Social Science: Issues and Ontology (Methodological Analysis)

Rozin Vadim Markovich Doctor of Philosophy Chief Scientific Associate, Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences  109240, Russia, Moskovskaya oblast', g. Moscow, ul. Goncharnaya, 12 str.1, kab. 310 rozinvm@gmail.com Other publications by this author

Sociology and social sciences. The crisis of sociology

The need for social knowledge and effective social science is more urgent than ever. Firstly, because we are living in a time of double transition ‒ the end of modernity and the formation of the next "big culture" ("future culture"), and secondly, because the world order established after World War II "ordered a long life" and humanity entered a period of social conflicts and wars, in particularThirdly, the previous development of our civilization has put life on earth in question, if not the threat of death. Political science and common sense alone are not enough to solve the Mont Blanc of existing social problems, and the usual understanding of science can provide little.

The purpose of this article is a methodological discussion of the problems faced by social science and the directions of their solution. Such related issues as the crisis of social science, the relationship between sociology and social sciences, the characteristic features of the social approach and the object, and the methodological scenario for solving these problems will be considered. In addition to comparative analysis, a logical and historical approach will be implemented, as well as the author's achievements in the philosophy of social science and semiotics ^{[11; 12]}.

According to a number of well-known sociologists, social science is experiencing a serious crisis. ^{[2; 7; 10; 17; 18]}. Before describing it, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that it is necessary to clarify what can be understood by social science in general. There is a significant ambiguity here: is social science sociology or all social sciences together (sociology, economics, history, law, social psychology, anthropology, political science, geography)? Back in 1904, Durkheim, in a debate with Tarde, asked: "Should sociology remain a field of philosophical reflection, striving to encompass social life in a single formula? Should it, on the contrary, split into several different sciences, or maybe choose its own specialization ‒ and then the question is, which one?.. Social reality is inherently complex. It cannot be called unknowable, it only resists being reduced to simple forms... sociology, if it wants to continue to exist, must abandon philosophizing, to which it owes its appearance, and engage in specialized research of specific phenomena" ^{[9, pp. 215-216]}.

And Tard begins by posing the same problem.: "Should we talk about social science or social sciences?.. Social sciences appeared before [general] social science, they prepared its evolution. These sciences, based on the comparative and evolutionary method, now themselves need to be compared with each other. Sociology should deal with this comparison of comparisons. Social life is studied by specialists from different industries, each of them observes social facts related to his interests" [Ibid., p. 217].

"When it was," our opponent will object, "now everything is wrong, the problems are wrong." I cannot agree: the problem of demarcation and connection between sociology and other social sciences is still relevant today. "I have," writes our famous Russian sociologist A.V. Tikhonov, "a critical remark about my opponent's understanding of sociology. For example, in his dispute with A. P. Davydov, and in his latest monograph, he speaks of social theories as synonymous with sociological theories. In my opinion, this is a purely philosophical and methodological aberration of consciousness regarding the essence of social and sociological knowledge. In sociology, we see that these are two big differences, but for philosophers this is not the case. For example, we explain to first-year students of the Faculty of Sociology what R. Mills's "sociological imagination" is, how visually, in everyday life, sociological facts are separated from social ones, and at the same time that a number of so-called sociological theories (exogetic, such as T. Parsons' "Structure of Social Action", "Capitalism and modern sociological theory”, by E. Giddens, “Object and Social Theory by N. Smelzer”, as well as the famous four-volume “Theoretical Logic and Sociology” by J. Alexander do not belong to our sociological works. “They are," as P. writes. By remaining without political and social obligations, they become or risk becoming an exoteric, elite and eccentric interest of marginal scientists. I would not recommend them to students" ^{[16, p. 245]}.

