Militarization of outer space and military‑space cooperation between Russia and the BRICS countries

Naumenko Anton Sergeevich Graduate student; Department of Comparative Political Science; P. Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University of Russia 6 Miklukho-Maklaya str., Obruchevsky district, Moscow, 117198, Russia anton1103837@gmail.com

Introduction

At the beginning of the 21st century, space finally transformed from the sphere of symbolic rivalry between powers into a key dimension of global security, economics and technology. The Russian Federation (Russia) has traditionally advocated the preservation of outer space as a space free of any type of weapons, and emphasizes the need to prevent an arms race in outer space (PAROS) ^[3].

Against the background of the increasing militarization of outer space and the deepening confrontation between Russia and the countries of the collective West / Western countries / countries of the global minority, Moscow has for many years relied on a traditional set of tools to counter this challenge. These include: the promotion of resolutions in the United Nations (UN) on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the principle of "non-first placement of weapons in outer space", as well as the joint development with China of a draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT), prohibiting the deployment of strike systems in orbit and the use of force against space objects ^[34].

However, the limited support of these initiatives from a number of Western countries and their refusal to participate in the development of legally binding restrictions show that multilateral negotiating mechanisms alone are not enough to reliably ensure Russian interests in the context of the escalated conflict with the West. This pushes Russia to search for and develop additional formats within which it is possible to strengthen military space stability and reduce dependence on Western infrastructure, including through the creation of alternative data and technology exchange channels. In this context, the BRICS format (an acronym formed from the first letters of the names of the participating countries: Brazil (Brazil), Russia (Russia), India (India), China (China), South Africa (South Africa) and the expanded BRICS+ format are beginning to be seen as promising tools for building a non-hegemonic architecture of space cooperation. In particular, the agreements on the "virtual constellation" of Earth remote sensing satellites and other BRICS space projects create the basis for coordinating space policy and gradually reducing technological asymmetries between participants ^[4]. We believe that such a problematic field allows us to consider space not only as a space of technological rivalry, but also as an important dimension of the formation of a new multipolar world order, in which BRICS acts as one of the key platforms for coordinating efforts.

Theoretically, the militarization of outer space is considered in several overlapping research paradigms, each of which interprets in its own way the causes and consequences of the growing military presence in orbit. Within the framework of the realistic approach that dominates classical studies of strategic stability, outer space appears as another theater of great power rivalry, where states seek to ensure control over critical infrastructure and gain additional opportunities to strengthen deterrence and force projection ^[30].

The liberal approach, on the contrary, focuses on the potential of arms control regimes and transparency mechanisms that can reduce the risks of escalation and turn outer space into a predominantly cooperative space, while critical and postcolonial approaches emphasize the asymmetric nature of access to space technologies and the reproduction of global hierarchies through control over orbital infrastructure ^[28].

The militarization of outer space in modern literature is understood not only as the deployment of weapons in orbit, but also as the increasing use of space assets for conducting military operations on Land, in the air, at sea and in cyberspace. For Russia, this difference is of fundamental importance: on the one hand, the Russian position proceeds from the inevitability of using space in the interests of defense, on the other hand, it emphasizes the inadmissibility of deploying strike weapons in orbit that undermine strategic stability and create prerequisites for a preemptive strike ^[27].

The militarization of outer space has already outgrown the narrow military‑technical agenda and has become one of the global problems of mankind, closely related to the crisis of the international security architecture. It is worth noting that discrepancies in the basic definitions of the "militarization" and "arming" of outer space in Russia and the United States of America (USA) make it difficult to develop common norms and increase the risk of misunderstanding in crisis situations ^{[29, 30]}.

The development of satellite reconnaissance, navigation, communications, and early warning systems, as well as the improvement of anti–satellite means – from specialized complexes to air defense elements - is turning space into a critically important element of the military infrastructure of the leading powers. Consequently, space is gradually becoming an arena for strategic rivalry from an element of cooperation, which dramatically increases the risks of escalation and undermines the disarmament regime ^[28].

