From "Informatization" to "Intellectualization": The Transformation of China's Military Concepts in the Xi Jinping Era

Dubrovskiy Ivan R. ORCID: 0000-0003-2655-0927 Postgraduate student; Department of Theory and History of International Relations; P. Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University of Russia 6 Miklukho-Maklaya str., Obruchevsky district, Moscow, 117198, Russia yiwan94@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

Introduction

Against the background of the rapid growth of the political, economic and military power of the People's Republic of China, its role in the international system is being significantly transformed. In the context of increasing global strategic competition with the United States, China is stepping up the development of its armed forces, while simultaneously promoting a new format of national security that goes beyond exclusively territorial defense. The transition from the concept of "protecting the near seas" to the task of ensuring interests "in the far abroad", as well as the formation of the expeditionary capabilities of the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA), indicate a fundamental change in military thinking.

The modern military and political leadership of China gives priority attention to the issues of strategic planning and adaptation of the Armed Forces to the new conditions of the international and technological environment. The problem raised in this study is the need to analyze the transformation of the military strategy of the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) in the context of increasing global competition, technological shifts and the changing nature of the armed struggle. Given the growing ambitions of the PRC on the world stage, including the protection of national interests abroad and the demonstration of military power, the study of Chinese military strategy is becoming particularly relevant both in scientific and practical terms.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the evolution of China's military concepts during the Xi Jinping era, identify their essential features, identify key areas of transformation of the PLA, and assess the significance of these changes for the future nature of the war and China's strategic position in the global system.

The role of informatization in China's modern military doctrine

Military doctrine is the foundation for the organization of defense and the building of the armed forces of any state, as well as the formalization of the military strategy of the state. In China, military strategy is "objective-subjective," reflecting the Marxist-Leninist view of military strategy. According to this concept, strategy is a nonlinear dialectic between objective reality and subjective initiative ^[1]. The task of the strategy (and the strategist) is to assess the objective reality, that is, the existing strategic environment, and then use the subjective initiative to change this reality in a way that is consistent with the goal of the strategy. The synthesis of objective reality and subjective initiative leads to the creation of a new, more beneficial objective reality. The concept of the objective-subjective nature of military strategy development, originally presented in 2002 in an article by Wu Chunqiu, professor of the PLA Academy of Military Sciences, entitled "Dialectics and the Study of Grand Strategy: the Chinese View" ^[2], is still enshrined in PLA doctrine, as evidenced by the 2020 edition of the Science of Military Strategy ^[3].

The military policy of the People's Republic of China is implemented with the help of Guiding Principles - guidelines for the development of the military organization of the state. Chinese theorists themselves consider these Guiding Principles to be "the core and generalized embodiment of military strategy" ^[4]. The Guiding Principles consist of four components: (1) the definition of a strategic adversary; (2) the main strategic direction, such as a region or direction; (3) the "form of warfare" and (4) the operational principles of the use of military force ^[5]. The guidelines are issued by China's highest military body, the Central Military Council of the People's Republic of China. Then they form the military doctrine, the structure of forces, determine the directions of military construction, etc.

Since the 1980s, the PRC's military strategy and military doctrine have been based on the concept of active defense. This concept proceeds from the position of opposing a stronger opponent and formulates the task of maintaining strength with the subsequent transition to initiative. It is based on the idea not of advancing from a position of superiority, but of overcoming weakness, characteristic of both the Red Army during the Civil War and China in the face of confrontation with the United States and the USSR in the first decades of the PRC's existence.

The term "active defense" first appeared in 1935 in a party document prepared by Mao Zedong under the title "Problems of Strategy in the War for Chinese Independence" ^[6]. In it, "active defense" was considered in the dialectical unity of "strategic defense", when in response to an enemy offensive, the army makes an organized retreat deep into the territory, and "strategic counteroffensive", when with the help of maneuver it is possible to form an advantage over enemy forces in a certain sector of the front and crush it.

It is worth noting that this strategic concept reflects the principle of the state's response to military-strategic threats with the use of military force. The principle itself has not changed over the decades of the PRC's existence, however, the external conditions and the form of a possible military conflict have changed. In June 2004, the Central Military Commission of the People's Republic of China approved Guidelines in which the external environment of a potential military conflict was expressed in the wording "conditions of informatization". Chinese President Jiang Zemin stressed the need for the PLA to prepare for local wars in such conditions ^[7]. According to the Central Military Commission of the People's Republic of China, informatization has become a key feature of modern armed conflicts, defining "informatized warfare" as the main form of warfare of the 21st century. The Chinese President set the task of transforming the PLA into a new type of force capable of defeating information warfare, which was reflected in the 2004 White Paper on Defense.

The term "informatization" in China has a national meaning, covering the civil and military spheres. It marks the transition to an information society through technology. In the military field, informatization is changing the nature of military operations: information becomes an independent space and a link between land, sea and air. Waging war in these conditions involves the use of information technology at all levels — from sensors and weapons to automated command and non-classical forms of warfare (cyber, electronic and psychological warfare) ^[8].

