Virtuality in the understanding of Gilles Deleuze and Henri Bergson and its role for modern philosophy of information science

Sayapin Vladislav Olegovich ORCID: 0000-0002-6588-9192 PhD in Philosophy Associate Professor; Department of History and Philosophy; Tambov State University named after G.R. Derzhavin 392000, Russia, Tambov region, Tambov, Internatsionalnaya str., 33 vlad2015@yandex.ru

Currently, the processes of virtualization, differentiation, and individuation associated with the latest information technologies (artificial intelligence and deep machine learning technologies, cloud computing, Internet of Things technologies, quantum computing, the spread of 5G mobile communications, blockchain, etc.) are changing the entire social activity of modern society. Therefore, the purpose of our research is to consider the concept of "Deleuze virtuality", which is not a condition for the possibility of any rational experience, but a condition for the genesis of real experience, and which is most often found as a phenomenon in modern philosophical discussions about large-scale technological transformations.

It can be noted that the concept of "virtuality", as well as the context of relevance accompanying it, acquire a unique innovative meaning for Deleuze. In addition, according to the modern researcher M. Deland (b. 1952), Deleuze's concepts of "actual" and "virtual" represent a realistic ontology, and he borrowed this ontological difference between them from another French philosopher A. Bergson^[1]. Moreover, Deleuze's philosophical reflections are difficult to interpret and can even be viewed as vague and incomprehensible. And the reason for such vagueness of his reasoning is, to some extent, the fact that he rejected traditional philosophical concepts, which he considered outdated and inadequate. In essence, Deleuze hoped to reform philosophical science on completely new conceptual foundations. At the same time, his habit of unique use of concepts and abbreviated narration lead researchers of his work to difficulties in defining a single concept of "virtuality". Simply put, in his reflections on virtuality, Deleuze often refers to modern advanced mathematics and physics. This is probably why his concept of "virtuality" is considered to be naturally suitable for its application in the world of the latest information technologies ^{[1, p.1-48]}.

It is important to emphasize here that the modern concept of "virtuality," which mimics, simulates, and reproduces our visual experience, may be the first thought that comes to mind when considering how virtual reality can be. That is why in Deleuze's works these terms acquire not only unique, but also innovative meanings. Instead of thinking about the "fog" of virtual images surrounding a real object, he suggests the concept of a "pre-individual reality" that is separate from what can usually be called real, but which somehow interacts with it^[2]. As for the French thinker and Nobel laureate in literature A. Bergson, for him the concept of "real" became problematic when considering the metaphysics of time, duration and intuition.

It is generally believed that in their works both Bergson and Deleuze want to move away from the subjectivist understanding of time, which gained popularity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries due to the growing influence of phenomenology, in which this time does not depend on subjective interpretation. As a result, Bergson and Deleuze, much like Simondon, were concerned with developing a philosophy compatible with the science of their time. And it was this kind of persistence that partly explained the rapid decline in Bergson's popularity. Bergson's apparent loss in his debates with A. Einstein (1879-1955) in 1922 at a meeting of the French Philosophical Society was a contributing factor. At this conference, Bergson, in a polemic with Einstein, tried to defend the plurality of coexisting "living" (psychological) times ^{[3,4, p.188-190]}. Bergson expressed the opinion that there is a single and universal time. This time is perceived by the human consciousness, and this perception is compared to a continuous line in which there is a memory connecting them between two moments. This is the real time – perceived and experienced. However, the features of perception and internal rhythms can be individual, both in biological systems like humans and nonlinear dynamic systems (planets, stars, etc.), which does not prevent their measurement in a single real-time format. In this sense, A. Bergson operates with "multiple living tenses". Einstein's rebuttal was ironic. "There is no such thing as a philosopher's time," he argued. However, in Bergson's concept of "virtuality," Deleuze saw a new epistemological theory that would allow him to move away from phenomenology to a metaphysical understanding of time as something simultaneous to the experiencing subject. Later, Deleuze expanded this concept of "virtuality", which served as the basis for his entire philosophy. However, to truly understand this concept, we must refer to Bergson's work and Deleuze's later reinterpretation of his ideas.

It should be noted that Bergson considers the concept of "virtuality" through the concept of "possible". In this case, this possibility, in his opinion, can be realized only through intuition, and it is not less, but more than the content of the idea of the "real". "For the possible is only the real, with the addition of the action of reason, which casts into the past the image of the real immediately, as soon as it took place" ^{[6, p.233]}. Strictly speaking, the possible is not the source of the real, but is itself produced from the real through some kind of intelligence. According to Bergson, it is a mistake to think that the possible precedes the real. Since the possible is the real, thrown back into the past, it turns out that the real must precede itself. This is why Bergson postulates that philosophy as a whole tends to make mistakes when analyzing the nature of possibility, suggesting that this possibility is thought of by many researchers as less than real only because we conceptualize the denial of the real and project it into the past, where the real did not exist. For example, we can perceive the shape of a certain tree and imagine how the branches of this tree could possibly grow in different directions, and this would change its shape. Thus, we deny the reality of the real tree and imagine another possible reality that could be. As a result, the real is mistakenly viewed as possible with an additional quality of existence, namely, it is implied that the real is greater than the possible. Which means that the real tree was "realized" by one of the possibilities that became reality. For Bergson, this implies a fundamental contradiction that must be overcome by eliminating our dependence on the concept of the "possible." And therefore, instead of possibility and reality, we must think in terms of virtuality and relevance^[7].

