Abstract: This article examines the attempts to achieve a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Vietnam. The peace process in the Vietnam conflict of 1966–1967 is a little-studied topic in Russian, as well as in foreign historiography. The proposals and programs for a peace settlement, exchanged between the different sides during the Vietnam conflict, can now be retraced through the newly declassified documents. Equally important to this question is that the “Pentagon papers” and the documents of the Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation have been fully declassified and permit not only to review in detail the actions of the United States in Vietnam, but also to assess the role of the Soviet Union in the Second Indochina War and to study the content of the Soviet-American negotiations on the question of Vietnam. This has allowed to examine more fully the efforts undertaken by the Soviet authorities to regulate the war in Vietnam and to ultimately reconsider the role of the USSR in the Vietnam conflict. The article also touches upon a number of questions pertaining to the development of the Soviet-American relations during the course of this “small détente”. In both foreign and Russian historiography many reasons have been put forward to showcase the worsening relations between the USSR and the United States during the 1960s. On the basis of newly declassified documents, the author comes to the conclusion that the Vietnam conflict became the main factor impeding the improvement of the two superpowers’ relations with each other after the Caribbean crisis. The article also addresses a series of questions regarding the role of the Peoples’ Republic of China in the peace process for the resolution of this conflict. China not only hindered the initiative of starting a dialogue between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, but also in every way tried to involve the US in the “Vietnam quagmire”.