Nature elements as subjects of law: philosophical and legal foundations of a new paradigm

Semenova Irina Vladimirovna Junior Researcher; Sector of Environmental, Land and Agrarian Law; Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences 10 Znamenka Street, Moscow, 119019, Russia ssem.irina@gmail.com Other publications by this author

Introduction. Environmental law is traditionally based on the differentiation of the subject and the object of regulation: the subjects are citizens, organizations and public entities, while natural components and complexes are considered as objects of protection, use and management. In the doctrine, such a statement is supported through the category of objects of environmental relations, which are understood as "socially significant natural values" ^{[1, p. 44; 2]}. This "object" framework allows for a detailed description of environmental management regimes, however, in the context of the environmental risks of the 21st century (ecosystem degradation, accumulated harm, climate change), it increasingly reveals the limits of effectiveness, especially when environmental damage is difficult to reduce to harm to a specific person.

New challenges affect not only the public legal part of environmental regulation (supervision, licensing procedures, environmental standards), but also private law ^{[12, p. 1]}. It is in the private law sphere that practical conflicts are concentrated: land turnover, construction and infrastructure projects, resource use agreements, environmental risk insurance and certain aspects legal responsibility. The question arises: are the instruments of private law sufficient to ensure the protection of natural complexes, if nature is legally "silent" and can only be protected indirectly through the interests of a person or the state.

The concept of "nature rights" and the recognition of individual natural objects (rivers, lakes, ecosystems) as subjects of law is one of the possible solutions to the problems posed. It assumes that the ecosystem is able to act as a carrier of legally significant interests, and its "voice" is realized through the mechanism of representation. This approach, on the one hand, strengthens the restorative orientation of liability, and on the other hand, it rebuilds the fundamental categories of private law: the object of civil rights, the limits of property rights, freedom of contract, criteria for harm and ways to compensate for it.

The purpose of this article is to reveal the philosophical and legal foundations of the new paradigm and to show how the model of legal personality of natural objects affects traditional private law constructions. To achieve this goal, the following tasks are solved: theories of legal personality applicable to nature are described; philosophical criticism of anthropocentrism and the translation of the value of nature into legal categories are substantiated; models of securing the rights of nature existing in foreign legal systems are analyzed; mechanisms of representation and procedural legitimization are highlighted; risks and conditions for possible adaptation of the approach in Russian law are formulated.

Methods. In the course of writing this scientific work, a set of general scientific and private scientific methods was used. The dialectical method allowed us to consider the evolution of the legal status of natural objects in the context of the change of the anthropocentric paradigm to the ecocentric one. The formal legal method is used to analyze the normative definitions and constructions of legal personality in Russian and foreign law. The comparative legal method formed the methodological basis for studying the constitutional, status and judicial models of recognition of the rights of nature. As part of the development of a phased adaptation of the concept of the legal personality of nature in the Russian legal order, the method of legal modeling was used.

Results and discussion. The problem of subjectivity of natural objects rests on the basic concepts of the subject of law. In the classical paradigm, the subject is associated with the ability to have rights and responsibilities, express will and bear responsibility. However, modern legal theory demonstrates that legal capacity and legal capacity are not identical: the existence of rights does not always imply an independent expression of will. The legal order recognizes legal entities, public entities, as well as persons with limited legal capacity who exercise their rights through representatives. Consequently, the lack of a natural object's own "will" is not a logical prohibition against granting it rights if mechanisms for representation and legal protection of the interest are provided.

It is important to distinguish between two similar but not identical approaches: strengthening the protection regime of a natural object as an object of law and recognizing it as a subject of law. In the first case, protection is carried out through the duties of people and the state in relation to the object; in the second, it is assumed that the object has its own rights, and the violation of these rights creates an independent basis for judicial protection, including in conflict with private interests.

