Transformation of Global Transport and Logistics Corridors in the Context of International Order Reconfiguration: The Role of the International North-South Transport Corridor in the Strategy of Non-Western Powers

Danilov Ivan Postgraduate student; Department of Theory and History of International Relations; RUDN University 6 Miklukho-Maklaya str., Obruchevsky district, Moscow, 117198, Russia 1142240152@pfur.ru Other publications by this author

The formation of a multipolar world order is accompanied by the growing fragmentation of traditional trade routes and the search for alternative ways to transport goods between major economic centers. The events of early 2024 demonstrated the vulnerability of established shipping routes: the volume of trade through the Suez Canal decreased by 50% due to acts of piracy in the Red Sea region and the massive redirection of ships en route around the African continent ^[1]. An increase in the average delivery time by 10-14 days led to an increase in logistics costs and stimulated governments and private companies to step up efforts to develop new transport arteries.

In these circumstances, the study of the North-South International Transport Corridor (MTK North-South or INSTC), a multimodal route with a length of about 7,200 kilometers connecting the Russian Federation, the states of the Caspian region, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of India, is becoming relevant. This project is considered by its participants as a tool to reduce transit time by 30-40% and reduce logistics costs by about a third compared to traditional sea routes ^[2]. The corridor attracts the attention of the leading powers of the non-Western world as a mechanism for diversifying trade routes and reducing dependence on transit hubs controlled by Western countries.

This study analyzes the geopolitical motives of the main participants in the INSTC project, the institutional mechanisms for its support, the comparative characteristics of this corridor with other major transport arteries, as well as the impact of Western sanctions regimes on the diversification of global logistics routes. The research is based on the analysis of official documents of the governments of the participating countries, reports of international organizations, analytical publications of research centers and materials of news agencies.

The geopolitical context and the formation of a new architecture of the international order

The expansion of the BRICS association in 2023-2024 reflects a broader process of strengthening the positions of the states of the Global South in the system of international relations. In addition to the original five members – Brazil, Russia, India, China and the Republic of South Africa - the group includes the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the United Arab Emirates and the Republic of Indonesia. The expansion of the organization is accompanied by the formation of a consensus within the BRICS regarding the need to restructure the existing global governance architecture. According to a study by the Carnegie Center, many new members of the association perceive BRICS as a platform for weakening the dominant positions of Western states in international institutions ^[3]. The Egyptian authorities have publicly stated that the country's participation in the BRICS should contribute to "the creation of a truly multipolar world in which the United States will no longer play the role of hegemon" ^[4].

The formation of an alternative global architecture is based on the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs, which are declared in the BRICS documents as opposed to the Western concept of a "rules-based order." The New Development Bank (NDB), established by the BRICS countries in 2014, plays an important role in this process. The bank's strategy for 2022-2026 provides for a significant increase in the share of project financing in the national currencies of the participating states ^[5]. By March 2026, it is planned to issue the first bond denominated in Indian rupees to support infrastructure projects in India ^[6]. The NDB's strategic objective is to increase the share of financing in national currencies to 30% of total commitments by the end of the five-year strategic period. These measures are aimed at reducing the role of the US dollar in settlements between the BRICS countries and creating alternative financial flows independent of Western banking infrastructure.

In parallel with the institutional development of the BRICS, so-called "partnership networks" are being formed within the framework of the BRICS+ format, which involves deepening cooperation with other major developing economies, including the Republic of Turkey, the Republic of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Kingdom of Thailand. This process can be interpreted as the creation of structures parallel to traditional Western organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development or the Group of Seven ^{[7, pp. 66-82]}. In the context of transport infrastructure, the BRICS countries are showing a growing interest in developing alternative supply chains and independent logistics hubs. The World Bank notes that the expansion of cooperation between the states of the Global South allows them to weaken the impact of Western sanctions regimes and diversify trade routes, reducing dependence on transit hubs in Europe and North America ^[8].

