", to the creative action of the mind, through which the diversity of physical phenomena is fixed as a scientific system of the driving forces of matter is not fragmentary, but integral, that is, "to constitute according to concepts into one whole, which the mind creates itself" ^{[16, p. 453]}. In this series there are also the great rare perfection of knowledge, "marking a great penetration into science," truth as an indispensable condition for the perfection of knowledge itself, understanding how a scientist defines his horizon aesthetically, finding out the reasons why a caricature of a methodological mind is possible, interpreting a way of thinking as a talent, and so on.

So, the fate of the idea of perfection in the European philosophy of Modern times was not easy: if in the German tradition, starting with Leibniz and Lessing, it did not leave the aesthetic pedestal, then in the French and English schools of aesthetic thought it becomes almost invisible. For Kant, this idea appears in the precritical period, almost fades away in the "Critique of the Faculty of Judgment" and is revived again in the late period of creativity. The place of perfection in the attitudes of modern thinking can be determined based on Paul Valerie's characteristic understanding of the pursuit of perfection as an intention that is hindered by modern life. We are talking about the extinction of the perfect man (this obstacle is not felt by some representatives of modern Western religious thought, who discuss the problem of perfection in the context of current debates in philosophical theology and in the cognitive science of religion [see, for example: 11, p. 9]). In modern life, much hinders the realization of perfection, and in life in general, perfection can be present at best only as some kind of "inlays", another thing is philosophy and art, for which the main thing will always be how a person finds a form (how can you be inside this form for the whole region of what Kant calls them strong social ties, - another question) as a possibility of possible harmony existing in the sphere of completeness and perfection, which the early Kant in "The only possible basis for proving the existence of God" calls wisdom, and the mature Kant thinks through in the "Critique of Pure Reason" as reason itself. Wisdom, devoid of the founding meaning of possible harmony and perfection, would have a ghostly existence. The mind proceeds from the fact that it proclaims the beginning of new spiritual forms of holistic and perfect actions, over the design of the material of which sensuality and reason will work, such a mind itself is capable of creative self–projection, is able to create for itself the spontaneity of thinking - this is the spontaneous linking of the manifold, viewing it in synthesis, this is the implementation of its "great plan" and of its own order.

The very perfection of the "Critique of Pure Reason" leaves in the structures of subjective immanence, it does not correlate in any way even with the idea of aesthetics contained in the first part of the transcendental doctrine of principles. It is difficult to call the concept of perfection even an aesthetic category, it has, if we proceed from the attitudes of the first "Criticism", a more universal, perhaps even substantial meaning for aesthetics – about the same as the concept of truth and other concepts that characterize the logical criteria for the possibility of cognition as such – the concepts of unity, multiplicity and completeness. They have universal significance, and through some of them, even before Kant, in what he calls the transcendental philosophy of the ancients, the aesthetic category of harmony was defined. All these concepts – a kind of system operators for categories – control the work on their application in the logical domain, revealing some synthetic concatenations of meaning, ways of integrating it into a new non-categorical integrity project.

Kant, therefore, temporarily evaded the aesthetic content of perfection only in order to raise another question: if the meaning of perfection lies in its objectification or the intention of objectivity, then why is this meaning already in moral philosophy associated with the ideas of aesthetic ethics. The active directions of the will to fulfill the moral law should be a conscious model for moving towards the maximum possible perfection, to borrow its meaning from him, therefore it is important to identify the formal condition of the possibility for our imperfect duty – to be perfect, as well as the makings, the realization of which as an aesthetic work can occur only under the sign of a priori creativity of reason and moral perfection as the meaning of the divine creation. And this concatenation of transcendental necessities, attributed to absolute meaning, is a normative scheme of the conditions of an aesthetic idea, which can also be depicted as a concept of unattainable perfection, and perfection itself as a predicate of talent. These couplings are always marked by transcendental meanings, which, precisely at the level of logic, give an interpretation of aesthetic perfection in the sense of genuine beauty. Perfection, which has truth as its condition, must be expressible and translated into the language of ultimate experience, which is accomplished in contemplation crowned with beauty. The subtle specificity of the approach to art shines through these themes – this part of culture, the language of which is built through and through from the ideal subjects of active perfection. Therefore, it is feasible to repeat the meaning of culture as a repetition of "the same thing", which makes possible the idealization of art as a form of active perfection.

Kant will follow the perfectionist attitudes of the "Critique of Pure Reason" in the later period of his work, in Opus postumum, the general provisions of which give the key to understanding the main aesthetic problems that Kant reflected on in his last work. Here thinking, moving at the level of philosophy of philosophy, necessarily has an attitude similar to that characteristic of artistic consciousness and aesthetic experience. Such an important picture of perception for aesthetics is written by the phenomenon of a phenomenon or an indirect phenomenon, and the act of putting it creates a specific ontology. The mind inevitably creates objects for itself, and in this sense it can be considered as an artist of objectivity, which has no limitations. If in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant repeatedly emphasized that we cannot extract anything from experience except what we ourselves have invested in it, then in Opus postumum this idea takes on a more voluminous form, becomes like an aesthetic stereo image, as if extended into the depths of contemporary physics, in relation to which the mind itself appears not just as a "lawgiver of nature", but as a creative subject dealing with objects that are internally and externally formed as works of art. To some extent, such works can be considered as attributed to the first founder of the world with all its possible perfections, because the objectivity of physical truth could not be constituted without the pure possibility, even if not strictly defined, of the perfection of primordial essence.