The philosophical core of the concept of "rights of nature" is connected with the criticism of anthropocentrism. The anthropocentric model considers nature primarily as a resource or human habitat, which in law is manifested in indirect protection: not the ecosystem as such is protected, but the rights and interests of people, or the public interest of the state. Under this concept, environmental protection is carried out without taking into account the value of ecosystems or natural objects themselves, since priority is given to the needs and requirements of society. This paradigm reinforces subject-object relations, where nature acts as property or a means of satisfying human needs, which contributes to the environmental crisis and ignores the long-term consequences of anthropogenic impact ^{[6, p. 91]}.

However, as O.S. Kolbasov noted: "the natural environment exists and is formed in accordance with objective laws of nature, which people cannot cancel or change or eliminate their manifestations, but they can and should learn them and apply them correctly in the interests of the development of society." A deep understanding of the laws of nature consists in the fact that people, in interaction with the environment, must coordinate their actions with the objective requirements established by these laws and obey them ^{[9, p. 198]}.

Ecocentric and biospheric ethics offer a different view: nature has an intrinsic value, and therefore can be an object of respect and protection regardless of the direct benefit to man. Nature (or its specific elements – rivers, forests, ecosystems) is given the status of a legal entity capable of having its own rights. This allows representatives of nature to appear in court on her behalf, in the same way as the interests of legally incompetent or legal persons are protected.

For law, this means the need to translate a value attitude into a normative form. In particular, this is reflected in the consolidation of the following regulatory requirements: the right of an ecosystem to exist and preserve, the right to recover from degradation, and the prohibition of significant deterioration of environmental functions. As a result, a new standard of environmental justice is being formed that takes into account the intergenerational dimension: the interest of future generations in preserving natural conditions is consolidated not only as a political goal, but also as a legally protected good.

Environmental damage is becoming a separate problem. The doctrine notes that the term "environmental harm" is widely used and is often used as a synonym for harm to the environment or its components ^{[3, p. 19]}. This statement captures the specifics: harm can be caused to the natural environment without direct damage to the property of a particular person. It is here that the concept of the rights of nature offers a clearer construction of the "victim": the rights of the ecosystem are violated, and protection is expressed in restoring its condition, and not only in monetary compensation.

In the private law sphere, the paradigm under discussion primarily affects the ownership regime for natural resources and the limits of the exercise of property rights ^{[10; 11]}. Russian law allows for the turnover of land and certain natural goods in the presence of public law restrictions. However, the recognition of a natural object as a legal entity creates a qualitatively different level of restrictions: it is not just about prohibitions imposed by the state, but about the need to take into account the "rights" of the ecosystem itself as an independent criterion for acceptable use.

Private law science already records the specifics of natural objects as objects of civil rights. Thus, it is emphasized that their distinguishing feature is "the ecological interrelation of a natural object with the surrounding natural environment" ^{[4, p. 51]}. Unlike ordinary things, a natural object is not completely isolated: its legal regime inevitably takes into account ecosystem connections. This argument can be developed in favor of legal personality: if an object is inherently inseparable from an ecological whole, then protection should focus on preserving the functions of the whole, and not only on the rights of the owner.

In contractual relations, the concept of nature rights raises questions about the limits of freedom of contract and the legal fate of obligations that contradict protected environmental interests. If a natural object has the right to be restored or preserved, then resource use agreements may require stricter environmental guarantees, monitoring mechanisms, and early termination. Otherwise, the rule of law faces the risk of "environmentally unfair" transactions, which are formally legal, but lead to irreversible degradation of ecosystems.

The most sensitive is the delicate block. For civil liability, the key issue remains the definition of the victim and the method of compensation. The nature rights model allows conceptualizing environmental harm as a violation of ecosystem rights, which reinforces the restorative nature of responsibility: priority is given to remediation, rehabilitation measures, and the creation of compensation funds. At the same time, monetary compensation is considered as a derivative when recovery is impossible or insufficient.

Comparative legal analysis of foreign sources shows several stable models of recognition of the rights of nature. The first is constitutional, when the rights of nature are consolidated at the level of the basic law and become a criterion for evaluating public and private decisions (Ecuador). The second is status (legislative), when a specific natural object is given legal personality and a mechanism for its representation is established (New Zealand, certain acts in Europe). The third is judicial, when courts form a doctrine through the interpretation of constitutional provisions and principles (Colombia and a number of other legal systems).

