Abstract: The subject of this research is the expert opinions of RAND Corporation prepared during the warfare against terrorism. Their characteristic feature consists in reference to the colonial experience of the leading European powers in counter-insurgency. Special attention is given to the analysis of two vectors in the activity RAND Corporation: publication of the articles of 1960s-1970s dedicated to the problems of anti-insurrection and adaptation of the colonial experience of counter-insurgency activity to the new conditions of warfare against terrorism in the Near and Middle East. The selected methodology demonstrates how the leading powers perceive the role of colonial knowledge in ensuring domestic security in the “third world” countries (it refers to the lessons of history analyzed on the expert level within the framework of historical modeling of asymmetric conflicts). The conclusion is made that the expert opinions of RAND Corporation virtually resemble the key expert opinions of the time of Vietnam War, but adjusted them to the current conditions of warfare against terrorism. The aforementioned works were rather used for justification of the decisions of political and military elites, and clarification of the context and origins of the new American anti-insurrection doctrine to mainstream audience, as well as to the U. S. officials and commanders inexperienced in subjection of the rebels.