Genesis of the Institution of Denunciation in the Theory and Practice of the Law of Treaties

Gu Wenshuo ORCID: 0009-0009-8484-3796 Postgraduate Student; Department of International Law; Peoples' Friendship University of Russia named after Patrice Lumumba Office 6, Miklukho-Maklaya str., Moscow, 117198, Russia 1042225079@pfur.ru

Chernykh Irina Alekseevna ORCID: 0000-0002-5369-1736 PhD in Law Associate Professor; Department of International Law; Peoples' Friendship University of Russia named after Patrice Lumumba Office 6, Miklukho-Maklaya str., Moscow, 117198, Russia chernykh-ia@rudn.ru

1. Question statement

The right of States to denounce an international treaty is one of the important elements in the field of international treaty law. However, it should be noted that so far there is not a single international legal document that establishes the definition of "denunciation of an international treaty" ^{[1, p. 155]}. From the analysis of doctrinal sources devoted to certain issues of the law of international treaties ^{[2, p. 124]}, it can be concluded that the denunciation of an international treaty is "the withdrawal of a State party from a treaty with a warning given in the manner and within the time limits stipulated in the treaty itself" ^{[3, p. 73]}, and "it is a procedural action performed unilaterally by a State party wishing to withdraw from its obligations under the treaty" ^{[4, p. 87]}.

Despite the fact that denunciation of international treaties is relatively common (for example, according to R. Helfer on denunciation of multilateral international treaties, from 1945 to 1969 there were 351 cases, from 1970 to 1994 – 710 denunciations)^[1], there are relatively few academic studies on the right to denounce, and most of them were conducted from the point of view of the theory of international relations. For example, realists in the theory of international relations usually consider the right to denounce as a manifestation of state sovereignty, emphasizing the motivation of the state to maximize its interests and studying how withdrawal from treaties affects the balance of power between states, without examining the international legal basis for the right to denounce ^{[5, p. 41] [6, p. 184]}. Scholars in the field of public international law also pay little attention to this topic. The most famous experts who have written on the topic of denunciation of international treaties in Russia include I.I. Lukashuk, A.N. Talalaev, O.I. Ilyinskaya Osminin, in China – Bu Lu, He Zhipeng, Xu Chunli, in other foreign countries – R. Helfer, A. Bradley and so on.

Historical and legal analysis of the existing practice on denunciation of international treaties^[2] shows that this institution has been developing gradually. Initially, the right to denounce international treaties was exogenous and independent of the terms of other treaties ^{[7, p. 12]}. Scientists might have the erroneous opinion that the contract could be terminated at their own request due to the exogenous right to denounce, even if the contract itself did not provide for an endogenous right to do so. It was under these conditions that the UN International Law Commission^[3] in 1963, at its 15th meeting, officially began to study for the first time whether the parties had the right to denounce international treaties that did not contain relevant provisions^[4]. As a result, examples of international treaties without explicit denunciation provisions were studied, such as the Paris Peace Treaty of 1856, the London Convention of the European Powers on the Regime of the Black Sea Straits of 1871 (hereinafter referred to as the London Convention) and other international treaties, as well as cases where the parties tried to denounce treaties based on implied law. The Commission drew attention to the contradiction between the obligation of treaties and the right to denounce, emphasizing the need for a balanced approach. However, the following gaps remained in their study: the lack of a unified approach to determining the conditions under which the implied right to denounce can be applied, and the lack of an analysis of the impact of other factors on the exercise of the right to denounce, primarily political ones.

In order to identify the characteristic features and possible variations in the implementation of the right to denounce international treaties, according to the authors of the study, one should not limit oneself to analyzing the provisions of international treaties of the last decades of the XX-XXI centuries, but begin the study from the origins, highlighting several stages in the formation and development of the right to denounce, offering the author's vision of the periodization of the right to denounce international treaties contracts. Considering that the study of the practice of applying the right to denunciation involves a formal legal and comparative legal analysis of the direct texts of international treaties, the sub-task of this study is to develop guidelines on the correct formulation of denunciation provisions for developers of international treaties, which will ensure the effectiveness of their implementation in the context of regulating international relations and contribute to the science of international public law. rights. It is planned to pay special attention to the influence of additional factors on the implementation of the right to denounce international treaties, which may be related to issues of foreign and domestic policy of States.

