The Soviet city and its budgetary situation before the beginning of the Great Patriotic War: quantitative analysis of problems and contradictions

Krivoruchko Vladislav Kirillovich ORCID: 0000-0001-5614-401X Postgraduate student; Department of Historical Informatics; Lomonosov Moscow State University 1 Leninskie Gory str., room 857, Moscow, 119991, Russia vladislav.krivoruchko1999@mail.ru Other publications by this author

Introduction

In the RSFSR, the scale of a city (status, economic potential of territories, number of inhabitants, etc.) determined the amount of its financing. But what was hidden behind the absolute figures for income and expenses? Did they reflect the real capabilities of the city authorities? How did the size of the budget relate to its quality? Have medium and small towns always found themselves in less favorable conditions? There are no answers to these questions in Russian historiography. The phenomenon of the Soviet city was understood mainly through urban planning practices ^{[1, 2, 3]}, the concept of the urban life cycle ^[4], the prism of the departmental approach ^[5], etc. In a number of studies, the organizational and legal ^[6] and financial ^[7] foundations of the activities of city councils were touched upon, social and domestic problems relevant to the period of industrialization and ways to resolve them were raised ^[8].

Quantitative methods for analyzing city budgets began to be used relatively recently. In 2020-2021, researchers from Chelyabinsk, S. A. Bakanov and A. A. Milyukova ^{[9, 10]}, proposed an approach aimed at studying the structure, dynamics and orientation of the city budget, and tested it on the materials of the mountains. Moscow and the mountains. Chelyabinsk in relation to the later period of the 1950s and 1980s. Unfortunately, this approach does not provide a complete picture of the budgetary state of the Soviet city: it is not possible to quantify the impact of changes in individual budget indicators that occur under the influence of various factors on its quality.

Quantitative methods were further developed in one of the articles ^[11] by the author of this publication. Based on the experience of modern economists, the author identified the potential of coefficient analysis as a comprehensive method for assessing various aspects of the budgetary state of a Soviet city (based on materials from Chelyabinsk in 1925-1940). In several stages, disparate income and expenditure indicators were aggregated and visualized in the form of a specific set of graphs reflecting the level of balance, independence and sustainability of the Chelyabinsk city budget. As a result, it was possible to create an effective diagnostic tool characterized by high sensitivity to transformational impacts and shifts (in the form of administrative and territorial reforms, changes in economic policy, demographic and urbanization shifts) that urban budgets were subjected to in the institutionally turbulent 1920s and 1930s.

A change in research optics has opened up new prospects for the development of the presented approach. Coefficient analysis, supplemented by other statistical methods (Spearman's rank correlation test, Z-score, calculation of coefficients of variation and asymmetry), was used to conduct a rating assessment of Soviet cities within one region. So, it became possible: 1) establishing a link between the scale of the city and individual indicators of the budget status; 2) identifying leaders and outsiders of regional development. Moreover, the list of coefficients under consideration was expanded, which made it possible to obtain a more accurate and comprehensive picture of the budgetary state of the Soviet city. From this perspective, the city budget turned into a "litmus test" reflecting the problems and contradictions generated by the planned economy.

The purpose of the study was to assess the budgetary status of 15 cities in the Chelyabinsk region in 1940 according to planned and actual indicators.

The budget status was understood as a complex characteristic of the financial situation, which reflected not just the balance of income and expenses, but the ratio of values for individual budget items, groups of items and totals, i.e. the level of balance, independence, stability, (not)tension and other qualitative characteristics of the city budget.

Research methodology

Achieving the research goal involved performing a specific sequence of actions, consisting of 7 stages described below.

