The use of veterinary police measures in the Russo-German Customs War (1892-1914): deliberate restriction of exports or forced necessity?

Kulakov Aleksei Aleksandrovich Head of the Center, National Research University Higher School of Economics 109028, Russia, Moscow, Moscow, blvd. Pokrovsky, 11, of. L-302 alexey_kulakov@inbox.ru Other publications by this author

The use of veterinary and police measures in the context of the Russo-German customs war (1892-1914) ^{[1, p. 62]} is one of the least studied topics in both Russian and foreign historiography. In part, its lack of study is explained by its interdisciplinarity. The customs war as an object of research in itself requires a historian to have deep knowledge in various fields, including the basics of law and economics. But if these branches of science are at least related to each other by belonging to the humanities, then the study of its veterinary aspects requires the researcher to have encyclopedic knowledge or, at least, to involve an external specialist who understands such issues.

The second reason why the use of veterinary and police measures often remains outside the boundaries of the study is due to the narrow interpretation of the concept of "customs war", perceived as an interstate economic conflict with the use of exclusively customs and tariff regulation measures (in the English literature, the term tariff war is used in relation to it). In other words, the "instrument" of this war is only the rates of customs duties. With this approach, any other foreign trade restrictions, including veterinary ones, are not considered as an instrument of customs struggle between countries, which, in our opinion, unreasonably narrows the scope of historical research of such conflicts.

The Russian-German customs war also began as a tariff war. On February 1, 1892, the German government refused to grant Russia further most-favored-nation treatment, which meant an automatic increase in customs duties on almost all Russian exports by 15-30%. The corresponding increase in prices for Russian products made them uncompetitive on the foreign market. At the same time, Germany concluded a number of agreements on lowering the customs tariff and granting preferences for agricultural products originating from other countries. Among these countries, in particular, were Austria-Hungary and Romania, Russia's main rivals in the global agricultural market ^{[2, p. 282]}, which, of course, was regarded as an unfriendly step towards our country. Until the conclusion of the Russian-German trade agreement on January 29 (February 10), 1894, the opponents fought each other mainly by increasing the customs tariff several times, although, in fairness, it should be noted that already at the initial stage of the conflict, Germany resorted to the introduction of veterinary and police measures as a response to restrictions on German imports. So, in early August 1893, as a measure aimed at preventing the import of plague, the authorities of Bromberg, Konigsberg, Gumbinen, Marien and Verdun banned the import of hay and straw from Russia, starting on the 25th ^{[3, p. 13]}. Considering that this restriction was applied only to Russian fodder a few days after the entry into force of the "combat" customs tariff for German goods and was not introduced immediately, but had a delayed effect, it can be assumed that the quarantine measure was not dictated by considerations of ensuring epidemiological well-being, but rather was used as a "weapon" in the customs war.

As a result of the multiple increase in customs duties, trade between Russia and Germany practically stopped, and the welfare of the population in both countries plummeted – the situation required defusing. The concluded trade agreement marked the end of the "hot" phase of the conflict, trade resumed, but it did not put an end to the customs war. The parties agreed to fix the rates of customs duties in the annexes to the trade agreement concluded for a period of 10 years, and had no right to change them unilaterally.

Thus, this agreement hindered the implementation of an autonomous customs policy by the participating countries and limited the possibility of using the tariff in the ongoing customs war. It became possible to influence the enemy's export volumes only through the establishment of non-tariff barriers, including in the form of veterinary and police measures.

Veterinary and police measures (today they are simply referred to as veterinary or veterinary and sanitary restrictions) were so named due to the fact that at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, the functions of monitoring epidemiological welfare in the country were assigned to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Veterinary services were structural divisions of the relevant departments.

The possibility of introducing veterinary restrictions was explicitly provided for in the trade agreement between Russia and Germany. Article 5 obliged the Contracting Parties to refrain from bans on exports and imports, except in cases where such a ban is imposed "in the interests of public health and the veterinary police" ^{[4, p. 10]}. In subsequent years, Germany, which was epidemiologically more prosperous than Russia, repeatedly resorted to this reservation, which gave rise to speculation about the existence of real reasons for the introduction of appropriate restrictions.

So what were the veterinary and police restrictions applied to Russian agricultural products: deliberate restrictions on exports or a forced measure to ensure sanitary and epidemiological well-being?

A number of sources indicate that numerous abuses took place on the part of the German authorities acting in the interests of rural owners.

