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Agarkov, K.Y. (2025). The impact of political campaigning in social media during the campaign period of the Russian presidential election in 2024. Sociodynamics, 1, 54–68. https://doi.org/10.25136/2409-7144.2025.1.72958
The impact of political campaigning in social media during the campaign period of the Russian presidential election in 2024
DOI: 10.25136/2409-7144.2025.1.72958EDN: NNIJUHReceived: 07-01-2025Published: 03-02-2025Abstract: Every year, the number of users of social networks is growing, representing not only a growth of communication between users and obtaining the necessary information, but also a political communication space growth. Over the past ten years, political parties have been increasing their presence on social media and broadcasting their political agenda. Currently, it is problematic to assess the effectiveness of communication on users of social networks with a political agenda. It is not clear what place political campaigning occupies on social networks against the background of other types of campaigning, including campaigning in the media. The hypothesis of the study is the statement that political campaigning on social networks influences the decision of the voter in the presidential elections of the Russian Federation. The research methodology includes: the method of content analysis, comparative analysis, as well as the method of comparison and the method of secondary data analysis. The aim of the work is to obtain data on the impact of the social media community of Russian presidential candidates during the election campaign in the 2024 elections. The objectives of the research are to study the political communication in the social networks of presidential candidates and the impact on the decision-making of the voter for whom to cast their vote on election day. The study is conducted during the campaign period from February 17 to March 15, 2024. The novelty of the work is to obtain specific data, on the basis of which a conclusion was drawn about the effectiveness of political campaigning on social networks in federal elections in Russia, as a result of which the hypothesis about the impact of political communication on social networks during the campaigning period was not confirmed. Keywords: Presidential elections, social technologies, political technologies, social networks, political communication, election campaigning, campaign period, social networks analysis, electorate, content analysisThis article is automatically translated. Introduction Every year, the number of users of social networks on the Internet is growing, representing not only a means of communication between users and obtaining the necessary information, but also a means of political communication. Over the past ten years, political parties have been increasing their presence on social media and broadcasting their political agenda. Currently, it is problematic to assess the effectiveness of communication on users of social networks with a political agenda. It is not clear what place political campaigning occupies on social networks against the background of other types of campaigning, including campaigning in the media. The hypothesis of the study is the statement that political campaigning on social networks influences the decision of the voter for whom to cast his vote in the presidential elections of the Russian Federation. The aim of the work is to obtain data on the impact of communities on social networks of candidates for President of the Russian Federation during the election campaign in the 2024 elections. The objectives of the study are to study political communication in the social networks of presidential candidates and the impact on the decision-making of the voter for whom to cast their vote on election day. The study is conducted during the campaign period from February 17 to March 15, 2024. Literature review Over the past decade, scientists have noted an increase in the importance of social media in election campaigns. Back in 2013, Swedish political scientist Anders Larson drew attention to the use of social networks on the Internet by election headquarters to promote political communication [1, p.461]. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the role of social networks in the pre-election period increased further, putting the distribution of political content on social networks in the leading role [2]. According to annual research, social networks on the Internet are used by the Russian population not only as a channel of communication between users, but also to obtain various information, news requests in politics [3]. The linear model of communication proposed by the American political scientist Harold Ruswell [4, p.222] is that political communication corresponds to a set of five elements: communicator-message-channel-recipient-effect. Social networks, like no other, are the most suitable for this type of communication. Russian political scientist Oleg Skripka proves that digital media, including social networks, are of great importance for democratic political practice as channels of two-way communication between political parties and the electorate [5, p.187]. A number of Russian scientists have dealt with issues of political communication in social networks on the Internet. In 2021, political scientist Viktor Titov drew attention to the fact that the communication of various Russian political parties on social networks is not fully used. In particular, posting their content does not take into account the interests of the audience, using their communities on social networks as a news feed, rather than a two-way communication tool with voters. It was pointed out that the content was compiled in an official business style, which is not quite accepted in social media groups on the Internet and the poor quality of content presentation in general among all parliamentary political parties [6, p.27]. But in 2022, the quality of political communication on social media between users and