Russia's "soft power" in 2000-2025: strategies, tools, and results

Efimenko Anastasiya Mikhailovna ORCID: 0009-0003-8513-1703 Assistant; Department of Public Administration; Lugansk State University named after V. Dahl Postgraduate student; Department of Public Administration; Lugansk State University named after V. Dahl 20A Molodezhny Square, Lugansk People's Republic, 291034, Russia efimenko.anastasiya.m@mail.ru

Introduction

In the first quarter of the 21st century, "soft power" finally turned into one of the central tools of foreign policy competition. Along with economic and military means of influence, States are increasingly resorting to the resources of culture, information, ideology, and education to advance their own interests in the face of increasing geopolitical turbulence. For Russia, which is facing large-scale foreign policy pressure, attempts at cultural and normative isolation, and the loss of significant positions in Western institutions of influence, the problem of developing an effective soft power strategy has become particularly important. The erosion of the former world order based on the global liberal consensus has exacerbated the need to form alternative models of international subjectivity, in which "soft power" becomes not only a resource of attraction, but also a means of adapting to the new foreign policy environment.

Interest in the phenomenon of "soft power" in Russian and foreign political science has increased significantly since the conceptualization of this term by Joseph Nye in the 1990s. Among the authoritative studies that have received wide recognition, the work of J. NYE, C. Hayden, J. Melissen, A. Watanabe, as well as Russian scientists specializing in this issue: M.M. Lebedeva, O.G. Leonova, O.A. Naumova, E.G. Ponomareva, D.B. Kazarinova ^[1-9]. The Russian academic tradition has developed various approaches to understanding the essence and limitations of "soft power." If M.M. Lebedeva focuses on institutional mechanisms and multi-vector nature, O.G. Leonova and O.A. Naumov emphasize the value-civilizational component and its transformation in the context of new geopolitical realities.Attention to this topic became especially intense after 2014, when the West imposed sanctions, sharply narrowing the possibilities of a "hard" projection of Russia's interests and thereby intensifying its interest in intangible channels of presence in the international arena. In this study, "soft power" refers to the ability of the state to shape the preferences of other actors through the attractiveness of culture, values, and politics. Humanitarian policy is seen as a broader framework for the implementation of "soft power," while cultural diplomacy is one of its tools, including educational, cultural, and religious initiatives.

Despite the accumulated base of empirical and conceptual research, modern Russian "soft power" is still the subject of scientific discussions. In particular, there are contradictions in the academic field regarding the criteria of its effectiveness, the mechanism of perception outside of Russia, as well as the relationship between state and non-state actors involved in humanitarian promotion. Comparative studies are of particular interest, in which the Russian model is contrasted with the approaches of the United States and China. American "soft power" is traditionally associated with universalism and liberal normativity, while the Chinese strategy emphasizes civilizational and economic mutual benefit and political neutrality ^{[1, 13, 24]}. In the Russian context, there is a gradual shift from a more universalistic and dialogical model to a more sovereignly oriented humanitarian policy, in which value components are strengthened.

Against this background, the research gaps become obvious. First, there is a lack of a holistic view of the stages of the evolution of Russian "soft power" over the past 25 years, which makes it possible to link political transformations within the country with changes in foreign policy positioning. Secondly, the tools for assessing the effectiveness of Russia's humanitarian diplomacy in the face of sanctions isolation and information pressure have not been sufficiently developed. Thirdly, the problems of the civilizational justification of the Russian "soft power" and its potential competitiveness as an alternative international project are poorly represented in the academic literature. In addition, the issues of adapting soft power strategies to new digital environments and political realities remain unresolved, in which traditional channels of influence are losing their stability.

