Abstract: The goal of this article consists in determining the key approaches existing in Harold Macmillan’s government towards solution to the Berlin issue during the crisis of 1958-1961. This will allow filling in the picture of the British part in the cold war, as well as development of the British-Soviet and the “special” British-American relations. The author defines the object of this research as the foreign policy of Great Britain during 1958-1961, while the subject is the policy of the conservative cabinet of Harold Macmillan regarding the problem of West Berlin. This work represents an attempt to fill in certain gap in the Russian historiography and objectively analyze the policy of Harold Macmillan’s government on regulation of the second Berlin crisis. The scientific novelty of this research is defined by the fact that new documents from British national archive are introduced into the scientific discourse for the first time, which were not previously used in research literature. The main conclusions consists in the fact that British government was searching for a compromise with the USSR in an attempt to resolve the Berlin problem. Position of the conservative cabinet was based on the goal to maintain the unity of the Western Bloc, but in closed discussions, the British government was leaning towards a moderate approach, such as possibility of recognition of de facto East Germany, which corresponded with the general course of Harold Macmillan’s government aimed to betterment of relations with the USSR.