The potential of social media as a means of preventing radicalism in the Muslim religious community

Sedykh Natal'ya Sergeevna ORCID: 0000-0001-7063-8067 PhD in Philosophy Senior researcher at the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tatarstan 420126, Russia, Kazan, 36A Levo-Bulachnaya str., sq. A natalja.sedix@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

Introduction

From a technical point of view, a social network is a software service, a platform for people to interact in a group or in groups. From the point of view of users, a social network is a community of people connected by common interests, common cause, or having other reasons for communicating with each other.

Interestingly, the concept of "social network" was introduced by sociologist James Barnes in 1954, even before the advent of the Internet ^[1]. The author of the term defined a social network as a structure consisting of a group of nodes, which are social objects, that is, people or organizations, as well as the connections between them and social relationships. In other words, a social network meant a group of people who have certain relationships, bilateral or unilateral ties. Obviously, with the advent of the Internet, the scientific concept of James Barnes began to gain popularity. This led to the development of social networks on the world Wide web.

Initially, social networks were focused on public content, and messengers were created as programs for instant text messaging over the Internet. However, the digital revolution has led to the fact that almost every social network has a built-in messenger, and most messengers perform the functions of social networks. As you know, using modern messengers, you can distribute not only text, but also photo, audio, and video content, hold video conferences, and create integrations with other teamwork applications. For example, today the vast majority of Telegram users not only exchange messages, but also read blogs, news feeds, and make purchases. And this reflects a general trend: messengers are becoming integrated platforms. Because of this, social networks and messengers are one of the formats of new media. To clarify, the main characteristics of new media are digital format, interactivity, and multimedia. Based on this, they include all online platforms and tools that allow users to create and share a variety of content.

So, despite the fact that the concept of "social network" appeared before digital technologies, in the modern world this concept is revealed as "a community of users based on an interactive network resource" ^[2]. This community is characterized by social network interaction, which is manifested, for example, in the opportunities to "share" a post, like, leave a comment, etc. At the same time, there is a new trend in the development of social networks. The user interaction model is being transformed and becomes more complex due to an increase in the proportion of rich content, which is close in format to blogs as translators of expert knowledge and/or motivated opinions on various issues, including religious ones. A blog is essentially an online diary where new materials are published sequentially and arranged in chronological order.

Thus, the wide range of possibilities of modern social networks is crucial in creating the "agenda" of young people. According to modern research, the social identity of today's young people is formed under the influence of online communities, since the digital world, as understood by representatives of the new generation, is a continuation of the real one. From the perspective of agenda setting theory, media, including new media, convince people to consider certain events, phenomena, and points of view more important than others. This result is achieved with the help of emotionally colored plots created, the frequency of mentions of something or someone, and the image-semantic series built in this way. Of course, sources of information are important in shaping a personal agenda. For the youth audience, these are online groups and communities on social networks, the content of which shapes their agenda, opinions and beliefs, values and goals ^[3,4,5].

Therefore, social networks have a powerful management potential. This opens up the possibility of using them both "to the detriment" of destructive pseudo-religious leaders, who actively promote radical projects through interactive and attractive content for young people, and "for the benefit", which is one of the leading goals of the Muslim clergy ^[6,7,8]. The priority task in this direction is to exert a real creative influence on the spiritual and moral sphere of a young man who is looking for an answer to the question: "what is good and what is bad," from the standpoint of the Islamic faith. Therefore, it is fundamentally important to organize educational network communication in a religious environment. And social networks should become its leading tool.

The degree of scientific elaboration of the problem

Currently, there is a growing research interest in the phenomenon of digitalization of religion. In this regard, the article examines the features of the use of electronic technologies in the implementation and support of religious practices and spiritual development, as well as the impact of digitalization processes on the transformation of religious life as an individual and various religious communities. These issues are reflected in the works of domestic (N. M. Markov, M. D. Yuldashev, O. A. Kulikova and others) and foreign (H. Campbell, P. Cheong, A. Possamai and others) researchers.

Various aspects of the use of digital technologies and social networks in spreading radical Islamist ideology and recruiting young people to extremist organizations are reflected in the works of domestic researchers such as S. I. Chudinov, R. F. Pateev, A. R. Suleymanov, and others, as well as foreign scientists: P. Cockburn, P. Müller, P. S. Harrendorf, A. Mischler, and others. others .