The purpose of this article is a comprehensive analysis of the strategy, tools and results of the use of Russian "soft power" in the period from 2000 to the present, as well as to identify the main changes in its foreign policy positioning in the context of increased international competition. Existing research on Russian "soft power" focuses primarily either on a conceptual understanding of the concept itself, or on an analysis of individual instruments of humanitarian influence. To a lesser extent, the issue of the phase evolution of the Russian model in 2000-2025 and the relationship of institutional changes with changes in the foreign policy environment has been developed. This article is aimed at filling this gap. Within the framework of this goal, the following tasks are set: to identify the key stages of the evolution of Russian "soft power"; to systematize its institutional and substantive components; to conduct a comparative analysis with the humanitarian strategies of the United States and China; to assess the real and potential effects of Russia's "soft power" in countries near and far abroad; to identify the limitations and contradictions constraining its development.

The conducted research has both theoretical and applied significance. Theoretically, it helps to clarify the conceptual framework and models for analyzing foreign policy influence of an intangible nature. In practice, the results can be used to develop recommendations for foreign policy agencies, cultural diplomacy institutions, media structures, and academic institutions involved in strategic forecasting. The article is aimed at a systematic rethinking of the role of a humanitarian resource in ensuring Russia's international subjectivity, taking into account the conditions of the post-liberal world order and the growing intercivilizational competition.

Methods and Materials

The study is based on a comprehensive qualitative and quantitative analysis of the evolution of Russian "soft power" in 2000-2025. Its empirical part is based not only on theoretical literature, but also on a body of open documents, statistical materials and institutional reports that make it possible to compare the stated foreign policy guidelines with the practice of humanitarian policy. The methodological framework includes content analysis, discourse analysis, comparative political science, institutional and historical-political methods.

The empirical sample was formed according to the principle of targeted selection. It includes 62 pieces of materials for 2000-2025: strategic and regulatory documents of the Russian Federation; program materials of Rossotrudnichestvo, the Russkiy Mir Foundation, the Gorchakov Foundation and specialized educational institutions; public speeches and interviews of representatives of foreign policy and humanitarian institutions; statistical data on foreign students, quotas, language programs, foreign missions and regional distribution humanitarian initiatives; as well as analytical reviews and international ratings used in the article as an auxiliary comparative material. ^{[10, 11, 15, 18, 19]}.

The criteria for including materials in the sample were: 1) direct connection with the instruments of Russian "soft power"; 2) public verifiability of the source; 3) representativeness for one of the three identified stages; 4) the presence of meaningful indicators of humanitarian policy – education, Russian language, culture, historical memory, support for compatriots, media presence or value-civilizational rhetoric. Duplicate messages, news texts without analytical or statistical load, as well as materials that do not allow establishing a link between the declared initiative and Russia's foreign policy positioning were excluded from the sample.

Content analysis was used to identify the thematic structure of Russian humanitarian policy. The units of analysis were the document as a whole, the semantic fragment and the thematic code. Coding was conducted in nine categories: "education and academic mobility", "Russian language and cultural heritage", "compatriots", "historical memory", "traditional values", "multipolarity", "media presence and information counteraction", "Global South", "digital and network formats". The unit of account was not the number of word uses, but the presence of a stable semantic block in the document; therefore, one material could be assigned to several categories simultaneously.

The discourse analysis was aimed at identifying how the semantic framework of Russian "soft power" is constructed in official documents, institutional reports and public speeches. The article analyzed ways to legitimize humanitarian policy, contrast the Russian model with Western universalism, represent Russia as an independent center of civilization, as well as changes in rhetoric from dialogue-integration to sovereign identification after 2014 and especially after 2022.

Statistical data were used in a descriptive mode and served for empirical verification of qualitative conclusions. Russian Russian Houses and Rossotrudnichestvo network indicators were included in the analysis, as well as information on the quotas of the Russian Government for foreign citizens, the number of foreign students in Russian universities, Russian language education abroad, the regional distribution of humanitarian initiatives and the dynamics of Russia's institutional presence in individual macro-regions. This approach made it possible to avoid reducing the article to a purely conceptual reasoning and to show which instruments have a measurable institutional expression.

