Trials against admirals in France under Napoleon I: on the role of the Investigative Council

Krichevtsev Mikhail Vladimirovich PhD in History Associate professor, Department of Theory and History of State and Law, Novosibirsk State University of Economics and Management 630099, Russia, Novosibirsk, Kamenskaya Street 52/1 cm.martellus@gmail.com Other publications by this author

At the end of the 18th century and at the very beginning of the 19th century, the French Navy had a sufficient number of ships and a good staff of officers. However, the general strategy of Emperor Napoleon I, who saw the main deployment of combat operations on land and attached only auxiliary importance to the fleet, negatively affected the participation of the fleet in the military events of the era. At that time, the French naval forces were inferior to the power and activity of the British fleets. The defeat of the combined Franco-Spanish squadron in October 1805 Cape Trafalgar became a landmark event of the era. The Imperial navy could not recover from this defeat, having completely switched to the defense of its ports and ensuring the continental blockade of the main enemy. In these difficult conditions, the naval justice was called upon to solve the tasks of maintaining discipline and punishing those responsible for the defeats of the sailors. Unlike civilian justice, she did not know the institution of the prosecutorial jury, the body of trial. However, in rare cases, when it came to senior naval commanders, a special body was appointed in France – the investigative council, which was supposed to pre-evaluate the commander's behavior before a military court (military council) dealt with his case.

The Institute of the Investigative Council of the era of the First Empire (1804-1814) is poorly researched in historical and legal science. Perhaps there is only one work that analyzes this body as part of a general overview of naval justice in the Napoleonic era - the book by S. Muffat. The French researcher provided information on the legislative regulation of the institute (according to the imperial decree of 1806) and some materials on the Dumanoir case ^{[17, pp. 271-276]}. However, she has no information about investigative councils in other cases. Given the state of historiography and the institute's poor scientific research, this article attempts to fill this gap. The study of this topic can contribute to understanding the broader problems of the history of naval justice and the French Navy, as well as issues of interaction between monarchical power and justice during the First Empire.

The purpose of the proposed article is to define the role of the investigative council in the system of investigative bodies and the court of the French Navy during the First Empire. For this purpose, the paper analyzes the regulatory regulation of the Institute of the Board of Inquiry and its functioning using the example of the trials of two admirals of the imperial era – Rear Admiral Dumanoir and Vice Admiral Villare de Joyeuse (1809-1810). The subject of the study is the history of the formation of this institute under Napoleon I, starting with its establishment in 1806. The object of study is the procedural law of the French Navy during the period of the First Empire in terms of pre-trial investigation. The study involved mainly published primary sources: legislative acts, reports of investigative councils to the monarch, correspondence of the emperor, as well as some handwritten materials (photocopies) from the collections of the National Archives of Overseas France (Archives nationales d'outre-mer –ANOM) (materials of official correspondence of the Maritime Ministry and colonies) and from the collection of the National Library of France (BnF) (papers of Bougainville, a member of the investigative council in the Dumanoir case). In the study of the material, methods of concrete historical and comparative analysis were applied, and a structural and functional analysis of the investigative councils of 1809 was carried out.

Speaking about the institute of investigative councils, a prominent theorist of military judicial law of the Restoration era, P.A. Odier, noted that they were not established by any law, but were mentioned in legislation "as something that had to be sanctified by morals and time" ^{[18, p. 321, 322]}. As applied to naval law, this remark is not entirely correct, since the investigative councils were established by a special law - the imperial decree of July 22, 1806 ^[9] However, they appeared there under a different name as "councils of the fleet" (conseils de marine). However, the subsequent practice of applying this law indicates the identity of these terms. In other acts of the imperial government on the formation of such bodies, the fleet council is designated precisely as the "council of inquiry" (conseil d'enquête), so there is no doubt that we are talking about the same body under different names. Under Napoleon III, the Code of Military Justice for the Naval Army was issued in 1858, where in art. 365 the mention of the investigative council was accompanied by a reference to the decree of July 22, 1806, this also confirms this identity ^{[22, p. 876]}.