I. Archival and source analysis. Reports on the execution of local budgets deposited in the R - 1029 fund (Main Financial Department of the Chelyabinsk Region) were used as the main source The United State Archive of the Chelyabinsk Region (hereinafter – OGACHO) ^[12]. The preparation of the data for the study included their selection, purification and transformation. As a result, a collection of datasets with budget figures (planned and actual) for 15 cities of the Chelyabinsk region for 1940 was formed. Among the selected cities were one regional center – Chelyabinsk, three cities of regional subordination – Magnitogorsk, Zlatoust, Kopeisk, and 11 regional cities – Kurgan, Kamensk-Uralsky, Troitsk, Karabash, Miass, Shadrinsk, Satka, Kyshtym, Asha, Katav-Ivanovsk, and Verkhneuralsk. During 1940, the status of Kurgan, Kamensk-Uralsk, Troitsk and Karabash was revised. They were classified as cities of regional subordination.

II. Determination of a set of coefficients, taking into account the institutional features of the development of the Soviet management system and the budgetary system at the local level. By the method of expert evaluation, a set of coefficients was determined that make it possible to assess the budgetary status of 15 cities in the Chelyabinsk region in 1940.

The balance ratio (K ₁) reflected the extent to which expenses were covered by income and the availability of additional funds in the budget

Independence coefficients (_K2–_K9) – the degree of autonomy of city authorities, budget independence from government subsidies, allowances from various funds and loans.

Sustainability coefficients (K10–_K19) – the ability of budgets to fully cover the costs provided for them at the expense of their own or borrowed funds.

The coefficients of budget security (By ₂₀) and effectiveness (By ₂₁) are the quality of life of the urban population, the amount of funds per inhabitant.

The tension coefficients (K ₂₂–K ₂₅) reflected the level of budget workload, the amount of obligations to the population, the "system" and "creditors" imposed on the city authorities.

The budget execution coefficients (_K26–K27) acted as a control tool, ensuring an assessment of the compliance of actual and planned values for income and expenses.

Formulas for calculations are presented in Appendix No. 1.

Depending on the direction of their influence, the coefficients were divided into positive (By ₁–By ₅, By ₁₀–By ₁₇, By ₂₀, By ₂₃–By ₂₄, By ₂₆) and negative (By ₆–By ₉, By ₁₈–By ₁₉, By ₂₁, By ₂₂–By ₂₅, By ₂₇). High values of positive and low values of negative coefficients were indicators of a more prosperous budgetary state of the Soviet city.

III. Reduction of coefficients to a comparable form. To do this, their indexes were calculated by minimum-maximum (Min-Max) normalization of the data. This scaling method has several advantages. First, after normalization, the proportional ratio between the values is maintained, which is important when studying the trend of changes. Secondly, all values are reduced to the range from 0 to 1, which makes it possible to compare indicators expressed in different units of measurement or having different scales (fractions, percentages, rubles), and also simplifies interpretation. Finally, the chosen method is characterized by relative stability to outliers, i.e. low susceptibility to extreme values.

So, for positive coefficients, direct normalization was performed.:

And K _n = (K _n - K _min) / (K _max - K _min), (1)

where kn is the actual value of the indicator for a particular year, _{K max} is the maximum value of the indicator for the entire observation period, and K _min is the minimum value of the indicator. and for negative coefficients, inverted normalization was used, which ensured that the positive values of the variables were preserved, but changed the direction of their influence so that higher values in the initial data became lower.:

And K _n = 1 – (K _n - K _min) / (K _max - K _min) (2)

Thus, the indices not only ended up in the same range from 0 to 1, but also received the same orientation (more is better), which later made it possible to correctly aggregate the transformed indicators and assess, in particular, the level of independence and sustainability of city budgets in the Chelyabinsk region.

The tension coefficients needed special attention. As a result of the inverted normalization, they began to reflect the opposite situation, turning into indices of (non-)tension of the city budget, which had to be taken into account in the subsequent interpretation of the results.

IV. Calculation of composite indexes and introduction of additional parameters. Further, by summing up individual indices (in the case of the independence, sustainability, execution and (non-) budget tension indices), the summary results were calculated using the formula:

SI _i=∑AND _i K _n (3)

To characterize the scale of the city, a number of additional parameters were selected: administrative status; number of inhabitants; total budget (by income and expenses).