The comparative political science method was used to compare the Russian model of "soft power" with the American and Chinese models ^{[1, 13, 24]}. The comparison was conducted not in the form of a general description, but according to an analytical matrix: institutional architecture, key channels of influence, value base, geographical priorities, type of target audience, digital infrastructure and performance constraints. The methodological triangulation of content analysis, discourse analysis, and descriptive statistics allows us to consider Russian "soft power" simultaneously as a set of institutions, a system of narratives, and a set of measurable practices.

The chronological framework of 2000-2025 is set based on the changing institutional and foreign policy conditions of the functioning of Russian humanitarian policy. The lower boundary is associated with the beginning of the restoration of Russia's foreign policy subjectivity in the 2000s; the boundary of 2007-2008 reflects the emergence of specialized institutions of public and cultural diplomacy; 2014 records the transition to a conflict-identification model under sanctions pressure; 2022-2025 is considered as a subtype of the same phase, when Western restrictions, digital barriers and reorientation increased to the countries of the Global South. This periodization makes it possible to link empirical indicators, content analysis results, and discursive shifts into a single research logic.

Table 1. Composition of the empirical study sample

Results

The analysis of empirical and theoretical data obtained in the course of the study made it possible to fix the presence of a stable phase structure in the development of Russian "soft power" in the period from 2000 to the present. Based on the dynamics of foreign policy conditions, the institutional framework, and the transformation of ideological content, three stages were identified: proto-institutional, institutional-constructivist, and conflict-identification. At the first stage, covering the first seven years of the 21st century, Russian foreign policy demonstrated an interest in intangible forms of influence, but lacked a comprehensive system of institutions. The main efforts were focused on restoring humanitarian ties in the post-Soviet space, supporting Russian-speaking diasporas, developing bilateral cultural programs and educational cooperation with traditionally friendly countries ^{[10, 11]}.

In the second phase, from 2008 to 2013, an organized soft power infrastructure was formed. Specialized structures appeared to coordinate international humanitarian activities: Rossotrudnichestvo in 2008, the Russian World Foundation in 2007, and the Gorchakov Foundation for Public Diplomacy in 2010. Russia's media presence abroad has significantly expanded, including through multilingual broadcasting in foreign markets. During the same period, an impetus was given to the export of humanitarian, cultural, religious and educational services to new regional areas, including Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia: science and culture centers were opened, quota programs for students from Africa and Asia were developed, and support for compatriots living abroad was expanded ^{[10, 11]}.

The third phase, which began in 2014, was marked by the institutionalization of the value-identification framework of the Russian "soft power". The foreign policy course of the Russian Federation has been reoriented towards a more sovereignly oriented humanitarian policy based on the rejection of universalist rhetoric and appeals to its own civilizational foundations. The discourse of cultural autonomy, Orthodox and traditional values, historical memory, and a multipolar world has become an important component of foreign policy positioning. During this period, there was a reduction in Russia's presence in Western countries and a simultaneous increase in activity in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East; therefore, the geographical structure of the use of "soft power" acquired a distinctly non-Western character ^{[6, 7]}.

In the context of deteriorating relations with the West and the introduction of large-scale sanctions regimes, Russia was forced to adapt its strategy of humanitarian influence to the new international environment. This has led to a rethinking of priorities, accents, and forms of communication. The decrease in the availability of Western academic, cultural and media platforms was accompanied by a reorientation of resources to strengthen its presence in the countries of the Global South, where Russian cultural and educational diplomacy gained relative freedom of action. The role of regional cooperation formats such as the Eurasian Economic Union, SCO, BRICS, as well as bilateral humanitarian agreements with Latin American, African, and Asian states has increased ^{[15, 18, 19]}.

To empirically verify the selected periodization, a content analysis of 62 materials was carried out. His results show that Russian "soft power" is most consistently described through educational, linguistic, cultural and diasporic tools, whereas after 2014, the proportion of materials in which humanitarian policy is associated with historical memory, traditional values and multipolarity has increased markedly. After 2022, the codes of media engagement, digital adaptation and reorientation to the countries of the Global South will be further strengthened in the building.