Let's consider the regulatory regulation of this institution. The decree of Emperor Napoleon I of July 22, 1806, was devoted to both the organization of fleet councils and the organization of police and justice on board ships ^[9]. Therefore, the decree also contained provisions on the establishment of other military judicial bodies (councils of justice, military councils) for the trial of sailors and measures to maintain order and discipline in the navy. Actually, the fleet councils are given a smaller part of the law – 15 articles out of 78. These 15 articles talked about the formation and composition of the Fleet council, the procedure for conducting an investigation, making decisions on a person under investigation, and handling documentation. The Fleet Councils were not a permanent institution and were convened only as needed. They were introduced only for a certain circle of people, namely, when "it is necessary to check the behavior of generals, ship captains and other officers who have been assigned command of our squadrons, divisions or individual ships." The verification was to be carried out in relation to "the missions that were entrusted to them," as well as "to save costs and consumption." Thus, the investigation through the Fleet Council involved studying the actions of naval commanders in the war, as well as their disposal of the financial and economic part. The act further clarified that the Fleet council should investigate to what extent the commanders, within their competence, carried out "instructions given to them by us," i.e. the emperor, and whether they "unnecessarily" used the right granted to the commanders by art. 34 of the same decree. Article 34 stipulated that "in the case of crimes of cowardice in front of the enemy, mutiny or unrest, or all other crimes committed in an environment of imminent danger, the commander, on his own responsibility, may punish or order the punishment of the perpetrators without observing formalities, in accordance with the circumstances."

Regarding the composition of the Fleet Council, the decree of 1806 did not contain an exact schedule of participants. The Council was to be composed of as many generals and ship commanders as the Emperor deemed necessary for a particular case. They were required to attend meetings in accordance with their seniority in rank. In the case of a general's conduct investigation, the Fleet council should, if possible, also be composed of generals. If the fleet council was called upon to investigate financial and economic spending issues, the head of administration and the inspector could be invited there (the latter without a casting vote). There was one chairman in the council, who could choose one of the members as a speaker. During the investigation of expenses and consumption, two members could be specially appointed for this purpose.

The Fleet Council was convened at a certain port on the instructions of the emperor. After the council was convened, the chairman was obliged to warn its members that, for reasons of honor and conscience, they should "avoid any prejudice and bias" in the assigned research, as well as remain silent about everything that was discussed or decided at the council. Thus, the meetings of the fleet council had to be held in secret, behind closed doors. The person whose conduct was being checked, or another whose presence was necessary, was summoned upon notification by the Chairman. They were required to take an oath to tell the truth before the council, answer all questions raised, and provide the necessary notes. Information about the behavior of subordinate generals and ship commanders was to be presented to the fleet council by the squadron commander, and they, in turn, summoned to the council, were required to report on the behavior of the officers serving under their command. These captains and subordinate officers were supposed to hand over their journals and ship's workbooks to the Chairman of the council. The speaker was required to record the result of the investigation achieved at each council meeting in a special register (as well as the final decision of the council).

Decisions at the council were made by a majority of votes, in the case of an equal distribution of votes, preference was given to the opinion of the chairman. The members of the council had to sign the adopted decision, and in case of disagreement with it, submit a dissenting opinion stating the reasons at the bottom of the protocol. This protocol, with the decision of the council, was transmitted to the Minister of the Navy for further presentation to the Emperor. At the same time, the emperor reserved for himself the "opportunity to inform later" about his "intentions" ^[9]. In other words, the monarch had the last word on the responsibility of a naval officer. The Emperor could well have stopped the criminal prosecution or given it a further course.

