Abstract: This article examines and analyzes the motives, grounds, and directions of the criticism of historicism in philosophical concept of Leo Strauss. The author determines and organizes the basic arguments proposed by Strauss against the principle of historicism. All objections made by Strauss are divided into two groups: the first includes the arguments that contest not the very content of the principle of historicism, but the attributed to it methodological meaning in the context of philosophical  and scientific cognition; the second includes the conceptual (general philosophical and worldview) objections against historicism. Strauss views historicism as a challenge faced by the modern philosophy. According to Strauss, the key role in development of the classical philosophical tradition and establishment of the concepts of historicity, played the consolidated in modern age idea of progress. Strauss assembles all of the major objections and arguments that were expressed against historicism by the representatives of various philosophical trends of the XX century. Personal contribution of Strauss into the criticism of historicism consists in substantiation of the thesis that this principle cannot have the historical and empirical explanation, but represents an inward controversial philosophical ideology. He conclusively demonstrated that the position of historicism cannot be confuted by the historical facts and arguments, but rather rejected for the sake of some other (not less fundamental than historicism) philosophical principle.

Abstract: This article analyzes the interpretation of historical cognition in semiotics of the culture of Y. M. Lotman. Special attention is given to the semiotic interpretation of the notions of “historical fact” and “historical event”. The author determines the place of Lotman’s semiotics in the context of classical (positivistic) and nonclassical (linguistically and hermeneutically oriented) philosophy of history and theory of historical writing, as well as clarifies the link between the interpretation of cultural communication in Lotman’s concept and semiotic aspect of historical cognition. The research reveals the similarities and differences of Lotman’s semiotics of history with the modern post-culturalist philosophy of history formulated in the works of H. White, F. Ankersmit, and C. Köllner. During the course of this study, the author applied the comparative method, problem-thematic way of analysis and presentation of material. It is demonstrated that the suggested by Lotman interpretation of the key notions of the historical writing theory (historical fact, historical process, historical reality) overcomes the extremes of objectivism and relativism in understanding of the historical past. The process of historical cognition is described in Lotman’s works in accordance with the model of cultural communication, in other words, as a dialogue between history and modernity that suggests the existence of common language between the culture of the past, which comprises the object of historical interest, and the culture of the present, the part and bearer of which is a historian.

Abstract: This article analyzes the philosophical-historical concept of Heinrich Rickert, as well as identifies the difficulties and contradictions faced by this concept. Special attention is given to the question about Rickert’s concept in the context of classical and nonclassical historiosophical teachings. It is demonstrated that the Rickert’s philosophy of history became one of the first attempts to overcome the classical (speculative) historiosophy of Hegelian type. Distancing from Hegelian metaphysics, Rickert was trying to avoid the two extremes in understanding of history naturalism and historicism (relativism). However, if naturalism in historical writing is actually being overcome by postulating the two irreducible to each other methods of comprehending reality (generalizing and individualizing), then avoding the historical relativism for Rickert is possible only through the return to the ontological model of speculative type, The experience of philosophical conceptualization of history within the framework of Neo-Kantian concept of H. Rickert shows that the logical analysis of the structure of historical knowledge, even complemented by the philosophical theory of values, does not allow solving the essential questions on nonclassical philosophy of history. The methodology of “reference to the values” cannot go without ontology, in other words, the representations about nature and specificity of historical existence.

Abstract: This article analyzes the philosophical-historical concept of Ortega y Gasset. Special attention is given to the teaching on historical (life) mind and the notion of “historiology”. The author clarifies the correlation between the notions of “methodology of history”, “philosophy of history”, and “historiology”, as well as determines the key points of divergence of Ortega y Gasset with the historiosophical constructs of the German romanticism, Hegel, Kant, and Neo-Kantians. The article defines the place of historiosophical concept of the Spanish philosopher in the context of classical and nonclassical European philosophy of the XIX-XX centuries. The parallels are drawn between the Ortega y Gasset’s interpretation of history and the nonclassical philosophical-historical concepts of Dilthey, Croce, Heidegger, and Sartre. The most substantial ideas of philosophical-historical concept of Ortega y Gasset imply the following: refusal from the subject-object opposition in description and explanation of the history and life; interpretation of the past as “life experience”; postulating of isomorphism of the individual and social past; overcoming the conceptual gap between the empirical writing of history and philosophical contemplation of history, historical science, and historiosophy.