Table 2. The results of the empirical corpus content analysis

The religious and civilizational component of Russia's "soft power" occupies a special place in the system of empirically identified trends. Since the mid-2010s, Russian humanitarian initiatives have increasingly appealed to the idea of a unique civilizational path that emphasizes the synthesis of Orthodox spirituality, historical memory, and sovereign state identity. Elements of this paradigm are actively being broadcast in countries where Orthodox communities are present, as well as in states that perceive Russia as a counterweight to the liberal-secular hegemony of the West. These mechanisms are most actively manifested in the countries of the Balkans, parts of the Middle East, as well as in some areas of cultural instability, where the religious component of politics is gaining decisive importance ^{[6, 7]}.

At the regional level, the largest presence of Russian "soft power" was recorded in the post-Soviet countries, in particular in Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In these countries, there is an institutionalized interaction in the field of education, culture, youth policy, as well as Russia's systematic participation in regional humanitarian forums and initiatives. There is also targeted support for Russian-speaking educational institutions, participation in the training of teaching staff and provision of methodological materials. In Eastern European countries, despite the decline in political loyalty to Russia, certain elements of humanitarian cooperation remained in place until 2022, including academic exchange programs, cultural centers, and participation in independent media projects. After 2022, there has been a sharp reduction in these formats, their administrative blocking, as well as the curtailment of a number of previously active cooperation platforms. However, there are efforts to maintain a point presence in countries with a more balanced foreign policy, such as Hungary and Serbia ^{[15, 17]}.

African and Latin American areas have been showing increased engagement since 2018, especially after the Russia–Africa summits and increased cooperation in educational and cultural diplomacy. In these regions, Russia is increasingly positioned as an independent and supranational partner, unencumbered by its colonial legacy and ideological conditions. The main focus is on supporting local educational systems, working with youth, developing Russian-speaking and bilingual programs, as well as holding cultural events with the participation of Russian creative teams ^{[18, 19]}.

In Asia, the main focus is on multilevel cooperation in the humanitarian field with Vietnam, Mongolia, Indonesia and the countries of Central Asia. These countries have established stable bilateral formats that support the synergy between educational exports, cultural policy and projects in the field of mass communication. There is considerable interest in joint historical and cultural research, participation in programs for the protection of intangible heritage, and strengthening ties at the level of student and youth initiatives ^{[12, 16]}.

One of the most important empirical results of the study was the establishment of the dependence of the effectiveness of "soft power" on the political and cultural context of the host countries. In countries focused on a balanced foreign policy, as well as in countries where there is a demand for cultural pluralism and multipolarity, the opportunities for the implementation of Russian humanitarian and cultural initiatives are noticeably higher. There is a great openness to exchange programs, festivals, and participation in joint media and educational projects. In the same countries where the pro-Western regulatory framework and political orientation towards the EU or the USA are dominant, the use of "soft power" tools encounters institutional barriers, censorship restrictions and resistance from the media and expert environment ^{[17, 24]}.

The results of the analysis also demonstrate that, against the background of geopolitical crises, since 2014, the vector of Russian "soft power" has increasingly acquired the features of a defensive strategy. This is reflected in the desire to retain and reproduce existing areas of humanitarian influence, strengthen ties with compatriots abroad, counter destructive information campaigns and enhance the role of domestic cultural symbols as a means of resisting global standardization. This is confirmed by the increased attention to the issues of national historical memory, the sacralization of the cultural code and the development of language programs as an instrument of identification influence ^{[7, 14]}.

There is a steady trend towards the formation of "information enclaves" – segments of the international information space in which Russian narratives have a high degree of resonance and are perceived as reliable and alternative to Western ones. These enclaves are most often found in countries with a pronounced demand for multipolarity and dissatisfaction with externally imposed models of social development. In them, Russian media resources, educational proposals and cultural initiatives are perceived not as a tool of state propaganda, but as a source of additional choice and confirmation of the alternative global worldview ^{[16, 21]}.