In my opinion, Z. Bauman outlined a solution to this problem using the example of the relationship between sociology and economics. So, if "in economics, the relations between acting individuals (actors) act as aspects of the production and exchange of goods and services regulated by supply and demand," then in sociology, according to Bauman, these exchanges set one of the contexts that determine people's behavior and their relationships. Other social sciences study other conditionalities (legal, socio-psychological, geographical, etc.). As a result, Bauman gives the following definition: "what distinguishes sociology and gives it a special character is the habit of considering human actions as elements of broader structures..." ^{[2, pp. 12-13]}. Here, "human actions" are analyzed by sociology, and "broader structures", as objective processes (economic, legal, psychological, etc.), are investigated by the relevant social sciences. S.A. Kravchenko gives a similar definition of sociology: "Sociology," he writes, "is a science that, based on empirically proven data, theoretically studies the activities of people in a specific social and cultural context of the functioning of society, its institutions and organizations, the contradictory development of public consciousness, conscious and unconscious motives of behavior" ^{[7, p. 30]}.

Bauman believes that the crisis of sociology arose at the third stage of the formation of the social sciences. At the first stage, social sciences positioned themselves as a new type of natural science. In particular, outlining Durkheim's position on this issue, Bauman writes: "In order to correctly describe and explain human behavior, a sociologist must (and is being urged to) leave aside the human soul, intentions, and personal meanings that only individuals themselves can tell us (the "riddles of the human soul" are thus doomed to remain unnoticed and impenetrable), and turn to the study of phenomena that can be observed from the outside and which will seem the same to different observers" ^{[2, p. 231]}. The same approach was shared by Pitirim Sorokin. However, he later adjusted it due to the schemes of culture and reflection. "Every socio-cultural system, according to P. Sorokin, is a creation of man. But man himself is an integral being, a product of socioculture that has internalized certain values. Any person is integrated into the socio-cultural system. People enter into a system of social relations under the influence of unconscious (reflex), bio-conscious (feelings of hunger, thirst) and socio-conscious (values, norms, values) regulators. At the same time, the unconscious and the bio-conscious are controlled and regulated by the socio-conscious" ^[15].

At the second stage, under the influence of the authority of Max Weber, sociology tried to build itself on the model of the humanities. "The idea that there is one, and only one, way to 'be a science' and that therefore sociology must selflessly imitate the natural sciences, Weber categorically rejects... to explain human action is to understand it: to grasp the meaning that the acting subject gives it" ^{[2, pp. 12-14]}.

In the third stage, according to Bauman, social sciences conceptualized themselves as "practice", confusing "truth with benefit, information with control, knowledge with power." Responding to state pressure, sociology "had to take into account the perspective of governance: to consider society from above as a material capable of resistance, as an object of manipulation, the internal properties of which need to be better understood so that it becomes more malleable and receptive to the form that they want to give it" ^{[2, p. 13]}.

I see another reason for the crisis of social science ‒ the transition to interdisciplinary research at the third stage of the formation of sociology. Sociologists, analyzing human actions and relationships, began to take into account their contexts and conditionalities in order to understand the functioning and change of these actions and relationships. The transition to interdisciplinary research had serious consequences for sociology. The subject of sociology began to blur, and the confrontation between sociology and the social sciences intensified. In the book "Thinking Sociologically," Bauman concludes that "sociology is a residual discipline, supplemented by what remains outside the field of view of other social disciplines" ^{[2, p. 10]}.

"The feeling of crisis," says B. Latour, "has become central to the social sciences" ^{[8, p. 355]}. One can also agree with S. Kravchenko, who argues that "there is a need for a significant update of sociological knowledge, methodology for the study of social realities and, consequently, the subject of sociological science itself" ^{[7, pp. 29-30]}.

One of the signs of the crisis of the social sciences is the reduction of the understanding of social action not even to reforms and modernizations, but only to the correct description and interpretation of social reality. "We," Latour writes, ‒want more participation... thanks to which you can help assemble a team in parts, providing it with an arena, forum, space, and representation through the most modest mediation of a risky report – usually this is a fragile intervention consisting only of the text" ^{[8, p. 175]}.

A social approach. The object of social science study

Apparently, there is a need for a methodological understanding of social science. The first step in this direction is to characterize the social approach, which, on the one hand, points to specific research objectives and vision, and, on the other, allows us to formulate the first principles of research. The second step is to set the object of study. Generally speaking, both steps took place in different areas of social science, but currently both the approach and the object of study in social science have to be discussed anew.