The social role of Russian Muslim religious organizations in the realities of the 21st century is shown in the works of modern scientists and authoritative Muslim religious figures such as R. R. Abyassov, R. K. Adygamov, A. H. Mavlikasov, R. N. Nurislamov, I. R. Bayazitov and others. At the same time, according to many modern scientists and practitioners, for example, I. P. Dobaev, R. F. Pateev, S. I. Chudinov, there is a need to develop mechanisms for the prevention of radicalism in the Internet environment. In this regard, it is important to note that the study of social networks as a means of preventing radicalism is at an early stage.

The purpose of the study is to study the potential of social networks as a means of preventing radicalism in the Muslim religious environment.

Tasks:

• 1. to consider the features of modern radical Islamist ideology and practice;
• 2. to characterize the online activity of extremists in the Internet space;
• 3. to show the possibilities of social networks in preventing the involvement of Muslim youth in destructive activities.

Methodology, methods and materials of the research.

The methodological basis of the research is a systematic approach, as well as the principles of interdisciplinarity and polyparadigmality. The main research methods were: the method of analysis and synthesis, the method of generalization, the descriptive method as a method of collecting, describing and structuring empirical data. And, along with this, the method of case analysis and meta-analysis as an integration, generalization of various research, analytical, and expert materials on the spread of the ideology of extremism through digital technologies and countering this phenomenon.

The source base of the study was:

• the official website of the National Center for Information Counteraction to Terrorism and Extremism in the educational environment and on the Internet;
• the official website of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the Republic of Tatarstan.

The empirical basis of the study was: The results of a case analysis of audio materials of lectures on pseudo-Islamic topics and a meta-analysis of research data on the dissemination of radical Islamist ideas through social networks.

The results and their discussion

The ideologists of the Islamic State (a terrorist organization banned in the Russian Federation) attached particular importance to social networks as a means of involving young people in terrorism, claiming that: "Media is half of jihad" ^[9]. It should be clarified that "jihad" is interpreted by Salafist ideologues as an armed struggle against all those accused of disbelief. Such a struggle is seen as a means to achieve the general goal of uniting all the inhabitants of the planet into an Islamist state without exception, the legal basis of which will be Sharia, a comprehensive Islamic set of rules of conduct.

Let's explain: Salafism (from the word "salaf" – predecessors) is one of the radical ideological and political movements aiming to return to the first principles (foundation) of religion. For this reason, in the writings of Western scholars, this movement is called "fundamentalism." And in the Islamic world, it has been given the name "Salafism." An important aspect of Salafi ideology is the denial of any innovations (bid'a) in the field of doctrine and law that have no direct justification in the Quran and Hadith - records of the words, deeds, endorsements or descriptions of the life and behavior of the Prophet Muhammad.

Salafists urge Muslims in all their actions and beliefs, norms and rules to follow what existed and was done during the period of the original Islam. Arguing for this position, Salafists claim that they are ideological and intellectual followers of the first generations of Muslims (Sahabs, Tabiyins and Tabi ut-Tabiyins). And this gives them the right to urge others to "return" to "pure Islam," to the way of religious life of an early and therefore "truly righteous" Islamic community. Salafists are characterized by simplicity, accessibility of dogmatic ideas, and their non-elitist nature. Therefore, their ideas are understandable to a wide audience. For example, you do not need to be an intellectual, understand religious teachings, to comprehend the "truth" preached by the Salafists. Their teaching is, in fact, a product created based on pop culture trends and addressed to a mass, undifferentiated audience. This largely determines the fact that in the 21st century, the ideology of Salafi jihad is being implemented in practice by numerous groups of religious and political extremists and terrorists hiding behind Islam. They carry out their destructive activities in many regions of the world, including the Middle East, North Africa, the Americas and Europe, as well as in the Russian Federation and the former Soviet Union. Among them are notorious terrorist organizations banned in Russia and most countries of the world: the Islamic State (IS), Al-Qaeda, the Victory Front (Jabhat al-Nusra), Boku Haram and many others ^[10].

Modern radical ideological doctrines, according to which terrorist practices are carried out, are based on two specially interpreted concepts – takfir (accusation of "kufr", i.e. disbelief) and jihad (holy war for faith). The radicals, unlike representatives of Orthodox Islam, arbitrarily expand the range of takfiri objects, absolutizing the concepts of "disbelief" ("kufr" or "godlessness") and "polytheism" ("shirk" or "paganism"). Proclaiming strict monotheism, they classify as "infidels" and "polytheists" all those who, in their opinion, are not "monotheists." Based on this, the radicals classify Muslims as "infidels," who are called "sectarians," including all those who do not share the ideology of Salafism, as well as Jews, Christians, and supporters of democratic, communist, capitalist, and other ideological and political movements of a non-religious nature. The ideologists of radicalism urge to fight the "infidels" with the help of "jihad" - an armed, and, in fact, terrorist struggle, the end result of which they see as an Islamist state with planetary proportions and, as a result, the world domination of Salafism ^[10].