The transcendental language of aesthetic perfection places it at the constant disposal of subjectively universal pleasure, which is beauty - this is a way to show how we grow in the world of the spirit. Pure a priori norms of aesthetics are also extremely important when we try to understand how the very possibility of science arises. The transition of philosophy to a system between nature and freedom (and "freedom itself is something whose consequences are absolutely accidental" ^{[26, S. 677]}) gives aesthetics its deep rhythm, which is carried out in such a way as not to miss the division of bodies into works of art and works of nature, on which the possibility of a horizon of a universal aesthetic language is based, possessing transcendental value. A whole range of aesthetic acts of creativity is based here – from knowledge about the creation of the empirical world, about the synthesis of logical and aesthetic perfection, to the creative action of the mind, through which the diversity of physical phenomena as a scientific system of the driving forces of matter is grasped not fragmentally, but holistically. It means that the world is fundamentally defined by the measurement of reality perceived by an aesthetic view. The aesthetic motive of perfection surpasses all objective activity as its infinite horizon, since perfection as such never exhausts any work on its fulfillment, which takes place in the field of experience, experience relating to objects with spiritual predicates.

Conclusion

Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" contributes to the methodological acquisition of aesthetic identity, which is generated through the transition to the infinite limit of the sensual, to the harmony of higher cognitive abilities, sets the prospect of revealing how art is possible, and declares itself in a specific experience of color and the ideality of perfection. How is color itself possible – as painting with light, or consciousness, or is it nothing but an image of time? Transcendental aesthetics, within which the first semantic images of aesthetics as a science and cultural form are formed, as a singular a priori of the history of art, as well as the structure of the coloristic discourse of criticism, reduces any objectivity of color and reveals the essential structures of its subjective experience. Transcendental aesthetics is formed on the threshold of the transcendental doctrine of principles, asserting the sensual as the basis of aesthetic truth (only if anything is definable as aesthetic truth at all), which easily crosses the boundaries of metaphysical structures, and the principle of ideality of all sensory contemplations of color. With one purely transcendental rhythm of reflection, Kant in the first "Critique" revealed the conditions for the possibility of the aesthetic, raised the question of what "makes all art possible", the transcendental undertaking itself manifested both timelessness and temporality behind their work in art. These general conditions are at the same time concrete, experienced in the critical trilogy, firstly, in the form of the reflective ability of judgment, that is, the configuration of such a state of mind, which is designed to search for subjective conditions for the formation of concepts, to distinguish the cognitive ability (sensuality and reason), which these concepts are inherent in. In the case of coloristics, the transcendental topic is important, when a reflexive definition is made of the place where the compared ideas about color should be attributed – whether they are thought by pure reason or given in the phenomena of sensuality, whether cognitive ability affects the idea of color. But do aesthetic judgments need research, which is undertaken to identify the grounds for their truth? Following the guidelines of Kant's transcendentalism, Husserl touches on this very problem, considering the synthesis inherent in consciousness alone, and shows that in our perception of an object and reflection on it, we see that its objective unity varies from one way of its appearance to another, but the mode of such manifestation is already immersed in the flow of another unity – the unity of synthesis. And perception itself proceeds in the unity of synthesis. The appearance of an object is diverse, it has different visual perspectives, excellent signs that become noticeable in their perception, for example, the shape or coloring, its color itself. "We always find the corresponding sign as the unity of the current varieties.  When viewed directly, we seem to have one unchanging form or color, while in a reflexive attitude, we have their characteristic ways of phenomena that continuously follow each other when changing orientation, perspective, etc. At the same time, each of these methods by itself, for example, the shape or color itself, hidden by a shadow, is a representation of this shape, this color, etc. Thus, one or another cogito realizes its cogitatum not in a void devoid of differences, but in the structure of the varieties to be described, which has a well-defined noemato-noetic structure that essentially belongs to this identical cogitatum" ^{[9, pp. 107-108]}.