The concept of sovereignty over transport corridors is becoming increasingly important in the discourse of non-Western powers. In contrast to the period after the end of the Cold War, when the global logistics infrastructure was largely shaped by the influence of Western corporations and financial institutions, large non-Western economies are currently striving to create their own transport arteries ^{[9, pp. 75-94]}. This desire is driven not only by economic considerations, but also by geopolitical calculations related to vulnerability to potential sanctions and political pressure from Western countries. The development of transport corridors connecting the Eurasian states and bypassing traditional sea routes through straits and channels controlled by Western powers is considered as an element of ensuring strategic autonomy.

MTK North-South: infrastructural characteristics and economic logic

The North-South International Transport Corridor was officially established in September 2000 on the basis of an intergovernmental agreement between the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of India, signed in St. Petersburg ^[10]. In subsequent years, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Sultanate of Oman, the Syrian Arab Republic and a number of other States joined the project, bringing the total number of participants to fourteen. The transport scheme of the corridor includes three main directions, differing in geography and modes of transport used. The western direction involves a route through the territories of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. The trans-Caspian route uses a ferry crossing across the Caspian Sea from the Russian ports of Astrakhan and Makhachkala to the Iranian ports of Bandar Anzali and Amirabad. The eastern direction runs through the territories of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, with subsequent access to Iran.

Reducing the length of the route compared to the traditional sea route through the Suez Canal creates the prerequisites for significant savings in time and financial resources during international transportation. A study by the European Parliamentary Research Service shows that when transporting goods from India to the Nordic countries, using INSTC can reduce the delivery time to 25-30 days compared to 45-60 days when traveling through the Suez Canal ^[11]. The reduction in logistics costs is estimated in the range of 30-40%, which makes the route attractive for commodity flows, especially in conditions of instability of traditional routes and their congestion. However, it should be noted that these estimates are preliminary in nature and are based on calculations of potential efficiency after completion of all infrastructure elements of the corridor.

The realization of the full potential of the project is hampered by a number of infrastructural constraints, the most significant of which is the incompleteness of the Rasht-Astara railway line in Iran with a length of 162 kilometers. This section connects the Iranian railway network with the Azerbaijani border and is a necessary element for the creation of continuous railway communication along the western direction of the corridor. Experts characterize this site as the "main bottleneck" hindering the development of the MTK ^{[12, pp. 565-577]}. The completion of this section will create a continuous railway route from St. Petersburg to the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas on the Persian Gulf coast.

In addition to the Iranian site, there are other infrastructure constraints. On Russian territory, the bottlenecks are the highways through Derbent and the Verkhny Lars border crossing, which have insufficient capacity to handle the growing cargo flows. Reconstruction of the federal highway Kavkaz and modernization of the port infrastructure in the Caspian Sea basin are required. The Russian government has included the solution of these tasks in the priorities of its transport policy, allocating significant budgetary funds for the development of the corridor's infrastructure. The eastern direction through Kazakhstan, despite the lower media coverage, actually handles the vast majority of freight traffic along the MTK ^{[13, pp. 132-138]}.

Strategic interests of the main project participants

Russian Federation

For Russia, the North-South MTC represents an element of a broader strategy to reorient foreign economic relations to the states of Asia, the Middle East and the Global South in the context of increasing confrontation with Western countries. The corridor allows redirecting commodity flows bypassing the sanctions restrictions imposed on Russia after 2014 and significantly expanded in 2022. The development of alternative transport routes that are independent of Western logistics infrastructure and financial institutions is considered in Moscow as an issue of economic security. The Russian authorities are increasing investments in the development of the corridor's infrastructure: in May 2023, Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Government Marat Khusnullin announced plans to allocate about 280 billion rubles for the development of the North-South railway between 2022 and 2030 ^[14]. These funds are intended for the modernization of ports on the Caspian Sea, the reconstruction of roads and railways, the construction of new border crossings and customs terminals.

Russia has set ambitious targets for increasing cargo turnover through the corridor. By the beginning of 2026, it is planned to double the volume of shipments to 30 million tons per year, and by 2030 – to reach the level of 35 million tons annually ^[15]. The main share in the export structure is made up of coal, metal products and petroleum products sent to the markets of South Asia and the Middle East. The eastern direction through Kazakhstan handles the vast majority of cargo traffic, which is explained by its technical readiness and the absence of infrastructure gaps. However, after the completion of the Rasht-Astara line, it is expected that part of the traffic will be redistributed to the western direction, which has a shorter length to the Mediterranean ports and the Persian Gulf countries.