In this regard, it should be clarified that, according to the Muslim tradition, the term "jihad" is understood as a struggle for faith, which is conducted in the following basic forms: "jihad of the heart" - the struggle against one's own evil inclinations; "jihad of the tongue" - "commanding worthy approval and forbidding worthy blame"; "jihad of the hand" - acceptance appropriate punishments for criminals and violators of moral norms; the "jihad of the sword", conventionally called the "holy war", is an armed struggle against infidels, in which eternal bliss in paradise is prepared for the fallen. At the same time, there are a number of conditions for the "jihad of the sword". For example, the official website of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the Russian Federation explains that Islam prohibits aggression, attacks on anyone. And the "jihad of the sword" is possible as self-defense, defensive actions of "the whole society, the people, to protect their religious rights, their Fatherland, relatives and friends, their property" ^[11].

It should be noted that "jihad of the sword" or as it is called by modern Muslim authors "armed jihad" is possible in strictly defined cases. For example, it is held to protect the country in the event of an invasion by an enemy army or to relieve the suffering of helpless and injured people who are in trouble and unable to protect their lives from danger. Along with this, there are other cases, the detailed consideration of which is a topic for a separate study. In this paper, other tasks are set. Therefore, we only note that in any case, as Islamic scholars (Alim) unanimously believe, "making a decision on jihad is within the exclusive competence of the first leader of the country, in this regard, Muslims are obliged to obey his decision" ^[12].

In general, according to Muslim orthodoxy, jihad is divided into "big" and "small." Great jihad is the nonviolent desire of a person to live as befits a righteous Muslim, following the will of God. It is achieved by adhering to the five pillars of the Islamic faith: the expression of Islam as faith (Shahada), regular prayer, fasting during the month of Ramadan, charity and performing Hajj, pilgrimage to Mecca. This, of course, requires discipline and diligence throughout life, constant intense spiritual work, and self-improvement. Therefore, from the point of view of classical religious precepts, "jihad with oneself" is more significant in terms of religious efforts than "small jihad" (armed jihad). This is determined by the fact that the main goal of the great jihad is the struggle to preserve one's soul from evil and vices, hatred and revenge, since the most dangerous enemy of a person is his nafs (base human nature, his ego). Therefore, a person who is obsessed with nafs must be tolerant of various difficulties that arise in the way of fulfilling Sharia law, since uncontrolled nafs lures a person to laziness, deprives him of responsibility in the performance of religious duties and engaging in good deeds, encourages him to commit sinful deeds in a fit of vicious desires and even crimes ^[12]. It should be noted that serious crimes, from the point of view of Sharia, are such acts as murder, theft, corruption, drug trafficking, sexual violence, prostitution and many others. Severe punishments are provided for them "in both worlds" ^[13]. To clarify: Sharia is a set of prescriptions fixed, first of all, by the Koran and the Sunnah, which determine beliefs, form the moral values and religious conscience of Muslims, and also act as sources of specific norms governing behavior ^[14].

Based on the above, it is obvious that the struggle against one's nafs is the basis of a great jihad. And the believer must show perseverance and firmness in him, which makes it possible for him to participate in the "small jihad." This is explained by the fact that only as a result of a persistent and effective spiritual struggle with his nafs, he will be able to be steadfast on the battlefield ^[12].

However, the theorists of modern radical Islamism not only deny the division of jihad into "big" and "small", but speak only of one jihad – combat, which must be constantly waged against the so-called "enemies of Islam" - that is, all those who are arbitrarily accused by them of "disbelief." Thus, one of the prominent ideologists of Salafism, Mohammed abd al-Salam Faraj (1954-1981), described in his writings the general strategy of "jihad". It is based on the fight against "near enemies", which include Muslims who do not share the ideological views and practices of the radicals, as well as "distant enemies", which include non-Muslim opponents of the radicals, primarily representatives of the Christian civilization. At the same time, A. Faraj stated that "jihad" is an individual duty for every Muslim (fard ain). His opinion was shared and developed in his writings by many other theorists of Islamism. For example, Tariq al-Zumr believed that the highest manifestation of all forms of jihad is armed struggle. Moreover, in his opinion, jihad in this case has an offensive character, and it is not necessary that the infidels initiate the attack first, "it is enough that they only have the signs of those people with whom they should fight" ^[10].