So, Deleuze in his works "Difference and Repetition" (1968)^[8], "Logic of Meaning" (1969)^[9], and "Dialogues II" (1977)^[2] pays much attention to Bergson's distinction between the concepts of "virtual" and "actual". In addition, as we have already noted, such a distinction is considered by him, as a rule, in contrast to the concepts of "possible" and "real". Therefore, despite the fact that Deleuze borrowed the very concept of "difference" from Bergson, in his own works he attaches much more importance to the importance of actualization through the concept of "difference". For Deleuze, this is one of the most important discoveries in Bergson's work. He argues that we cannot understand virtuality simply in terms of possibility, because, unlike the possible, the virtual itself is completely real. This is not just a paraphrase of a possibility, but also a new concept of a part of reality on which we can base an entire theory of both experience and the genesis of objects. In other words, the virtual cannot be opposed to the real, otherwise we fall into tautology. As a result, the virtual should be understood in contrast to the actual, namely the world of real extended objects. As Deleuze claims: "The virtual, on the contrary, is not opposed to the real; it has complete reality in itself. Its process is actualization"^{[8, p.259]}. That is why we can understand the virtual as a sphere of differential relations that become "actualized" when they move into the actual sphere. Therefore, the virtual becomes a fundamental concept, both in the works of Bergson and Deleuze. However, the functioning of the virtual and its subsequent actualization must certainly be understood in Bergson's works if we want to see their importance for Deleuze's philosophical research. To do this, we must first look at how Bergson introduces the concept of "pure memory," and later uses it to create a new concept of "time."

Thus, it was after this discussion that Deleuze emphasized the novelty of Bergson's ideas. He argues that we mischaracterize both the past and the present, arguing that the present becomes the past only when it is replaced by another present. In other words, thinking about the relationship between the present and the past solely as a sequence raises many problems that he will try to solve. He asks a question: "... let's think about it.": how could the new present be overtaken if the old present did not really leave at the very time it is present? How could any present have somehow passed if it had not been the past at the very time when it is the present?"^{[6, c271]}. The answer to this question for Deleuze is a fundamental paradox concerning the nature of time, which underlies Bergson's concept of memory, and which implies the concept of "virtuality". That is, "The past would never have been established if it had not coexisted with the present, whose past it is. The past and the present point not to two consecutive moments, but to two coexisting elements: one is the present, which does not cease to pass, and the other is the past, which does not cease to be, but through which all the present pass. It is in this sense that there is a pure past, a kind of "past in general": such a past does not follow the present, but on the contrary, it is assumed by him as a pure condition, without which the present could not pass. In other words, every present returns to itself as the past"^{[6, p.271]}.

We can say that the meaning of this modernity is that there must be a past in general, a pure past that is the whole past (and thus constituting our entire past), which coexists with the present moment in the form in which it is experienced by an individual perceiver. The past cannot simply flow from the present, it must be a condition that allows the present to exist to the extent that it is determined by the movement into the past. As a result, the past is assumed to be the present, because if it did not exist, no present could exist. A virtual object is never the past in relation to the new present, just as it is not the past in relation to the present it was. This is the past, as a contemporary of the present. Simply put, we are all defined by the past, which exists from the outside, but at the same time makes up our experience.

That is why Bergson duration is determined not so much by sequence as by coexistence ^{[6, p.272]}, which consists in the fact that it is inherently virtual. In other words, when we place ourselves in the past, we are not just immersed in a specific area containing certain memories, and which is different from another area containing other memories – we are interacting with the past as a whole. Here, such a past contains various levels that encapsulate the entire past in various states of compression (when it descends along a cone down to sensation). In this regard, Deleuze believes, our entire past is reproduced, restarted, repeated, at the same time, at all levels that it outlines. It is in this sense that we can talk about the regions of Existence itself, the ontological regions of the past as a whole, all coexisting and repeating each other. The repetition that exists in the past is the repetition of the plans of the past. This is not a repetition of the same thing expressed through identity, but a repetition of an analogous difference, in which certain levels share similarities through their common difference. Each level is both similar and different from each other. Our leap into the past through memory implies interaction with the virtual nature of these planes, since Bergson's theory assumes a form of movement that cannot be physical and, therefore, relevant, but must be virtual. This moment seems to suggest that virtuality is not homogeneous and not localized on one plane of consciousness, but is layered, heterogeneous and not devoid of consistency. In this case, we begin to see the first formulations of the concept of "repetition" in the form in which it exists in Deleuze's most famous work "Difference and Repetition". As a result, it is in this respect that we begin to see similarities between the pre-individual past of J. Simondon (1924-1989)^{[10, p.15]} and the virtual past of Bergson, represented by Deleuze. Both of these concepts contain the paradoxical notion that it is something that exists, but does not actually exist. Moreover, we could say that Bergson's form of memory draws parallels with the unconscious, developed by F. Schelling (1775-1854) and later widely disseminated by Z. Freud (1856-1939). The unconscious exists, but we can only become aware of it because of its effects in reality. Thus, it serves as a partial determination of our conscious and actual actions.