It was planned to include data on the volume or value of gross output produced by urban enterprises to illustrate the economic potential of the territories. However, comprehensive data was available only for 1934 (for each city and each enterprise) ^[13]. In statistical collections for later periods, they were presented either selectively (for several key enterprises) or in an aggregated form (by industry for the entire region). The statement that by 1940 Due to the intensification of labor and the launch of new industrial capacities, the previous structure of the distribution of production volume between the cities of the Chelyabinsk region cannot be preserved: it is possible that some medium and small towns could experience explosive growth in 6 years. Thus, the introduction of data for 1934 into the review would be fraught with distorted conclusions at the fifth and sixth stages of the study. Their use had to be abandoned.

The results of stage IV are presented in appendix No. 2. It should be noted that the planned indicators were reflected in it, since first it was important to assess the "prescribed" budgetary state of the cities.

V. The further logic of the study suggested establishing a connection between the scale of the city and individual indicators of the budgetary status. Taking into account a small sample of data (15 observations), their heterogeneity and the presence of outliers, the author chose to calculate the values of Spearman's rank correlation coefficients. Thus, it was necessary to convert the source data into ranks. In the case of administrative status, the ranks were assigned by the method of expert assessment. In all other cases, use the RANK formula.CP(number; array of numbers; 1) in the MS Excel system. The ranking results are presented in Appendix No. 3.

After assigning the ranks, it became possible to calculate Spearman's rank correlation coefficients. Given the large number of recurring ranks in the case of administrative status and the balance index, a special formula was used for calculations, not a general one.:

ρ = (Σxᵢ² + Σyᵢ² – Σdᵢ²) / (2 × √ (Σxᵢ² × Σyᵢ²)) (4),

where: xᵢ and yᵢ is the deviation of the assigned rank of average rank (RCP = (1 + n) / 2) variable (xᵢ = Rₓᵢ-Rₓᵢср, R_yᵢ-R_yᵢCP), Σxᵢ2 and Σyᵢ2 – sum of squares of deviations, dᵢ – the difference between the ranks of the i-th object in two variables (dᵢ = Rₓᵢ – R_yᵢ), Σdᵢ2 – the sum of the squares of all the differences of rank n is the number of observations (objects).

The results of the calculations are presented in Table No. 1.

Taking into account the small volume of observations (n=15), the interpretation of the results was based on the table of critical values of Spearman's rank correlation coefficients. Thus, the values ≥ 0.514 (with a significance level of 0.05) turned out to be statistically significant.

Table 1. Values of Spearman's rank correlation coefficients between budget indexes (planned) and parameters reflecting the scale of the city

Note: The color of the cells reflects the strength of the Cheddock scale bond (green corresponds to medium (0.5–0.7), yellow – strong (0.7–0.9), orange – very strong (0.9–1.0)).

Thus, in a planned economy, there was a strong positive relationship between the status of a city, the total amount of its budget, and the number of residents (in each case, the values of p ranged from 0.775 to 0.954).

A statistically significant relationship between indicators reflecting the scale of the city and budget indicators was observed only in the case of the number of inhabitants and the index of (non)tension (the value of p was 0.525). The fact is that in large cities, the structure of income and expenses was characterized by a greater degree of differentiation. In addition, unlike medium-sized and small towns, they had already passed the stage of intensive growth and, accordingly, could abandon significant investments in the social sphere, housing and communal services, etc.

In other cases, there was no statistically significant association. This observation applies, among other things, to the indices of budget security and effectiveness. Obviously, the amount of funds per person correlated with how critical for the Soviet system were the activities of city residents employed in various industries (for example, in industries related to the military-industrial complex) or with the stage of development of a particular city (the stage of intensive growth could result in large amounts of per capita financing), and not with its scale. It is possible that cities with high levels of budget security and efficiency could be in the zone of "increased administrative attention."

The presence of a strong direct relationship between the level of independence, on the one hand, and the level of sustainability, on the other (the value of p was at the level of 0.861), indicated an attempt to form a relatively "healthy" budget system based on the principle of independence of local authorities.