It should be noted that simultaneously with the development of these ideas, the propaganda of Islamist groups began to develop. Its first products began to be created in the 70-80-ies of the XX century. This was due, on the one hand, to the realization that it was not enough to "infect" the ideas of struggle to recruit for "jihad." At the same time, it is necessary to involve a person in the real armed activities of the group. To do this, it is necessary to form his ideological and psychological readiness to fight with weapons in his hands and be ready to die for the "just cause." On the other hand, at that time, the first signs of division appeared in the Islamist movement and, as a result, competition began between various groups for those who could potentially join their ranks. Moreover, during the war in Afghanistan (1979-1989), local mujahideen and foreign fighters were forced to look for ways to attract as many recruits as possible. As a result, propaganda began to separate itself from sermons in mosques in the Persian Gulf countries. Islamists began using formats such as magazines and videos distributed on VHS tapes. And already in the 90s of the XX century. Propaganda formats in the form of audio or video messages from both the leaders of the terrorist group and ordinary militants have finally become established in the Islamist environment. At the same time, Islamists increasingly chose the media to communicate with the audience — almost all of Osama bin Laden's appeals were broadcast through the media, since at that time the Internet, especially in Islamic countries, had not yet received proper distribution. In turn, the wider spread of the Internet has led to a rapid transition of jihadist agitation into virtual reality. It was conducted on numerous websites and forums.

According to the "spirit of the times," the concepts of Islamist theorists began to adapt to the realities of the emerging digital world. For example, Anwar al-Awlaki, an ideologist of the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula terrorist organization banned in Russia, published the book "44 Ways to Support Jihad" in 2009. In it, along with traditional ways of supporting terrorist actions such as financing and aiding, the author listed ways related to information warfare and Internet propaganda. These, according to al-Awlaki, include "the fight against the lies of the Western media," the dissemination of news and literature about "jihad" in various languages, as well as the composition of Nasheed — Islamic chants — on the theme of "jihad" and the like. At the same time, the ideologue of the terrorists called on his supporters to closely monitor the news about "jihad" and actively spread it, as it "revives attachment to the struggle" ^[9].

These recommendations were adopted by the IS media jihadists. Thus, after the proclamation of the so-called "Caliphate" in 2014, it became necessary to position it in the public space. Therefore, numerous media units were created that produced diverse and high-quality Internet propaganda products in the form of video stories that captivate young people, interactive games, nasheeds, and Internet propaganda posters using infographics. The religious rhetoric used served a dual function. On the one hand, it was used to "give sacred legitimacy to propaganda materials", on the other - to "force the reader to construct a special picture of the world beneficial to Islamists" ^[15]. Moreover, the group managed not only to organize a powerful production of propaganda products, but also to organize its large-scale distribution using all available social networks.

Thus, by the beginning of the 21st century, through the efforts of foreign Islamist theorists, the ideological doctrine of jihadists was formed, which is the justification for modern terrorism, hiding behind the Islamic faith. In it, "Jihad" acts as a tool for destroying the very institution of a secular state and returning to the past, to the so-called "golden age" (seventh century) of Islam. Obviously, a voluntary mass return of modern people to the medieval worldview and way of life is extremely unlikely. Therefore, Islamist theorists justify the need to use violence for the total establishment of Salafi ideology on a global scale. They view "jihad" as armed violence, and "media jihad" as the use of "soft power" for propaganda purposes, which is an organized persuasion.

It is significant that in order to create an attractive image of the IG, the medieval mentality was translated through postmodern technologies ^[15]. All produced propaganda products were distinguished by high quality, vivid, dynamic subjects, including videos of executions performed as a theatrical performance. Moreover, a modern researcher, R. F. Pateev, came to the conclusion that today jihadism should be considered as a form of "delinquent subculture, where the negation (inversion) of dominant values in society acquires importance" ^[16]. An analysis of the forms and content of this subculture shows that it is characterized by eclecticism, manifested in a combination of modern culture of violence and radical interpretations of Islamic attitudes: jihad, receiving rewards in paradise, takdir (predestination), takfir (accusations of disbelief), jahilia (pre-Islamic barbarism). This is illustrated by the fact that the jihadist subcultural style is presented online in the form of photo and video stories in which "mujahideen warriors" appear in modern uniforms and with the latest weapons in their hands. At the same time, the young girls present in certain plots serve the idea of "romanticizing jihad." They appear in modest Muslim clothes and bright modern makeup, demonstrating the image of the heart as a symbol of love for the "mujahideen" ^[17].