The Constitution of Ecuador establishes that nature has the rights that the Constitution grants it (art. 10). These rights include: the right to restore, to respect one's existence, as well as to maintain and restore life cycles, structure, functions and evolutionary processes (Chapter 7) (Constitution of The Republic of Ecuador 2008 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Ecuador_2021 (date of access: 02/22/2026)). This fact, as V.S. Khizhnyak notes, allows us to consider nature as a subject of constitutional law in Ecuador ^{[5, p. 87]}. Ensuring the rights of nature in a given country can be illustrated by judicial decisions. In particular, in February 2026, the Portoviejo River was recognized as a legal entity by a court decision. During the trial, it was found that the river's rights were violated by chronic pollution, which led to deterioration of water quality and disruption of ecosystem functions throughout the river basin. In its decision, the court recognized the Portoviejo River as a subject with rights and under special protection, and prescribed a number of measures: the development and implementation of medium- and long-term wastewater treatment plans, mechanisms for the participation of citizens and civil society in supervision. The court's decision obliged local authorities to stop the ongoing pollution and implement specific measures to restore the river, reflecting the constitutional recognition of the rights of nature (Santa Ana (Ecuador) Court Case: Rights of the Portoviejo River // Eco Jurisprudence Monitor. [electronic resource]. URL: https://ecojurisprudence.org/initiatives/santa-ana-ecuador-court-case-rights-of-the-portoviejo-river / (date of access: 03/20/2026)).

New Zealand, in the Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017, explicitly establishes the status of the river as a legal entity, establishing that it has all rights, duties and responsibilities as a legal entity: "Te Awa Tupua is a legal person and has all the rights, powers, duties, and responsibilities of a legal person" (Te Awa Tupua is a legal entity and has all the rights and has all the rights, powers, duties, and responsibilities of a legal entity). At the same time, the law establishes representatives acting on behalf of the river, which makes the model practice-oriented: subjectivity is provided institutionally, not declaratively (Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act.(New Zealand)Subpart 2—Te Awa Tupua.Legal status of Te Awa Tupua. [electronic resource]. URL: https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2017/7/en/latest/#DLM6830854 (date of access: 02/22/2026)). In 2025, by an act of the Parliament of New Zealand, Mount Taranaki was granted the status of a legal entity, becoming the third natural object in the country with rights and obligations. (The Parliament of New Zealand has granted the status of personality to Mount Taranaki. // Online publication Komsomolskaya Pravda [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.kp.ru/online/news/6206790 / (date of access: 02/24/2026)). The Te Ture Whakatupua Mō Te Kahui Tupua 2025/Taranaki Maunga Collective Redressact 2025 establishes as a legal entity not only Mount Taranaki, but also its peaks and environment, and names this natural complex Te Kahui Tupua: "Te Kahui Tupua is a living and indivisible whole covering Taranaki Maunga and other tūpuna maunga, including Pouakai and Kaitake, from their peaks to, and including, all the surrounding lands, and incorporating all their physical and metaphysical elements" (Te Kahui Tupua is a living and indivisible whole that includes Taranaki Maunga and other Tupuna maunga, including Puakai and Kaitake, from their peaks to all adjacent lands, and including all their physical and metaphysical elements) (Te Ture Whakatupua m ō Te K ā hui Tupua 2025/Taranaki Maunga Collective Redress Act 2025. Subpart 1—Te K a hui Tupua and Ng a Pou Whakatupua (New Zealand) [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2025/1/en/latest/#LMS899643 (date of access: 02/24/2026)).