The application of the provisions of the decree of July 22, 1806 in practice can be traced to two specific cases. The first concerned Rear Admiral P. Dumanoir and his actions during the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805. Admiral P. S. de Villeneuve, commander of the French squadron, was named the main culprit of the defeat by the British in this battle. Villeneuve was unable to skillfully lead the fleet, lost his flagship and was captured by the enemy. Released from English captivity and fearing persecution in France on April 22, 1806, he, according to a popular version, committed suicide in a hotel in Rennes (Brittany) ^{[24, p. 41, 42]}. The admiral's death followed before the decree on the organization of naval justice was issued, so there could not yet be any instructions from the emperor to convene an investigative council to study his actions. However, in the future, Napoleon I was interested in the question of the legality of the actions at Trafalgar by another naval officer, Pierre Dumanoir Le Pelley. Commanding the vanguard, Dumanoir reached the battlefield, but allegedly did not join the battle and chose to withdraw, which seriously weakened the forces of the allied fleet. The investigation of the Dumanoir case began only in 1809, when the Emperor ordered the Minister of the Navy, D. Decre, on September 7 to organize an investigative council. The monarch ordered four people to be included in its composition: two senators, Counts Fleurieu and Bougainville, and two vice admirals, Thévenard and Rosily. The Council had to verify the suspicions that had arisen from many evidences that Dumanoir had not carried out maneuvers in accordance with signals and "at the behest of duty and honor"; that he had not done everything possible to free the center of the French fleet and especially the flagship; that he had not attacked the enemy side by side and had not even approached the fire close enough to engage in battle; that he finally left the battlefield when he could fight. The results of the investigation were to be reported to the Emperor ^{[11, p. 518]}.

As noted by S. Muffat, the investigative council on the Dumanoir case was composed entirely of old-serving officers of the general rank, very elderly, none of whom were present at the site of the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805 and at least none of them had sailed for two decades ^{[17, p. 274]}. It seems that the council members cannot be blamed for incompetence: they are all experienced naval commanders. Thus, Senator S.-P. Fleurieu (71 years old, born 1738), former Director General of ports and arsenals of the Navy, took part in drawing up almost all plans for naval operations during the Franco-British War of 1778-1783 (for the independence of the United States), Minister of the Navy (1790-1791) ^{[8, p. 228, 229]}. Senator L.-A. de Bougainville (80 years old, born 1729) is a famous circumnavigator, participant in naval battles in the French and British wars for the independence of the United States, commander of the naval army of Brest in 1790 (see: ^[21]) Vice Admiral A.-J.-M. Thevenard (76 years old, born 1733) served in the Navy during the Seven Years' War, built ships, was briefly Minister of the Navy during the Revolution (1791), and then commanded the naval forces of Brest, Toulon, and Rochefort ^{[6, p. 374, 375]}. Vice Admiral F. E. de Rosili-Mero (61 years old, born 1748) participated in the battles of the Franco-British War during the Louis XVI era, and commanded the combined fleets of France and Spain under Napoleon from 1805 to 1808. He is the youngest member of the council and sailed in the 1800s, contrary to the opinion of S. Muffat ^{[5, p. 239]}. One might also think that not participating in the Battle of Trafalgar made the council members more objective and impartial investigators. The Emperor quite reasonably believed that the judgment of these experienced people could be trusted.