Of course, the Simondonian pre–individual existence is the existence of potential possibilities, which serves as the basis for the internal resonance necessary for the transductive operation of individuation. This operation is the main driving force through which all individuals (physical, technological, biological, mental, and social) are born. Similarly, Bergson's virtual realm of the pure past is a collection consisting of various levels or areas that, paradoxically, contain the entire past in its entirety, and serve as a necessary condition for the emergence of the present. As a result, both of these concepts serve as a post-subjectivist ontological justification for the processes of perception and individuation that define life (in general) and human existence (in particular).

Returning to understanding how actualization works, we must address Deleuze's distinction between the virtual and the actual, as well as between the possible and the real. For Deleuze, both the virtual and the actual are completely real, while the possible is unrealistic. Just as virtuality is opposed to relevance, opportunity is opposed to reality. As a result, actualization is not the becoming of real possibilities, but the becoming of actual virtual ones that coexist alongside them. In this case, such reasoning highlights the subtle difference between Simondon and Deleuze. If for Simondon the pre-individual exists as a realm of potentials within an individualized entity that serves as the source of all future individuation, then for Deleuze, individuation finds itself exclusively in the realm of potentiality or possibility. Therefore, Deleuze makes it clear that the possible is opposed to the real, and then the process to which the possible is subjected is realization. The virtual, on the contrary, is not opposed to the real. It has a complete reality in itself. The process it undergoes is the process of actualization. It would be wrong to see only a verbal dispute here: it is a matter of existence itself. It follows that without such an approach, pre-individual existence cannot serve as a creative (genetic) condition for what will be defined as actualization through individuation. In this case, we are faced with two questions: how does the realization of the possible differ from the actualization of the virtual? And how can we understand this difference in relation to existence itself? Essentially, we want to see how the virtual can provide us with the essential rationale necessary for the genesis of objects or ideas. If we want to answer these questions, we must return to Deleuze's discussion of Bergson.

In the final chapter, "The Impulse of Life as a movement of differentiation" in Bergsonism (1966)^{[6, pp.301-322]}, Deleuze argues that realization is determined by two rules: the rule of similarity and the rule of limitation. The rule of similarity states that the real must be in the image or likeness of the possible, which it implements. Simply put, the similarity rule involves the false problem of projecting the negation of the real into a past in which it did not exist, and thus it retroactively creates an opportunity from the present image (as we saw earlier with the example of a tree). Based on this, the real is not like the possible, but the possible is like the real. Similarly, the limitation rule shows us that not every opportunity can be realized. Any implementation necessarily includes a "limitation" that prevents some features from appearing. This limitation shows us which possibilities have been realized from the point of view of the present, thereby limiting what should be possible. Continuing with our example of a tree, we could say that a real tree has acquired only a certain shape due to the limitation of all other possible variations in the direction of branches, leaf size, and so on. However, this can only be understood from the point of view of the present, in which a real tree exists. On the other hand, in actualizing the virtual, rules replace the processes of discrimination and creation. For Deleuze, the mechanism of creation arises from the mechanism of discrimination, which means that creation can only occur through difference. In other words, since both the virtual and the actual exist in reality, the transition from one to the other implies a change in appearance, or, in another way, implies a differential transition through a creative act from one mode of reality to another.

Thus, we can state the fact that the lack of similarity between the concepts of virtual and actual implies a primary creative difference in the process of actualization. As a result, following Deleuze, it can be argued that the most important characteristic of virtuality is existence, which is actualized through differentiation. That is, virtuality has to differentiate (create its own lines of differentiation) in order to be actualized. Here, like Simondon, we can understand creation (becoming). as a solution to the problem between two states that differ from each other in nature, but are connected through their incompatibility. Therefore, realization cannot be creative, since reality is unable to add anything to the possibility due to the false problem of "less" in the nature of the possibility (as we explored earlier). Therefore, the actualization of the virtual is a process of becoming, where such creation is determined by difference.

It is obvious that the Bergsonian concept of "life impulse" is used by Deleuze as an example of the creative nature of actualization through difference. But how can we understand this abstract concept? In its basic form, we could say that the life force can be seen as the general tendency of life to diverge, create, and adapt to its environment in a way that does not need to rely on any mechanistic or teleological explanations. Moreover, Deleuze notes, "What does Bergson really mean when he talks about a life impulse? We are always talking about virtuality in the course of actualization, about simplicity in differentiation, about totality in the course of division: to continue "through dissociation and doubling", through "dichotomy" – this is the essence of life"^{[6, p.304]}.