Since 2014 Chinese President Xi Jinping adjusted this vision by proposing the military doctrine of "victory in local information wars". The doctrine included several key provisions outlined in the 2015 white paper "China's Military Strategy" ^[9]. The first is the priority of information superiority: advanced intelligence is seen as the basis for achieving control in the air, at sea, and in other areas during "local information wars." The second is the expansion and complication of the battlefield: new spaces are being added to the traditional spaces (land, sea, air, space) — electromagnetic, cyber, and cognitive. At the same time, the air and space dimensions are integrated, becoming a strategic point for gaining initiative. Thirdly, integrated joint operations are becoming the leading form of combat operations, where forces of different types and branches of the armed forces operate under a single command. Fourth— war places high demands on management: targets and strikes are coordinated so that operations are as efficient, economical and with minimal risks as possible.

In the 2013 edition of the Sciences of Military Strategy, prepared by the PLA Academy of Military Sciences, it is emphasized that informatization has radically changed the very principle of the formation of combat power. Traditionally, it was understood as a combination of three elements: material base (weapons, equipment, platforms), energy (fuel and ammunition) and information (communications and management). In the conditions of modern warfare, it is information that has turned from an auxiliary factor into a key one that determines the use of both materials and energy. This became the basis for a large—scale reform of the PLA, the purpose of which is to maximize the central role of information in combat operations.

According to this work, the very mechanism of victory has changed: if earlier it was achieved by destroying the enemy's material resources, now it is by neutralizing his information systems, which paralyzes the combat potential. For this purpose, attacks on command centers, control systems and information infrastructure are expected. The main tool is the "integration of information and fire", that is, the combination of reconnaissance and sensor systems with high—precision long-range weapons.

In the 2020 edition of the Science of Military Strategy, the role of information has become even more important. It argues that winning the information war is a key function of the armed forces and the basis for fulfilling any military tasks. For the PLA, the information component is no longer an additional opportunity, but the foundation of all types of military activities.

The PLA's current strategic goal is to accelerate the process of informatization and parallel improvement of mechanized troops by 2027. While mechanized forces reflect the industrial era (tanks, artillery, armored vehicles), computer-aided troops are built around reconnaissance and strike complexes, including surveillance systems, reconnaissance and precision weapons ^[10].

Xi Jinping's guiding principles, set out in the 2015 White Paper, maintained a focus on local wars on China's periphery, without moving to larger-scale goals. The central scenario continued to be a possible conflict related to Taiwan's attempt to achieve independence by military means, while the border with India and the South China Sea were considered secondary strategic areas.

Joint military operations continued to be the main form of combat, which was conceptualized as "integrated joint operations" in 2004. Documents published after 2019, such as "General information on Joint Operations" ^[11], confirm that it is this form that underlies the operational doctrine, despite theoretical discussions of new approaches in the academic environment. The "basic guiding idea" of the operations has also not changed, which is the formula "information dominance, pinpoint strikes against strategic goals, joint actions for the sake of victory" ^[12]. This idea remains the foundation of strategic planning and has not been officially revised to this day.

The direction of informatization in the process of modernization of the PLA

The implementation of the doctrine of "victory in local information wars" required both organizational changes in the form of the creation of new branches of the armed forces, and the development of offensive and defensive capabilities of the PLA.

From an organizational and structural point of view, an important contribution to the development of the PLA's national security capabilities in information warfare was the creation of the PLA Strategic Support Forces (SSF) at the end of 2015, which centralized the management of key non-kinetic combat areas (outer space, cyberspace, electronic warfare, information and psychological operations), as well as the tasks of comprehensive management of all types of technical intelligence. The PLA SSP organizationally consisted of two space systems management structures (航天系统部), responsible for launches, tracking, and satellite management, and network systems management (网络系统部), which included technical and radio intelligence agencies ^[13]. However, in 2024, this Service was reorganized because it did not fully meet the requirements of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief for the coordination of joint operations, information warfare and the provision of intelligence information.

In 2024, they were divided into three separate branches of the armed forces: the Aerospace Forces, the Cyberspace Forces, and the Information Support Forces. Chinese President Xi Jinping, during a solemn ceremony on the occasion of the formation of the Information Support Forces, said that this important decision was made taking into account the need to modernize national defense in a new environment. In his speech, the emphasis was placed on the fact that the M&A represents a fundamentally new structure, the "newest branch of the strategic level military", which will coordinate the development and application of cyber information systems to ensure victory in modern wars ^[14].

The military reform carried out in 2024 is beneficial to the PLA from the point of view of increasing combat capabilities, since the commander of any joint command can relatively quickly use the forces and means of the M&A to his advantage without contacting a higher headquarters ^[15]. It is assumed that such an approach can increase the effectiveness of joint operations, during which diverse groups of troops (forces) interact ^[16]. In this regard, the M&A is being integrated into the existing system of joint operations of the Chinese Armed Forces as soon as possible to perform tasks in a timely and effective manner in the face of information counteraction from potential opponents.