The philosopher of science Piama Gaidenko writes that "the phenomenological method cannot deal with reality, which in principle is not, cannot become a phenomenon, something that reveals itself to consciousness" ^{[5, pp. 363-384]}. The methodological version of thinking developed by the author does not assume that a social phenomenon will appear to consciousness on its own; in order for it to be actualized, it is necessary to establish and think correctly. The latter includes reflection on the understanding of social scientists of their approach, which, in my opinion, is characterized by the following features.

First, a social scientist, as a rule, evaluates social phenomena in order to influence them. These assessments allow us to reach one or another understanding of "social action". For example, K. Marx assessed the capitalist sociality existing in his time as unfair, and based on this he argued for the need for "expropriation of expropriators," i.e. revolution. On the contrary, "Durkheim," writes the American sociologist J. Ritzer, "feared social chaos and hated it. His work was influenced by the riots that resulted from general social changes, such as industrial strikes, the disintegration of the ruling class, disagreements between church and state, and the rise of political anti-Semitism, more characteristic of modern Durkheim France. In fact, most of his works are devoted to the study of social order. He believed that social disorder is not a necessary part of the modern world and can be reduced through social reforms" ^{[10, pp. 30-31]}. Improving the social order, of course, does not involve revolution, but reform. Most modern social scientists and practitioners are inclined towards them. And, for example, Latour and Bauman even talk about adequate awareness of social phenomena and problems as an effective type of social action.

Secondly, social scientists, unlike psychologists who study psychology, focus on the study of such anthropological phenomena as the behavior and structure of groups, communities, and society, I think, close to what Latour calls a "social collective." At the same time, the listed anthropological formations are considered not so much as free associations, for example, friends or lovers, but rather from the point of view of their social organization ("social order"). This double description (the collective and its social organization ‒ norms, institutions) was proposed by Aristotle.

Man, he writes in Politics, "is by nature a political being, and one who, by virtue of his nature, and not because of accidental circumstances, lives outside the state, is either an underdeveloped being in the moral sense, or a superman; Homer also reviles him, saying "without a family, without a tribe, without laws, without a hearth” <...> After all, one of two things must be recognized: either the citizens participating in public communication are not citizens, or they should all be involved in the common good.The public good is justice, that is, what serves the common good. According to the general idea, justice is a kind of equality... and such an equally correct one means the benefit of the entire state and the common good of citizens" ^{[1, pp. 378-379, 467, 471]}.

The crisis of the social sciences has also affected the understanding of the object studied in social science. Initially, Aristotle proposed a fairly general description of a social phenomenon, referring it to what happens "by nature" ("From all that has been said," he writes, "it is clear that the state belongs to what exists by nature, and that man is by nature a political being" ^{[1, p. 376]}). In modern times, during the development of social science, society was considered such a phenomenon, which is currently being denied by many. For example, Latour writes: "As long as we are looking for the shadow of society behind the collective, and the shadow of Leviathan behind society, no science of the social can advance. To put it more bluntly, either society or sociology" ^{[8, p. 229]}. You can understand Latour: in the twentieth century, the state demonstrated how, with the consent of society, it can enslave this society.

Bauman further blurs the understanding of the social phenomenon (recall the title of one of his recent books, "Fluid Modernity"), highlighting the humanitarian plan in it, attributing multiple ("popularistic") sociality an existence designed to serve not the order as the state understands it, but the cause of freedom. "By its very nature," he writes, "sociology is extremely poorly adapted to such an occupation as 'locking' and 'sealing'. Sociology is an extended commentary on the experience of everyday life, an interpretation based on other interpretations and, in turn, feeds them. It does not compete, but joins forces with other private disciplines dealing with the interpretation of human experience (literature, art, philosophy). Sociological thinking, at the very least, undermines faith in the exclusivity and completeness of any interpretation. It draws attention to the multiplicity of experiences and forms of life, shows each of them as a whole in itself, as a world with its own logic, and at the same time exposes all the falsity of its complacency and ostensibly obvious self-sufficiency. Sociological thinking does not complicate, but rather facilitates the flow of experiences and their exchange. And to put it bluntly, it adds to the uncertainty, since it undermines efforts to “freeze the flow” and close all entrances and exits. From the point of view of the authorities, who are concerned about the order they have established, sociology is part of a chaotic world, more a problem than a solution.…Sociological thinking helps the cause of freedom" ^{[2, pp. 239-242]}.