It is important to note that in his work "Creative Evolution" (1907)^[7] Bergson uses the analogy of differentiation with an artillery shell. Differentiation is when a projectile breaks into fragments, where the special way it breaks is explained not only by the explosive force of the gunpowder contained in it, but also by the resistance of the metal. So, life breaks down into individuals and species. Therefore: "Differentiation is always the actualization of virtuality, which stubbornly continues to exist through all its actual divergent lines" ^{[6, p.305]}. In addition, here an unexploded shell represents a virtual unity that dissociates and becomes actualized upon explosion. In this regard, fragments (fragments) of a projectile, which in themselves can also be considered as shells containing a certain part of the whole projectile (or virtual whole) from which they emerged. What is important here is that Bergson considers virtuality as a whole that is simultaneously part of a real object. That is, the virtual half coexists with its real half. Here we can identify parallels between Bergson's "life impulse" as a creative life force and Simondon's individuation through transduction. The use of the analogical method by both Simondon and Bergson suggests that ontogenetic structures should be understood through their operations, and not the other way around. If we recall Simondon's statement that "... every operation and every relationship within an operation [is] an individuation that divides or dephases a pre-individual being"^{[11, p.5]}, we will see undeniable comparisons with the creative process of actualizing the virtual, which Deleuze represents in Bergsonism. Indeed, the metaphor of the shell, which Bergson uses to describe how the "life impulse" works, echoes Simondon's statement that the individual-environment pair is accompanied by perpetuated individuation ^{[11, p.7]}. As a result, for both philosophers Bergson and Simondon, the description of the process of ontogenesis is of paramount importance. And it is here that we begin to see the basis of how Deleuze combines the influence of Bergson and Simondon in his later works to propose a theory of creative actualization that can be understood by adding the process of individuation to it.

That is why, in order to explicate Deleuze's virtuality, we will first focus our attention on the fifth chapter, "The Actual and the Virtual" of his book Dialogues II (1977). In this work, Deleuze revisits the concept of "virtuality". Borrowing the epistemological concept of "ideas" from I. Kant (1724-1804), Deleuze believes that the virtual not only has complete reality in itself, but is also the opposite of both the actual and the unreal. Moreover, Deleuze highly appreciates virtuality, directly connecting it with the essence of philosophy, which he understands as a theory of pluralities, each of which consists of actual and virtual objects. However, he does not mean to deal with wholes that encompass entire realms of reality in the Hegelian spirit; although from his point of view, multiplicity is a system that is diverse. We can say that the plural is a multitude, and even the one is also a multitude, since this one embodies an idea. For example, Deleuze explains the idea of multiplicity using mathematical concepts and theory: "An idea is a certain continuous set with n parameters. Color, or rather the Idea of color, is a multitude in three dimensions. Measurements should be understood as variables or coordinates on which the phenomenon depends. Continuity should be understood as a system of relationships between changes in these variables, for example, the quadratic form of coordinate differentials. Certainty should be understood as the elements that are mutually determined by these relationships, where a change entails a change in the order or metric of the set" ^{[8, p.226]}. As a result, the idea of multiplicity, connected with the mathematical idea of diversity, occupies a special place in Deleuze's study of virtuality. In other words, a manifold is a generalization of the concepts of a curve and a surface and its simplest definition: "A manifold is a topological space that is locally Euclidean"^[12]. Moreover, according to M. Deland, formally, Deleuze's multiplicity is purely technical in nature, since it includes elements from several different branches of mathematics: differential geometry, group theory, and dynamical systems theory^{[1, p.1]}.

The study of pluralities, according to Deleuze, should be the goal of philosophy. In other words, our goal is not only to penetrate through these multiplicities (no matter how complex the mathematical terms we use to explain them) and reach existences, but also to try to find the fundamental elements in the structure of these multiplicities. At the same time, he does not mention at all what was the goal of philosophy, for example, since antiquity and up to E. Husserl (1859-1938). For example, the main goal of Husserl's philosophy is the consistent removal of the outer layers of reality in the process of phenomenological reduction and the resulting disclosure of the essence of things^[13]. In other words, the most postulated and pursued goal of philosophy is to penetrate into the essence of reality. Moreover, Deleuze sees in his philosophical research, like Simondon, the radically anti–fundamentalist task of reversing Platonism.

In order to reverse Platonism, according to Deleuze, it is necessary, first of all, to remove entities and replace them with events, like streams of singularities ^{[1, p.37]}. At the same time, he does not say which ontic (metaphysical) type of pluralities philosophy should strive for. In addition, he does not clearly state whether these pluralities belong to the ontic sphere as a conglomerate of entities, or are products of human consciousness and, consequently, subjective constructs resulting from human activity (including his cognitive activity) and enclosed in his immanent sphere. In our opinion, Deleuze's ontology is realistic. Because in a sense, this is any ontology that always postulates the existence of objects, and which it qualifies as elements of reality. However, Deleuze cannot explain how this ontology allows ideal epistemological objects, such as virtual images and real objects, to form into what we consider reality. Deleuze also does not mention philosophy in the context of language, which would be an obvious anti-metaphysical (or anti-ontological) statement by him as a postmodern philosopher.

Ultimately, Deleuze argues that each of the pluralities that make up the subject of philosophy consists of actual and virtual objects, and each object is a combination of one of them. That is why Deleuze's virtuality is not only one of the two main categories for studying plurality, but also one of the main philosophical categories that allows one to penetrate reality (no matter how it is understood). As a result, virtuality reveals itself to be the main and necessary attribute of everything that exists, the material from which reality is created. Later, after a general statement about the purpose of philosophy and the fundamental role of virtual and actual objects in its achievement, Deleuze turns to a narrower problem – the concept of "perception". Nevertheless, virtual and actual objects remain the central problem – only now as objects that are present in perception, that is, connected with memory.