The political dimension of Russia's interest in INSTC is related to the strengthening of Moscow's position as a central transit hub in the system of Eurasian transport links. Control over key transport arteries connecting Europe, Central Asia, and South Asia strengthens Russia's geopolitical influence in the region and creates tools for economic interaction with states interested in diversifying their trade routes ^{[16, pp. 159-173]}. At the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in June 2025, Russian President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin announced the readiness of the Russian side to complete the construction of the remaining sections of the corridor and expressed hope for the temporary nature of geopolitical tensions in the region ^[17]. In November 2024, the President of Russia appointed former Minister of Transport Vitaly Saveliev as special representative for the development of the North-South Railway, which indicates the high priority of the project for the Russian leadership ^[18].

Republic of India

The Indian leadership views the North-South Trade Corridor in the context of a broader strategy to diversify foreign trade routes and ensure the country's energy security. The corridor provides India with direct access to the markets of Central Asia, rich in natural resources, and allows it to bypass the territory of Pakistan, with which New Delhi maintains tense relations. After the introduction of Western sanctions against Russia in 2022, India significantly increased imports of Russian oil and coal, taking advantage of significant price discounts ^{[19, pp. 72-105]}. The volume of bilateral trade between Russia and India has grown from approximately $11 billion in 2021 to more than $67 billion in 2023, with Indian imports of Russian energy resources accounting for the bulk ^[20]. The development of land transport routes through INSTC provides India with an alternative to maritime supplies and reduces vulnerability to potential shipping disruptions.

An important element of India's strategy in the region is the development of the Iranian port of Chabahar on the Arabian Sea coast, in which New Delhi has invested over 200 million US dollars. The port of Chabahar is considered by India as a key hub for trade with Afghanistan and Central Asian countries, allowing it to bypass Pakistani territory. The integration of Chabahar into the infrastructure of the North-South ITC could significantly strengthen India's position in regional logistics, but the implementation of this potential is hampered by the ongoing Western sanctions against Iran and the need for large-scale modernization of the port infrastructure and railway approaches to the port ^{[21, p. 1-12]}. Indian companies are cautious about investing in Iranian projects due to fears of secondary sanctions from the United States, which slows down the pace of development in this area ^[22].

India's participation in the INSTC project should also be viewed in the context of the Indian-Chinese rivalry for influence in Eurasia. China's Belt and Road Initiative (OBOR) provides for the creation of a wide network of transport corridors under Chinese control, including the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which India perceives as a threat to its interests. The researchers note that for India, the North-South MTK is "an alternative to OBOR" and opens up opportunities for trade with European markets via routes not controlled by Beijing ^{[23, pp. 38-59]}. The Indian leadership considers the development of its own transport infrastructure in Central Asia and the Middle East as a tool to counter the growing Chinese influence in the region. At the same time, India is balancing between cooperation with Russia within the framework of INSTC and participation in alternative projects such as the India-Middle East-European Economic Corridor (IMEC), promoted jointly with the United States, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

The Islamic Republic of Iran

For Tehran, participation in the North-South ITC project represents an opportunity to strengthen the country's status as a major transit hub connecting the markets of Eurasia, the Persian Gulf and the Indian subcontinent. In the context of prolonged international isolation caused by Western sanctions, the development of transport infrastructure and the attraction of transit cargo flows are considered by the Iranian leadership as a source of foreign exchange earnings and a tool for integration into the regional economy. Iran is actively modernizing the port infrastructure on the coasts of the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, including the ports of Bandar Abbas, Anzali, Amirabad and Chabahar, seeking to increase their capacity and technical equipment to handle the growing cargo flows ^{[24, pp. 66-83]}.