What happens? Bauman leans towards a humanitarian research program ("interpretation based on other interpretations"). In addition, the sociological approach is characterized, from his point of view, by the recognition of the multiplicity of forms of existence of sociality and the attitude towards freedom. Unlike Bauman, the Russian philosopher V.G. Fedotova believes that the social approach is defined by two methodological programs at once ‒ the natural sciences and the humanities. "Now," she writes, "there is a certain tendency to reject scientific dominance in the social sphere and a tendency to criticize science, criticism that is largely fair. The importance of scientific, humanitarian and extra-scientific social knowledge is emphasized. Their great immediacy, comprehensibility for non-specialists, and connection with everyday practical consciousness arouses natural confidence in this type of knowledge. However, social sciences are responsible to people for the state of social life, because their goal is not only objective knowledge, but also to find ways of socially necessary transformations. The requirement of clarity and accessibility for discussion is replaced by another one ‒ to be able to reveal social mechanisms, to enable them to be used, to carry out not only a regulatory and advisory, but also a cognitive-transformative, even technological function. Social sciences are adequate in the humanities if they fulfill these tasks. For example, the economic sciences will show their humanitarian adequacy if they not only express people's economic aspirations, but also find mechanisms and ways to realize these aspirations based on objective economic laws ... We are talking about the interaction of social sciences and humanities, that is, about the simultaneous operation of two programs. One analyzes the goals and values of the subject, the other identifies patterns that could lead to the achievement of these goals. The first is focused on “humanization”, the second on “reification"... An attempt to build a third, "integrating" program is wrong, if only because both programs have multidirectional vectors that negate each other" ^{[17, pp. 136, 139]}.

Modern difficulties in understanding the social approach and the object of study are also related to the different attitudes of sociologists to the history and development of social phenomena. For example, J. Ritzer writes that "today in sociology there are fierce discussions between those who continue to consider the current society as the modern world, and those who claim that significant changes have taken place in recent years, and we have moved into a new, 'postmodern' world" ^{[10, p. 484]}. While some social scientists take into account the previous development of sociality, considering that it has made a significant contribution to modernity, others identify the social phenomenon only with modernity.

The recognition of the multiplicity of forms of existence of the social phenomenon about which Bauman writes does not mean the absence of social patterns. There are at least three of these patterns. The first is the cultural and historical patterns of the formation and development of sociality. These include both management and power factors that determine, as Latour would say, "effective collective assembly", as well as work to improve (improve) social life, outlined in ancient culture by Plato and Aristotle. The second pattern is the different interactions of social groups, communities, and societies (both uniting and separating, contributing to social life and not), which, on the one hand, result in larger social formations (for example, unions, the state), on the other hand, conflicts and wars take place. The third pattern relates to our time: under the influence of the processes of globalization, the Internet and mobile communications, modern communications and vehicles, economic processes, education and technology, a single planetary organism is emerging.

Agreeing with the way Fedotova characterizes the specifics of social science, I want to make one correction. Yes, a social scientist, conducting his research, follows two methodological programs at once. For example, describing the campaigns of Alexander the Great, P. Green, on the one hand, analyzes the attitudes of consciousness of the participants in these campaigns (Alexander's identification with the gods, the interpretation of the Persians as weak warriors in Isocrates' message, the unwillingness of the Macedonian army to go further after India ^[6]), i.e. implements a humanitarian methodology, on the other hand, reconstructs objective natural mechanisms and processes (economic conditions of the campaign, military technologies, actions of social institutions, etc. ^[6]), in this case, this is a natural science approach. However, both humanitarian and natural science methodology are only partially implemented by Green, for example, he does not compare his proposed interpretation of the consciousness of the participants of the campaigns with other versions of their consciousness (which is usually typical for the humanities), does not confirm the description of objective mechanisms by experiments (the procedure adopted in the natural sciences).