parliamentary political parties has improved significantly. There is a mutual active communication in social networks, which has a positive effect on electoral performance in the regions [7, p.94]. To date, there is no common understanding in sociology of how social networks affect users' decision-making for whom to vote in elections [8, p.98]. Even in the most massive political party in Russia, United Russia, not all party members are registered on social networks [9, p.25]. The hypothesis of the work is the statement that political communication on social networks during the campaigning period for the presidential election of the Russian Federation influences the decision of the voter for whom to cast his vote at the polling station. According to the law, the campaigning period before election day runs from the moment consent is given to the Central Election Commission to run and ends one day before the start of voting [10]. In the presidential elections of the Russian Federation in 2024, the dates of the campaign period were from February 17 to March 15. Social networks were also used for campaigning. The current President of the Russian Federation and candidate for the post of President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, ran as an independent self-nominated candidate. According to his press secretary Dmitry Peskov, Putin V.V. does not conduct social networks, because he does not need them, and everyone listens to his words [11]. Although in the 2012 presidential elections in Russia, the confrontation between the campaign advertising of the election headquarters of the current President V.V. Putin and opposition candidates on social networks had a fairly wide resonance, as a result of which the information campaign on social networks was completely defeated. At that time, it was believed that opposition voters were mainly present on social networks [12, p.147]. In the election campaign for the Russian presidential election in 2018, full-fledged campaigning has already been launched on social networks using a set of political technologies from most of the declared candidates and the political parties supporting them. Self-nominated candidate V.V. Putin and candidate from the political party "Communists of Russia" M.A. Suraikin (who took the penultimate place according to the results of the votes cast) did not use social networks for political advertising [13, p.10]. Not only high-quality campaign videos of the presidential race participants, but also SMM promotion specialists were fully involved in social networks and messengers. The 2018 election campaign showed an upward trend towards the reorientation of the electorate towards social media resources [14, p.65]. The rest of the participants in the presidential election used social media quite widely, both in the form of their official party and personal pages. In addition, regional party communities on social media were involved. We propose to consider political campaigning from the official communities of political leaders nominated as candidates for President of Russia. Research methods and empirical base The activity of using social networks is a rather complex phenomenon that represents an opportunity for all participants of the network. User interaction takes place in horizontal relationships that ignore the hierarchy of communication flows. Working with information on social networks involves different areas of activity. First of all, it is the creation of informational messages based on the requests of network users. Secondly, the consumption of media content, when the recipients of messages reflect on them, distribute them, communicate with an indefinite circle of users. Thirdly, the reaction of the addressees makes it possible to form the following content of political communication. Thus, the activity of political actors in social networks boils down not only to the creation of messages, but also to constant work with the feedback of the audience, which is included in the political groups of social networks based on personal requests. As a rule, such users of social networks are aimed at interaction. Based on the above, to study the issue of political communication, it is proposed to consider not only the created content of political leaders declared for the presidential election of the Russian Federation, but also the reaction of social media users to the proposed media messages in the form of various comments, reposts and endorsements. The accepted methodology in the study is based on the possibility of qualitative and quantitative analysis. Based on the Stopsters platform [15], a content analysis and reactions of users of social networks of the official groups of candidates for President of Russia during the campaign period were conducted. Quantitative analysis was used to compare the accounts of political parties and the types of media activity of users of social networks. The quantitative analysis made it possible to identify and compare the reaction to the political content of the candidates for President of the Russian Federation and users of social networks. By comparing the results obtained in the elections and the activity on social networks, taking into account the media activity of the electorate, the results were obtained, indicating the interest and quality of political content. The results of the study. The headquarters of the candidate for the post of President of Russia Vladislav Davankov from the New People political party officially used two social networks: Telegram and VKontakte [16]. During the election period, 10,786 subscribers were collected on the VK platform on the Vladislav Davankov page [17]. 27 messages were posted, 561857 views were received, 17393 message approvals ("likes"), 1739 readers shared community messages, 3633 comments were left. The most popular campaign video "Dankov- time for new ones!" was released on March 9 and gained 127046 views, 2275 likes, 164 comments and 510 reposts [18]. The daily averages were: 20,836 views, 644 user approvals, 134 comments, and 64 reposts. On the Telegram network, Davankov//The Vice Speaker of the State Duma [19], who at that time had 172,376 subscribers, posted 34 messages from February 17 to March 15, 2024, which received 305,386 approval from Telegram users who read the posts. 