The general conditions of the possibility of the aesthetic are experienced in the critical trilogy, secondly, and in the form of an image, a space-time image. If we consider ways of combining colors that create different images within the same palette, then each such image can be viewed in the same way as Kant considers the image of a number. If I consider different shades of red, putting them one after the other, then this will be his color image. The diversity of these shades is perceived by us, but since their various perceptions (burgundy, scarlet, etc.) meet in the soul absent-mindedly and separately, the question arises how to combine them. Such a connection is not made by feeling. Therefore, it is necessary to look for some other way of such a connection. Kant finds it in such an active ability of the concordant synthesis of the manifold, which is called imagination. His activity is aimed directly at perception, the structure of which is imagination itself. Kant calls the intentional activity of imagination grasping (appregension), so that the very "ability of imagination should reduce the manifold [available] in contemplation into one image" ^{[19, p. 173 (A 120)]}; if we talk about aesthetics, then the ability of imagination must first attach aesthetic impressions to the sphere of its activity, that is, to carry out their appregension, to be "apprehension aesthetica" ^{[27, S. 320]}. However, this grasping of aesthetic impressions from the peculiarities of color in the paintings of various artists would not yet create a color image if there were no subjective reason for the soul, passing from one perception of the composition (that is, the random unity of the set) of color to another, to re-evoke the previous perception associated with the subsequent, and thus she created whole series of color representations, that is, if the empirical act of the reproductive ability of imagination was not performed in the soul. Contemplation of burgundy, scarlet is directly related to the red object and is always a single one, and the color image itself as an image of sensuality should be distinguished from the color scheme. The transcendental idea of it is not just the idea of a spectrum of colors, of primary and secondary, local or analog colors, of a complementary or monochrome color scheme, it is the idea of it as a kind of scheme as such – this a priori definition of time, pure synthesis, which is the product of schematism as "art hidden in the depths of the human soul". An artist can only be born, but such a birth is accompanied by an act of inner artistry hidden in the depths of his soul. The picture is painted, in fact, by the mysterious temporal art of the soul. And only thanks to this does the color image itself become possible, the interpretation of which is an old problem of the philosophy of painting. The artist comes to the world of painting when he comes to the beginning of his spiritual life. With his immense work on the selection of colors, he combines them in a new way, in this combination there is something of the great ideas that bear the stamp of his outstanding beginnings, the creation of color rhythmics in a limited space, "figurative logic" (Valerie); thus, the artist puts himself in a closer relationship to philosophical thinking. What can philosophy tell us about painting and how can it deepen our understanding of this enduring art form? The philosophy of painting explores the complex relationship between the form and color of the painting, comprehends the ways of detecting the real color between the painted surface and the depicted object, between expression and modifications of artistic thinking, opening the current debate to address issues related to the way of seeing, perceiving an object through the act of drawing it. But how can this be done if, as Jean Ingres said, "the drawing is not outside the line, but inside" the line itself? "The surface plays an important role in seeing things. How the light is reflected largely depends on its quality. As soon as the artist begins to consider color not as something separate, existing by itself or by contrast with neighboring colors, but as a consequence of all the radiations and reflections occurring in the space between the bodies in it; as soon as he makes an effort to catch this barely noticeable reflection, use it and give his work, not connected with the composition, his perception of the form immediately changes. Having reached the limit, he comes to impressionism" ^{[3, pp. 178-179]}. In another direction in painting, in suprematism, which is interpreted by Kazimir Malevich as a new pictorial realism, the artistic axis of color is established, each form's own color is revealed, which seeks to express the invisible power of sensations. Under the manifesto of geometric abstractionism (and today geometric eidetics prevails as an aesthetic model in some types of art, primarily in architecture) the artist is trying to bring a philosophical basis, here the color itself is a way of purely philosophical cognitive movement. Previously, paint was oppressed by common sense and the spirit of paint was fading. At a certain period, the colors have matured, although their form has not matured in consciousness. Entering into a dispute with the old realism, which was "powdered with the taste of aestheticism," he believes that this trend did not see the new beauty of modern life and proposed a kind of replacement of philosophical reflection with aesthetic. One should not expect from Malevich a clear distinction between philosophy and aesthetics, because he is talking "about that psychological attitude, the state that we today call "experience", and the ideas themselves ... are inspired by Machist ideas, although this issue, as well as the problem of understanding and comprehending all the basic terms of Malevich, still requires special study" ^{[2, p. 535]}. As for color, this pictorial essence (and for Kant, "only essence is metaphysically perfect" ^{[26, S. 502]}), then, according to Malevich, artistic consciousness should be freed from the settings of the plot genre that reduced it, characteristic of representatives of the academic tradition, and open up opportunities for the construction of color itself. At the same time, it is necessary to identify new prospects for the color-formal analysis of the historicity of art.

For Kant, it is inapplicable when, for example, the idea of red is called an idea, although such a representation can hardly be called even a rational concept. The situation is even more complicated with the ideal of sensuality. After all, the creations of the faculty of judgment, concerning which it is impossible to create a clear concept, Kant calls monograms, which "represent only individual, although not defined by any rules, features that constitute rather a vague image of various data of experience than a definite picture; like what, according to artists ... hovers in their head as the indescribable outlines of their works or assessments. They can, although not precisely, be called the ideals of sensuality, since they should be an unattainable model of possible empirical contemplations, although they do not give any rules available for explanation and verification" ^{[18, p. 739 (In 598)]}. Therefore, an unambiguous eidetic consolidation of these vague mental contours and imaginative variations is impossible. But the question is not whether an unattainable example of color contemplation is possible, but how imagination delivers a color image to the concept. The image of a red spot in a painting is always limited to only a part of the scope of the concept of color and never reaches the generality of this concept. To an even lesser extent, its image as a product of the empirical faculty of imagination may be adequate to the empirical concept of a red object. The empirical concept of red always refers directly to the scheme of imagination as a rule for determining our contemplation of red in accordance with the general concept of color. Later, even a universal of color will be built in phenomenology. "In order to perceive any universal, it is necessary first to perceive or imagine several objects that it is inherent in. At the same time, it is necessary to examine several objects, only in this case it is possible to identify what they have in common… To understand what red is in general, it is necessary to see not only a red rose, but also a red flag, red blood, etc." ^{[9, p. 18]}. The concept of a red spot means the rule according to which the imagination can draw this spot in a general way, without being limited by any single particular appearance given to me in the experience of color perception, or in any possible way in concreto. Color, therefore, will be nothing more than a unity of synthesis of the diverse content of the homogeneous contemplation of red in general (green in general, and so on), arising due to the fact that the subject produces time itself (this pure image of all sense objects in general, the definitions of which are the product of apperception in relation to the forms of contemplation) in grasping the contemplation of red, green, blue (in this case, with the so-called additive synthesis of light rays).