It is also worth explaining how the pattern is understood in social science. These are not eternal laws of the first nature, but rather patterns characteristic of certain cultures and historical times. For example, discussing a good option for election-based social governance, Aristotle writes the following. "Therefore, the principle of mutual retribution is salutary for states; this principle must exist in relations between free and equal, since they cannot all rule at the same time, but either by year, or in some other order, or even periodically.… And when one person, or a few, or the majority rule, guided by public benefit, naturally, such types of government are correct, and those that involve the benefits of either one person, or a few, or the majority, are deviations" ^{[1, pp. 129, 420]}.

As subsequent history has shown, these propositions of Aristotle were used by some rulers in the Middle Ages, but especially in Modern times, i.e. they acted as a social pattern. But they understood them and used them according to the time and circumstances, violating the principle of equality, reducing elections to a simple imitation, as is currently the case in a number of countries around the world.

Two sources of social knowledge and patterns

Why does Bauman believe that "sociology is an extended commentary on the experience of everyday life, an interpretation based on other interpretations" despite the fact that he himself has conducted more than one social study, for example, described in the book "The Relevance of the Holocaust"? Comments are most often based not on research, but on diagrams. Unlike scientific knowledge obtained on models (the latter involve confirmation by facts, rigorous discourse, experiment, if possible), schemes allow solving a problem, understanding a phenomenon of interest to a researcher or practitioner, and acting on the basis of this understanding (see ^{[11, pp. 57-64]}). Based on scientific knowledge, a practitioner can create calculations and realistic forecasts, based on schemes, only understand and act (experience shows that here a planned result can only happen by chance). For example, the understanding of the Holocaust gained in Bauman's book is scientific knowledge. They are supported by facts and are conclusions within the framework of historical, sociological, psychological, comparative and a number of other arguments related to well-known scientific disciplines.

And here is an example of a social phenomenon obtained in the scheme; based on it, I. Wallerstein defines the nature of social action. "First of all," he writes, "we need to understand what's going on. And then make a decision about which way we want our world to move. We need to finally realize that today we must do everything possible to make the world go where we want it to go. <...> The most important thing in these disputes is to determine to what extent any social system, in this case the future system that we are building, is ready to rely on two fundamental foundations of the social structure that have long been recognized by all ‒ freedom and equality, and these concepts are interconnected much more strongly than the social science of the modern world system is ready to recognize <...> When building a system (or systems) that inherits our existing world system, we will have to make a choice between a hierarchical system where everyone will receive benefits and privileges according to their place in the system, no matter how they get this place, even if thanks to their good abilities, and a relatively democratic system where relative equality will exist." ^{[4, pp. 196, 197, 200]}.

Defining the object of social study as a world system, Wallerstein proceeds primarily from methodological considerations; he cannot prove the existence of such an object in social reality. "Part of the problem," Wallerstein explains, "is that we studied these phenomena by putting them into separate boxes and giving them special names: politics, economics, social structure, culture, without realizing that these boxes exist mostly in our imagination, and not in real life. The phenomena that we find in them are so intertwined that one necessarily presupposes the other, one affects the other, and any phenomenon cannot be understood without taking into account the contents of other boxes... We said that the world system has many institutions ‒ states and interstate structures, manufacturing firms, households, classes, all kinds of groups and associations ‒ and it is these institutions that form the basis that allows the system to function, but at the same time feeds the conflicts and contradictions that permeate it" [Ibid., pp. 44, 45]. Although Wallerstein cannot prove the existence of a world system by introducing such a representation of the object of social science study, he expresses the current trend of assembling such an object from traditional objects of sociology based on a systematic approach and synergetics.

An analysis of the existing literature suggests that most of the ideas about social phenomena are derived from diagrams, so it is difficult to expect that social actions based on them will be realistic and effective.

Possible methodology for the constitution of social science

If the natural sciences and humanities have developed and it is possible to rely on the analysis of samples of these sciences to find out their features, then it is problematic to use samples of social science in crisis. This article is only about a methodological idea (project). Its implementation, as it should be clear from the above, involves the construction of an object of study of social science within the framework of a social approach. What does it mean within the framework of a social approach? For the author, this approach, in addition to the above-mentioned problematization, boils down to the following provisions.