VI. Identification and analysis of discrepancies between planned and actual indicators of the budgetary state of cities. Next, the values of Spearman's rank correlation coefficients were calculated between the actual budget indicators and the parameters reflecting the scale of the city. At the appropriate stage, data on the combined budgets and administrative status of cities (Kamensk-Uralsky, Kurgan, Karabash and Troitsk became cities of regional subordination) were adjusted to reflect the identified changes, and a new indicator was also introduced – the consolidated budget performance index.

The interim results of Stage VI are presented in Appendices No. 4 and No. 5. The final results are included in Table No. 2.

Table 2. Values of Spearman's rank correlation coefficients between budget indexes (actual) and parameters reflecting the scale of the city

Note: The color of the cells reflects the strength of the Cheddock scale bond (green corresponds to medium (0.5–0.7), yellow – strong (0.7–0.9), orange – very strong (0.9–1.0)).

The increased correlation between the status of a city, the total amount of its budget and the number of inhabitants (in each case, the values of p ranged from 0.839 to 0.961) made it possible to characterize the logic of assigning a new administrative status in the RSFSR as purely formulaic.

The disappearance of a statistically significant relationship between the level of independence and sustainability (the value of p between the corresponding indices was 0.382) indicated a manifestation of systemic dysfunction and a change in the general logic of budget resource management – the use of targeted measures by local authorities (urban and regional) in response to various external challenges (for example: a decrease in the share of turnover tax in the budget). This was also indicated by a change in the direction of the correlation (from positive to negative) between the parameters reflecting the scale of the city and some indicators of the budget situation.

The main task of the city Councils was to achieve a formal balance and, as a result, to meet the control figures for income and expenses (the value of p between the corresponding indices was 0.861). Given the link between the consolidated index of (non-)budget tension and the balance index, it can be assumed that the balance was achieved due to the refusal of local authorities from a number of their obligations. When executing the budget, the totals acquired a framework character. The structure of revenue and expenditure indicators for individual sections and paragraphs of the budget has changed.

It is noteworthy that the volume of per capita financing also correlated with budget performance indicators (the value of p between the indices of budget performance and budget execution was 0.546), which could be due, for example, to the location of individual cities in the region in the zone of "increased administrative attention", falling into which resulted in high demands on the budgetary discipline of city Councils.

VII. Conducting a rating assessment of cities. The further logic of the study suggested compiling a rating table based on planned and actual indicators of the budgetary status of cities in the Chelyabinsk region to identify a hidden link between the scale of the city and its overall budgetary status. The places in the table were allocated based on the sum of budget indicators, which were previously normalized (min-max) to exclude the dominance of some indicators over others. The calculation of their weight coefficients, which was performed using the formula, allowed us to take into account the relative importance of each budget indicator.:

Weights i = (1 / RankS _i) / Σ (1 / RankS _i) (5),

where: RankS _i is the rank of a separate budget indicator (the rank was assigned based on the value of the Pearson correlation coefficient between individual budget indicators and their originally calculated amount, the higher the value of the correlation coefficient, the higher the rank assigned to the indicator); 1 / RankS _i is the reverse rank, and Σ (1 / RankS _i) — the sum of the reverse ranks.

The weights are shown in Tables 3 and 4.

Table 3. Weight coefficients for individual

budget indicators (planned)

Table 4. Weight coefficients for individual

budget indicators (actual)

The distribution of weights according to planned and actual indicators differed, which also indicated a manifestation of systemic dysfunction and a change in the overall logic of budget resource management. There was an increase in the values of the weighting coefficients of the budget balance and (non)tension indices (from 0.10 to 0.41 and from 0.07 to 0.10, respectively), while the values of the weighting coefficients of the independence and sustainability indices decreased (from 0.08 to 0.07 and from 0.41 to 0.07, respectively).