Comparing data across different regions allows you to capture the coverage asymmetry in a more structured way. In the sample materials, the post–Soviet space and Central Asia were mentioned as a priority area in 33 of the 62 housing units; Asia in a broad sense – in 22 materials; Africa – in 17; Latin America – in 12; Western Europe and North America - in 11, and mainly in the context of restrictions, blockages, sanctions and reduction of institutional presence. Consequently, the most complete soft power infrastructure remains in the CIS and Central Asian countries, a medium–intensive presence is recorded in Asia and the Middle East, and targeted but growing activity is in Africa and Latin America, while the western direction after 2022 acquires a predominantly residual and defensive character.

The analysis of the perception of Russian "soft power" abroad deserves special attention. Empirical data obtained as a result of the analysis of international indices, public opinion polls and expert assessments allow us to conclude that there is a paradoxical duality in relation to the humanitarian projection of Russia. On the one hand, in a number of countries it continues to be associated with a high level of scientific and cultural capital, with classical Russian literature, schools of music, theater and ballet, as well as with achievements in space, engineering and mathematics. On the other hand, the modern political connotation of the "soft power" of the Russian Federation in the international press and analytics is often viewed through the prism of suspicions of politically motivated information influence, which indicates a growing gap between the potential cultural appeal and the political image of the country ^{[1, 20]}.

An additional empirical result was the identification of an imbalance between the institutional saturation of the soft power infrastructure and the limited channels of its perception. Despite the availability of a wide range of tools from cultural centers to transnational media platforms, from educational programs to religious initiatives, it is not always possible to ensure the organic integration of these mechanisms into the cultural fabric of the host countries. This is especially true for States with a high sensitivity to issues of cultural autonomy and a historically conditioned distrust of external forms of influence. In such conditions, the effectiveness of "soft power" is determined not only by the scale and regularity of initiatives, but also by the degree of trust in the source, contextual relevance, and the ability to propose a positive, integrative agenda ^{[1, 24]}.

The totality of the data obtained allows us to conclude that modern Russian "soft power" operates in a deeply fragmented international environment, where there is no universal format for its perception. This determines the need for constant adaptation of tools, consideration of local socio-cultural specifics and diversification of strategies depending on the political, cultural and informational context.

Discussion

The results obtained make it possible to transfer practical recommendations from the level of general wishes to the level of scientifically based conclusions directly following from the empirical corpus. Unlike descriptive approaches, where digitalization, personnel renewal, or the transition to a network model are formulated as self-evident modernization directions, in this study they are derived from three groups of data: the structure of an empirical sample, the results of content analysis, and a comparative matrix of "soft power" models ^[5-7].

The first result is related to the refinement of the chronological logic of the study. The period 2000-2007 is characterized as proto-institutional, since humanitarian initiatives existed mainly in the form of disparate foreign policy and cultural practices. The period 2008-2013 is defined as an institutional constructivist period: it was then that Rossotrudnichestvo, the Russian World Foundation, and the Gorchakov Foundation were formed and the infrastructure of public diplomacy expanded. The period 2014-2025 has a conflict-identification character, as humanitarian policy is increasingly associated with historical memory, traditional values, criticism of Western universalism and a reorientation towards non-Western audiences ^{[7, 20]}.

The period 2022-2025 should be considered not as an independent phase, but as a subtype of the radicalization of the already established conflict identification model. After 2022, sanctions and platform restrictions intensified, Western channels of cultural communication decreased, and the codes "Global South", "media presence and information counteraction", "digital and network formats" became more pronounced in the corpus of materials. Therefore, periodization is based not on a mechanical calendar division, but on a change in institutional regimes, foreign policy constraints, and discursive dominants.