In December 2023, Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi, during talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin, stressed the "strategic importance" of INSTC for Tehran and confirmed the Iranian side's readiness to complete the construction of the Rasht-Astara railway line connecting the Iranian transport network with Azerbaijan in the coming years ^[25]. The completion of this section will allow Iran to receive railway cargoes from the north and send them to the ports of the Persian Gulf for further shipment by sea to the countries of South and Southeast Asia. After the partial lifting of sanctions as a result of possible agreements on the nuclear program, Iran plans to significantly increase the use of the corridor for trade with Russia and India. Currently, Russian grain and agricultural products are already exported to Iran through INSTC, with volumes estimated at several million tons annually, although the bulk of Russian oil to India is still transported by sea tankers ^{[26, pp. 95-113]}.

The development of transit potential is also linked to Iranian plans to increase non-energy exports and diversify the economy. Transit fees and related services can become a significant source of budget revenue, reducing the country's dependence on the oil and gas sector. Iran is also interested in strengthening economic ties with the states of the former Soviet Union and South Asia as a counterweight to Western pressure ^[27]. Participation in multilateral transport projects contributes to Iran's political legitimization in the regional arena and demonstrates the country's ability to maintain normal economic relations despite sanctions.

The Republic of Azerbaijan and the Central Asian States

Azerbaijan considers the North-South Railway as a tool to increase transit flows through the Azerbaijani territory and the port of Baku, which contributes to the economic development of the country and strengthens its position as a regional transport hub. In September 2022, Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran signed a trilateral declaration on achieving INSTC cargo turnover of 30 million tons annually, and in December 2024, an intergovernmental agreement was signed on the development of the western route of the corridor ^[28]. Azerbaijan is also balancing its participation in the North-South International Transport Corridor and the development of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route connecting China with Europe through Central Asia and the South Caucasus, which allows Baku to diversify its sources of transit revenue.

The Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are also showing growing interest in participating in the INSTC project. In June 2025, the five Caspian littoral states jointly expressed support for the development of the North-South CTC at the regional Caspian Forum, emphasizing the importance of the corridor for the economic integration of the region ^[29]. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have officially declared their readiness to join the INSTC agreement, reflecting the growing attractiveness of the project for the Central Asian republics. For these landlocked countries, participation in international transport corridors is an important factor for integration into the global economy and diversification of foreign economic relations. The development of transport infrastructure also helps attract foreign investment and modernize national transport systems. However, the Central Asian states are striving to maintain a balance between participation in Russian projects and the development of alternative routes, including the trans-Caspian corridor towards China and Europe, which allows them to avoid excessive dependence on one partner.

Institutional support and financial mechanisms

The implementation of a large-scale transport project covering the territories of more than a dozen States with different political systems and economic interests requires the creation of effective mechanisms for multilateral coordination and financing. The MTK North-South project receives institutional support both at the bilateral level between individual participating countries and within the framework of multilateral platforms, primarily BRICS. In recent years, BRICS summits have repeatedly stressed the importance of developing transport infrastructure to deepen economic cooperation between member countries and a wider range of developing countries. The joint Declaration of the leaders of Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan, signed in September 2022, consolidated the commitment to achieve INSTC cargo traffic at the level of 30 million tons, which gave the project the status of a priority initiative for these states ^{[30, pp. 685-692]}.

The New BRICS Development Bank is playing an increasing role in financing infrastructure projects in its member countries, including transport infrastructure. The NBR's strategy for the period 2022-2026 provides for a transition to a more active use of national currencies of the participating states in financing projects. The Bank plans to increase the share of loans in local currencies to 30% of total liabilities by the end of the strategic period ^[6]. The issue of the first bond denominated in Indian rupees is scheduled for March 2026 to support infrastructure projects in India. These measures are aimed at reducing currency risks for borrowers and reducing dependence on the dollar financial system. The development of financial instruments in national currencies facilitates the lending of large transport projects like INSTC, as participating countries can receive financing without the need to attract dollar loans and the associated risks of sanctions restrictions.

There are specialized coordinating bodies at the bilateral level. The Russian-Indian Logistics Working Committee coordinates projects within the framework of the North-South International Transport Cooperation, conducting regular consultations between transport departments and private companies of the two countries. The Russian side has established the position of special presidential representative for the development of the corridor, which ensures a high level of political control over the implementation of the project. Iran and Azerbaijan have established joint working groups to address technical issues related to the harmonization of customs procedures and security standards at border crossings.