The general conditions of the possibility of the aesthetic are at the same time concrete, since they also exist in the form of productive imagination, variations of the judgment of taste, aesthetic ideas and transcendentals of art. In the first Critique, Kant is primarily interested in the question of how thinking about color is possible – and this is basically the question of how to indicate its boundaries (in this case, it is a limitation of coloristic judgment by the relation of objects to the subject, as Kant will later say, the very "representations of colored objects are not pure contemplations" ^{[27, S. 687]}), whether a color monogram is possible. It is hardly possible to reveal the rational transparency of the evidence of color, the very indication of the boundaries of thinking about color is, in fact, a symbolic indication, supplemented here by the "spontaneity of linking the diverse [content] of only possible contemplation" ^{[18, p. 545 (In 428)]} of a color phenomenon as a sensory phenomenon, the predicates of which cannot be attributed to itself an object, for example, has the red color of a rose (here it is fundamentally important to look at a rose as an object whose analytics grasp its dual structure: a rose as a phenomenon that does not coincide with the same rose as an object in itself). Color reveals and completes this transcendental duality, but how to read the meaning of the phenomenon of color itself, or rather, its ambiguity, and not to involve it in unforeseen psychological configurations and twists of thinking. Is it permissible to say that Kant is building a kind of quasi-realism of color (one can even describe it with the Kantian term dynamic realism), the perception of which should occur to us in the activity of consciousness, consciousness given not in the self-activity of contemplation, but in a transcendental subject, which is based on the subject itself? This is something we do not know, but the question is: is it the same as the soul as a substance in an idea, and not in reality? Or are conclusions about color just, as Kant would say, an appearance that constantly teases a person and mocks him, which is capable of quarreling the mind with itself? Can transcendental subjectivity fully manifest itself and manifest itself in color, and how can color experience be reduced to those conditions that, according to Kant, allow us to stop, according to the rule of reason, only on an adequate subject, or rather, a phenomenon, an answer to the questions of reason? Apparently, Kant's philosophy of color can be treated as a projection of a discipline that establishes, as the philosopher himself emphasized, "indestructible boundaries, on the one hand, so that we do not rush into the arms of soulless materialism, and on the other hand, so that we do not get lost in spiritualism, devoid of a foundation in our life" ^{[18, p. 535 (In 421)]}.

An example of color, which can hardly be given the meaning of a transcendental pattern, acquires its affirming power insofar as ideality shines through in it. It is in aesthetic modes (imagination, games, and so on) that color is first revealed to us, the feeling of which should be affected by external objects. Although, if we follow Kant's logic, it turns out that when we talk about color, we should be talking not so much about the affixation of the sensory configuration, as about its modifications, about its spiritual formations, which we attach to the specific contents of color perception. And aesthetics here is manifested in the fact that through her efforts the activity of color perception itself is created and read, which cannot be found either in transcendental aesthetics itself or in any other transcendental structures in a ready-made form, but can only be found in the work of the relationship of subject to object, or subject to subject, which is quite variable, as a result of which it is created the feeling of randomness is true, "a change in attitude is not always a change in a thing" ^{[27, S. 358]}. Not only the conceptual apparatus of the theory of color, but also all Kant's aesthetic constructions are consistent with the transcendental attitudes of the "Critique of Pure Reason": since the structures of transcendental aesthetics are internal acts of contemplation preceding any experience, it becomes obvious how localization and temporalization of color phenomena occurs in sensory embodiment, how the ideality of coloristic meaning forms an attitude to its artistic the event. True, imaginative-sensual idealization, without which aesthetics could not have arisen, poses in turn a very delicate problem of the beginning, which Kant is fully aware of in the course of a critically balanced analysis of the aesthetic faculty of judgment. The attitudes of transcendental aesthetics are reinterpreted by its phenomenological interpretations, Husserl gives it an expanded meaning, believing that "the arguments given by the critique of reason regarding space and time, obviously, although in an extremely limited and unexplained form, have as their goal the noematic a priori of sensory contemplation, which, being expanded to a concrete a priori given in purely sensory contemplation of the first order nature, requires its transcendental-phenomenological completion by inclusion in the constitutive problematics" ^{[9, p. 275]}. Husserl's theory of perception and intentional psychology rises above the new transcendental aesthetics with its understanding of the pre-imaginative contemplation of intentional experiences, the fundamental problem of which is the substantiation of the concept of the soul.

The attitudes of transcendental aesthetics in the Kantian sense are the basis for constructing the aesthetics of color in the "Critique of the Faculty of Judgment". Kant's coloristic illustration of the relationship between phenomenon and noumenon is complemented in the third "Critique" by the consideration of color in the context of the analysis of the beautiful, within the formal structure of which they strive to achieve an ideal identity of the aesthetic through the comprehension of the unity of sensory reality, a specific teleological horizon, carrying teleological authenticity in its aesthetic form through all cultural samples. Teleological reason permeates the entire aesthetic space. The problem is how to move from these theoretical attitudes to artistic experiments with color, to understanding the history of the art of color, understanding how color is revealed by art through a dialog box in all its variety of shades and meanings, how to aesthetically describe the delightful harmony of colors in painting. How can the phenomenon of color be given an aesthetic characteristic that opens its endless project? Why can this phenomenon be called beautiful?