The second result concerns the comparative measurement. A comparison of Russia, the United States, and China shows that the differences between the models of "soft power" are not only in terms of the set of institutions, but also in the type of regulatory proposal, the mechanism of attractiveness formation, and the nature of the target audience. For a more visual presentation of the results of the comparative analysis, they are summarized in an analytical matrix.

Table 3. Comparative analytical matrix of the "soft power" models of Russia, the USA and China

The third result follows from the content analysis. The most represented codes were "education and academic mobility" (38 out of 62 materials; 61.3%), "Russian language and cultural heritage" (35 out of 62; 56.5%) and "compatriots abroad" (28 out of 62; 45.2%). The code "digital and network formats" is much less pronounced (14 out of 62; 22.6%). This means that the Russian "soft power" retains a strong offline contour, but does not sufficiently transform it into stable digital and horizontal forms of interaction ^[21-23].

Table 4. Relationship of empirical results and practical conclusions

Table 4 shows that the practical recommendations are not an abstract list of measures. Digitalization is necessary because the digital code has turned out to be the least represented in the corpus; personnel renewal is necessary because efficiency depends on regional adaptation; a network model is necessary because a centralized infrastructure by itself does not provide depth of perception; a positive agenda is necessary because the discourse of historical memory and value identity enhances the identification effect, but not always creates an attractive image of the future.

This leads to a more accurate understanding of digitalization. Russian Russian language courses at Russian Homes, digital alumni clubs, regional media projects with local authors, platforms for joint cultural archives and educational tracks should not be a formal expansion of the presence on social networks, but rather the creation of a digital contour to support existing offline tools. This model responds to the identified shortage of digital codes and at the same time uses the most powerful components of Russian "soft power" - education, language and cultural heritage ^[21-23].

Personnel updates should also be derived from the results of the analysis. If the effectiveness of Russian humanitarian policy depends on the regional context, a specialist in this field cannot only be an administrator of cultural events. He must have the skills of audience analysis, intercultural communication, digital promotion, graduate work, and feedback assessment. Otherwise, even an extensive network of representative offices will reproduce the events without turning them into a stable channel of trust.

The transition to a network model should be understood not as a rejection of state institutions, but as their functional expansion. Unlike the United States, where a significant part of the attractiveness is created by non-governmental cultural industries and universities, and unlike China, where humanitarian projects are integrated into the economic and infrastructural agenda, the Russian model is overly dependent on government channels. Therefore, its modernization should take place through the interface of the state, universities, public foundations, graduate communities, local cultural venues and digital mediators, especially in Asia, Africa and Latin America ^{[18, 19, 24]}.

Finally, the recommendation for a positive agenda also has an empirical basis. Content analysis shows the importance of historical memory, traditional values and multipolarity, but the comparative matrix captures the weakness of the predictive image of the future. Therefore, Russian "soft power" needs not only to protect historical and cultural heritage, but also to offer a development project that is understandable to external audiences: educational, technological, cultural and humanitarian.

Conclusion

The conducted research made it possible to reveal the complex multi-layered structure of the Russian "soft power" in the context of the systemic transformation of the international order. Unlike the unified models focused on cultural universalization and liberal normativity, the Russian approach has evolved as a form of strategic self-affirmation aimed at protecting and projecting national and civilizational identity. This specificity cannot be reduced to a single political and propaganda dimension: the Russian humanitarian strategy is based on a stable institutional framework, rich cultural heritage and experience of international cooperation, covering both the post-Soviet space and the regions of the Global South.