70,822 comments, 23977 reposts, and 6664977 views were received. The campaign video, released on March 14 [20], garnered the most views (297,500) and comments (11,813) [21]. On average, 196046 views, 2083 comments, 8982 likes and 705 reposts were collected per day. Nikolai Kharitonov, nominated as a candidate for the post of President of Russia from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), did not create separate pages for himself on social networks, having at his disposal a personal Telegram page created on December 27, 2023 and gaining 5,145 subscribers [22] over the entire campaign period, with 818,833 content views and 4,398 reposts.. Nikolai Kharitonov's campaigning was mainly carried out in the official social media groups of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. On the VKontakte social network [23], the main campaign took place from February 17 to March 15, 2024. As of March 15, 107928 subscribers were registered in the group, 111 messages were posted, which received 1077521 views, 36699 approvals, 6611 comments. 4,695 times social network users have shared content. The greatest response was generated by the content with Nikolay Kharitonov's program, posted on March 1 and garnered 27,274 views, 982 positive responses and 446 comments. 215 people shared the content. Daily averages on VKontakte: 9708 views, 59 comments, 330 likes and 42 reposts. On the Odnoklassniki social network [24], 36317 subscribers were registered in the KPRF group at the time of the end of the campaign. The political content consisted of 94 posts, which received 15,647 positive responses and 3,537 comments. 2,997 people shared the content. The most popular message among users of the social network, about the "Memorial Day of I.V. Stalin", posted on March 5 and garnered 123 comments, 1054 positive user reactions and 115 repostings. The average daily user reaction to content showed 166 likes, 31 reposts and 37 comments. At the end of the campaign period, 13362 subscribers were registered in the Telegram of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation [25], 78 messages were posted, which received 909,917 views, 21358 positive reactions from netizens and 2546 reposts. The most popular message was "A voice for Kharitonov – a voice for Russia! Appeal to the citizens of the country", published on March 12, 2024, which received 88,974 views, 1,731 positive responses and 90 repostings. On average, the channel showed 11,665 views, 273 endorsements and 32 repostings by users every day. Leonid Slutsky, a candidate for President of the Russian Federation from the Liberal Democratic Party, campaigned on social networks from his personal pages on social networks [26]. During the campaign period, 57 messages were posted on Telegram, which received 14084328 views, 46613 user approvals and 7375 repostings. Comments were disabled for the entire study period. As of March 15, Leonid Slutsky's Telegram channel [27] had 228,371 subscribers. The most popular message during this period was the message: "Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Lebedev, Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, has passed away," which collected 85,703 views. On average, 247093 content views were received daily, 817 likes and 129 repostings were collected. At the end of the campaign period, 10,505 people had subscribed to the personal VKontakte page. 55 messages were posted, which received 48,906 approvals, 1,156 comments, and 927 repostings. The most popular message was the politician's congratulations on Defender of the Fatherland Day on February 23, 2024, which gathered 52,884 views. On average, the page received 60975 views per day, 899 likes, 21 comments and 16 repostings per month. Leonid Slutsky has a personal page with 800 subscribers in Odnoklassniki [29] and no election campaigning was conducted from it. Table 1- The results of the campaign in social networks.
In terms of the number of content views on social networks, Leonid Slutsky is in first place, Vyacheslav Davankov is in second, and Nikolai Kharitonov is in third. In terms of the number of subscribers on social networks, Leonid Slutsky is in first place, Vyacheslav Davankov is in second, and Nikolai Kharitonov is in third. The ratio of viewed content and expressed approval (positive emotions) by messages showing the quality of the content during the campaign period is Vyacheslav Davankov in first place (5%), Nikolay Kharitonov in second place (3%) and Leonid Sluitsky in third place (1%). According to the election results, Vladimir Putin won, who did not conduct direct campaigning on social networks and scored 87.28% of the vote. Nikolay Kharitonov took the second place, receiving 4.31% of the vote, Vyacheslav Davankov (3.85%) and Leonid Slutsky (3.2%) took the third and fourth places [30]. The quality of the content, designed for users of candidate groups on social networks, indicates that its indicators did not affect the voter. According to electoral activity [31], as a rule, it is mandatory to attend all elections.: 72% of voters are aged 60 and over, 67% are 45-59 years old, 64% are 35-44 years old, 57% are 25-34 years old and 37% are 18-24 years old. Of the respondents, 63% prefer the traditional method of voting and 33% prefer electronic voting via the Internet. 