The calculation of the sum of budget indicators was already carried out according to the formula:

∑And _i = ∑In c And _i × And _i (6),

where: And _i is the budget indicator, and weights _{i are} its relative.

It is important to emphasize that at this stage, budget performance indexes were excluded from consideration, since they themselves were the result of comparing actual and planned indicators.

There were different distances between the assigned locations, so it was decided to carry out additional calculations to assess the discrepancies.

The Z-score allowed us to understand to what extent the results of each city were normal or abnormal in the context of the overall population.:

Z = (X - μ) / σ (7),

where: X is the individual value, μ is the arithmetic mean of the general population, σ is the standard deviation of the general population. For greater clarity, the obtained absolute values were converted to relative values (%).

To assess the degree of uniformity of data on the amounts of planned and actual indicators for all cities of the region, the coefficient of variation was calculated using the formula:

CV = σ / μ * 100 % (8),

where: σ is the standard deviation of the general population, μ is the arithmetic mean of the general population.

The skewness coefficient was calculated to assess the distortions in the data distribution.:

Sk = ( n / ((n-1)*(n-2)) ) * Σ(xᵢ - x̄)³ / s³ (9),

where: n is the number of observations, x is the sample mean, s is the sample standard deviation (s = √( Σ(xᵢ - x)2 / n)), Σ(xᵢ - x)3 is the sum of cubes of deviations of each value from the average.

In the context of the study, it was important to assess the individual condition of each city by comparing the amounts of its actual and planned indicators.

The final calculation results are included in Tables No. 5 and No. 6.

Table 5. The general budgetary situation of the cities of the Chelyabinsk region in 1940:

rating table for planned and actual indicators

Notes: The color of the cells in the third and sixth columns corresponded to the city's position in the overall ranking (the leaders were highlighted in green, the cities in the middle position were highlighted in light green, turning into white, and the outsiders in a vulnerable position were highlighted in red). In the case of budget figures, the arrows indicated discrepancies between the "prescribed" and the actual condition. In the case of cities, to change their administrative status during the year. The cities are arranged in descending order (Chelyabinsk is the largest city, Verkhneuralsk is the smallest)

Table 6. Coefficient of variation and coefficient of asymmetry

The analysis of tables No. 5 and No. 6 allows us to draw a number of rather interesting conclusions.

The scale of the city affected the budget situation, but not in all cases. The quality of the budget was associated to a greater extent:1) with the structure, scale and forms of organization of production deployed in these cities, and the state's demand for certain categories of industrial goods, which was reflected in a number of key revenue items (tax on buildings, land rent, turnover tax, tax on consumer cooperatives, income tax on individuals, etc.); 2) with the stage of urban development, etc.

When planning income and expenses, there was a certain disparity between cities in terms of the quality of their budget status, and hence the capabilities of local authorities and their flexibility. There was a skew of the data to the right (Skp = 1.11), which indicated the presence of a potential leader, which should have differed in the sum of its indicators from most cities in the region. In this case, this role was assigned to Chelyabinsk, which was confirmed not only by the city's place in the overall ranking, but also by the Z-score.

In reality, the situation was different. The actual results turned out to be more balanced (CVp = 57.16%, CVf = 38.21%), which indicated increased data uniformity. Now there was a slight left bias in the data (Skf = -0.03), which indicated a slight disparity from below. At the same time, in all cities, with one exception (Kurgan), there was an improvement in the individual budget situation. In other words, the real situation of most cities turned out to be more advantageous than the "prescribed" one.

The situation with the largest city in the region and its administrative center, Chelyabinsk, was the most striking evidence of the presence of unaccounted–for factors in the planning of city budgets. So, instead of the "prescribed" first place, the city took only the ninth in the overall rating, having "sifted" by 45.71% in terms of budget indicators. Given the scale of Chelyabinsk, such a deviation can be considered catastrophic, and the situation of local authorities is quite difficult.

What caused this situation?