The first meeting of the investigative council on the Dumanoir case was scheduled by Decree for September 14, 1809, at ten o'clock in the morning at the hotel of the Maritime Ministry ^{[2, f. 346]}. In total, there were thirteen meetings ^{[17, p. 274]}. The rear admiral, who was summoned, gave his testimony on the points of issue. His answers were also checked by the logs and reports of other officers (in particular, the log of Captain Letelier, etc.). As a result, Dumanoir managed to convince the council of his innocence, even in the most vulnerable positions. It was presented that on the day of the battle of 29 Vandemieres of the XIV Republic (October 21, 1805), the rear admiral could not immediately follow the signals given to him by the command due to a weak wind. The vanguard ships following him also did not respond to the signals. It was only after some time that the vanguard flotilla was able to be set in motion using additional watercraft. Dumanoir also testified that he then tried to break through on his ship "Formidable" to the center of the Franco-Spanish fleet, to the Spanish ship "Santisima Trinidad" and the French flagship "Bucentaure" (on which Admiral Villeneuve was stationed) and then confronted two enemy ships. But, acting downwind, the opponents passed right in front of him and caused serious damage to the mast and rigging. Dumanoir did not have time to join the flagship and witnessed its complete encirclement and surrender to the enemy. Under these conditions, with only three ships from the vanguard behind him and having severe damage on the "Formidable", the rear admiral preferred to get out of the thick of the battle in order to save the ships and crews. The documents submitted to the council recorded the emergency condition of the ship "Formidable". He received holes from the cores and began to fill with water, the condition of the mast did not allow maneuvering. Dumanoir had to take emergency measures to avoid flooding. Three ships were ordered to protect the "Formidable" and, if necessary, rescue the crew. Under these conditions, the rear admiral could no longer continue to participate in the battle ^{[13, p. 15, 16],[16, p. 220, 221],[23, p. 405-408]}. Taking into account all the circumstances described, the members of the investigative council considered the commander's actions justified and unanimously stated that there were no complaints about his behavior during the battle. The decision was signed on October 20, 1809, and it was reported to the Emperor.

Napoleon I, however, was not completely satisfied with the results of the inspection and on November 23 issued an order to conduct a new investigation into Dumanoir. It was necessary to study the circumstances following the Battle of Trafalgar in the collision at Cape Ortegal on 11, 12 and 13 Brumaire of the XIV Republic (November 2, 3 and 4, 1805), when the rear admiral surrendered four of his ships "Formidable", "Scipion", "Mont Blanc" and "Dugay-Trouin"captured by the British. It should be established whether, in these circumstances, the rear admiral personally and through his maneuvers did everything possible to protect the squadron, the ship on which he was stationed, and "for the honor of His Majesty's weapons" ^{[2, f. 345]}. The investigation was entrusted to the same investigative council: it is obvious that the emperor still had no doubts about the competence of its members and the ability to make an informed decision.

On November 27, 1809, Minister Decre informed the members of the Council of the continuation of the investigation and proposed that its meetings be held there, at the hotel of the Maritime Ministry, starting on November 28 ^{[2, f. 344]}. Dumanoir had to testify again. Among the papers of Admiral Bougainville from the manuscript collection of the National Library of France, the text of the explanatory note of the defendant has been preserved ^{[2, f. 340–343v]}. In it, Dumanoir outlined his vision of the events of 11-13 Brumaire of the XIV Republic (November 2-4, 1805). The description did not contain a general plan for the movement of the rear admiral's squadron after the Battle of Trafalgar, it is devoted only to specific events of these three days. It is known that Dumanoir was going to bring the ships saved in this battle to the French shores. On the way, on 11 Brumaire, he came across two frigates (obviously British), which did not respond to his signals, then another frigate, which the rear admiral followed, apparently hoping for an easy victory, having four battleships. However, this pursuit unexpectedly brought him to the main British forces. At daylight on 12 Brumaire, Dumanoir saw an enemy squadron of eight ships, of which there were four battleships and four frigates. The forces were unequal, and Dumanoir took measures to evacuate as soon as possible. To facilitate movement, he even ordered some of the guns to be dropped from the stern of the Formidable into the sea, which weakened the ship's firepower. An attempt to break away from the pursuit of the British squadron proved unsuccessful. In the end, on the morning of the 13th Brumaire, the opponents faced each other in full readiness to fight. The rear admiral lined up his ships and took an unequal battle. After many hours, it ended with the complete victory of the enemy and the capture of the burning French ships.