So, modern researchers single out violence and geodanism as the main constructs of the jihadist subculture. Violence has different physical, psychological, and symbolic forms. Moreover, it is motivated by bitterness towards those who are not members of the destructive group. In order to cultivate and glorify violence, modern digital technologies are used, thanks to which it is framed in grotesque forms, used, firstly, to give aesthetics and lightness to cruelty, and secondly, to "emotionally infect" joy from human grief and suffering. Hedonism also has different manifestations. On the one hand, it manifests itself as pleasure from the discomfort caused to others, as well as from the violation of prohibitions, social norms and moral and ethical attitudes of modern society ^[16]. On the other hand, "delayed hedonism" is manifested, since jihadists, after death as a result of their use of armed violence, including the so-called self-detonations, count on paradise in the company of "beautiful virgins" ^[18].

In this regard, it should be noted that, from the point of view of Islamic orthodoxy, a shahid is a Muslim who sacrifices himself for the sake of faith, homeland (for example, defending it on the battlefield), honor or family. And thus deserves paradise, which he finds himself in immediately after his physical death. The "virgin houris" are waiting for him there. This idea is exploited by the leaders of jihadism, motivating their followers to commit terrorist crimes by promising them eternal heavenly enjoyment after death. In particular, in one of the Russian-language video clips for Nasheed, it sounds very tempting: "Shahid's blood does not have time to dry, as he has already met her, her eyes enjoy his contemplation. A houri with big eyes, a virgin like a ruby" ^[16]. In general, the biographies of jihadists presented in various information and propaganda materials are characterized as an unequal, noble and selfless struggle against the "enemies of Islam" in the name of a good goal - the creation of a "just" state. And they receive rewards for their "heroic efforts" in paradise. It is noteworthy that certain media resources have even transformed Hollywood films and popular video games so that jihadist fighters take the place of the heroes ^[15]. According to the conclusions of R. F. Pateev, there is a fusion of jihadism with the gaming subculture. At the same time, the motives and meanings of jihadist computer games are aimed at suggesting the inevitability of the "heroes" going to heaven ^[16].

It should be noted that VR technologies are used in gamification. To clarify: virtual reality is a technology "with the help of which an interactive digital space is created, reproducing the subordination of the physical laws of the real world" ^[19]. Accordingly, virtual reality has properties such as plausibility, which manifests itself in the feeling of realism of scenarios, and the effect of presence, achieved by involving the maximum number of senses. We emphasize that virtual reality (VR) has an impact on visual and muscle memory, spatial orientation, analysis of various life situations and decision-making in these conditions. Therefore, virtual immersion in an attractively constructed jihadist reality activates the psychological mechanisms of viewers' identification with the heroes of media stories. To clarify: the identification mechanism is manifested in the fact that the viewer emotionally puts himself in the hero's place, experiencing events with him. Sympathizing with the hero, the viewer tends to imitate him in real life and act the same way as him. This is illustrated by data on the effectiveness of IG propaganda spread around the world through all available social networks. So, in 2016, the number of foreign fighters who joined the group was approximately 27-31 thousand people from 86 countries ^[20]. And despite the fact that the "quasi-caliphate" was defeated, its virtual activities in different regions of the world continue with numerous supporters formed during the network activity during its physical existence. After its collapse, they began to independently produce and distribute propaganda materials on social networks aimed at radicalizing individuals and groups. And, in this way, to involve new members and even organize terrorist attacks. Similar network activity was recorded during the monitoring of the Russian social network VKontakte ^[21].

It should be noted that radicalism is the acceptance of any extreme views and ideological solidarity with them, while extremism is the willingness and ability to achieve fundamental changes in destructive, extreme ways that go beyond the law. One of the extremist practices is terrorism. Recruitment to a particular extremist organization occurs after an individual has become radicalized. Therefore, the efforts of malefactors to involve young people in extremism begin with the "launch" of the process of radicalization of an individual, which is the formation of social attitudes leading to the approval and, ultimately, to the use of illegal violence for political purposes ^[22]. Young people experiencing a crisis situation and, as a result, a state of frustration are the most susceptible to such influences. frustratio —"frustration of plans", "destruction of plans") is a mental state that occurs in a situation of real or perceived inability to meet certain needs. Or, more simply, in a situation where desires do not match the available opportunities. As the analysis of real cases shows, in modern society, this can be both material security and a social need, for example, a sense of community, belonging as opposed to an excessive sense of loneliness and helplessness. It is important to note that the state of frustration negatively affects both the emotional and cognitive spheres of personality. This is expressed, on the one hand, in the experience of anxiety, depression, and on the other hand, in the weakening of the ability to think rationally and critically. As a result, there is a decrease in the level of self-control. Therefore, it is young people experiencing this condition who risk falling into the "networks" of recruiters.