Abstract: This article examines the main interpretations of the principle of historicism in the context of classical philosophy of history: “romantic” historicism, Hegelian historicism, and Marxist historicism. It is demonstrated that the principle of historicism has the constitutive meaning for the philosophical historical reflection, however, in various versions of the philosophy of history, such principle attaint different and at times incompatible with each other interpretations. Namely such representation of the principle of historicism in many ways substantiates the specificity of one or another concrete version of the philosophy of history. Historicism can be combined and/or contradict the other fundamental principles of European philosophy and science – substantialism, transcendentalism, teleologism, determinism, objectivism, reductionism, universalism, and presentism. Classical historicism represents a fundamental ideology of the metaphysical (speculative) philosophy of history, the paradigmatic examples of which are the theories of the historical process of Hegel and Marx. The following key features are inherent to the classical historicism: linear conception of time, idea of development (progress), finalistic determinism and teleologism, presumption of existence of the universal regularities of historical development.

Abstract: This article examines and compares the philosophical-culturological concepts of Frank and Jaspers. Main attention is turned to the problem of unity of the world history and culture. The author determines the place of historiosophical problematic in the context of metaphysics of unitotality of Frank and existential philosophy of Jaspers. Rejecting the teleological way of structuring the meaning of world history, Frank does not doubt the very possibility of philosophical contemplation of the eternal and universal in culture (socio-historical existence) and the need for determination of the timeless aspects of social life. Jaspers, in turn, believes that the historical scope of the final human existence is always limited, and unity of mankind can be apprehended as just the postulate of philosophical faith. The unity of world history in the concepts of Frank and Jaspers cannot be cognized through the assignment to all nations and cultures of a single and universal fore them purpose. Both concepts consider history as a path to suprahistorical. History (culture) as a specific reality is possible due to the correlation of a human with suprahistorical. A man can create the history and exist within history, because experience the “dissatisfaction with history” and desire to go beyond its boundaries.

Abstract: This article exa,ins the problem of correlation of the phenomenon of ideology with the modern technique in the concepts of F. G. Jünger and J. Habermas. Special attention is given to the question on the transformation of ideology as a form of public consciousness in the conditions of the modern technical civilization. In Jünger’s concept, the criticism of technicism is realized in the prospect of returning of human to the more original and authentic way of existence. Within the framework of Habermas’ philosophy, the criticism of technocratic and scientist consciousness is realized from the humanistic positions with the future expansion of the space of “communicative rationality”. Jünger reviews the technique as a favorable environment for assertion and domination of the ideologies, while Habermas transform technique and science into quasi-ideology of society of the later capitalism. Jünger considers the technical (technocratic) consciousness as axiologically and ideologically neutral; and Habermas sees a new form of ideology within this type of consciousness, which becomes more dangerous while less noticeable and achievable for the critical reflection.

Abstract: This article examines the F. Anfkersmit’s concept of historical identity, as well as determines its main approaches towards the identity conceptualization within the modern philosophy of history. The author clarifies the correlation between the notions “historical identity” and “sociocultural identity”, and also defines the place of the concept of “elevated historical experience” in the context of post-metaphysical historical philosophical reflection. Special attention is given to the role of oblivion in the process of changing the sociocultural identity. The content of the notions “memory”, “oblivion”, and “trauma” is being revealed within the framework of the problematics of identity. The author pursues parallels between the interpretation of identity of a subject in Ankersmit’s philosophy and the phenomenological philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre. Unlike the constructivist theories of sociocultural identity, in Ankersmit’s concept the identity of a subject is not constituted via the description of history, but rather logically and ontologically precedes any forms of historiographical representations. Identity is not a construct, but a direct given. The elevated historical experience which reveals to the historical subject its unlikeness, is the experience of an irreversible gap between the past (previous identity) and the present (new identity).