2. Historical and legal analysis of the institution of denunciation

A careful analysis of the texts of international treaties at the early stages of the development of international law, starting with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 (which included the Peace Treaty between Emperor Ferdinand III and Christina, Queen of Sweden and their respective Allies^[5] and the Peace Treaty between the Holy Roman Empire and the King of France and their respective Allies^[6]), allows to conclude that the right to denounce international treaties was not originally endogenous to the treaty, but exogenous due to the authorization of other international treaties. For example, the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748 (Peace Treaty between the King of Great Britain and the United Provinces of the Netherlands in 1748)^[7], the Madrid Peace Treaties between England and Spain in 1667 as a response to French expansion under King Louis XIV.^[8] and 1670 as a means of settling all disputes in America^[9] and the Vienna Peace Treaty of 1738 (between Austria and France, which ended the War of the Polish Succession)^[10].

We also quote from Article 3 of the 1773 Treaty on the Division of the Border between Poland and Prussia ^{[8, p. 90]}, which states ^[11] that "in order to avoid and resolve any issues and disagreements on any matter arising from the fact that the provisions of the Treaty of Znamensk ceased to comply with the present state of affairs, the Contracting Parties The parties hereby abrogate the sixth, seventh, eighth, nineteenth and twenty-first articles of the aforementioned Treaty of Znamensky of 1657^[12], and the articles not expressly abrogated by this treaty remain in force and the obligations provided for by them remain." Article 4 of the same treaty further states that "in order to avoid any disputes in this regard, the contracting parties also cancel the Treaty of Bromberg of 1657"^[13].

There is no doubt that initially the right to denounce international treaties was exogenous and depended on the terms of other treaties ^{[9, p. 85]}. This led to the fact that, in practice, there could be an erroneous opinion that, since there is a possibility of an exogenous right to denounce, States can terminate the treaty at their own request if the treaty itself does not provide for the right to denounce.

It should be noted that during this period, cases of denunciation of international treaties with an exogenous nature, especially peace agreements between States, are not uncommon. To confirm this, we can cite the following fact: each of the 8000 peace treaties concluded from 1500 to 1860 was "forever" respected and valid for an average of no more than two years ^{[9, p. 56]}.

After the war between France and Prussia, the conflicts in Europe shifted to the West, and the initial balance of power changed, which gave Russia the opportunity to declare its interests ^{[10, p. 284]}. Hoping to regain control of the Black Sea in order to regain its military power and diplomatic positions in the region, Russia unilaterally declared in 1870 that it would no longer be bound by the provisions of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1856 on the neutralization of the Black Sea (hereinafter – the Paris Treaty). It was against this background that the London Convention of 1871 was adopted by the European Powers on the Regime of the Black Sea Straits^[14] (hereinafter referred to as the London Convention). It repealed the provisions of the Paris Treaty on the neutralization of the Black Sea, and Russia's withdrawal from the Paris Treaty essentially called into question the binding nature of international treaties. Although other states did not formally recognize the legality of its withdrawal, the London Convention actually became a solution to the issue and indirectly recognized Russia's unilateral act.

It was from this moment on that the exogenous nature of the right to denounce international treaties changed. Since then, the right to denounce has been confirmed by the parties, and the conditions for its application have been openly proclaimed, based on the fundamental principle of international law — pacta sunt servanda^[15]. In other words, taking into account this principle and the reality of the practice of international treaty law, the London Convention clearly proclaimed the postulate that contractual obligations can be terminated, and treaties can be amended with the consent of the contracting States on the basis of friendly understanding. Of course, it would be contrary to the general principles of international law and incompatible with the practice of international treaty law if, after the conclusion of an international treaty, modification, withdrawal or termination of the treaty were not allowed under any circumstances.

This not only meant the transition from the exogenous to the endogenous right of denunciation, but also served as the basis for the subsequent codification of this right in art. 54 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties^[16] (hereinafter – the Vienna Convention). After the adoption of the London Convention, the stability and effectiveness of international treaties have increased significantly. Even with regard to peace treaties on the distribution of territories after wars, the probability of withdrawal from which was high, such an exit was effectively settled. At least after that, not a single contracting party ignored the terms of the international treaty and withdrew from it, claiming that it had violated the provisions of the treaty, but preferred to interpret the terms of the treaty in its favor. All this happened due to the recognition of the right to denounce in the London Convention.