According to the results of modern research, the radicalization of potential members of jihadist groups in the digital world has the character of double socialization, which takes place simultaneously in offline and online modes ^[21]. For example, there are cases when "psychological processing" for recruitment purposes begins offline, if the potential victim is personally acquainted with the recruiter, for example, his friend, relative, classmate, etc. And then the attacker involves the "victim" in online communities, for this he shares links, invites to visit Islamist sites, forums, etc. Along with this, the possibilities of social networks are widely used by extremist activists to involve as many new members as possible in the group.

Here is a typical recruitment algorithm in social networks ^[23]. The first step is to choose a "victim." To do this, attackers analyze accounts, pay attention to the statuses, topics and content of publications on the page of potential victims. The circle of objects of influence includes, first of all, young people who are in an unstable psycho-emotional state, which is reflected in the choice of content for their page and ways of their own positioning. Examples include such statuses as "Lone wolf", "Everything is bad", etc. They attract the attention of the recruiter, he seeks to get to know the author of the page and establish a network friendship with him. To do this, the attacker uses information collected based on the analysis of the user's page about his interests, lifestyle, and future plans and involves him in discussing topics that are important to him (sports, computer games, movies, etc.). In this way, the attacker seeks to become an "understanding friend" and gain the trust of a potential victim. After the goal is achieved, he proceeds to talk about "How to make the world a better place?" and talks about radical Islamist projects for world reconstruction, the creation of a "just, prosperous state", and a "responsive society." During such conversations, the recruiter shares links to books, videos, etc. by Islamist activists and pseudo-religious leaders. After the victim is imbued with radical ideas, he seeks to organize a meeting to encourage extremist actions.

According to the results of monitoring of the Russian social network VKontakte conducted in the period 2023-2024, the Internet audience showing interest in Salafism, in comparison with previous periods, is not inclined to decrease, despite the physical defeat of the so-called "Islamic State". It is noted that increased control in the digital space and increased legal responsibility for the dissemination of extremist content have led to the blocking of resources openly broadcasting it and the "squeezing out" of communities that are directly affiliated with banned extremist and terrorist movements of an Islamist orientation. However, radical Salafi discourse is still present in the online environment, acquiring more veiled forms and representations. As noted by S. I. Chudinov, online Salafist groups on the VKontakte social network are able to include dozens, and in some cases even hundreds of thousands of young users between the ages of 18 and 29 ^[21]. At the same time, among radical online groups that target different ideologues and show varying degrees of rigidity in their positions, the most aggressive discourse is typical for those who are allegedly under the influence of the IS terrorist movement. In addition to the direct threat of recruitment for terrorist attacks, the danger of radical online communities also lies in the fact that they "contribute to the deformation of traditional Islamic ideas about the spiritual principles of Islam, its social teachings and attitudes towards the relationship with other value and cultural systems" ^[21]. The author of this article came to similar conclusions as a result of an expert-analytical study of audio recordings of a thematic series of lectures conducted by one of the imams, which were posted on the public channel of one of the messengers. The study was conducted in 2024 at the request of a law enforcement agency authorized to prevent and counter extremism. Due to the fact that this study was of a closed nature, the region, the name of the religious organization of which the mentioned imam was an employee, and, accordingly, the law enforcement agency that paid special attention to his activities are not indicated. According to the results of our research, the lecturer is a follower of Salafism. His classes were aimed at shaping the students' radical ideological attitudes. And, thus, the creation of a base for recruitment into extremist and terrorist organizations. Moreover, after listening to such lectures, young people can continue to search for information on their own, turning to questionable sources and Internet preachers recommended by the lecturer. As a result, they may be involved in terrorism not only in their region of residence, but also in other regions of the Russian Federation. In addition, young people who have attended these lectures and become supporters of the pseudo-religious ideas promoted at them can consolidate and organize a separate jamaat (community) that will promote Salafism, involve new members and use criminal methods to solve their pressing, including financial problems. Such an organized and cohesive jamaat can transform into a terrorist organization in the presence of a charismatic destructive leader.