So, in one of the reports addressed to the Director of the Department of Trade and Manufactures of the Ministry of Finance, V.I. Kovalevsky, it was said that "the main gap in the treatise is in the absence of positive rules for border sanitary supervision of livestock, so that German efforts to protect themselves from infection were conscientious and did not mask another goal, namely: sanitary difficulties to provide indirect protection of their own cattle breeding" ^{[5, l. 1-2]}. The crossing of the Prussian border was carried out only through land checkpoints, subject to mandatory veterinary inspection. Such an inspection was carried out only if the number of animals exceeded 10 individuals, otherwise the placement under veterinary supervision had to wait several days. At the same time, the exporter paid for the services of a veterinarian and the maintenance of animals at the border. "As a result," commercial agents pointed out, "Germany earned 12,000 marks from veterinary and sanitary supervision at only one border checkpoint (not counting the amount of customs duties), which indicated the fiscal nature of the restrictions, which were not caused by objective necessity" ^{[5, l. 4]}.

Russia has repeatedly protested about abuses in the implementation of veterinary supervision, violations of the principles of international trade and the existence of grounds for retaliatory measures against German imports ^{[5, l. 6-7]}. The German historian G. Halgarten called such actions "veterinary police customs quibbles" ^{[6, p. 203]}.

In 1896-1897, due to the numerous difficulties created by the German government for the supply of grain, meat, live cattle and poultry from Russia, relations between trading partners again slipped into open confrontation, known in German historiography as the "little customs war" ^[7]. Upper Silesia imposed a total ban on the export of pork and geese; grain also came under the action of veterinary and police measures on the Prussian border. The newspaper Königsberger Hartungsche Zeitung published information that the relevant restrictions were introduced under the pretext of importing epizootics and grain bacilli from Russia, paying special attention to the targeted nature of the restrictions – targeting exclusively Russian agricultural products ^{[8, p. 1]}. The newspaper calls the reason for the introduction of veterinary restrictions "doubtful", and grain bacilli are an "invention" ^{[9, p. 1]}, hinting at the lack of real grounds for the application of such measures. Through diplomatic channels, the German government was informed that Russia did not dispute the right to introduce veterinary and police measures, but only "the correctness of their application, so that measures of an exclusively economic nature would not be taken under the guise of sanitary measures" ^{[10, l. 188]}.

In order to assess the legality of the restrictions imposed in the Privislinsky region, a special veterinary commission was established. The commission's conclusion noted that "the Prussian provinces adjacent to the Russian provinces are the least susceptible to epizootics" and that the diseases are widespread mainly in West Germany, which, according to experts, indicated the far–fetched reasons for a total ban on the import of pigs and geese from Russia" ^{[10, l. 105-109]}.

Unjustified veterinary and police restrictions and other "hostile" actions towards Russian exports forced the Finance Ministries of the Russian Empire to act. In response, paratarif measures were introduced against German goods, providing for a change in approaches to the classification of leather and haberdashery goods, which entailed additional amounts of customs duties, as well as mandatory veterinary examinations of German horses. The Ministry noted that it was forced to respond to the unfriendly actions of the German side, which "cannot be interpreted ... otherwise than as the result of harassment by the Prussian Agrarian Party in order to restrict the import of vital products from Russia" ^{[10, l. 3]}.

G. Halgarten considered the German Ministry of Agriculture, which implemented the ideas of the Union of Rural Owners, to be the culprit of the aggravation of Russian-German relations ^{[6, p. 203]}. The German press, on the contrary, placed personal responsibility for a new round of customs warfare on local authorities, dependent on farmers and charged with the authority to "pinpoint" the introduction of veterinary restrictions. For example, the aforementioned Königsberger Hartungsche Zeitung was critical of the introduction of a ban by Thorn and Upper Silesia on pork supplies from Russia. The newspaper considered such measures excessive, pointing out that "the ban, issued at the insistence of farmers, is based, as in Upper Silesia, on hygienic considerations, although in Thorne there is ... a slaughterhouse equipped with all necessary precautions, ... so successful that ... the danger of spreading the disease has not been established" ^{[11, s. 1]}. At the same time, the newspaper's correspondent notes, "the population of Thorn is constantly suffering from rising meat prices and is forced to pay three times more than residents on the other side of the border, the middle class now knows who to thank for this "shutdown policy", which cannot be justified by objective reasons, because well-equipped and managed slaughterhouses are quite they are able to provide the necessary protection against the risk of epidemics" ^{[11, p. 1]}.