In our opinion, it is necessary to identify the potential of BRICS and BRICS+ in terms of advancing Russian interests in the military space sector and ensuring Russia's national security in the context of the militarization of outer space. In order to achieve these goals, it is necessary to consider the approach of Russia and the BRICS member countries to space security issues and assess their joint potential.

We believe that, from the perspective of the liberal school of international relations, military‑space cooperation between Russia and the BRICS countries, first of all, should be considered not as an instrument of power rivalry, but as a form of institutionalized cooperation and increasing interdependence. The liberal school proceeds from the fact that the more states are linked by common projects, transparent rules and regular data exchange, the higher the price of unilateral escalation for them and the easier it is to negotiate arms deterrence. In this sense, space initiatives within the framework of the BRICS can be interpreted as an attempt to integrate the use of the orbit into stable cooperative regimes, where the emphasis is on joint scientific, technological and applied programs, rather than on increasing confrontation; it is through such institutions, according to the logic of liberal institutionalism, that it is possible to gradually limit the militarization of outer space and replace the logic of the "balance of power" the logic of mutual benefit and long-term rules of the game.

The problem of militarization of outer space: legal and historical aspects

The legal and historical aspects of the militarization of outer space, designed to regulate this issue, are formed around the UN treaties on outer space, which were developed in the context of bipolar confrontation in the 20th century. The basic document remains the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the Outer Space Treaty of 1967), which established freedom of use of outer space, a ban on the placement of weapons of mass destruction in orbit and the principle of using outer space in the interests of all mankind. However, this treaty does not explicitly prohibit the deployment of conventional weapons in outer space, does not regulate anti-satellite weapons and cyber operations against space objects, and is poorly adapted to the realities of states' high dependence on space services ^[32]. The current regime actually allows for widespread military use of space infrastructure while formally maintaining the rhetoric of "peaceful use," which undermines confidence in legal restrictions. Analyzing the evolution of the legal doctrine of the demilitarization of outer space, it is worth noting the transition from predominantly declarative norms to attempts to form stricter prohibitions on the deployment of weapons in outer space and consolidate them in multilateral agreements.

Key documents also include the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, and the Convention on Registration of Launched Objects, which form the basis of a liability and transparency regime, but only indirectly address issues of military use of outer space.

These documents consolidated several important ideas: a ban on the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in outer space, free access by all States to outer space, the inadmissibility of national appropriation of outer space and celestial bodies, as well as a general orientation towards the "peaceful use" of outer space. In practice, this did not mean a complete ban on military presence, but rather a restriction on the most dangerous forms of weapons.

A separate problem is created by anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) tests, which were conducted by different countries and which led to the formation of a large number of debris in orbit ^[42]. On the one hand, such tests are not explicitly prohibited by existing treaties, unless they are weapons of mass destruction. On the other hand, clouds of space debris threaten the safety of both civilian and military vehicles and raise the issue of conscientious fulfillment of obligations. It is precisely because of this that experts are discussing the idea of a separate ban on destructive ASAT tests, at least those that create long‑lived debris in orbit.

Attempts to supplement the corpus of norms with initiatives to prevent an arms race in outer space (PAROS), including draft treaties banning the deployment of weapons in outer space and the use of force against space objects, are still encountering resistance from a number of Western States that consider existing political commitments and confidence-building measures sufficient ^[35]. As a result, there is a gap between the rapidly evolving military space practice and the relatively static international legal framework, which creates both threats and opportunities for Russia and other space powers. For Moscow, this gap increases concern about the vulnerability of space infrastructure and the prospects for unilateral dominance of the United States and its allies in orbit, and therefore makes the PAROS issue one of the priorities of diplomatic activity.