It should be emphasized that in his search for the nature of perception, Deleuze uses the concept of "virtuality" in quantum physics, which he may consider as a heuristic aid, pointer, inspiration, or analogy – but the concept itself is still the basis of a postmodern approach to virtuality. In other words, virtual particles in quantum physics are objects with such a short lifespan that they cannot be detected experimentally, and therefore they exist only in physical models and theories. Indeed, some scientists consider them to be existing, but essentially unobservable theoretical objects that belong to natural "decoration", while others consider them to be a theoretical, fictitious construct used in physical models for explanatory purposes. It follows that there are two views on the status of the existence of virtual particles: according to one, they exist like other material objects in nature; according to the other, they are fiction, useful for explanation. In the latter case, they acquire a special ontic status – between existence and non–existence (they exist "because" of the observed objects) - or a special onticoepistemological status (their cognition is so unique that it is essentially impossible to say whether they exist or not). In short, the way they exist is as unclear to physicists as it is to philosophers.

Deleuze characterizes virtual particles briefly. He pays attention only to those properties that he considers important for his theory of perception. At the same time, his main focus is on their extremely short life span. Following in the footsteps of physicists, he defines virtual particles as particles whose radiation, absorption, appearance and dissolution are instantaneous, last for a shorter period of time than one can imagine, and which obey the uncertainty principle^{[2, p.148]}. In addition, he argues that virtual images surround a real object, and new virtual images disappear and are reborn. In his own words, clouds of virtual images create a "virtual space" ^{[2, p.148]}. Moreover, Deleuze believes that it is optical devices that take the actual object and the virtual image as a starting point and show under what conditions the actual object becomes virtual and the virtual image becomes relevant (without any references to the relevant literature)^{[2, p.158]}.

It is obvious that Deleuze's virtuality is a very broad matrix or idea on which he bases the virtual in general terms and which he transfers to the sphere of immanence. Deleuze formulates his concept of "virtuality" together with the concept of the "actual object": for him, the virtual is inextricably linked with what is relevant. Virtual images and actual objects are present in perception and memory as ideal objects. That is, they exist only in the immanent sphere (which Deleuze understands in a unique way: he clearly does not associate it with a cognitive subject). Therefore, moving from the content side of virtuality to the concept of a "virtual particle", then to virtual objects present in perception, Deleuze moves from a physical object to an ideal object located in the sphere of immanence. What further complicates the situation is that, as we said earlier, the realistic ontological interpretation of virtuality in physics is not the only one, since it is also sometimes considered a theoretical fiction^[14].

Another disadvantage in Deleuze's explication of the concept of "perception" is that his judgments about a virtual image and a virtual object are not sufficiently differentiated. In essence, he identifies virtual images with objects created in memory-related perceptions, and even calls memories virtual images. It is the dramatic identity of virtual images that makes perception resemble quantum particles. In this regard, actual perception surrounds itself with a cloud of virtual images distributed over increasingly distant, larger and larger moving contours that simultaneously create and destroy each other. Deleuze postulates these various kinds of memories as virtual images, since their speed or brevity also obeys their "unconscious" principle ^{[2, p.148-149]}. From this it can be concluded that there is neither an ontic nor an epistemological difference between a real object and virtual images (although the latter is less definite, despite Deleuze's assurances). Moreover, there is no definite boundary between a real object and virtual images. As Deleuze notes, the immanence plan includes both the virtual and its actualization at the same time, without defining the boundary between them ^{[2, p.149]}. The immanence plan contains both what is virtual and its actualization. Here, virtual and actual objects do not have different ways of existence, as, for example, in the Aristotelian theory. Aristotle repeatedly argued that once realized, sensory forms leave lasting traces in consciousness (a certain tendency to actualize), and that because of this, subsequent sensory experiences allowed the imagination to evoke sensory forms as representations where these perceived objects are devoid of matter^[15].

And that is why in the concept of "Deleuze virtuality", the actual (the object of perception) and the virtual (images of the object of perception contained in memory) have the same way of existence. It follows that these two concepts are ideal and subjective. However, this qualification is somewhat questionable, since the interpretations of Deleuze's conclusions in traditional philosophical terminology are vague, and this also applies to subjectivity. Therefore, being apparently in clear contradiction with the transcendental tradition, Deleuze does not mention man, although he speaks of the unconscious, memory and perception, which, it would seem, are forces and examples typical of individual subjectivity.