New institutional platforms are gradually being formed. The expansion of the BRICS+ format, including dialogue with Turkey, Indonesia, Iran, Egypt and other major emerging economies, creates the basis for broader infrastructural integration of the countries of the Global South. This trend reflects the desire of non-Western powers to create an alternative architecture for global economic coordination, independent of Western institutions such as the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank, traditionally controlled by the United States, Japan and European countries. Consolidating the positions of the participating countries within the framework of multilateral platforms reduces the political risks of financing projects and creates mechanisms for collective pressure on individual States to fulfill their obligations.

Comparative analysis of global transport corridors

The modern system of global commodity flows is characterized by the coexistence of several competing transport arteries, each of which has specific advantages and limitations. The Suez Canal remains the most developed and traditional sea route connecting Asia and Europe. About 15% of the world's maritime cargo turnover passes through the canal, making it one of the busiest hubs in global logistics. The advantages of the Suez route are the developed shipping infrastructure, high throughput and well-established logistics chains ^{[31, pp. 73-92]}. However, the vulnerability of this route to local conflicts and technical accidents became apparent in March 2021, when the container ship Ever Given blocked the channel for six days, paralyzing maritime traffic between Asia and Europe. The events of 2023-2024, when attacks by Houthi groups in the Red Sea led to the redirection of a significant part of ships en route around the Cape of Good Hope, once again demonstrated the risks of concentrating cargo flows on one route ^[32]. A detour through the African continent lengthens the journey by about 10-14 days and increases the cost of transportation due to additional fuel consumption and increased insurance premiums.

The North-South MTK offers a significant reduction in the length of the route compared to the sea route through Suez or bypassing Africa. According to experts, the distance from the ports of India to Northern Europe via INSTC is about 40% shorter than the route through the Suez Canal. The reduction of transportation costs is estimated in the range of 30-40%, which creates a significant price attractiveness for shippers ^{[33, pp. 51-79]}. However, it should be borne in mind that these estimates are based on calculations of potential efficiency after completion of all infrastructure elements and optimization of border procedures. Currently, the multimodal nature of the corridor, which requires cargo transshipment between different modes of transport, and bureaucratic delays at the borders partially offset the benefits of reducing geographical distance. The development of a unified digital platform for cargo tracking and document management simplification could significantly increase the competitiveness of INSTC.

The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, also known as the "Middle Corridor", is an overland artery connecting China with Europe through the territories of Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. The route is actively used for container shipments from East Asia to European markets, offering a delivery time of 12-15 days from the Chinese border to the Black Sea ports, which is significantly faster than the sea route (30-40 days) ^[34]. The Trans-Caspian corridor is receiving active support from China within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative and European countries interested in diversifying import routes from Asia. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are investing heavily in the development of railway infrastructure and ports on the Caspian Sea to increase the capacity of the corridor. However, the "Middle Corridor" faces limitations related to the need for ferry service across the Caspian Sea and differences in railway standards between China, post-Soviet countries and Turkey.

The India-Middle East-European Economic Corridor (IMEC) is a relatively new initiative announced in September 2023 at the G20 summit in New Delhi. The project involves the creation of a multimodal route connecting India with European markets through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel using sea and rail transport ^[11]. IMEC is positioned by its supporters as an alternative to the Chinese OBOR initiative and as a tool to reduce Europe's dependence on the Suez route. The project enjoys the support of the United States, which sees it as a means of strengthening economic ties between American allies in the Middle East and Europe while strengthening India's position as a counterweight to China. However, the implementation of IMEC faced significant obstacles ^{[35, pp. 222-235]}. The escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in October 2023 and the subsequent destabilization of the situation in the Middle East have called into question the feasibility of the project in the foreseeable future. The corridor requires large-scale investments in railway infrastructure on the Arabian Peninsula and complex multilateral coordination between the states of the region with different foreign policy orientations ^{[36, pp. 135-152]}.