A separate area of research is related to the Institute for the Demilitarization of Outer Space. As A.M. Potapenko shows in his work "International legal problems of the demilitarization of outer space", the current regime is fragmented: in a number of areas, for example, on the Moon and other celestial bodies, stricter restrictions are fixed, while near-Earth space remains a zone where military and civilian applications are closely intertwined ^[41]. It is emphasized that demilitarization includes not only outright bans, but also transparency measures, information exchange, launch notifications, joint projects and other steps to reduce distrust.

Russian strategic goals in space and their relationship to BRICS

Against the background of the development of Russia's space cooperation within the framework of the BRICS, its space policy combines several interrelated sets of goals: ensuring national security and strategic deterrence, maintaining the status of a great power and space leader, developing high-tech industries, as well as strengthening cooperation with the states of the Global South and the countries of the world majority. In the context of sanctions pressure and restrictions on access to Western technologies, the importance of the latter two goals is noticeably increasing, and BRICS is becoming one of the key tools for achieving them ^[1].

As a result, the issue of demilitarization of outer space for states boils down not only to abstract norms, but also to what alliances and formats they can actually promote their approaches and protect infrastructure. Against the background of the development of space cooperation, Russia's space policy within the framework of the BRICS combines several interrelated sets of goals: ensuring national security and strategic deterrence, maintaining the status of a great power and space leader, developing high-tech sectors of the economy, as well as strengthening cooperation with the states of the Global South and the countries of the world majority. In the context of sanctions pressure and restrictions on access to Western technologies, the importance of the latter two goals is noticeably increasing, and BRICS is becoming one of the key tools for achieving them ^[1].

From a security point of view, it is fundamentally important for Russia to prevent the unilateral military dominance of the United States and its allies in space and minimize the vulnerability of its own space infrastructure. The development of cooperation within the BRICS framework – from the exchange of data and scientific projects to coordinated diplomatic positions on PAROS – allows forming a wider range of states interested in demilitarization of outer space and limiting unilateral military initiatives of the countries of the collective West ^{[13, 14]}.

From an economic and technological point of view, participation in the BRICS space initiatives opens up an additional market for Russia for space services and technologies: launch services, satellite platforms, components of navigation systems and remote sensing systems, as well as developments in the field of nuclear energy for spacecraft ^[5]. In political terms, this strengthens the position that Russia is not isolated, but integrated into a wide range of partners developing alternative formats of cooperation ^[2].

In addition, in 2024, it was decided to phase out Russia from the International Space Station project ^[8], as a result of which the creation of the Russian Orbital Station (ROS) becomes the central element of Russia's manned program ^[6]. The leadership of Roscosmos has repeatedly stressed its interest in attracting the BRICS countries to participate in this project, including through the creation of a joint scientific module and conducting research on board the ROS in the interests of all participants in the association ^[20].

Russia's proposal to create a joint research module for the BRICS countries based on the ROS was a logical continuation of the course towards transferring cooperation from Western-centric formats such as the International Space Station (ISS) to alternative coalitions ^[6]. Such cooperation allows Moscow, firstly, to share the financial and technological burden of creating a new station, and secondly, to consolidate the status of the "core" of a multilateral space project, around which a broader "space community" of the countries of the Global South and the countries of the world majority is being built.

We believe that Russia's space cooperation with its BRICS partners is not limited to applied security and monitoring tasks. The scientific and educational dimension plays an important role. Within the framework of the BRICS, working groups on astronomy and big data are being formed, joint research infrastructures and federated cloud networks for processing astronomical data are being created, which, in particular, is reflected in the initiatives of BRICSKA and BRICS Astronomy Network ^{[22, 23]}.

Russian scientists are actively involved in these projects, combining their own competencies in radio astronomy and big data processing with the resources of partners, which increases the overall resilience of the Russian scientific and technological complex to sanctions pressure. From Moscow's point of view, the development of such multilateral projects not only strengthens scientific potential, but also forms a long-term basis for trust between the elites of the BRICS countries, which in the future facilitates both military-technical and military-space cooperation ^[21].