A comparison with the expected results of the study confirms the working hypothesis that in the post-Crimean and especially post-Ukrainian period, Russian "soft power" lost some of its universalist potential, but at the same time strengthened the functions of normative resistance and symbolic mobilization. This shift from integration to opposition, from co-optation to selective interaction, reflects a deeper transformation of Russia's geocultural position in world politics. At the same time, empirical data have shown that even in conditions of isolation and sanctions pressure, stable pockets of positive humanitarian perception remain, especially in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

An important result of the study was the confirmation of the structural dependence of the effectiveness of Russian "soft power" on the political and cultural context of the recipient countries. In States with a high degree of sensitivity to the ideas of cultural pluralism, anti-hegemonism, and civilizational sovereignty, Russian humanitarian initiatives demonstrate relative resilience and potential for institutionalization. On the contrary, in countries where the Western regulatory framework dominates and access to alternative sources of information is limited, there is a sharp narrowing of channels of interaction, accompanied by a devaluation of Russia's positive image. This circumstance underlines the need for a geographically differentiated humanitarian strategy based on comprehensive regional diagnostics and cultural adaptability.

The novelty of the results obtained lies not only in the proposed three-phase periodization of the evolution of Russian "soft power", but also in the empirical justification of this periodization through content analysis, discourse analysis and comparison of statistical indicators. The presented approach allows us to consider Russia's humanitarian influence not as a sum of disparate actions, but as a strategic process subordinated to the logic of foreign policy adaptation, value articulation and cultural representation. In addition, key constraints hindering the development of this strategy have been identified: institutional fragmentation, a lack of a positive agenda, weak representation of digital and online formats, as well as distrust in a number of countries, formed at the level of political discourse.

The practical significance of the research lies in the fact that its results can be used in the formation of foreign policy, cultural and educational programs aimed at improving the effectiveness of Russia's humanitarian presence abroad. The conclusions about the need for regional differentiation of tools, digital support of Russian homes and educational programs, institutional development of graduate networks, as well as a transition from predominantly defensive rhetoric to a positive humanitarian proposal focused on the joint production of meanings and long-term trust have advisory value.

Among the limitations of the study, it should be noted the lack of open and comparable quantitative data on the activities of Russian humanitarian institutions in certain regions, especially after 2022, when access to international statistics and assessment platforms was significantly complicated. There is also a gap between the declarative level of foreign policy and humanitarian concepts and their implementation in practice: some strategic objectives remain difficult to assess due to institutional overload, insufficient coordination between structures and the lack of a unified performance measurement system. In addition, an objective assessment of the perception of Russian "soft power" is complicated by the high politicization of expert and sociological data in countries where Russia is the object of information counteraction.

Nevertheless, the revealed patterns open up opportunities for future research directions. A more in-depth analysis of the structure and mechanisms of the formation of humanitarian alliances between Russia and the countries of the Global South seems promising, especially within the framework of multilateral platforms such as BRICS, SCO and the Eurasian Economic Union. In the future, special attention should be paid to studying the processes of institutional consolidation of Russian "soft power" and its adaptation to new forms of international competition, primarily in the digital environment, in the education system and in the field of symbolic representation.

Another important task for subsequent research is to develop a model for evaluating the effectiveness of humanitarian diplomacy tools, taking into account regional specifics, sensitivity to cultural influences, political openness, and the level of trust in the source. This will not only strengthen the validity of project activities in the humanitarian field, but also increase the effectiveness of foreign policy planning in the context of ongoing global polarization. Given the instability and fragmentation of the modern world order, Russia's "soft power" needs a holistic, flexible and adaptive concept that can seamlessly fit into the multi-level structure of international cooperation.

Russia's humanitarian resource remains an important factor in its international positioning, but it requires modernizing the institutional framework, rethinking semantic accents, and strengthening coordination between government and public actors. Only with the formation of a systemic, sustainable and open humanitarian strategy will Russia be able not only to preserve, but also to expand its influence in a rapidly changing world where values, meanings and culture are becoming equal elements of global competition along with economics and military power.

The article is published in its final version as approved following the last positive peer review recommending acceptance for publication. It incorporates revisions made by the author in response to prior negative peer review reports that did not recommend publication. All peer review reports, including initial negative reviews, are published in open access alongside the article. All versions of the author’s revisions are archived in the publisher’s repository and may be made available upon reasonable request in accordance with Elsevier’s editorial policies and applicable data availability requirements.
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