A special place on the plane of immanence, as Deleuze notes, is occupied by an actual object that dissolves into a multitude of constantly emerging and disappearing virtual images. At the same time, virtual images, as a rule, elude any conscious perception due to the shortness of their existence. However, it is unclear here whether short-life is the only reason why virtual images are localized in the "unconscious." Later, as the alternating virtual images disintegrate and new ones appear, the real object is surrounded by an increasing number of different images – "flashes", momentary memory images. In this case, virtual images not only, as in the traditional theory of perception, constitute the object of perception, but are also created by it. In addition, there is also movement in the opposite direction when virtual images approach the real object (which, as a constituted object of perception, has its virtual equivalents in memory). It follows from this that virtual images are not much different from a real object. Moreover, memory creates not one stable image after the act of perception, but many virtual images that appear simultaneously with the act of perception. As a result, according to Deleuze, memory is not only a virtual image, but also a double of a real object – its mirror image. Therefore, the actual (the constituted object of perception) always coexists with the virtual. Virtual images are objects in the unconscious, or, in other words, a set of images that changes over time and manifests the actual object in a new way. Hence: "... all plans merge into one, following the path that leads to the actual" ^{[2, p.150]}. Such a Deleuze idea is close to the idea that is analyzed, for example, in the theory of "perception" by D. Hume (1711-1776), where an object based on experience is always constituted in the mind of the subject and consists of sensations, affects and emotions, representing a set of impressions ^{[16, p.19-20]}.

Thus, according to Deleuze, the real object also consists of virtual images, which, in turn, consist of the actual object. In this case, the structure of perceptual objects (actual and virtual) is bidirectional or a feedback loop. Ultimately, it can be stated that Deleuze formulates a theory of "perception" that has its predecessors and followers in both American and European epistemology (i.e., the theory of "perception"). Coon (1922-1996), M. Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), G. Ryle (1900-1976), J. Gibson (1904-1979), and others). These earlier and modern theories postulate sensory data, impressions, and mental representations (physiological, created by stimulating the subject's brain, or immaterial, mental) formed during perception as pre–linguistic-or, more generally, non–linguistic-results of perception. For Deleuze, the real object is similar to the mentioned objects, which are created by perception in its various variants.

At the same time, despite the fact that theories of perception differ in research methods and conceptual apparatus, none of the existing similar theories, with the exception of Bergson's, have used and do not use the concepts of "virtuality" and "relevance". It follows from this that Deleuze borrowed the idea of virtuality from Bergson, and at the same time, both of these philosophers in their theoretical research are quite far from the generally accepted approach to perception. In this regard, it can be noted that the existing theories of perception, both idealistic and intermediate-realistic, differ in the conceptual apparatus and terminology that they use to describe the object constituted by the subject of perception. Moreover, the terminology and concepts of one theory are difficult, if not impossible, to translate into the language of another. For example, the concept of sensory data does not directly correspond to the concept of a virtual object or image in perception, or the cognitive concept of mental representation – they are all too embedded in their respective theories. Of course, Deleuze's theory of "perception" differs from these modern theories of perception. It has a broader scope because it covers memory. Deleuze, referring to Bergson, argues that perception is inextricably linked to acts of memory. Memory is able to merge so well with the present perception that we cannot tell where perception ends or memory begins ^{[17, p.130]}. In this regard, Deleuze finds the connection between perception and memory in Bergson; memory for perception is the same as a mirror image for a reflected object. Strictly speaking, Deleuze agrees with Bergson that an object can be both touched and seen; it can affect us, and we can also influence it; it carries the promise of possible actions, and in this sense it is relevant. Acts of perception occur so fleetingly that they occur unconsciously. You could say that they don't have time to enter consciousness, because they disappear instantly. Due to their variability, their instantaneous appearance and disappearance, Deleuze considers it justified to consider them as related to virtual particles described in quantum field theory. However, in our opinion, if acts of perception occurred only unconsciously, it would contradict our general knowledge of perception; there is no doubt that people are aware of their perception.

Deleuze does not consider the problem of the transition of acts of perception from the unconscious to the conscious. It can be assumed that the concept of the "unconscious," which once appears at the very end of the first paragraph of the text discussed here, gets there by accident and is not one of its central ideas. At the same time, from our point of view, the most important idea present in several places of the text, as well as in other works of Deleuze, is the concept of the "plan of immanence", that is, immanence as such. Therefore, if Deleuze correlates his concept of "immanence" with its origin in transcendental philosophy, then it can be argued that it nevertheless encompasses a system of consciousness. However, this is just a guess, Deleuze himself has never said this directly. In addition, Deleuze's concept of perception also differs from other philosophical theories of perception in that it multiplies objects created in the process of perception. Deleuze argues that a real object is not connected with a single virtual image, but with streams of such images arranged in diagrams, a concept that he borrows from Bergson^{[2, p.158]}.

Real objects emit and absorb virtual images that are located in different proximity to them, correspond to them, and are probably copies – not necessarily accurate– of the object of perception that constitutes itself. A real object is surrounded by a changing cloud of virtual images, the radiation, absorption, emergence and destruction of which occurs in a shorter period of time than any of those that a person is able to imagine or realize. As a result, the actual object dissolves, turning on the plane of immanence into a changeable cloud of virtual images, objects created in unconscious memory. A person is not able to perceive virtual images consciously because of the short life span. The dissolving virtual images are updated by emitting other, higher-ranked virtual images. All of them form a continuous stream, and only a certain singularity can separate them into objects ^{[2, p.149]}. In addition, this feature can be a person who cuts through clouds of virtual images, naturally arranged in a continuous stream of memories, or forms in which the results of perception are presented.