The management of financial resources in a large city was burdened by the "multiplicity of responsibilities" of local authorities – involvement in a complex network of vertical and horizontal relations between party-Soviet and economic-production actors and, as a result, the need to overcome periodic imbalances that hid behind the facade of a planned economy. In other words, city councils became hostages of institutional contradictions, fell into the trap of someone else's administrative rationality (setting overly ambitious goals, pursuing narrow (personal) interests by individual actors, blurring the spectrum of responsibility, etc.) and incurred additional costs, acting as a kind of shock absorber or mediator within the Soviet system. In addition, in a planned economy, a high degree of income diversification in a large city resulted in less transparency and predictability of its budget, which consequently led to fluctuations, mainly in the level of balance, independence and sustainability. So, according to the results of 1940 Chelyabinsk lost 206.7 thousand rubles in building tax (5.65% instead of 6.42%), 357 thousand rubles in land rent (2.29% instead of 3.11%), 215.9 thousand rubles in tax on non-commodity transactions (3.81% instead of 4.86%) and 364.3 thousand rubles. collection for cultural and housing construction from workers, employees and other non-agricultural population (5.13% instead of 6.15%), etc.

Obviously, the administrative resources of the city authorities were limited in one way or another. They couldn't always use : a) methods of non-economic coercion to meet revenue and expenditure targets; b) or resort to the use of informal practices and mechanisms to minimize budget costs. There was also no need to rely on "departmental guardianship" from individual enterprises, the directors had their own production plan – the construction and maintenance of social infrastructure facilities remained a secondary focus. The budget was the main management tool for city councils.

The mechanism of budget equalization that has developed locally (as part of the system of state redistribution of funds) he put major cities at a disadvantage. It was based on the variability of tax tariffs and rates for different cities (including regional districts) within the same region. The corresponding decision was made annually by the regional Council of Workers' Deputies based on the figures "lowered" by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR or the RSFSR for a specific republic, territory or region. Priority was given to medium and small towns, which did not always have optimal predictable sources of income (for example, they did not have an extensive housing fund), but were forced to respond to the social and economic challenges of industrialization ^[14]. Chelyabinsk was home to such industrial giants as the tractor plant (CHTZ), the electrometallurgical plant (CHEMK), the machine tool plant (ZSO), etc., but interestingly, since 1939, the turnover tax has been credited not to the city budget, but to the regional budget ^[15]. If Chelyabinsk was deprived of revenue from turnover tax, then for other cities it served as one of the sources ensuring their noticeable separation. In addition, at the turn of the 1930s and 1940s, the system of donor-recipient relations was "reanimated" locally (the likely incentive was the inclusion of local budgets in the state budget in 1938 and the change in the previous income structure), which operated on the basis of the regulatory fund of local councils and special purpose funds. In 1940, 8.01% of all expenditures in Chelyabinsk were made in favor of the "lagging territories." Moreover, according to the results of 1940, there was a deliberate shift in the financial burden from medium-sized cities to large ones (the amount of deductions for Shadrinsk was 1.47% instead of 4.03%, for Troitsk 0% instead of 5.15%, but for Chelyabinsk 8.01% instead of 5.08%, and for Magnitogorsk 3% instead of 0%), but with subsequent compensation (contributions were made to the budget of Chelyabinsk from the regional budget and from the regulatory fund). Therefore, we can say that there is a practice of "mutual settlements" between budgets of different levels. Thus, large cities were not only inferior to medium and small ones in relative terms in terms of some tax revenues, but also became "donors" to the latter.

Finally, during the budget period, various unforeseen circumstances could arise (population influx, elimination of consequences of utility accidents, etc.), entailing additional enormous expenses.

Of particular interest was the situation with Kopeisk, Karabash, Katav-Ivanovsky, Asha, Kurgan and Shadrinsky. The first four cities can be confidently attributed to the number of departmental ones. They housed relatively large enterprises (usually no more than two) subordinate to one of the All-Union People's commissariats (NKUP, NKTSP, NKSM, NKCHP). Moreover, these cities received their status relatively recently: Kopeysk, Karabash and Asha – in 1933, Katav-Ivanovsk – in 1939. It seems likely that a clear outsider position was imposed on these 4 cities based on strict budgetary discipline, which local authorities had to adhere to when implementing their management decisions, and the need to build social infrastructure (in each case, more than 84% of all expenditures were on education and healthcare).