Beauty in a sense conveys the peculiarities of color, it cannot become an object of cognition, but is only perceived as an indefinite object of empirical contemplation and benevolence, that is, as a phenomenon; at the same time, it appeals to meaning, not to a coloristic fact. Reading a judgment, say, about the beauty of a wildflower is, firstly, collecting coloristic meaning in a symbol and, secondly, clarifying how thinking captures a figurative language that absorbs the beautiful forms of nature, how it simultaneously realizes the idea of the infinite task of art. Kant refers to aesthetic images and forms of color, which are revealed in time, manifested in the rhythmic drawing of a musical work; the paradox of their semantic embeddedness into each other, their relationship makes both those and other aesthetic phenomena related to infinity mysterious. The rhythm of color is the rhythm of the ether through which Euler described color, and the main thing for Kant here is how the soul perceives this rhythm, how admiration for the color scale and technique is generated, why formal definitions of the unity of the diverse in color perceptions can be attributed to beauty, why the coloristic type of perception, speaking the language of phenomenology "hanging, so to speak, in the air – in the air of absolutely pure possibilities of imagination" ^{[9, p. 153]}. The art of color, in essence, is excluded by Kant from the aesthetic analysis of painting (therefore, the aesthetic installation appears here as if shimmering), understood by the philosopher as an image of sensory visibility of spatial extent, creating visible images to convey aesthetic ideas, as they are "drawn to the eye" in an expressive form, become a creative project.  In the free insight and experienced anticipation of the imaginary, extreme forms are constantly drawn, which are approached by the structures of color perception associated with what Kant calls the aesthetic truth of the space and time of experience, in which the uncertainty of the contour is transcendence. In the third "Critique" Kant continues the line of transcendental aesthetics, representing color as subjective immanence, as an empirical phenomenon, the interpretation of which is important for understanding cultural formation. But such an interpretation relativizes the specificity of aesthetic meaning as such. The question of the purity of colors is for Kant not a question of the imagery of the painting, they only contribute to the fact that the form of the work itself becomes more refined and clearer, has, according to J. Derrida, "creative power, always acting as a revelation." This is only part of the question of how the aesthetic eidetics of the various abilities of creative subjectivity is created.

The idea itself, in the Kantian sense, becomes an aesthetic concept introduced into a coloristic event. The idea and the mind are hidden in the depths of the perception of color given in the mode of visual perception. Aesthetics itself strives to move in its innermost thoughts from the innate mind ("eingeborene Vernunft" ^{[24, S. 273]}), "immersed in the activities of the creative workshop of humanity (and "skill has rules, wisdom has rules" ^{[27, S. 127]}), to to the apodictic mind, to realize the ultimate self-understanding of artistic activity in accordance with a priori structures, which will be the comprehension of it in the form of aesthetics as a philosophy of art. It is in the continuous clarification of the principles of art, the benevolence for the onset of aesthetic truth. Sometimes it abstracts from the concept of truth, asserting something opposite, namely, that reason depends on sensuality, even created by it. Describing the phenomenon of sensitivity, Valerie sees in it "an inexorable force that is the essence of each of us and exactly corresponds to us, moves us, speaks to us and is pronounced in us; depending on the hour and day, it becomes either joy, pain, need, disgust and hope, strength or weakness, changes does the value system turn us into angels or monsters? I reflect on the diversity, on the saturation, on the variability of our sensory substance, on its inexhaustible hidden possibilities, on its innumerable components, by the actions of which it is torn apart, deceives itself, multiplies forms of attraction or repulsion, creates for itself reason, language, symbolism, develops and organizes to build from them outlandish abstract worlds" ^{[3, p. 300]}. This beautiful description of sensuality is directly related to aesthetics, but Kant's understanding of this phenomenon as the beginning of cognition is interpreted in the Critique of Pure Reason not simply as being reduced to this beginning, but as a normative interpretation of sensuality. It is only important to understand how such a measurement of it is possible. And if we proceed from Kant's understanding of the boundaries of sensuality, then it is impossible to agree with Valerie's position that she is the author of reason. The attitudes of transcendental aesthetics allow us to conclude that sensory contemplation has nothing to do with the creation of the mind. Moreover, "the sensual is based on the intellectual" ^{[27, S. 413]}. The science of a priori forms of sensuality is faced with a dilemma of sensuality and reason, which in the language of aesthetics appears in the form of dilemmatic arguments about the relationship of aesthetic pleasure and reason. But being applied to a group of rules of inference in transcendental aesthetics, this dilemma, as we see, will remain unresolved in the late period of Kant's work. Some texts of this period still speak of the predominance of a rationalistic attitude. "In the sensory world, everything is accidental, because everything is rational" ^{[27, S. 414]}. In these texts, focused on transcendental becoming, much remains vital for modern aesthetics.     

It would be interesting to analyze whether Kant's transcendental intuitions and movements of the meaning of color were realized in the artistic practices of the last three centuries, in their comprehending activities, in their so different coloristic projects that transform one color tuple into another. Thus, Degas "was satisfied only when his work looked perfect due to a sense of the integrity of the ensemble, and not the refinement of details, and above all due to the overall structure and coordination of the various constituent elements, in other words, the correct ratio of the lines of the drawing, the combination of light and shadow and colors among themselves" [cit. according to: 3, p. 234].  These projects can be characterized as corresponding syntheses that incorporate everything unheard of new, practices of a new type. The problem is what these practices grow out of. It is no less interesting to trace how these projects relate to the idea of an aesthetic a priori of spatiality-temporality, historical-transcendental subjectivity that has arisen in modern philosophy, even with projects of a new creation of meaning.

Perhaps the most universal aesthetic process is the process of moving towards the Word of everything that is, that was, is and will be, it is a sequence of what determines the time of creation, gathers consciousness at the limit, gives a projection of its formations in the category of thinking in accordance with the truth; in its historical relation to itself, it he has the opportunity to appear before the image, carrying the experience of the world as a meaningful meaning, marking the entry into the spontaneous metaphysics of "being in the mode of beauty" (Husserl). And aesthetics is necessary because it assumes responsibility for the ultimate interpretation of the historicity of creativity revealed by the Word.