The PRC attaches paramount importance to the development of command, control, communications, computing, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems, seeing them as the basis for modern warfare, where the speed of information collection, processing and transmission, as well as the speed of decision-making, are crucial. The PLA is modernizing technology and management organization to effectively coordinate joint operations in different theaters of military operations.

C4ISR systems provide secure communication and real—time data exchange, from intelligence to logistics and weather information. This allows commanders to make multi-level decisions faster and improves management efficiency in difficult conditions. The PRC is actively developing space infrastructure and near-space platforms to enhance the tasks of reconnaissance, surveillance and reconnaissance, as well as support for precision strikes ^[17].

To achieve information superiority, Beijing relies not only on C4ISR, but also on electronic warfare. PLA electronic warfare units train in jamming, suppressing, and disrupting enemy communications, radar, and navigation systems, including GPS. These actions are considered as a way of deterrence even before the conflict begins and as a key element of information and intellectual warfare.

The Chinese military and political leadership considers cyber operations, along with electronic and psychological warfare, to be one of the key tools for achieving information superiority and countering a stronger adversary. Beijing has declared cyberspace a critically important area of national security and is accelerating the development of cyber warfare ^[18].

The PLA considers the integration of cyber assets with space and electronic warfare as a strategic weapon for disrupting enemy control systems. Cyber operations perform the tasks of reconnaissance, deterrence, attacks on logistics and communications, as well as enhance the effect of kinetic attacks. Special attention is paid to the protection of its own systems and infrastructure, including preventive measures and offensive actions against enemy cyber activity ^[19].

Prospects for the modernization of the PLA: a course towards "intellectualization"

Subsequently, the military and political leadership of the People's Republic of China recorded that the form of warfare was evolving from "informational" to future "intellectual" warfare. During these transformations, artificial intelligence (AI) is expected to become as important a factor in winning on the battlefield of the future as information technology is today.

The concept of intellectualization in China involves the introduction of AI and related technologies for the development of the C4ISR system, however, AI is considered not as a goal, but as a means of integrating humans, weapons, and combat methods into a "system of systems." The main task is to create a unified structure for integrated joint operations, providing unified command, maneuverability and comprehensive support.

Chinese military and political circles believe that the world has entered a new "revolution in military affairs." Xi Jinping has repeatedly stressed the need for military innovation, the development of new theories, strategies and technologies, including AI, quantum computing and big data. The Chinese approach of "developing the army through science and technology" is aimed at creating unique advantages in key areas and realizing the goal of a "powerful army" ^[20].

In 2016-2017, the PLA was tasked with actively using AI for command, planning, and decision support, as well as integrating new technologies into joint operations ^[21]. AI is recognized as a strategic direction that affects both the economy and the military sphere. Since 2017, it has been included in the national strategy and is being implemented through military-civilian integration, where technology companies play a leading role. In the 14th five-year plan (2021-2026) and in 2024, the NPC session confirmed that AI is a key element of the Chinese "revolution in military affairs" ^[22].

China's experience in introducing AI into weapons is reflected in the work of researchers from the Center for Security and New Technologies, which analyzed 343 PLA contracts. In this paper, seven priority areas are identified: autonomous vehicles, ISR, logistics, electronic warfare, modeling, command and control, and automatic target recognition ^[23]. These areas can be divided into two categories: AI in armament and AI in combat support.

China is developing systems with different levels of autonomy, from remote—controlled to almost completely autonomous. The PLA is committed to integrating manned and unmanned systems, using AI for group attacks, and logistics. Examples are the TYW-1, ASN-216 UAVs and the FH-97A project ("loyal slave"). However, there are no truly lethal autonomous systems with advanced AI yet ^[24].

AI is also used in ISR tasks, for example, in YLC-2E and YLC-16 radars, and in the future — in cognitive radars and air defense systems with automated decision-making and sensor integration functions. China is working on an "Integrated Air Defense and Missile Defense System" using AI ^[25].

Conclusion

The transition from the concept of "informatization" to "intellectualization" reflects the profound transformation of Chinese military thought and practice during the Xi Jinping era. If at the beginning of the 21st century the key direction was the development of information technology as the basis of warfare, today the focus is shifting to the use of artificial intelligence and related innovations as a factor of a new level of military superiority.

This transformation demonstrates Beijing's desire to adapt to the changing nature of the war and stay ahead of potential adversaries through technological and organizational advantages. The introduction of new branches of the armed forces, the modernization of control systems and the focus on cyber and cognitive spheres of warfare indicate the PLA's transition to a model of the armed forces, where information and intelligence become not just resources, but the basis of all military power.

Thus, Chinese doctrine in the era of Xi Jinping is shaping a course towards the "intellectualization" of war, involving the integration of man, technology and weapons into a single system. This course reflects a broader strategic vision: to transform the PLA into a "world-class army" by the middle of the 21st century, capable of operating effectively in the context of a new revolution in military affairs.