However, there are other issues that have not been resolved in the London Convention, if we consider the declaration of denunciation enshrined in it in a strictly literal sense. It recognizes that the denunciation of the treaty is possible only with the consent of the Contracting States. Can a party terminate a contract based on the fact that other participants do not comply with certain conditions? For example, in this case, do the norms of general international law allow a State party to exercise and apply the right to denounce a treaty based on the principle of a significant change in circumstances or in the event of a violation of the treaty by other parties? Does this mean that the parties to a bilateral or multilateral treaty, which says nothing about the right to denounce, still have the right to withdraw from the treaty? If so, what conditions must be met? As mentioned earlier, the London Convention does not provide direct answers to other questions regarding the right to denounce international treaties.

In general, before the adoption of the Vienna Convention, the general principles governing international treaties in the system of international law remained unclear, especially with regard to the right to denounce. In this context, the issue of the creation of the Vienna Convention, as a document codifying the norms of the law of international treaties, was included in the agenda of the International Law Commission. In 1963, at the 15th meeting, the Commission for the first time officially began to study the question of whether the parties have the right to denounce international treaties that do not contain relevant provisions^[17].

Since that moment, the International Law Commission has decided that this issue is the highest priority in its mandate, for which it has elected four speakers on the topic of the law of treaties. Among them, the greatest attention was paid to the right to denounce international treaties by Fitzmaurice G. and Waldock N., who prepared the relevant reports.

In his report to the International Law Commission in 1957, G. Fitzmaurice argued that "an international treaty can be terminated unilaterally by the parties, even in the absence of a provision explicitly providing for the right to denounce, in two circumstances: Firstly, it can be concluded from the provisions of the international treaty that the parties intended to allow its denunciation. Secondly, from the nature of an international treaty, it can be concluded that in the absence of contrary indications in the treaty, the parties should have the right to denounce unilaterally. Examples are international treaties on the union and international treaties on trade"^[18].

In such cases, the international agreement, given its nature, is subject to termination provided notification is given within a reasonable time. G. Fitzmaurice noted that such an implication could also be explicitly excluded from the text of the treaty itself^[19].

In fact, the issue of termination and withdrawal from international treaties was not raised in the reports of the special rapporteurs of the Commission until Fitzmaurice G. It was his work that gave the Commission the opportunity to begin a comprehensive study of the issue of denunciation of international treaties.

N. Waldock was a special rapporteur long before G. Fitzmaurice's report caused a discussion in the International Law Commission. In his report, he interpreted the word "denunciation" as "an act of declaring that a party will no longer consider itself bound by an international treaty from the date of the declaration or from another date"^[20]. However, he did not share the opinion of Fitzmaurice G. that if an international treaty does not contain a provision on denunciation, then the right to withdraw from it is presumed.

N. Waldock also noted in his report that if the international treaty itself provides for a period of validity, then the participating States indirectly excluded the possibility of unilateral denunciation during this period. If the treaty itself contains provisions on unilateral denunciation of the treaty, then the contracting States must exercise their right to denounce in accordance with this provision. Thus, the International Law Commission does not need to develop a text dealing with these two situations^[21].

Following the preparatory work of the International Law Commission and the reports presented, an active discussion about the right to denounce international treaties continued at a diplomatic conference that took place from March 26 to May 24, 1968 in Vienna^[22]. After analyzing the comments and proposals of the States participating in the Conference, the following wording was eventually fixed in Article 56 of the Vienna Convention:

"1. A treaty that does not contain provisions for its termination and which does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal from it is not subject to denunciation and withdrawal from it is not permitted unless: (a) it is established that the parties intended to allow the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal; or (b) the nature of the treaty does not imply the right of denunciation or withdrawal.

2. The Participant shall give at least twelve months notice of its intention to terminate or withdraw from the agreement in accordance with paragraph 1."

Since the creation and adoption of the Vienna Convention, according to R. Helfer, over the period 1970-1994, a total of 710 cases of denunciation of multilateral international treaties have occurred ^{[11, pp. 1579-1600]}, which is exactly twice the number of denunciations of multilateral international treaties over the 25-year period 1945-1969, namely 351 cases. As noted in the doctrine, of course, the significant increase in the practice of denouncing multilateral international treaties is explained not only by the fact that the total number of ratifications of international treaties increased significantly from 1970 to 1994, but also by the explicit recognition and regulation of the right to denounce in the Vienna Convention within the framework of the United Nations. This was also facilitated by the growing number of inclusions of provisions on the right to denounce in multilateral international treaties, combined with a full understanding and proper implementation of the right to denounce by withdrawing States. In our opinion, all these are factors that should not be overlooked.