In the Critique of Pure Reason, the concept of perfection is analyzed outside of transcendental aesthetics. Kant gives a more or less definite description of perfection, which is directly related to the aesthetic facet of the transcendental meaning of the world. Its exceptional importance for understanding Kantian aesthetics is due to the fact that the metaphysics of perfection in late Kant allows us to rethink the critical approach to identifying the structures of aesthetic judgment in the third "Critique". Kant's thought about the connection between the perfect and the aesthetic moves like a wave. The philosopher elevates their connection in the early period of creativity, penetrating into the very core of the aesthetic – into a soul full of feelings. This implies not only the state of a person imbued with a strong feeling, but also the state of the soul, which contains all the properties for its own integrity, the utmost completeness; Kant sees here a range of intense perception, the maximum concentration of emotional excitement and movement, even the incomprehensibility of its achievements, which have as their premise something different from the content of contemplation, observations. Subsequently, he posits the limits of perfection at the very beginning of the critical path, reduces its status in transcendental analytics to the level of an imaginary transcendental predicate, but at the same time carries out an epistemological search for perfection, focused on the work of categories on the logical normalization of the harmony of cognition with oneself. Since such an approach to the interpretation of perfection, implemented in the Critique of Pure Reason, is connected in transcendental analytics with the concepts of unity and diversity, it is a favorable place for the transition to the philosophical and aesthetic universality of harmony.    Consequently, in the second part of the transcendental doctrine of the principles, the maxim of perfection presupposes a kind of recursive procedure provided for by the requirements of unity and multiplicity, when fulfilling this requirement, these concepts constantly pass into each other. Kant also refers to the concept of perfection in transcendental dialectics, primarily in connection with the understanding of the supreme being, which he calls the author of world perfection, the concept of this being allows us to substantiate the regulatory principle of nature research and testifies to the movement of Kantian thinking towards metaphysical symbolism. Aesthetic moments inevitably fit into the idea of the most perfect being, associated with the image of him as an unattainable limit of perfection, as an exalted cause, as the creator of the world. Through the concepts of completeness and perfection, Kant depicts the mind itself, although he has not yet drawn a line under the perfectionist idea of reason.  The requisites of any knowledge concerning our higher abilities (reason, reason and judgment) in moral philosophy will take the shape of culture - this manifestation of the perfection of humanity; but the cultural landscape itself cannot be conceived outside of art.

Already from the materials for the "Critique of Pure Reason" it becomes clear why in the "Critique of the faculty of Judgment" there is such a tense relationship between the perfect and the aesthetic, almost complete separation of them. Aesthetic emotion is usually accompanied by joy, but can it be characterized as perfect? Higher abilities are a boon for a person, but this does not mean that they are perfection. It all depends on whether he practices these abilities in a perfect form, which only pave the way to goals, but are not themselves a blessing. In this case, we need to ask ourselves what is the meaning of perfection. This new approach to perfection was never discussed by Kant as a problem. The meaning of perfection does not need to express an aesthetic sense of pleasure, aesthetic feeling as such is subjected to a kind of reduction here, since perfection brings us closer to the completeness of what we actually feel, and this ideal object remains as if outside, because it may or may not cause us pleasure. Therefore, the aesthetic performs a kind of oscillatory movement in relation to perfection, and the moment of their connection is elusive. True, the opposition of beauty to perfection did not become so obvious in the first introduction to the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment, where Kant reflected on a kind of artistic technique of nature, which raises the question of how the principle of beauty and the principle of perfection are connected in art: does it imply the opposition of these principles, or the combination of different names of one and the same concept. The text of the "Critique of the Faculty of Judgment" testifies in favor of the opposition, but we have doubts whether such an interpretation will be final. Nevertheless, in the third "Critique" the necessary relation between the aesthetic and the perfect cannot be established. And this marks the moment when aesthetics, without merging, can find a connection with perfectionism. And the very question of transcendental perfection could precede aesthetic understanding as its premise or latent basis. This question arises in Kant from the teleological postulate, then from the freedom that inspires the aesthetic reflections of the philosopher. But in teleology itself, as Husserl will show, the very unity of meaning and event is put at risk. Therefore, in aesthetics as a form of teleological discourse, thinking enters a rather risky field, and it is extremely important for it that it be illuminated by the light of the distinction that Kant will draw between the perfect, the beautiful and the sublime, with a priori determination to adopt the meaning of aesthetic genius.

Through the discovery of the deep semantic sources of perfection, one can approach the theory, method and the beginning of aesthetics. After all, perfection, although not identical, is still commensurate with the criteria of beauty and what G. V. Leibniz called spontaneous harmony, and E. Husserl will call the harmony of monads. The aesthetic concepts adjacent to perfection, connected with the description of the picture of unity, dynamic diversity, in many ways resemble aesthetic criteria, also assuming only subjective correspondence, but not with categories, but with ideas; they also resemble the structures of the immanent activity of synthesis, the space of which is difficult to keep within the limits prescribed for a long time. In fact, the highest perfection is singular: "the most perfect is only one" ^{[26, S. 514]}. The definition of the eidos of perfection, which constitutes the infinite task of metaphysics, is a means of a new justification of its ultimate concepts: "metaphysical perfection itself is absolute greatness" ^{[27, S. 369]}.