The Königsberger Hartungsche Zeitung also published a report by the Oppeln Chamber of Commerce and Industry on the adverse effects of restrictions on pork imports from Russia. Among them, the chamber attributed rising prices for bacon and lard, falling living standards of the middle class, the inability of the eastern provinces to independently meet sharply increased demand and the lack of solidarity from other German lands, "which did not take the expected part in supplying the meat market of Upper Silesia" ^{[11, p. 1]}.

Although the crisis caused by the introduction of veterinary and police measures was quickly resolved by the parties at the next meeting of the Berlin Conference, the situation periodically worsened due to the introduction of restrictions on the supply of livestock products from Russia. The German side continued to introduce new measures to restrict Russian exports, and as the deadline for the end of the trade agreement approached, this trend only intensified.

According to the data of the Department of Customs Duties, in 1898, the German government closed all checkpoints except five on the Russian-Prussian border for the passage of poultry from Russia. In January-April 1901, under the pretext of a smallpox epidemic in the border area, passenger and freight traffic was suspended along the entire land border line within the Warsaw and Kalinin provinces. In the same year, Germany introduced a special fee for the issuance of permits for border crossing for residents own border provinces to prevent them travelling to Russia for the food. At the same time, the Lubech Customs informed the Ministry of Finance about the ban imposed by the Prussian authorities on the passage of Russian horses under the pretext of spreading contagious diseases, and the Zelgona customs reported on the non-admission of Russian geese across the border if they were not transported in cages, as a result of which exporters were "forced to stop the goose trade" ^{[12, l. 23-28]}. In 1903, The transportation of meat from Russia was restricted: German customs refused to allow meat products to pass except by rail; the goods themselves were subject to mandatory preliminary examination, and rejected meat was subject to destruction ^{[12, l. 16-18]}. According to the report of the Okulsky crossing point, the "restrictive" measures against meat from Russia were caused by "the petition of German meat dealers who are unable to compete with our meat producers" ^{[12, l. 19-20]}. A number of the listed measures were canceled after the tsarist government sent appropriate protests.

During the negotiations on the extension of the trade agreement in 1903-1904, the Russian delegation put forward as one of the conditions the elimination of discrimination in the implementation of veterinary and police surveillance of livestock: the introduction of quarantine measures was to apply not only to Russia, but also to third countries (an exception could be made only in relation to Austria-Hungary) ^{[12, l. 192]}.

However, the outbreak of the Russian-Japanese war significantly weakened the negotiating positions of our country: the German negotiators did not make concessions on this issue. The Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs defended the position that veterinary police surveillance "is not the result of any arbitrariness and whim" and "was caused by necessity as an inevitable protection against the importation of sick Russian cattle into Germany" ^{[13, l. 4-5]}; it considered it inappropriate to raise the issue of any mitigation in this case.. When concluding an additional convention to the trade agreement, S.Y. Witte managed only to obtain "some formal relaxations in the rules for importing livestock" ^{[14, p. 194]}. Veterinary and police restrictions continued to "poison" Russian-German trade relations until the outbreak of World War I, except for the easing of sanitary restrictions in 1912 on farm animals transiting from Russia through Germany to third countries ^{[15, l. 3]}.

Analyzing the sources, it may seem that the German authorities used veterinary and police measures solely to restrict the export of Russian cattle, deliberately finding fault with domestic suppliers, and there was no problem of ensuring epidemiological well-being. However, there were problems with the organization of veterinary medicine in Russia at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries.

The correspondence between the Veterinary Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Empire and the Grodno Board eloquently testifies to the state of affairs. The department's directive No. 5277 dated 11/04/1905 states that "the frequent cases of shipments of live poultry from Russia to Germany that have been affected by infectious diseases in recent years" threaten to "undermine our export trade" and special rules for its export to Germany need to be developed (such rules will later be adopted for others). types of farm animals). But in addition to the rules, proper organization of veterinary supervision is also necessary "at first, at least only in large breeding sites for poultry intended for export purposes" ^{[16, l. 6]}. The board's report indicates that only the Brest railway station is suitable for these purposes, but "veterinary and sanitary riots" are taking place there: sick poultry are sold at a cheap price to ordinary people; dead birds are used by them to pluck feathers; corpses are not buried after that and could even be sold for meat; a pool for geese is often It is observed to be polluted and, of course, could serve as a source of infection for imported poultry. The reason for such "unrest", according to the board, is that poultry farming belongs to the female household, "as a result, it is difficult to expect the male population to take poultry farming seriously; without this ... it is impossible to count on the serious attitude of the male population to poultry health, and negligence in this regard will lead to negligence to all established veterinary and police measures" ^{[16, l. 33]}. At the same time, in September 1905, cholera was detected in poultry, "but veterinary and police measures were not taken in the absence of any orders on this matter, but veterinary advice was given to bird owners" ^{[16, l. 34]}.