China's Belt and Road Initiative (OBOR) is the largest transportation infrastructure development program covering dozens of countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe. The OBOR includes both land routes through Central Asia and sea routes through the Indian Ocean, with the development of a network of ports in South Asia, the Middle East and East Africa. China provides large-scale financing of infrastructure projects in partner countries using loans from Chinese development banks and investments from state-owned companies ^{[37, pp. 532-543]}. However, the implementation of the OBOR is facing increasing criticism related to the high debt burden of recipient countries and accusations of "debt diplomacy" when the inability to repay Chinese loans leads to the transfer of control over strategic facilities to Beijing. A number of countries, including Malaysia and Pakistan, are reviewing the terms of participation in OBOR projects or suspending their implementation due to concerns about financial stability and the geopolitical consequences of growing dependence on China ^{[38, pp. 1-22]}.

A comparative analysis of the main transport corridors is presented in Table 1, which demonstrates the key parameters, advantages and limitations of each route.

Table 1. Comparative characteristics of the main international transport corridors

Source: compiled by the author on the basis of the conducted research.

It follows from the presented comparison that each of the considered corridors has specific advantages for certain types of cargo flows and trade directions. The sea routes through Suez retain the advantage for bulk shipments with low added value, for which speed of delivery is not a priority. Overland corridors like INSTC, the Trans-Caspian Route, and the potential IMEC are more attractive for container transportation and cargo requiring fast delivery. The choice of a particular route is determined not only by economic considerations, but also by geopolitical factors, including sanctions risks, political stability of transit countries, and strategic relations between the sending and receiving States.

Conclusion

In the context of the tightening of Western sanctions regimes, the instability of traditional sea routes and the growing influence of the BRICS association, the North-South International Transport Corridor project is considered by its participants as an alternative to established routes and a tool for Eurasian integration. The experience of 2023-2024 demonstrates an increase in cargo turnover along the corridor, which reached 27 million tons in 2024, and the participants' plans envisage a further increase in the scale of transportation to 35 million tons by 2030.

The realization of the potential of the North-South railway largely depends on overcoming infrastructure constraints, primarily the completion of the Rasht-Astara railway line in Iran, and on the degree of political support for the project at the international level. The institutional consolidation of the BRICS countries through joint funds, the New Development Bank, the BRICS+ mechanism and bilateral coordinating bodies plays an essential role in creating a financial and political framework for the implementation of the project. The development of financial instruments in national currencies reduces dependence on the dollar system and facilitates the financing of major infrastructure initiatives bypassing Western sanctions restrictions.

A comparative analysis of the main transport corridors shows that the North-South Transport Corridor has the potential to significantly reduce the time and cost of cargo delivery between South Asia and Europe compared to sea routes. However, realizing this potential requires solving a complex of technical, administrative and financial tasks. The multimodal nature of the corridor, which involves the use of various modes of transport and the crossing of multiple borders, creates additional difficulties compared to direct sea transport. The success of the project will depend on the ability of the participating countries to achieve the necessary level of coordination and agree on procedures to facilitate the movement of goods.

Western sanctions against Russia and Iran have a dual impact on the development of INSTC. On the one hand, the sanctions encourage these states to step up efforts to create alternative trade routes and financial mechanisms independent of Western infrastructure. On the other hand, sanctions risks deter the participation of some potential partners and investors in projects related to Russia and Iran. India, despite its interest in developing INSTC, has to balance between deepening cooperation with Russia and maintaining normal relations with Western countries. The Central Asian states are also seeking to diversify their transport links, avoiding excessive dependence on any one partner.

The transformation of the global transport and logistics infrastructure reflects broader processes of reformatting the international order. The creation of alternative transport arteries, financial institutions and coordination mechanisms between non-Western powers contributes to a gradual change in the world order towards greater multipolarity and a decrease in the dominance of Western countries in managing global commodity and financial flows. However, the degree and pace of this transformation will depend on the ability of non-Western Powers to effectively coordinate their actions, mobilize the necessary financial and technological resources, as well as on the development of the geopolitical situation in key regions. Ongoing regional conflicts, economic difficulties of individual participating countries, and persistent differences in national interests may slow down the implementation of ambitious projects such as the North-South Transport Hub.