In moral philosophy and in the interval between the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment and Kant's last work, the concept of perfection acquires a more universal meaning associated with the understanding of the greatest perfection as "the ideal of all virtue, as the principle of reason" ^{[26, S. 421]}. This concept correlates even with those features of human development that serve as the basis for the teleological representation of humanity in the personality of each person, the universal ideal as the ideal of moral perfection. This ideal, concepts as the embodiment not of anthropology, but of anthroponomy, sets the aesthetic attitudes, the attitudes of aesthetic ethics. Today, in the Russian philosophy (V.A. Smirnov), the idea of all-humanity, different from the Kantian-Solovyov idea of unity, is justified, but it can also be considered as perfect humanity.

The various headings of perfection and the specific processality set by it clarify why the system of freedom has a system of nature as its analogue, they turn to the identity of this letter of noumenal substance in transcendental apperception, on which creative imagination, genius and taste are aesthetically formed. And in Kant's "Logic" there is an interpretation of aesthetic perfection in the sense of genuine beauty. Despite its usefulness for logical perfection, Kant records a completely irremediable confrontation between these two perfections. True, there are also aesthetic boundaries in the interpretation of perfection, at least Kant points out that it is unacceptable for a person to consider certain feelings as pleasure from the perfection of other people. Perfection, which has truth as its condition (reproduction on a new level of the idea of the "Critique of Pure Reason"), can be understood only as the ultimate experience, which is accomplished in contemplation, crowned with beauty. At the same time, it is conceived in close connection with the idea of humanism, the purpose of which, according to Kant, is to present the world to us as a beautiful moral whole, in all its perfection. At the same time, knowledge itself is divided into objectively and subjectively oriented: if the former are distinguished by accuracy as the principle of formal aesthetic perfection of knowledge that coincides with the object, then the latter are distinguished by refinement as the principle of agreement of knowledge with the subject, assuming a special sensuality, agreement with the laws of contemplation. And this will be the principle of aesthetic perfection embodied in beauty.

In Opus postumum, Kant sees in transcendental philosophy itself not only the philosophy of philosophy, not only the teaching of reason, but also a kind of art of reason. After all, she is also engaged in some kind of aesthetic activity, since she seeks to reflect on how the mind can create a picture of the whole, so the picture drawn by it is a picture of what is not just given to us in experience (of course, "no conclusion is drawn from experience about the most perfect world" ^{[26, S. 488]}) or in a phenomenon, but it is given through what we have created (the mind inevitably creates objects for itself), since what we have done ourselves is revealed to us and perceived by us, therefore, such an important picture of perception for aesthetics is written by the phenomenon of a phenomenon or an indirect phenomenon, and the act of positing it creates a specific ontology.

Even the mind itself appears not just as a "lawgiver of nature", but acting not naturally, but creatively. Fragments of this manuscript relating to the problem of the correlation of apperception and affiction, sometimes interpreted as a new deduction or a new schematism, are aimed at combining the efforts of natural sciences and metaphysics. Kant sees one of the greatest perfections in "the principle of the method of making judgments from goals in physics" ^{[26, S. 421]}. The need for such a connection is best evidenced by the experience of modern physics, which is constantly inventing tools for operating experience as a work, or, as Kant would say, inventing means to create experience.  And if we talk about modern biophysics, then to a certain extent Kant's words about bodies that are internally and externally formed as works of art can be attributed to its subject area. To some extent, such works can be considered as attributed to the first founder of the world with all possible perfections, the physical understanding of which always remains not a strictly defined concept of the perfection of primordial essence, in the representation of which aesthetic moments associated with the image of it as an unattainable limit of perfection, as an exalted cause, as, finally, the creator himself fit into the idea of the world. At the same time, the manuscript relies on a number of aesthetic acts of creativity – from knowing how to start creating an experience, as if asking nature about its intricate secrets, how to synthesize logical and aesthetic perfection, the pinnacle of which is the art of genius, to the creative action of the mind, through which the variety of physical phenomena as a scientific system of the driving forces of matter is grasped in a non-fragmentary way, and holistically; moreover, the mind itself writes a picture of such a system. In this series there are also the great rare perfection of knowledge, truth as an indispensable condition for the perfection of knowledge itself, understanding how a scientist defines his horizon aesthetically, finding out the reasons why a caricature of a methodological mind is possible, interpreting a way of thinking as a talent. All of them are directly related to fundamental transformations in the human mindset "as if through a new creation and a change of heart" (Kant).

By transcendental philosophy itself, Kant understands the acts of consciousness through which the self–creation of subjectivity is born - this is, in essence, an aesthetic process, and he writes into the system of ideas that through which the subject himself becomes the creator of his own being. In a certain sense, philosophy itself is for Kant a perfect fulfillment of spiritual tension, which finds a place in the image of a complete whole, while he considers it possible even to talk about metaphysical perfection; outside of perfection, it is difficult to characterize even wisdom, which is understood as an attribute of perfect reason. At the same time, "wisdom is moral perfection" ^{[26, S. 744]}. Of fundamental importance for aesthetics is the fact that the deepening of the interpretation of perfection produced within its framework also implies the application of a perfectionist attitude to the comprehension of art. Art is a part of culture, but culture itself, with all the diversity of its spiritual formations, is also conceived by Kant in the image of active perfection, which allows us to consider art as such, its cumulative meaning in a single aesthetic hypostasis, which is a combination of two essences – art as creation through freedom and the second, which is not in the "Critique of the faculty of judgment", but which can be deduced from the analysis of works written in the late period of his work, namely art, as something that exists only once in the spiritual form of the active perfection of humanity.