At the United Nations and other multilateral forums, Russia seeks to enlist the support of the BRICS countries in key initiatives to prevent an arms race in outer space. Although BRICS is not a military‑political bloc, its final documents regularly emphasize its commitment to the peaceful use of outer space and the importance of preventing outer space from becoming an arena of armed confrontation, which is in line with Russian rhetoric ^{[7, 10, 34]}.

A special role is played by coordinating the positions of Russia's and China's strategic partners, who are jointly promoting draft resolutions on PAROS and raising the issue of developing legally binding restrictions on the deployment of weapons in outer space. The support from India, Brazil, and South Africa, though not always unequivocal, allows Moscow to demonstrate that its approach is shared by major developing powers, not just traditional allies ^{[9, 14]}.

From a military and space point of view, BRICS is often described as a trans-regional forum without rigidly institutionalized obligations, but with a growing set of mechanisms for sectoral interaction. Since the 2010s, the BRICS agenda has increasingly included issues of science, technology and innovation, including cooperation in the space sector, and all members of the association have their own space programs and infrastructure ^{[12, 19]}.

From a political point of view, BRICS is a tool for Russia to promote a multipolar world order and collectively challenge Western hegemony, including in high–tech sectors. In the field of space, this means striving to build alternative channels of access to remote sensing data, navigation and communication services, as well as scientific and technical developments independent of Western centers of power. Space cooperation fits into Russia's foreign policy activities aimed at developing ties with the countries of the Global South, as well as the countries of the world majority, and reorienting foreign economic and technological ties after the introduction of large-scale sanctions by the countries of the collective West ^{[1, 2]}.

It should be noted that the key practical achievement of the BRICS in the space sector was the signing in 2021 of the Agreement on Cooperation on the BRICS Remote Sensing Satellite Constellation ^[4]. In accordance with this document, the space agencies of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa agreed to form a "virtual constellation" of operating satellites and establish a mechanism for exchanging remote sensing data to solve common tasks, from climate monitoring and natural disasters to environmental protection ^[15].

The constellation includes, in particular, Russian Canopus‑V spacecraft, as well as Indian Resourcesat series satellites, Chinese Gaofen‑6 and Ziyuan III 02 and Brazilian‑Chinese CBERS‑4. Satellite data is received by a network of ground stations in all five countries. For Russia, participation in this mechanism allows, on the one hand, to demonstrate the status of a technological leader and a provider of space services, and on the other hand, to gain access to additional partner data arrays, increasing the stability of its own orbital grouping and reducing dependence on Western sources ^[18].

Despite the positive dynamics, space cooperation within the BRICS is facing a number of limitations. The level of technological development and priorities of the countries' space programs differ significantly: China and India are rapidly increasing their capabilities, including manned flights and lunar missions, while Brazil and South Africa are focusing on remote sensing applications and services based on them ^{[16, 17]}. Russia, experiencing sanctions and resource pressure, has faced the task of import substitution and catch-up development in a number of segments, which narrows its maneuverability. As emphasized by SergeyV. Solovyov, an expert from MGIMO (U) of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is the combination of technological asymmetry, political differences and the fragmentation of the legal framework that makes cooperation in space especially vulnerable to external shocks and fluctuations in bilateral relations ^[33].

It is also worth noting that the BRICS countries do not have a unified assessment of the risks of the militarization of outer space and relations with the West. India cooperates with the United States and its allies in a number of space projects, while Brazil focuses on multi‑format partnerships, which limits the depth of military-space integration and does not allow the BRICS to act as a single bloc in space security issues ^{[31, 39, 40]}. Last but not least, the institutional fuzziness of the BRICS is manifested in the absence of rigid supranational structures and commitments, which at the same time provides flexibility and makes it difficult to implement large long-term programs.