83% are people aged 60 and over, 67% are between 45 and 59 years old, and 60% are 35-45 years old, which indirectly confirms the use of Internet resources by these age groups of voters. According to a VTsIOM poll dated 02/10/2024, 75% of respondents expressed confidence in Vladimir Putin, 4% would vote for Nikolai Kharitonov and Leonid Slutsky, 5% would vote for Vladislav Davankov [32]. On 03/11/2024, the poll showed the distribution of votes as follows: Vladimir Putin - 82%, Nikolai Kharitonov and Vyacheslav Davankov - 6% and Leonid Slutsky- 5% [33]. According to Mediascope [34] in Russia, the age group 55+ uses social networks and messengers in terms of time: 13% of the Odnoklassniki social network, 12% Telegram, 10% Vkontakte. Age group 45-54 years: 18% VKontakte;16% Telegram, 8% Odnoklassniki. Age group 35-44 years old:12% VKontakte; 16% Telegram and 5% Odnoklassniki. Age group 25-34 years old 22% VKontakte, 15% Telegram, 2% Odnoklassniki. Age group 12-24 years old: 24% Telegram, 12% Vkontakte [35]. These data show that more than a third of the electorally active population (60+) use social media. Basically, the Odnoklassniki social network, where, unlike other candidates, Nikolai Kharitonov is present. The consumption rates of this age group are low compared to other age groups, so the performance indicators of using social networks and messengers are also small. The age group of 35-55 years old are quite active users of social networks in terms of time spent on the Internet, mainly using the social network VKontakte and the Telegram messenger. The same age group is also electorally active in the elections. The statistics provided on the social networks of candidates Slutsky and Davankov show the advantage in reacting to content during Leonid Slutsky's campaign period. The election results show a slight preponderance of Vyacheslav Davankov's votes, which gives reason to conclude that the impact of content on social networks on voters is insignificant. The final financial statements of the presidential candidates indirectly confirm the claim that the use of social networks is not effective enough. Assuming that the cost item "For the production and distribution of printed, audiovisual and other campaign materials" [36] includes expenses for political advertising on social networks. Thus, the expenses of the leader of the presidential election, Vladimir Putin, amounted to 17.34% of the entire election budget. 71.18% of the budget was spent by candidate N.M. Kharitonov, who took second place in terms of votes received. The LDPR candidate L.E. Slutsky spent almost the entire budget (98.36%) on expenses that included advertising on social networks and came in fourth place following the election results. The expenses of presidential candidate V.A. Davankov amounted to 54.87%. Conclusions Despite the rather large involvement of the electorate in the campaign for the presidential elections in 2024, in general, and significant participation in social networks in particular, the voting results did not show a significant impact of political content on social networks on users. As a result of the study, data was obtained on the use of political communication in social networks and the impact on the electorate as a result of deciding who to vote for at the polling station. The campaign headquarters of the current President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, did not use political technologies in social networks during the campaign period and did not conduct campaigning. The results of the study showed that the most high-quality and interesting political content for users of social networks during the campaign period was created by the election headquarters of Vyacheslav Davankov and Leonid Slutsky. Nikolai Kharitonov's political content was of the least interest. Vyacheslav Davankov, the leader in all indicators of social media activity and positive user reaction to published content, received about the same number of votes as outsider Nikolai Kharitonov. The expenses of presidential candidates for campaigning on social networks in general and during the election campaign in particular were not justified by the election results. Large budgets allocated for the production of campaign materials, including on social networks, and high-quality political content during the campaign campaign of candidates L.E. Slutsky and V.A. Davankov did not allow gaining a decisive advantage between the losing candidates. The lack of campaigning on social media and the low budget for the use of campaign materials by candidate Vladimir Putin did not have a significant impact on getting votes. The novelty of the work is to obtain new data and compare them, on the basis of which a conclusion is drawn about the effectiveness of political campaigning on social networks in federal elections in Russia, as a result of which the hypothesis of the study was not confirmed. Conclusion The above research data indicate that, despite the leading promotion of political content on social networks by presidential candidate V. Davankov, the resources attracted for the publication of campaign material by L.E. Slutsky and the low participation rates in election campaigning on social networks by N.M. Kharitonov, the voting results showed approximately the same distribution of votes among the candidates. The conclusions are confirmed by the number of votes won in the elections by Leonid Slutsky, who used political communication on social networks quite intensively during the campaign period and lost the number of votes to the outsider of the campaign company on social networks, Nikolai Kharitonov. The work carried out has shown that over the past fifteen years, political parties have begun to pay more attention to broadcasting political content on social networks, especially during the electoral period. Based on the above data on the distribution of age-related indicators of social media use, we can expect an increase in the importance of political campaigning on social media in the next ten years, as reflected in the voting results. It is also highly likely that in the future, with an increase in the age of the audience on social networks, political campaigning will become a necessary condition for winning elections. References
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Official website of the Central Election Commission. http://www.cikrf.ru/analog/prezidentskiye-vybory-2024/finansirovaniye-vyborov/itog.php
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