As the examples of M. Mukozhev (1966-2009), Kabardino-Balkarian imam, ideologist of Wahhabism, A. Astemirov (1976-2010), one of the leaders and ideologists of the Islamist movement in the North Caucasus, S. Buryatsky (19822010, birth name - Alexander Tikhomirov) show. - the Salafi preacher, the infamous ideologue of the North Caucasian jihadist formations, the appearance of a terrorist group in the region is preceded by the appearance of a Salafi preacher who is preparing an ideological base for this. And in the future, new members will join such a group, ideologically ready for violent actions. For example, Abuzagir Mantaev, one of the militants of the so-called Sharia Jamaat who were killed on October 9, 2005 in Makhachkala, defended his PhD thesis in 2002 in Moscow on the topic "Wahhabism and the political situation in Dagestan." To clarify: Wahhabism is a type of Salafi religious and political trend in Islam. For some time Mantaev worked in the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the European part of Russia. In 2005, he returned to Dagestan and joined the ranks of the Sharia terrorists ^[10].

It should be emphasized that timely developed and competently implemented social prevention measures can significantly reduce and sometimes even eliminate the risks of developing radicalism in a religious environment, which is a conscious, purposeful, socially organized activity to prevent possible social, psychological, pedagogical, legal, and other problems and achieve the desired result. Moreover, in our opinion, it is advisable to distinguish primary and secondary levels in the system of social prevention of radicalism. Primary prevention is aimed at a wide range of people and is aimed at preventing the formation of adherence to radical ideologies. Secondary prevention is aimed at people who have fallen under the influence of radical ideologies and is aimed at their re-socialization and social integration ^[24].

It is important to note that the need to strengthen primary prevention is evidenced, in particular, by the conclusions of R. F. Pateev regarding the fact that media products of jihadist subcultural creativity fill the modern digital space. However, the formation of counter-narratives capable of shifting the attention of young people who are already interested in them is difficult, since this requires the exploitation of similar attitudes focused on mass culture: violence, hedonism, consumerism, etc. ^[16]. Accordingly, a kind of "vaccination" is important, making a young person less sensitive to jihadist propaganda. Therefore, primary prevention is of particular importance in the system of preventive measures, since it allows you to form a kind of immunity to destructive influences. This is confirmed, in particular, by the studies we conducted earlier, which involved young people (university students) who were recruited on social networks and refused to participate in radical movements ^[25]. They motivated their position by the fact that the ideas of the attackers have nothing to do with the Islamic faith, but it is difficult to have discussions with them, since destructive activists conduct very aggressive disputes, so the young people chose to completely refuse to communicate with them. During our conversation, they expressed gratitude to the imam of the mosque of which they are parishioners and to all the mentors who introduced them to religious values and morals, explained the basics of the Islamic worldview and social behavior of Muslims. Moreover, as the experience of the countries of the Islamic world shows, religious figures who enjoy high authority among Muslims play an important role in the prevention of radicalism ^[20]. This is largely due to the fact that the religious environment is a microsystem of special social and interpersonal relationships between people who profess a particular religion. Relations in the religious environment are formed on the basis of common needs, interests, values and joint religious activities of believers. Therefore, they quite steadily unite the latter into religious groups (communities). As a result of the development of these relations in the religious environment, a certain community of psychological characteristics develops: a community of views, norms of behavior, attitudes, assessments of everyday and socially significant events; and a common specific ideological and emotional atmosphere arises ^[26].

Because of this, the religious environment influences social cognition on both the individual and group levels. To clarify, social cognition is an affective and cognitive process of constructing an image of the social world in individual and public consciousness. The process of social cognition proceeds through everyday, including network interactions with cognizable objects and subjects^[27].