Thus, virtual images created in perception as images of an actual object, thanks to memory, affect this actual object. Moreover, virtual images function like subjects that actualize or constitute actual objects. An actual is an addition or product, an object of actualization, the subject of which is only the virtual. That is why actualization belongs to the virtual ^{[2, p.149]}. There is a correspondence between real objects and virtual images, they are inextricably linked to each other. As a result, virtual images play a leading role in the formation of real objects, which are objects of perception. The process of perception is based on and related to the memory process. According to Deleuze, perception creates not one (as postulated in most theories of perception), but many of its objects, which change, disappear and generate others under the influence of a changing cloud of virtual images. These images are formed in perception, but they are not its objects – they are real objects. The object of perception (actual object) is not a material object in natural nature, but an object on the plane of immanence. Deleuze believes that images in vibrating memory are virtual images that affect and transform it, shaping it in the process of its formation. Therefore, there is not a single object of perception, but a stream of objects consisting of a changing cloud of virtual images. The multiple structure of the object of perception distinguishes Deleuze's concept from other idealistic and realistic (within the framework of intermediate realism) theories of perception. What it is not unique in is the bidirectional construction of the object of perception, that is, in the mutual influence of the actual object and the virtual images that surround it on each other.

This is why Deleuze's theory of perception is idealistic, but it is an atypical idealism that marginalizes, and even seeks to eradicate, human participation. Whereas in other idealistic theories, it is the cognitive subject that is the main category. He performs acts of cognition and formulates perceptual knowledge. Deleuze seems to be striving for an subjectless idealism in which acts of perception are free from subjective conditioning and, therefore, in a sense objective. If this is precisely his goal, then it is rather doubtful due to the introduction of an immanent plan, which, after all, is purely subjective (at least in the generally accepted meaning of this concept). As a result, it is unclear whether Deleuze really wants to banish a person – he seems to implicitly admit his existence, resorting to the plane of immanence, in which he places both the actual object and virtual images, and arguing that virtual images are created and take place in the unconscious. Moreover, Deleuze believes that what happens in memory-related perception occurs in an epistemological void: neither the real object nor the cloud of changing virtual images are openly "attached" to a person, and we have no idea how this subject creates and manages them. Obviously, Deleuze's idealism is absolute: an idealism that not only rejects the "naivety" of realism, but also tries to exclude the real existence of man. One could conclude that virtual images are not created by the subject, but arise, disappear and affect the real object by themselves. The plane of immanence itself is also subjectless, therefore, it is understood in a completely different way than in transcendental philosophy.

Thus, the main difference between Deleuze's theory and most other theories of perception is the use of the concept of the "unconscious" and the displacement of the "center" of perception (along with memory) into the sphere of the unconscious. Do real objects also function in the unconscious, or does it contain only virtual images – memory images? If the latter are copies of the former, which surround them in close proximity, we can conclude that the real objects created in perception are in the unconscious. However, this state of affairs leads to a serious dissonance with the widespread and necessary belief in conscious acts of perception. Deleuze argues that perception is inextricably linked with memory, and that in these acts the actual object is dynamically constituted by virtual images, and, conversely, virtual images are constituted by the real object. A real object is an object of perception, whereas virtual images are created in memory and reflect the object of perception. In this case, memory is not an actual image that is formed after the perception of an object, but a virtual image that coexists with the actual perception of the object. Memory is a virtual image that is modern to a real object, its counterpart, its "mirror image" ^{[2, p.150]}.

Therefore, the actual object, that is, the object of perception, is in fusion with its virtual image (which belongs to memory), and at the same time both of them are separated. There is merging and separation, or, in other words, oscillation – a constant exchange between a real object and its virtual image. Through this constant exchange, virtual images are constantly becoming relevant, and the virtual image never ceases to become relevant. The virtual image absorbs all the relevance of the character, while the real character is nothing more than virtuality^{[2, p.150]}. This means that the object of perception is constantly under the influence of virtual images created in memory. And at the same time, when there is an exchange between perception and memory, neither the object of perception nor the images formed in memory are permanent, but infinitely constitute each other. More importantly, the difference between a virtual image and a real object becomes unclear. It follows that it cannot be argued that virtual images and real objects have different ways of existence. With some reservations (described below), we can say that both virtual images and real objects are ideal objects that belong to the unconscious subject of perception, and possibly also to his conscious sphere – although this is only a preliminary assumption. This is complicated by the fact that, as we said earlier, Deleuze avoids including the category of subjectivity, despite his constant references to the plane of immanence, which without the subject seems impossible or at least mysterious and different from the sphere of immanence in transcendentalism. And this approach of excluding a person, in our opinion, occurs for the following reasons. Firstly, the sphere of transcendental immanence is always subjective, whereas in Deleuze, apparently, it is not. Secondly, in transcendental philosophy, the sphere of immanence is conscious, and in Deleuze's case predominantly or exclusively unconscious. Thirdly, the sphere of immanence is not only in the "unconscious", but also in language. As a result, the immanence plan contains not only actualization, or as a relation of the virtual with other concepts, but also the actual as a concept exchanged by this virtual ^{[2, p.152]}. It is noteworthy that this thesis, which appears towards the end of the text under consideration, significantly changes and expands the content of Deleuze's theory. If it were destined to play a major role in this concept, the plane of immanence would have to be considered as consisting of linguistic terms and expressions, and not as belonging to the sphere of the unconscious or, perhaps, also consciousness.