Thus, the local administration of the Grodno province actually recognized the existence of numerous sanitary and epidemiological problems in the region and the lack of proper supervision of the health of live poultry. Similar problems were observed with other types of farm animals.

Thus, from the circular of the Veterinary Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Empire dated 05/19/1904 No. 690, it follows that when checking the conditions for sending commercial and industrial pigs to the border areas, numerous violations were identified. The circular states that "the above-mentioned matter is very unsatisfactorily handled at most points" ^{[15, l. 5]}: the pig quarantine facilities are improperly equipped and adapted, do not allow isolating and thoroughly inspecting the animals contained, and do not protect the latter from infection during transportation to the loading station. "Veterinary supervision of quarantined batches of pigs," the document says, "their branding and inspection, often carried out without due attention, superficially and cursorily, as well as without strict observance of the above rules and bearing the obvious character of aimless formalism, do not at all ensure the destinations of sales markets from the delivery of shipments that are unfavorable for infectious diseases" ^{[15, L. 5]}.

From the circular of the Grodno Governor dated 11/20/1910 No. 1498 regarding the import of foot-and-mouth disease to Warsaw from various points of the province, it follows that veterinarians in charge of supervising pigs sent to the Privislinsky region do not fulfill all the requirements in full accuracy before sending pigs"; assuming "in the future, pigs will be sent without the use of livestock thermometry, and without the a thorough inspection of animals (especially the lower extremities) will result in the dismissal of those responsible for veterinary supervision from their positions" ^{[17, l. 9]}.

Finally, the letter of the Railway Administration of the Ministry of Railways and Communications of the Russian Empire dated 02.10.1911 No. 25239 also indicated violations of veterinary and sanitary rules. The main and most frequent "irregularities" are the loading or reloading of cattle and pigs without veterinary inspection and without proper notification of such shipments to destination stations, in addressing live cargo to stations not intended for unloading animals, sending pigs without quarantine, insufficient washing, cleaning and disinfection of wagons, and station contamination. The Department expresses concerns that "the recurrence of such omissions ... may not only adversely affect the cattle trade, but also fundamentally undermine the export of pigs abroad" ^{[17, l. 21]}.

The problems of proper organization of veterinary supervision in the territory of the Russian Empire gave rise to a discussion in the professional community about the need to switch to a different export model, replacing the export of live livestock and poultry with beaten ones. The removal of broken meat "would eliminate the need to establish a complex and burdensome ... system of veterinary and police measures at the places of assembly, recreation and unloading." <animals> and would save significant monetary expenses for equipping an entire network of railway stations with the necessary devices ..." ^{[16, l. 41]}. Experts also attributed the disadvantages of supplying live meat abroad to the inability to use raw material residues for their own needs and the creation of conditions "for economic slavery", providing "states that are our markets" with the opportunity to "fatten their cattle breeding almost for free with products that could serve no less well to raise the quality our own animal husbandry" ^{[16, l. 41]}.

Despite the obvious benefits of such an export model, it was never implemented during the years of the customs war for several reasons. The first is purely economic – the sale of by–products involves the creation of special conditions for their production, storage and transportation (construction of slaughterhouses, warehouses, refrigerators, conversion of railway wagons, etc.), which will ultimately lead to higher costs than the organization of proper veterinary supervision. The second is Germany's disinterest. As the Veterinary Department noted, "in matters of international exchange, supply always has to meet demand, and the sales market, Germany, cannot be encouraged to receive our export items in the form we desire, rather than in the form it requires. It is a well-known fact that all countries receiving products from outside tend in most cases to ensure that they are delivered in unprocessed form, because, undoubtedly, this state of affairs gives them certain advantages. A change in this condition in relation to poultry exports may also be objected to by Germany in the sense that, based on the inspection data of battered poultry, it is much more difficult to verify the correctness of the veterinary supervision established for it at the slaughter sites and to judge the degree of validity of its sanitary well-being" ^{[16, l. 41]}. Finally, the third reason is that it is not profitable for the producer, since imported beaten meat is traded on the market at a lower price.