Taking into account these opportunities and limitations, there are several key areas in which Russia can use the BRICS format to advance its interests in the context of the militarization of outer space. The deepening of data exchange and the development of joint orbital groupings make it possible to increase the stability and reliability of the Russian space infrastructure, reducing its vulnerability to unilateral sanctions and potential military threats. The expansion of the BRICS "virtual constellation" and the connection of new members of the association to it can create the basis for a large alternative Earth observation system that is less subject to external control ^[24]. As emphasized by the staff of the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, L.V. Pankov, O.V. Gusarova and D.V. Stefanovich, the formation of such multilateral orbital groupings in the BRICS format allows not only solving applied monitoring tasks, but also building sustainable technological chains, reducing the dependence of participants on Western space service providers. ^[36].

It is important to emphasize that at the institutional level, a promising direction is the further institutionalization of the BRICS space track – the development of a Joint Committee on Space Cooperation, the formation of the BRICS Space Council under discussion, as well as the creation of specialized working groups on navigation, communications and remote sensing.

According to D.A. Gugunsky, a specialist from the Patrice Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University of Russia, consolidation of multidirectional bilateral and multilateral projects within the framework of a single "umbrella" BRICS agenda can turn disparate initiatives into an integrated architecture of space cooperation, where Russia gets the role of one of the key coordination centers ^[38]. For Moscow, this means an opportunity not only to participate in shaping the rules of the game, but also to include its security and arms control priorities on the unification agenda.

Russia can consolidate its role as the "architect" of multilateral space projects by offering partners participation in the Russian Space Exploration, the lunar program and deep space missions, where Russian expertise in the field of rocket and space technology and nuclear energy is traditionally strong. This will allow not only to share costs and risks, but also to strengthen Moscow's political influence, turning it into a center of attraction for states interested in access to advanced space technologies outside Western channels ^{[7, 20]}. Experts L.V. Pankova, O.V. Gusarova and D.V. Stefanovich emphasize in their work that it is the transition from "symbolic" cooperation (joint statements and forums) to joint infrastructure and scientific and technical projects that can provide the BRICS countries with a qualitative leap in reducing technological asymmetries and strengthening strategic sovereignty ^[36].

A separate area is the use of BRICS as a platform for the implementation of "space diplomacy". For example, S.S. Popova and A.V. Gorokhova show by the example of Russia and China that space cooperation is increasingly being used as a tool of foreign policy: through joint projects, research centers, educational programs and the exchange of expertise, stable trust is being formed between elites and a positive image of states as responsible actors in space is being created ^[37]. The transfer of such practices to the BRICS multilateral format allows Russia not only to balance the Western agenda in space institutions, but also to promote its own regulatory initiatives among countries already involved in joint programs.

At the diplomatic level, Russia can consolidate support for its PAROS initiatives through BRICS, promoting the concept of the inadmissibility of deploying weapons in outer space and using outer space for unilateral military domination ^{[6, 18]}. Coordinating UN votes and coordinated statements by foreign ministers and heads of space agencies strengthen the legitimacy of the Russian approach and make it difficult to advance Western initiatives aimed at consolidating the de facto status quo in the interests of the United States and its allies. In this context, space diplomacy is becoming for Russia not an abstract concept, but a practical tool for working with a coalition of countries willing to work together against the militarization of outer space.

It should be emphasized that Russia is able to use the BRICS space dimension to develop ties in related areas: cybersecurity, energy, transport and digital infrastructure, where the use of space data and services increases mutual dependence and creates additional incentives for long-term partnership. The complexity of such interaction will contribute to the formation of a "dense network" of connections that is resistant to external pressure and changing political conditions ^{[25, 26]}. As noted by D.A. Gugunsky, it is the multisectoral nature of cooperation – from navigation and communications to monitoring infrastructure and natural resources – that turns the BRICS space track into a resource for strengthening the economic and political positions of participants, including Russia ^[38].