Kurgan and Shadrinsk were the centers of the food industry. Their outsider position could be related, in general, to the system of redistribution of funds within the Soviet state (tax tariffs and rates, etc.) or to the relatively low cost of production, which affected the city budget.

According to the results of 1940 Only one of the six cities, Shadrinsk, emerged from an obvious outsider position. In his case, three factors worked at once. The development of art production in the city provided an increase in income under the paragraph "income tax from cooperatives and economic bodies of public organizations" through the All-Industry Council by 3.48% (from 5.87% according to plan to 9.35% in fact). The second factor is a successful combination of circumstances. Thus, the amount of contributions to the regulatory fund was not 4.03% of all expenses, but only 1.47%, i.e. part of the financial burden shifted to other cities of the region (+ 3% compared to the plan for Chelyabinsk and Magnitogorsk). As a third option, competent management of budgetary resources. Thus, the cost savings in Shadrinsk, instead of 0% according to the plan, actually amounted to almost 3.19%.

However, the numerical composition of the outsider group has not changed. Despite the improvement of its individual budget status, albeit nominally, Miass joined it.

The situation with Magnitogorsk, which was built at the turn of the 1920s and 1930s around the industrial giant MMK and a number of related enterprises, deserved special attention. By all accounts, the city was a departmental city (it is a single-industry city), but it was not in an outsider position. Magnitogorsk took the second place in terms of the total planned indicators, and in terms of the actual total it was in the first place, becoming the absolute leader. In the case of planned indicators, one can only assume that this was the reason for the separation from other departmental cities.: 1) the scale of Magnitogorsk; 2) increased attention "from above" as one of the symbols of industrialization; 3) the rapid development of the city, which required flexibility on the part of local authorities, etc. In the case of actual indicators, the situation could have at least two explanations. Firstly, the active use of urban lands that were leased to MMK and related enterprises (for buildings, warehouses, departmental housing, etc.) and provided an increase in income under the heading "utilities and landscaping" (3.79% according to plan and 7.53% in fact). Secondly, the transition to austerity, which resulted in a reduction in expenditures of budget organizations and institutions (0% according to plan and 1.01% according to plan), a reduction in management costs (0% according to plan and 0.77% in fact) and utilities (6.48% according to plan and 5.31% in fact).

No less interesting was the situation with Kyshtym, which was also a departmental and relatively young city (city status was obtained in 1934). According to the sum of its budget indicators, Kyshtym occupied a middle position, which could be due to the growing demand of the state for certain categories of goods. There was an electrolyte plant in the city that specialized in the production of copper, which the country's defense industry urgently needed. According to the results of 1940, Kyshtym saw an individual increase in budget indicators (+75.79%), as well as a change in the city's position in the overall rating. Surprisingly, the increase in indicators was not provided by the turnover tax (29.3% according to the plan and 21.2% in fact), but by the tax on buildings (7.83% according to the plan and 12.67% in fact), which could indicate the commissioning of new industrial and warehouse premises or the expansion of the departmental housing fund, and income tax from the consumer cooperative (2.23% according to the plan and 5.85% in fact), which supplied the population with food and thereby created conditions for the consolidation of workers in the field. Consequently, the effect of departmental affiliation could manifest itself indirectly. A similar development scenario could be traced to the example of Kamensk-Uralsky, which housed an aluminum plant specializing in the production of alumina, the main raw material for the manufacture of aluminum used in the aviation, automotive industries, etc.