• Social reality (sociality) We consider it in two ways: as a cultural and historical phenomenon and as a phenomenon of modernity. At the same time, modern research suggests that modernity is coming to an end and a "future culture" is beginning to take shape. All three aspects of sociality (cultural-historical, modern, and transitional) are characterized by social patterns that can be identified in special reconstructions. In turn, social patterns operate on the territory of a particular culture and historical time. Their interpretation in other historical and cultural contexts and totalities involves taking into account the relevant contexts and rethinking the patterns themselves. In other words, in social science there is a dialectic of regularity and singularity (Gilbert Simondon would say, the logic of "individuation" ^[14])

• Social reality is popularizing. Its multiplicity is due to historical, cultural, anthropological, and possibly spiritual factors.

• Social reality is reconstructed using three methodological programs ‒ humanitarian, natural science (with amendments to the above-mentioned particularity) and interdisciplinary (for the latter, see ^{[12, pp. 75-127]}).

• Social reality is described in anthropological terms in sociology, and in terms of conditionality and contextuality in other social sciences. The core of sociality is formed by the structures and processes of governance and power. An essential characteristic of sociality is also work aimed at improving social life (another thing is that it often fails or is only imitated).

Now the scheme of the object of study of social science. But first, we will treat the social research of the "Donor" project ^[13]. If in the study "The relevance of the Holocaust" ^[3] Bauman does not discuss the specifics of the object of study, this object is set as a multi-component in the course of study, then in the work of the project "Donor" the authors begin with the construction of such an object, coming to the conclusion that the object of study should be a new social institution of donation. They considered this institute, on the one hand, as a unique Russian education, on the other hand, using the social knowledge (regularity) gained in the social science of institutions. "What does the hypothesis of donation as a social institution mean? The fact that the main characteristics of institute a can be transferred to donation, since in addition we are talking about the resumption of donation in new conditions, it is necessary to take into account the characteristics of the formation of a social institution.…

Projecting ideas about a social institution and its formation onto donation, the developers included the following components in the basic scheme of the donation institute: government authorities, SECS, public organizations, regular donors, as well as potential participants of the institute – primary donors and future potential donors. In order to understand what factors can influence the decision to donate blood, as well as to integrate the institution of donation into the culture (society), other institutions were represented in the schematic diagram, namely, the media, Business, Education, Religious denominations, various public (non-donor) associations.…

So, there are three main concepts and schemes of the institute: the institute as an established education (the concepts of B. Malinovsky, M. Oriu, A.A. Matyukhin and V.G. Marachi), the institute as an emerging social education (the author) and the institute in the system of other institutions and in culture... The analysis of the current Russian situation conducted by the project developers has shown that the current donor reality is best described by a “mixed model". Both the state and public organizations participate in this model. The Blood Service is responsible for a common “blood bank” distributed centrally among medical institutions and without reference to local clinics. The blood service collects and supplies components, as well as attracts donors. NGOs help the state, both at the national and local levels." ^[13].

This study shows that social patterns transferred to a new (in this example, the modern Russian situation) need to be rethought and formulated anew. It also suggests the following. Historical and cultural reconstructions are one thing, the purpose of which is to identify and analyze social patterns (for example, the author identified patterns related to social institutions and European sociality), and the analysis of individual social phenomena (such as the Holocaust, donation, and the state), which use both unique characteristics of the studied social phenomenon and social patterns, is another.

The third type of social research (the first two are historical and cultural reconstructions and the analysis of individual social phenomena) is just taking shape, it is the study of the emerging planetary social organism (the whole). This includes, for example, Wallerstein's research on the world system, the world economy as a global social phenomenon, the Internet, mobile communications and AI, also as a planetary social phenomenon, the state of the Earth's biosphere and technosphere, and a number of others.

Thus, the object of social science study is quite complex, containing three different hypostases ‒ historical social formations (in different regions of the Earth ‒ Europe, Asia, the East, and America), individual social phenomena in different historical contexts (from the Ancient World to modernity), and an emerging planetary social organism. The methodology of the study of this object is determined, among other things, by the social approach, the main features of which we have indicated above.

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