Despite the fact that there are still different opinions in the international community regarding the international legal status of the provisions of the Vienna Convention concerning the right to denounce, one thing is certain: in the field of studying the law of international treaties, the Vienna Convention has become an integral object of research. An increasing number of modern scientists are turning to some of the principles embodied in the Vienna Convention, as well as the legal structures contained therein. For example, regarding the right to denounce international treaties, scientists Bradley A. and Gulati M. argue that "when States explicitly stipulate the creation of international treaty obligations, they often introduce the right to denounce them, sometimes setting a deadline for notification of denunciation. Even if they do not explicitly agree on the right to denounce, the subject matter regulated by the international treaty itself sometimes means the existence of an implied right to denounce. Even if there is no general right to denounce, the Contracting Parties usually have a certain right to denounce in the event of a significant change in circumstances" ^{[12, p. 3]}. Their opinion does not differ from the relevant provisions of the Vienna Convention^[23].

However, A. N. Talalaev, a leading international lawyer in the field of international treaty law, notes that the Soviet delegation at the Vienna Conference held a different position, namely: too broad an understanding and application of the term "denunciation" would lead to a violation of the principle of pacta sunt servanda, that is, the term "denunciation" could only be used in the case of treaties explicitly providing for the right to withdraw, and that Article 56 of the Vienna Convention generally prohibits the presumption of an implied right to withdraw, therefore the Soviet Union did not make a reservation to this article upon accession to this Convention ^{[13, p. 68]}.

However, I.I. Lukashuk also notes in his writings that although Article 56 of the Vienna Convention provides the basis for denunciation, in practice it can cause controversy, especially in cases involving serious political or security issues. International tribunals or other dispute settlement mechanisms usually balance between the stability of the treaty and the sovereignty of the State when interpreting Article 56 ^{[14, p. 385]}.

It should be noted that Article 56 of the Vienna Convention, as a procedural rule of law, is deeply idealistic, preaches the principle of pacta sunt servanda and reminds sovereign states that they cannot act arbitrarily, and therefore is considered certainly attractive outside the legal field. However, in practice, the application of Article 56 is difficult and is not always respected by the parties, and the political nature of the issue of the right to denounce makes the chances of clarifying the legal norms established by Article 56 unlikely.

This political nature is expressed mainly in the fact that the parties not only rely on the provisions of legal norms, but also take into account their own political interests, foreign policy, international relations and other non-legal factors. For example, when a party to a treaty considers the possibility of denunciation, it usually assesses whether such withdrawal would be in its own political and economic interests, and if a State considers that the existing treaty is no longer beneficial to it, it may try to withdraw from it using article 56 as an international legal basis. However, denunciation of the treaty may also cause a political reaction if it affects the national interests of other participating States ^{[15, p. 118]}. In addition, diplomatic relations and political alliances between states often significantly influence the decision to terminate the treaty ^{[16, p. 116]}. In some situations, a state may refrain from withdrawing from an existing treaty for political reasons ^{[17, p. 354][24]}, even if it considers the treaty to be unprofitable for itself. These factors may make the application of art. 56 limited in practice.

It is important to note that in this case it is necessary to correctly understand the essence of Article 56 of the Vienna Convention, which is not a strict norm in terms of content to be applied in the absence of a provision on the right to denounce in an international treaty and thereby giving rise to disputes between the participating States. This article is intended to serve as a guideline for the practice of the law of international treaties, the significance of which depends on the desire of the States concerned, and it will have the intended effect only if they are ready to refer to it as a basis for denunciation.

3. Conclusion

The issue of the right to denounce has long been of concern to the international community. Since the formation of the Westphalian system, more and more international treaties have been signed between States. However, over time, many States withdrew from them for various reasons. Such factors that could and still can have a special impact on the implementation of the right to denounce international treaties include: the geopolitical situation, economic interests, national security considerations, as well as the diplomatic and strategic priorities of States. All this together subsequently affects both the relations previously regulated through international treaties and their effectiveness in these documents.