The future of the BRICS space dimension is not limited to an unambiguous forecast: depending on the external conditions and the priorities chosen, at least two different models may develop. In the medium term, one can imagine a scenario in which the BRICS space dimension transforms for Russia from an auxiliary channel of cooperation into one of the key pillars of the national security strategy. The expected deepening of scientific and technical cooperation between the BRICS countries in the space sector by 2035, including the expansion of the mandate of the Joint Committee on Space Cooperation and the transition from simple coordination of data exchange to joint planning of lunar, orbital and scientific missions, creates prerequisites for the formation of an ecosystem of space projects. In such a scenario, Russia, relying on Roscosmos, participation in the International Lunar Scientific Station and the development of multilateral remote sensing groups, gets the opportunity to consolidate around itself some of the countries of the Global South and the global majority interested in access to data and technologies outside the Western regulatory framework, while promoting an alternative agenda in the field of norms of responsible behavior in space.

A more restrained version of the future is also possible, in which space cooperation in the BRICS format develops fragmentarily: some participants balance between Western initiatives and Russian‑Chinese projects, and contradictions in assessing the risks of space militarization and arms control regimes hinder the development of truly consolidated positions. In this case, the importance of BRICS for Russia will continue to be considerable ‑ as a source of data, an additional market for services, and a platform for diplomatic maneuver – but its potential as the basis of a fundamentally new space security architecture will remain only partially realized. The choice between these trajectories will largely depend on whether Russia is able to turn the accumulated projects and institutions into a long-term strategy combining technological development, space diplomacy and active rulemaking in the interests of demilitarization of outer space.

Conclusion

The militarization of outer space radically changes the parameters of the strategic environment for Russia, turning orbital space from an auxiliary dimension of military activity into one of the key factors of national security. In these circumstances, the BRICS format and the expanded BRICS+ format have significant but not fully realized potential as tools that simultaneously reduce the vulnerability of the Russian space infrastructure, strengthen Moscow's diplomatic position in discussions on preventing an arms race in space, and support technological sovereignty through cooperation with major developing powers.

Joint orbital initiatives, such as the BRICS "virtual constellation" of Earth remote sensing satellites, create the basis for diversifying space data sources and increasing the stability of the Russian grouping through mutual redundancy and information exchange, which goes beyond the traditional concepts of BRICS as primarily an economic forum. The projects of the Russian orbital Station, lunar and scientific and technological programs have demonstrated that Russia is able to act as the "architect" of multilateral space projects, around which a new center of attraction is being formed for the countries of the Global South and the world majority interested in access to advanced technologies outside Western channels.

Scientific and educational initiatives that have rarely been considered in the military-political context before are becoming important, but together they form a long-term infrastructure of trust and interdependence that increases the willingness of partners to support Russian positions on space security issues.

A separate result of the study was the clarification of the limitations and contradictions hindering the use of the BRICS potential in the interests of Russia: the heterogeneity of the technological level and strategic priorities of the countries of the association, differences in assessments of the risks of militarization of outer space and the depth of interaction with the West, as well as the institutional "fuzziness" of the format itself. These factors make it possible to assess the limits of what is possible and identify ways to adjust Russian policy – from deepening sectoral cooperation in areas where the interests of the parties objectively coincide, to more purposefully using BRICS platforms to develop consolidated positions on PAROS and promote legally binding restrictions on the deployment of weapons in outer space.

Thus, the presented analysis shows BRICS and BRICS+ as a multidimensional instrument of Russian space and military-political strategy, combining technical, diplomatic and regulatory dimensions and thus going beyond the simple expansion of economic cooperation.

The article is published in its final version as approved following the last positive peer review recommending acceptance for publication. It incorporates revisions made by the author in response to prior negative peer review reports that did not recommend publication. All peer review reports, including initial negative reviews, are published in open access alongside the article. All versions of the author’s revisions are archived in the publisher’s repository and may be made available upon reasonable request in accordance with Elsevier’s editorial policies and applicable data availability requirements.
Read all reviews on this article