Even with the recognition of a natural object as a subject of law, the key question remains: who represents it and how. A comparative legal analysis of foreign models allows us to identify several mechanisms: the appointment of representatives, the creation of management councils, the distribution of powers between the state and indigenous/local communities, and the participation of non-profit organizations. Functionally, the representative's task is to translate environmental indicators into legal requirements: to file a claim, demand the suspension of work, and insist on remedial measures. In France, based on the New Zealand example, a bill was introduced in February 2026 to grant the status of a subject of the right of the River Seine. The draft law prescribes a mechanism for ensuring her rights, providing for the creation of an institution consisting of a scientific committee and the "Parliament of the Seine", whose activities will be aimed at managing and protecting the river (Proposition De Loi relative à la personnalité juridique et aux droits de la Seine [Electronic resource]. URL: https://ecojurisprudence.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/ppl25-424.pdf (date of access: 03/23/2026)). It is assumed that this institution will represent the rights of the Seine River, file lawsuits for this purpose and ensure the implementation of restoration measures. At the same time, as a disadvantage of this draft law, it is noted that in addition to its name, the bill lacks a direct reference to the legal personality of the Seine River itself, which makes its legal status unclear (France National Law: legal personality and rights of the Seine River [Electronic resource]. URL: https://ecojurisprudence.org/initiatives/france-national-law-legal-personality-and-rights-of-the-seine-river / (date of access: 03/23/2026)).

From a procedural point of view, the new paradigm is closely related to the expansion of procedural legitimation. If earlier nature protection often required proving a violation of an individual right (for example, the right to a favorable environment), then with the subjectivity of the ecosystem, the violation of its own rights becomes the basis, and the representative acts not as an "assistant to the state", but as a procedural carrier of the ecosystem's interest.

Criticism of the concept of the rights of nature is usually based on two directions. The first is theoretical: "a subject without a will" supposedly destroys the classical categories of law. However, law has long operated with subjects whose will is expressed indirectly, and the issue boils down to the quality of the institution of representation. In the philosophical and legal plane, the rationale may be based on the fact that legal subjectivity is not a natural property, but a tool for protecting values. In this sense, the thesis of the non-subjectivity of nature does not exclude its ability to acquire rights ^{[7, p. 75]}. The second area of criticism is practical. There is a risk of politicization: a representative of the ecosystem may use the status to promote private interests or block socially significant projects. In addition, without clear criteria for "significant harm" and without monitoring, the rights of nature can become declarative. Therefore, the minimum legal conditions for the model to work include: defining the boundaries of a natural object; securing measurable environmental indicators; independent expertise; procedures for resolving conflicts with human rights and economic interests.

The Russian doctrine states that the current legislation does not provide for "nature rights" as an independent category ^{[8, p. 700]}. Consequently, the introduction of a new paradigm is possible either through doctrinal development and subsequent legislative recognition, or through a gradual expansion of procedural mechanisms for nature protection without a direct change in the status of the object.

It seems that a step-by-step model is realistic. The first stage involves the point–to-point recognition of the status of individual unique ecosystems (for example, specially protected natural territories or water bodies of key importance for water supply and biodiversity), while creating an institution of representation. The second stage is the development of remediation responsibility for environmental damage with the priority of remediation and the creation of trust funds. The third step is to expand procedural legitimation for public actors and strengthen judicial control over environmentally significant decisions.

Criteria for selecting natural sites for possible "subjectivity" may include: ecological uniqueness and vulnerability; importance for ensuring the rights of citizens; the presence of clearly defined borders and monitoring tools; stable connection with the interests of local communities; manageability of the regime and the presence of a competent authority. These criteria make it possible to minimize the risk of symbolism and ensure the practical efficiency of the institute.

Conclusions. The recognition of natural objects by subjects of law reflects a paradigm shift: from the protection of nature as an "object" to the protection of ecosystems as carriers of legally significant interests. The philosophical and legal foundations of the approach are related to the criticism of anthropocentrism and the development of concepts of subjectivity. The private law dimension manifests itself in the restructuring of the limits of property and freedom of contract, as well as in the rethinking of tort liability for environmental damage, where restoration takes priority. A comparative legal analysis of foreign practice shows that the institute is efficient in the presence of representation, procedural legitimation and measurable environmental criteria. Gradual adaptation is promising for Russia: from point statuses and strengthening of restoration mechanisms to institutionalization of representation of ecosystem interests.

The article is published in the version approved by the reviewers (after receiving a positive review recommending the manuscript for publication) with corrections made by the author (after receiving the editor’s comments, if any).
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