The development of the institution of denunciation of international treaties has come a long way. Prior to the adoption of the London Convention, the right to denounce was not officially recognized, and the provisions on denunciation often depended on the text of other subsequent treaties. The adoption of this document contributed to the transformation of the right of denunciation and the change of character from exogenous to endogenous, which allowed sovereign States to gradually begin to understand such a right correctly. Based on the research results of the UN International Law Commission and after the adoption of the Vienna Convention, relatively complete provisions on the right to denounce appeared within the UN, but some issues were still not clearly resolved, for example, in the context of the application of Article 56 on denunciation, the content of which is still understood and applied in practice in different states.

Having studied the formation and development of the right to denounce international treaties, it is proposed to identify three historical stages: from the moment of the emergence of an international treaty as a source of international law as such to the London Convention, after the adoption of the London Convention to the appearance of the Vienna Convention, from the Vienna Convention to the present. The international treaties used in periodization as key points [the London and Vienna Conventions] introduced their own changes in specific historical periods, which significantly influenced the implementation of the right of States to denounce treaties.

In order to ensure the effective implementation of international treaties, international intergovernmental organizations, Governments and scholars in the field of international law should pay more attention to practical issues of the implementation of such law and the correct formulation of denunciation provisions in specific international treaties. It is proposed to use such principles as 1) the implementation of the right to denounce an international treaty on the basis of its endogenous nature; 2) the inclusion of reference norms to Article 56 of the Vienna Convention or the entire document as a fundamental basis for regulating the procedure for concluding, amending and terminating international treaties when formulating the right to denounce in specific international treaties. The proposed principles could be included in a practical guide, during the development of which additional issues should be worked out.: 1) improving the existing mechanism for denunciation of treaties, which would fill the shortcomings of Article 56 of the Vienna Convention in its practical application; 2) classifying the nature of an international treaty and the specific conditions and boundaries of the implied right to denounce it; 3) maintaining the effectiveness of international treaties, including by creating a monitoring mechanism for denunciation of international treaties and engaging in international responsibility for their unlawful denunciation by States.

^[1] Note: The United States officially withdrew from the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement in 2020, and Russia officially withdrew from the 1992 Open Skies Treaty in 2021.

^[2] Note: the name of an international treaty may vary in practice: treaty, convention, treatise, declaration, exchange of notes, etc., see: Tunkin G. I. Theory of international law. Moscow: Zertsalo, 2023. P. 76; "Treaty" means an international agreement concluded between States in writing and regulated by international law, <...> regardless of its specific name" // Vienna Convention on the Law of International Treaties, adopted on May 23, 1969 [Electronic resource]. Access mode: https://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/conventions/law_treaties.shtml (date of request: 02.02.2025).

^[3] Note: The United Nations International Law Commission (ILC) is a subsidiary body of the United Nations established in 1947 by the UN General Assembly for the development and codification of international law. It plays a key role in shaping and strengthening the legal framework of international relations.

^[4] Document A/CN.4/SER.A/1963/ADD.1, dated February 14, 1963. «Documents of the fifteenth session including the report of the Commission to the General Assembly» // Yearbook of the International Law Commission. 1963. Vol. II. P. 200-201. [Electronic source]. – Access mode: https://legal.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc_1963_v2.pdf (date of access: 02.02.2025).

^[5] Peace Treaty of Osnabrück between Emperor Ferdinand III and Queen Christina of Sweden and their respective allies. [Electronic source]. – Access mode: https://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=3778 (date of access: 02.02.2025).

^[6] Treaty of Peace between France and the and the Holy Roman Empire, signed at Münster, 14 (24) October 1648. [Electronic source]. – Access mode: https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:oht/law-oht-1-CTS-271.regGroup.1/1_CTS_271_eng.pdf (date of access: 02.02.2025).

^[7] Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. Concluded at Free Imperial City of Aachen, October 18, 1748. [Electronic source]. – Access mode: https://www.ieg-friedensvertraege.de/treaty/1748%20X%2018%20Friedensvertrag%20von%20Aachen/t-283-1-de.html?h=1 (date of access:02.02.2025).

^[8] The Earl of Sandwich's Treaty. Concluded at Madrid, May 23, 1667. [Electronic source]. – Access mode: https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo2/A32181.0001.001?view=toc (date of access:02.02.2025).

^[9] The Godolphin Treaty. Concluded at Madrid, July 8, 1670. [Electronic source]. – Access mode: https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo2/A32671.0001.001?view=toc (date of access:02.02.2025).