At the end of our reflections on Kant's interpretation of perfection, we should throw light on the understanding of the current state of sociality. And although there is still no adequate model of it (by the way, the Kantian concept of perfection as "additional adequacy" can be attributed to its construction ^{[27, S. 699]}), nevertheless, some preliminary arguments about its understanding in the light of the Kantian concept of perfection are possible. Perfect can be reason (determining its location relative to the boundaries of nature and acting in accordance with the principles of completeness and perfection), unity, knowledge, truth, morality (and morality begins only in the field of perfection), sensuality (it lets the finest notes of magic into the upper registers of the mind, and the "perfection ... can be borrowed only out of sensuality" ^{[27, S. 129]}), pleasure (for example, such a kind of peace of mind as "perfect calm pleasure" ^{[26, S. 420]}) a work of art (almost perfect correspondence between the idea and its execution in the artist's work), religion, but what about society, the human race, humanity, without which all these structures are impossible.

When we talk about humanity, it is presupposed in advance as a kind of unique imprint of the perfection of the world, as an indirect perfect community. It is obvious that only through perfection, through its historical search, striving to comprehend and manufacture an unexplored social fabric, the borderline states of humanity extend to infinity. But we cannot find perfection itself in the human world, drawn by these boundaries – the boundaries between God and the animal, and within these boundaries is found a perfectly arranged matrix of life, a form of history, the coherence of the diverse. But should there be perfection in the social world? Of course, some improvements of the social order are possible, but a perfect social life is nothing more than an ideal in reality (despite the fact that for Kant the very "perfection… [and] there is reality" ^{[26, S. 701]}) it is difficult to find perfect relationships between people (or perfection in the structures of communication between them, and even more so to demand perfection from the interlocutor, only one's own perfection can be the responsibility and goal-setting of the individual) and where we often encounter inconsistency of these relationships with what we observe in fact. Where some social things are more perfect than others. But here Kant faces two questions. If humanity is the carrier of infinite perfection, then what about the finite being, man, can he be the carrier of perfection? What about freedom, which preserves human perfection (only the act of a free person can be the creator of perfection), the idea of which has not yet been realized in the structures of social experience? This idea can be approached by the connection between free citizens, which creates a specific form – a social form, also conceived by Kant as an education born under the intelligible sign of perfection and completeness, movement for the better.  But when thinking about this form, one should be realistic, because even with the advent of a global civil society, "there will not be the slightest increase in the basis of morality in the human race, which would require something like a new creation (supernatural influence). – One should not expect too much from people in their advancement for the better, because otherwise we can justifiably become the subject of ridicule of a politician who is inclined to take the hope expressed here for the fantasy of an exalted mind" ^{[25, p. 110]}. Another question is: how is it conceivable to move towards perfection within the limits of the humanly possible and the structures performed within these limits? For Kant, it is associated, for example, with an aesthetic event: "Human perfections are means for all possible purposes of his being, hence talents" ^{[27, S. 344]}. As for social structures, the justifications of ideal state creations have appeared more than once in the history of thought, but their fate, Kant writes here, "turned out to be the same as the fate of the creation of the world: not a single person was present at this, and could not be present, since in this case he would be the creator." myself. It is a sweet dream to hope that the state, as it is thought here, will be realized someday, even if it is too late; but a gradual approach to it is not only conceivable, but also, as far as it is compatible with the moral law, is a duty, the duty not of citizens, but of the head of state." In the "Dispute of Faculties", Kant is concerned with the question of whether the evolutionary movement of humanity in the direction of perfection is being carried out (later he will talk about "the perfection of the world as a moral whole" ^{[27, S. 482]}), and whether it is possible to give any justification for this process so that one can talk about the human race as the author of possible perfection. Kant finds arguments in favor of such a movement in the moral principle of humanity, in the character possessed by the human race as a whole, "and this character, at least in the makings, is moral; and it not only allows us to hope for progress for the better, but already in itself is such, as far as it is possible for him in at the moment" ^{[25, p. 102]}. These arguments follow from the law and the constitution of the state and are combined in them, these structures, at least, remove obstacles on the way of humanity to the better. In Kant's view, this movement is associated with two types of enthusiasm: firstly, with enthusiasm or with a tendency to goodness bordering on affect, and, secondly, with the enthusiasm of the right-affirmation of humanity, with the material principle of the will, and the right itself, the idea of which is embodied in the field of morality, "should not be won by revolutionary means, always unfair. To rule autocratically and at the same time govern in a republican way, i.e. in the spirit of republicanism or by analogy with it, is what makes the people happy with their constitution" ^{[25, p. 104cn]}. The implementation of the perfectionist idea in relation to the state, built on the principles of justice as a perfect object, is empirically problematic.  Much in the practice of the authorities slows down the activity of the states themselves on internal improvement as a way to achieve omnipotence, does not favor the formation of the moral way of thinking of their citizens. Nevertheless, Kant likens the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government to moral persons, each of whom "complements the other in the name of perfection (complementum ad sufficietiam) of the state system" ^{[21, p. 317]}. Building a state for the sake of perfection is a very difficult task. But the enormity of this task does not negate its necessity. We have a lot of talk about improvement today – from the improvement that education is aimed at to the improvement of military equipment. And since the country is turning into a new center of power in the modern world, it is possible to do this under the condition of the development of Russian statehood in the name of national perfection. At one time, Pavel Korin created sketches for the grandiose painting "Rus leaving", but if we want to make sketches for the metaphysical canvas "Rus, Russia imperishable", as they were, are and will be, then it is hardly possible to implement it outside the context of the concept of perfection.