Abstract: This article explores the problem of understanding of history as integrity in the perspective of metaphysical and post-metaphysical historico-philosophical reflection. The author determines the main approaches towards the problem of unity of the history, as well as analyzes interpretations and solutions of this problem presented in the works of Hegel, B. Croce, L. Karsavin, O.Spann, and P. Veyne. A special attention is given to the analysis and comparison of the various ways of understanding of the unity of historical process in the context of classical philosophy of history. The author distinguishes the notions of the “integrity of history” and the “completeness of history”; it is demonstrated that the apprehension of history as integrity is possible without implying the idea of the “completeness of history”. In the context of classical (metaphysical) philosophy of history, the unity of the historical process is provided due to the differentiation of the two levels of historical events: ontological history, which identifies with the logic of history, and the empirical history. In post-metaphysical philosophy, the possibility of conceptual understanding of the world history as integrity is denied; what is accepted, is just the multiplicity of unrelated events.

Abstract: In the article the problem of the relation between past and present is viewed, the parallels between Karsavin’s metaphysics of all-unity and Heidegger’s existential analytics are drawn. The similarity of interpretations of the past and present in Heidegger’s theory and Karsavin’s theory is manifested in the following main points: temporal moments of the past and present are viewed and analyzed in the context of human existence; the past and the present are seen as intercorrelated structural moments of human existence; in both concepts the distinction between two modes of existence and reality of the past is made – the authentic and inauthentic one. The differences in the interpretations of the past and present are related to the fact that the idea of Absolute existence (perfect all-unity), which is characterized as overtemporary and overspatial, is primary in Karsavin’s metaphysics. Heidegger proceeds from existential temporality, which is essentially finite. Heidegger is limited by the fact of rajneeshees and correlation of time points (ekstasis), Karsavin shows and clarifies the interindirect nature of past, present and future.

Abstract: The article outlines some ways of mapping the fundamental ontology of M. Heidegger and the metaphysics of integral traditionalism of R. Genon. As a starting point to identify similarities and differences in philosophical constructions of the two thinkers the principle of "ontological differentia" (ontologische Differenz) is elected, that suggests a consistent distinction between existence and being. In the context of Heidegger's phenomenology ontological differentia has the status of a fundamental principle and foundation of philosophical reflection as such. The distinction between being and existence is the basis of the distinction of philosophy and private positive sciences. This principle also determines the specificity of Heidegger’s interpretation of the history of West European metaphysics. Heidegger sees the history of metaphysics through the prism of ontological differences. In Genon’s metaphysics the ontological differentia lies in the distinction of the totality of the manifested opportunities (determined conditions) on the one hand, and the Being as the unmanifest principle and the metaphysical foundation of any expression on the other hand.Consideration of the principle of ontological differentia in the context of fundamental ontology and in the context of the metaphysics of integral traditionalism revealed the following similarities in Heidegger’s philosophy and Genon’s philosophy: 1) the recognition of transdefinition of being and apophatic nature of the ontology; 2) the approval of the fundamental incomparability and incommensurability of philosophy and positive sciences; 3) the statement of the plurality of states/modes/dimensions of being and the problem of a unified concept of being. However the identified similarities in philosophical constructions of the two thinkers should not obscure the more fundamental differences. The main difference between Heidegger and Genoon is the difference in the methods of constructing the ontology. The way to the fundamental ontology of Heidegger lies in the existential analytics of Dasein, while Genon’s way of constructing the ontology remains a purely metaphysical (speculative).