Thus, as part of the primary social prevention of radicalism, it is advisable to organize meaningful Internet communication, on the one hand, to explain the basics of the Islamic faith and culture, including the moral regulators of social behavior of Muslims. On the other hand, it is used to provide spiritual support to people who are experiencing any difficulties of a material, social, or psychological nature, which makes them easier "prey" for recruiters. The subjects of social prevention are groups of individuals and organizations on whose actions the elimination of the causes of negative phenomena and their consequences depends. It is obvious that the main subject of social prevention of radicalism in the religious environment are the Spiritual administrations of Muslims as centralized organizations. Accordingly, it is advisable for them to take leadership positions in planning, creating and promoting positive preventive media content. To clarify, positive preventive media content is content aimed at preventing negative phenomena in society and competing with destructive content in the media space ^[23]. Such content carries a certain value for the target audience and arouses its sincere interest. At the same time, it has an educational and preventive task. It is advisable to involve so—called digital strategists in its creation and dissemination - these are those who use existing digital resources for religious purposes, for example, bloggers. Today, they are represented, on the one hand, by professional theologians who have a special theological education and occupy a significant position in a religious organization. On the other hand, they are charismatic folk "theo-bloggers" who may not have sufficient theological training, but consider their blog as a way to present religious doctrine in an accessible way to a wide range of believers ^[17].

It is important to consider the categories of Islamic morality such as justice, respect, good neighborliness, and striving for the good of all members of society, regardless of their nationality and religion, as the value basis for positive preventive media content broadcast in a Muslim religious environment. It should be noted that these categories are the basis of the social teaching of Islam and the Social Doctrine of Russian Muslims.

We emphasize that the main illustrative and didactic means of explaining the above-mentioned categories, taking into account the peculiarities of the digital generation, should be infographics created using various media tools that allow interactive plots to be constructed. And social networks should become the main means of promoting such content, since they promote informative learning, that is, learning outside the standard educational environment. To clarify, informative learning is an individual cognitive activity that accompanies a person's daily life and is not necessarily purposeful. This includes, for example, learning certain skills in everyday life, self-education, and enlightenment, including through the consumption of religious content and social media communication with religious figures who answer audience questions, comment on significant public events, and thus set the vectors of their social perception.

To summarize, religious organizations have accumulated some experience in the media space, but their efforts to create positive preventive content are at an early stage and need to be developed based on adequate scientific and methodological support.

Conclusions

Radical Islamist ideologists distort the interpretation of the category of "jihad" accepted in traditional Islam. They view "jihad" as armed violence aimed at destroying the very institution of a secular state and establishing Salafi ideology on a global scale. Moreover, Salafist ideologues have introduced the category of "media jihad", which implies the use of "soft power" for propaganda purposes as an organized persuasion. With the help of the latest digital technologies, propaganda media products are being created that cultivate violence and a kind of hedonism. These products are distributed by extremist activists in all available social networks. Such activities, as monitoring and analytical studies show, are also carried out in modern Russian cyberspace. Moreover, due to increased control in the digital space and active prosecution for the dissemination of extremist content, radical Islamist discourse is undergoing a transformation, taking on more veiled but no less dangerous forms. It is difficult to counteract this phenomenon by constructing counter-narratives, since their creation also presupposes reliance on a culture of violence and consumption, which have a destructive effect on traditional values and models of human and society's social life.

So, there is a need to develop methods of primary social prevention of radicalism aimed at creating a kind of immunity to destructive network influences and, thereby, reducing the risks of youth involvement in radical Islamist activities. In this regard, it is advisable to involve Muslim religious figures in the creation of positive preventive media content focused on education in an interactive mode and solving the tasks of informative education. At the same time, the value basis of such content should be the categories of Islamic morality, which are the basis of the social teaching of Islam and the Social doctrine of Russian Muslims, namely: justice, good neighborliness, striving for the good of all members of society, regardless of their national and religious affiliation.

Conclusion

According to the results of this study, social networks are a promising means of primary prevention of radicalism, which must be conducted not only offline, but also online. Its expediency is determined, on the one hand, by the fact that extremist activists, despite strengthening their opposition to the spread of destructive content, continue to promote radical Islamist ideas, often giving them more veiled forms. On the other hand, it is determined by the cognitive and socio-psychological characteristics of the representatives of the so-called digital generation.

Based on this, it is advisable to form an alternative network agenda for young people who are interested in the Islamic faith and culture. Obviously, this requires the active participation of Muslim religious figures in the creation of positive preventive media content aimed at educating, first of all, about the values of Islamic morality. It is important to note that this activity should be carried out on the basis of scientific and methodological support, its results should be subjected to monitoring analysis and expert assessment.

Thus, the study of social media as a means of preventing radicalism is very promising in terms of further research. In this regard, special attention should be paid not only to the use of digital, but also to humanitarian, communicative, and psycholinguistic technologies for the creation and network promotion of positive preventive media content. At the same time, it is equally important to develop criteria for assessing the effectiveness of its impact and the prolonged social consequences of its impact on the target audience.

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