^[10] The Peace of Vienna. Concluded at Vienna, November 18, 1738. [Electronic source]. – Access mode: https://www.ieg-friedensvertraege.de/treaty/1738%20XI%2018%20Friedensvertrag%20von%20Wien%20betr.%201735%20X%203,%201736%20V%2018,%201737%20V%202/t-279-1-de.html (date of access:02.02.2025).

^[11] Treaty between Poland and Prussia. Concluded at Warsaw, September 18, 1773. [Electronic source]. – Access mode: https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:oht/law-oht-45-CTS-253.regGroup.1/law-oht-45-CTS-253 (date of access:02.02.2025).

^[12] 1657 IX 19 and 1657 XI 6 Treaty of Wehlau and Bromberg. Concluded at Znamensk, September 19, 1657. [Electronic source]. – Access mode: https://www.ieg-friedensvertraege.de/---_site.popup..html_dir._treaty.110_comment.280_notrans.1_likecms.html (date of access:02.02.2025).

^[13] Note: Similarly, Article 17 of the Guadalupe Hidalgo Treaty between the United States and Mexico of 1848 provides that "The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, signed in Mexico in 1831, remains in force for another eight years from the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification of this treaty and that each of the Contracting Parties The parties reserve the right to cancel the agreement by notifying the other party one year in advance of their intention to cancel the agreement at any time after the expiration of the specified eight-year period." Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Concluded at Guadalupe Hidalgo, February 2, 1848. [Electronic source]. – Access mode: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/guadhida.asp (date of access:02.02.2025). The treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation. Concluded at the city of Mexico, April 5, 1831. [Electronic source]. – Access mode: https://llmc.com/titledescfull.aspx?type=5&coll=2&div=7&set=01511t (date of access:02.02.2025).

^[14] The London Convention of 1871 Signed in London, March 3, 1871. [electronic resource]. Access mode: https://runivers.ru/doc/d2.php?CENTER_ELEMENT_ID=146933&PORTAL_ID=7146&SECTION_ID=6748 (date of request: 02.02.2025).

^[15] Note: In fact, the term "denunciation" was not explicitly mentioned by the parties in the London Convention of 1871, which has always been considered the fundamental international document in which the issue of the right to denounce international treaties was de jure discussed.

^[16] Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Signed in Vienna, May 23, 1969 [Electronic resource]. Access mode: https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_12754 / (date of access: 02.02.2025).

^[17] Document A/CN.4/SER.A/1963/ADD.1, dated February 14, 1963. «Documents of the fifteenth session including the report of the Commission to the General Assembly» // Yearbook of the International Law Commission. 1963. Vol. II. P. 200-201. [Electronic source]. – Access mode: https://legal.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc_1963_v2.pdf (date of access: 02.02.2025).

^[18] Document A/CN. 4/107. Dated March 15, 1957 “Second Report on the Law of Treaties by Mr. G.G. Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur” // Extract from the Yearbook of the International Law Commission. 1957. Vol. II. P. 22. [Electronic source]. – Access mode: https://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_107.pdf (date of access: 02.02.2025).

^[19] Note: As for the exceptions to the general provision pointed out by the Special Rapporteur, such as union treaties and international trade agreements, which are inherently limited in duration, their termination also requires notification within a reasonable time. However, he did not provide any theoretical justification or practical examples to confirm his position. Document A/CN. 4/107. Dated March 15, 1957 “Second Report on the Law of Treaties by Mr. G.G. Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur” // Extract from the Yearbook of the International Law Commission. 1957. Vol. II. P. 38. [Electronic source]. – Access mode: https://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_107.pdf (date of access: 02.02.2025).

^[20] Document A/CN. 4/156. Dated March 20, 1963 “Second Report on the Law of Treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur” // Extract from the Yearbook of the International Law Commission. 1963. Vol. II. P. 38. [Electronic source]. – Access mode: https://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_156.pdf (date of access: 02.02.2025).

^[21] In the same place.

^[22] Document A/CONF. 39/11/Add.2. Dated May 22, 1969 “United Nations conference on the Law of Treaties” // Official records. Documents of the Conference. 1971. Vol. Ⅴ. P. 131. [Electronic source]. – Access mode: https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/docs/A_CONF.39_11_Add.2-E.pdf (date of access: 02.02.2025).

^[23] Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Signed in Vienna, May 23, 1969 [Electronic resource]. Access mode: https://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/conventions/law_treaties.shtml (date of application: 02.02.2025). Art. 62.

^[24] Note: for example, to maintain diplomatic relations or strengthen regional alliances.