Conclusion

In the conditions of a planned economy (in the case of the Chelyabinsk region in 1940), the relationship between the scale of the city and its budgetary status (bigger is better) was practically not traced. The quality of the city budget was primarily related to the structure, scale and forms of organization of production deployed in the cities of the region, with the state's demand for certain categories of industrial goods and the stage of development of a particular city. During the reporting period, priorities in budget resource management shifted from independence to formal balance, indicating a manifestation of systemic dysfunction. A comparison of the rating lists compiled separately according to planned and actual indicators revealed significant discrepancies. Firstly, there was a reduction in the gaps between places in the overall ranking, which indicated a "natural leveling off of the budget status of the cities of the Chelyabinsk region during the year. Secondly, the overall configuration of the seats was changing. By the end of 1940, Chelyabinsk, the largest city in the region, was in the most vulnerable position, which could not achieve the "set" targets due to numerous imbalances in the Soviet system. Initially claiming leadership, it eventually became one of the cities with balanced indicators. Some "departmental cities (regardless of their scale)" and food industry centers, whose outsider position was consolidated even at the budget planning stage, also found themselves in a vulnerable position.

In similar studies, further possibilities for applying coefficient analysis are seen in the study of cities that had the same status (for example: administrative centers of territories, regions or the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic) or performed a similar role in the Soviet economic system (for example: centers for the extraction of raw materials, gas and energy; centers of final industrial production; non-producing cities; transport centers, multifunctional cities, etc.) at a specific time interval or in dynamics (if comprehensive data is available). Thus, there may be: 1) thresholds have been set for the level of budget balance, independence, sustainability, etc. for classifying cities as a certain type or to exclude (in whole or in part) any connection at all; 2) the degree of financial independence of local authorities and their role in the Soviet budget system and management system has been assessed by comparing analog cities, analyzing existing formal and informal institutions (with the involvement of additional sources), as well as taking into account regional specifics; 3) various scenarios of urban development in the RSFSR are considered; and, if possible, 4) the phenomenon of the Soviet management model is rethought, which will allow it to identify new previously hidden trends and problems, or to obtain additional confirmation for the already made to draw conclusions in historical and economic research and, thus, to test the proposed approach.

Appendix 1

A set of coefficients for a comprehensive assessment of the budgetary state of a Soviet city

Notes: D – income, ND – tax income, NDm – local taxes and fees, NiD –non–tax income, NiDcom –income from utilities, BVP – gratuitous income from the state, Fdoh – income from the regulatory fund of local councils, Z – loans, Df–actual income, and Dp-planned income; H – number of inhabitants; R – expenses, NiRcom – expenses for utilities, MR – minimum expenses (mod., health, social security, etc.), OGR – national expenses (mod., health, social. provision, etc.), Frac – contributions to the regulatory fund of local councils, PP – payments on loans and credits, RF – actual expenses, Rp – planned expenses.

Appendix 2

Budget (planned) indexes and parameters reflecting the scale of the city

Compiled by the author according to: OGACHO. F. R-1029.Op.7. 127. L.354-400, 451-498; F. R-1029.Op.7. D.128.L.48-53-vol., 194-196-vol., 338-385-vol., 436-486-vol.; F. R-1029.Op.7.D.129. L.1–49, 100-196-vol., 299-343-vol., 540-587-vol.; F. R-1029.Op.7. D.130.L.378-381-vol., 534-537; F. R-1029.Op.7.D.131. L.343–390-vol.

Appendix 3

Ranks assigned to budget (planned) indexes and parameters reflecting the scale of the city

Appendix 4

Budget (actual) indexes and parameters reflecting the scale of the city

Compiled by the author according to: OGACHO. F. R-1029.Op.7. 127. L.354-400, 451-498; F. R-1029.Op.7. D.128.L.48-53-vol., 194-196-vol., 338-385-vol., 436-486-vol.; F. R-1029.Op.7.D.129. L.1–49, 100-196-vol., 299-343-vol., 540-587-vol.; F. R-1029.Op.7. D.130.L.378-381-vol., 534-537; F. R-1029.Op.7.D.131. L.343–390-vol.

Appendix 5

Ranks assigned to budget (actual) indexes and parameters reflecting the scale of the city

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