Reference:
Goncharova, S. Yu..
Intentionality of Consciousness as a Biological Feature of Brain
// Psychology and Psychotechnics. – 2014. – ¹ 3.
– P. 295-303.
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Abstract: The article is devoted to the definition of intentionality offered by John Searle as the corner stone of his
philosophy. The main idea of Searle’s theory of intentionality is that intentionality should be defined in terms of
natural science just like consciousness. According to the philosopher, scientific definition of intentionality would allow
to solve a great number of important philosophical issues. Our mind has different forms of intentionality, perception
and intentional action being the basic forms and linguistic acts deriving from these basic forms.
Since the research analysis is oriented at solving a particular issue, i.e. the main purpose of research is to study
intentionality as a feature of brain, in particular, to provide a definition of intentionality from the point of view of the
representative of English analytical philosophy John Searle. For this purpose, the author of the article used the method
of historical reenactment. This method is based on the analysis of philosophical concepts that are directly related to
the topic.
John Searle’s approach to intentionality involves the definition of consciousness as a natural biological phenomenon.
However, unlike other phenomena of the kind, consciousness is the subjective phenomenon that, at the same time, can
influence physiological processes. In his theory of intentionality John Searle admitted that he was both an internalist,
realist and follower of Gottlob Frege. John Searle believed the subjective qualitative aspect to be the most fundamental
in the concept of mentality and used the term ‘intentionality’ for describing the subclasses of mental states that are
typically object-oriented.
Keywords: Searle, intentionality, feature of brain, intentional content, mental states, illocutionary force, orientation, correspondence, execution conditions, mental representation, possible world.
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