In 1912, the German authorities attached great importance to veterinary and police relief in relation to the transit of domestic meat products in Russia. They were seen as a chance to "dispel ... the firm belief that has developed in some circles in the West about the insufficiency of our veterinary supervision," the successful results of which "could have a huge impact on preparing favorable ground for an agreement on wider marketing of our cattle products to Germany in the upcoming negotiations on a new Russian-German trade agreement." ^{[15, l. 3]}.

Numerous measures have been taken to strengthen animal health control on the Russian border, and the Veterinary Department has repeatedly pointed out to the governors the reputational risks of improper meat products for domestic trade. "Indulgences on the part of veterinary supervision," said one of the relevant reports, "whatever their motives, will lead to the delivery of meat products to the borders of Prussia, which are unfavorable for infectious and widespread diseases, which circumstance will serve as a powerful weapon for opponents of allowing the aforementioned importation to assert that Russian meat, which is within the limits of German veterinarians will detect the changes inherent in infectious diseases, which is a source of infection, poses a menacing danger to German cattle breeding and, of course, confirms the opinion about the failure of Russian veterinary supervision" ^{[15, l. 3]}.

A number of archival documents indicate the introduction of a veterinary safety monitoring system in the border regions. Thus, the Veterinary Department regularly requested reports from the county veterinarians of the Grodno province and the Privislinsky region on the incidence of animals and the presence of epizootics. The response reports emphasized that "the slaughter of livestock for the purpose of sending meat to Germany" was not carried out ^{[18, l. 1, 4, 10]}.

Another measure to strengthen animal health control was the introduction of mandatory certification of export horses for sale to Germany and horses bordering Prussia from November 26, 1912. A standard passport was issued for each horse, which reflected information about the owner, the place of purchase, the characteristics of the animal (gender, breed, color, special signs), the date of the veterinary examination, the number of the carriage in which the horse was traveling to the border, and the destination station. In addition to the introduction of passport books, there were a number of strict rules for veterinary inspection and transportation of animals abroad. The horse was not allowed to be exported in the absence of a certificate of well-being issued during the last month. The rules regulated the actions of not only animal owners, but also station chiefs, veterinarians, local authorities, customs and police officials; requirements were introduced for the sanitary condition of railway wagons intended for transportation, and the procedure for quarantining horses. The release of a horse abroad was allowed only through certain checkpoints, provided that the veterinarian determined that the exported animal corresponded to the one described in the passport and diagnosed the absence of signs of glanders ^{[15, l. 16-20]}.

Despite the existence of clear instructions on veterinary supervision, the system of passports, veterinary certificates and other certificates has often been criticized. The Veterinary Department stated that "with the existing contingent of rural authorities and lower ranks of the rural police, it is impossible ... to expect that the issued certificates could have a serious significance of reliable documents for the veterinary business," their registration is "only a simple formality, embarrassing for merchants, purposeless for veterinary and sanitary needs and created only for the sake of imaginary reassurance." Germany, which, of course, needs not artificial, but life rules" ^{[16, l. 42]}.

Summarizing the above, it is impossible to answer unequivocally the question of whether the German veterinary and police measures were a manifestation of unfair competition, hampering Russian exports, or dictated by the interests of national security in order to prevent the import of dangerous infections and diseases into the country. On the one hand, archival documents confirm the unsatisfactory state of veterinary supervision in Russia at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries, demonstrate negligence in its implementation and a lack of understanding of the importance of appropriate measures for international trade, which, of course, indicates the validity of the concerns of the German side. On the other hand, numerous facts of abuse and speculation in favor of the Prussian junkers, the lack of reliable evidence of the importation of diseases from Russia, and finally, the political and economic benefits of the Reich from the introduction of prohibitive measures on the supply of farm animals and crops cast doubt on the good faith of the German authorities and the reality of the threat of the spread of epizootics. Obviously, the truth lies somewhere in between: depending on the state of interstate relations during the years of the customs war, veterinary and police measures could be used both to deliberately restrict Russian exports and to ensure the epidemiological well-being of the German Empire.