Summing up the substantive aspect of Deleuze's theory of "perception", we can draw the following important conclusion that it differs in many ways from other epistemological concepts of perception. As a result, Deleuze's concept of "virtuality" has little in common with virtuality in physics – it is simply loosely inspired by the concept of a virtual particle, which occupies a central place in quantum field theory, which he transfers to a completely different sphere, namely, the sphere of idealistically understood perception associated with memory. Finally, we come to the problem, the solution of which is the main purpose of this study. Is it possible to transfer Deleuze's concept of "virtuality" to the philosophy of computer science and use it to explain virtual objects and virtual worlds created by computers? And how can this be done?

So, first of all, Deleuze considers virtual images as short-lived objects created in memory in the process of perception, which immediately disappear. Whereas real objects are objects of perception that are not limited by any one constitution, but are constantly reconstructed in the process of perception under the influence of virtual images. Therefore, real objects are also impermanent, but they do not seem ephemeral. Such or similar properties are noticeable in some virtual objects and worlds created by computers. Some virtual objects created by a computer are also ephemeral. They appear and disappear in an instant, to be replaced by new ones created by the creators: natural or artificial intelligence. For example, computer design involves creating multiple versions of an object that are constantly being redesigned, improved, enriched, and more. All these transitional phases are short-lived and quickly disappear, leaving behind only the "target" object, that is, the final product, which is stable, relatively durable and not ephemeral. It follows that virtual objects are universally ephemeral only in Deleuze's theory, while computer–generated worlds and objects are not always so - ephemerality is not their common attribute. Some virtual worlds inhabit human consciousness collectively, and subsequently individually, for relatively long periods of time, and this prolonged presence causes relatively permanent cultural changes (for example, characters in computer games often become quite permanent elements of culture). In this case, some virtual worlds and computer–generated objects are ephemeral, but some – the end results of such design work – are stable and relatively durable.

Secondly, both Deleuze virtual objects and computer-generated virtual objects affect the objects that generate them. Deleuze's virtual objects affect the actual object, or the constituted object of perception, and in the context of computer science, virtual objects affect the consciousness of a computer user. In the latter case, virtual worlds change the consciousness of their creators. Mutual interactions are a common feature that, to a limited extent, justifies the transition from Deleuze's concept of virtuality to computer virtuality.

Thirdly, computer-generated virtual worlds are initiated and formed in the subjective consciousness of their creators, and then through intersubjective communication they penetrate into the collective consciousness, whereas Deleuze's virtual images are created unconsciously and remain in the unconscious. That is why, in the first case, virtual worlds can be objectified, that is, transferred from an individual system of consciousness to a collective system of consciousness. In another case, objectivization also means autonomy in the understanding of K. Popper's theory of three worlds (1902-1994)^[18]. As a result, virtual objects and virtual worlds become independent of computer programmers and the users who create them. Deleuze's virtual objects are unconscious, so they cannot be transferred to the collective consciousness in order to make them intersubjectively accessible and autonomous, or independent of the individual unconscious. At the same time, as we noted earlier, the presence of the subject in Deleuze's theory of perception is disturbing at best. Therefore, the unconscious nature of virtual images postulated by Deleuze is probably the biggest obstacle in adapting his theory to the problem of computer-generated virtual worlds. If we accepted his claim that virtual worlds are unconscious, they would not be able to access individual consciousness, which would contradict generally accepted intuitions and pre-philosophical ideas about them and how they are perceived. It is the presence of virtual worlds, both in individual and collective consciousness, that makes them so important for modern culture and the changing cultural environment of a person and, in fact, allows them to transform the environment in which people exist. This refers to the virtualization of the social and individual world, which detaches the man-made world from material reality and direct interpersonal relationships.

Thus, the origin of virtual worlds and objects in computer science differs from the origin of virtual images in Deleuze's concept. Virtual worlds and objects in computer science are created on the basis of knowledge, using software that computer users possess. Deleuze's virtual objects are created in perception as memory objects that make up the object of perception (the actual object). Virtual images and virtual objects created by a computer are not tangible, but they are real. This similarity, however, is of secondary importance because of its commonality. Therefore, in intuitive representations, virtual worlds and objects constructed in computer science have a different mode of existence than the corresponding actualized objects, which can, for example, be materialized equivalents of virtual objects. However, according to Deleuze, virtual images and real objects are epistemological objects (and not inherently independent) and have the same way of existence – both belong to the plane of immanence. That is why the fundamental concept of "virtuality" with the properties given to it by Bergson and Deleuze is not a good candidate for explaining the specifics of computer–created virtual worlds and their elements - virtual objects. Strictly speaking, the transfer of the concept of "virtuality" created by Bergson and Deleuze to the concept of "virtuality" in modern computer science is inadequate – there are too many differences and too few similarities between them.