In justification, the rear admiral could only refer to objective circumstances, which proved impossible to win. His ships were already in serious condition after Trafalgar. The flagship "Formidable" was damaged and leaking. According to the rear admiral, "the people constantly used at the pumps were tired and exhausted (sur les dents)." The best sailors and gunners died in the last battles or were abandoned in hospitals, and defeats weakened the courage of those who remained in the ranks ^{[2, p. 341v]}. According to the rear admiral, he had only 60 guns on the "Formidable" (the ship had previously carried 80 guns, the rest of the battleships of the French squadron had fewer). The British had two out of four battleships with 80 guns each, so the enemy had a clear fire advantage ^{[2, f. 343, 343v]}. Finally, during the battle, Dumanoir himself was wounded by a bullet in his left leg and, apparently, could no longer fully perform his functions ^{[2, f. 342]}. And yet, according to the commander, the French did not disgrace their honor in this battle. Even the British commander, Admiral Strachan, expressed his respect in a report to the British Admiralty.: "that the French squadron fought to worship" (lit. "that the French squadron fought to admiration"). Dumanoir had been in English captivity after the battle, and apparently knew these details. He inserted the phrase in English into the French text to confirm the testimony about the dignity of his sailors. In conclusion, the rear admiral expressed the hope that the investigative council would recognize his behavior as "the behavior of a man of honor and a general who did everything possible to protect the unit under his command" ^{[2, F. 343, 343v]}.

This time, the opinion of the council members was not as favorable as before. In its final opinion of December 29, 1809, the council considered that Dumanoir was to blame for the incident ("le contre-amiral Dumanoir a eu tort"). It consisted of: giving an erroneous order to the captain of the Mont Blanc ship at the beginning of the battle to make a U-turn, which the rear admiral himself then canceled; refusing to fire on attacking British frigates, which could be smashed by coming close to them; turning the sides of the ships only in response to enemy fire. in general, he is indecisive in all maneuvers. But at the same time, the investigative council paid tribute to the steadfastness of the French teams, who, in conditions of a clear advantage of the enemy, fought for four and a half hours and surrendered only when the main masts of their ships were smashed ^{[13, p. 16, 17]}.

After receiving the council's opinion, Minister Decret offered the Emperor several possible options for deciding Dumanoir's fate. He could be retained in the service or suspended as a result of dismissal due to unfitness, resignation or removal from office, or tried by the military council ^{[17, p. 276]}. The Emperor preferred to put the rear admiral on trial. A naval military council on his case was convened in the port of Toulon. The chairman of the court was Vice Admiral Gantom, the members of the council were Vice Admiral Alman, Rear Admirals Cosmao and Boden, captains of the ship Faye, Trule, Violette and Martin. The speaker on the case was Rear Admiral Gourdon. Together with Dumanoir, two subordinate officers Berenger, the captain of the ship Scipion, and Le Tellier, the captain of the ship Formidable, were tried. Considering this case, the court found the charges against the Rear Admiral and his officers to be groundless, and their bravery and competence in the case at Cape Ortegal were beyond doubt. Therefore, on March 8, 1810, all the accused were acquitted, and their swords were returned to them ^{[15, p. 3]}.

Given the circumstances and outcome of Dumanoir's case, one can doubt the impartiality and sufficient objectivity of the investigative council. The council, reconvened by the emperor, now clearly wanted to play along with Napoleon's intentions to make the rear admiral responsible for the defeat at Cape Ortegal. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain that in the first case, when the rear admiral's positions were not entirely impeccable, he was fully acquitted, and in the second case, the council ignored the obvious evidence of the commander's innocence and used possible leads to accuse him.

For comparison with the investigative council discussed above, we can cite data on the council in the case of Vice Admiral Louis-Thomas Villaret-Joyeuse. In this case, it was not about a naval operation, but about the admiral's actions on land. From 1802 to 1809, he served as Captain General of Martinique and was forced to defend the island from the British attack in January-February 1809. The forces of the attackers and the defenders were unequal. The British used the fleet and infantry landings, having a total of 16 thousand people. The vice admiral had only 6,000, of whom there were 3,500 National Guardsmen and five battalions of the 82nd and 26th Infantry regiments under the command of General Udeto. For defense needs, there were also about 300 cannons on forts, batteries and in the arsenal. Since General Udeto was already very old, Villare de Joyeuse entrusted the main command of the troops to Colonel Montfort. The latter considered that the British would strike the main blow from the western part of the island, in Kaz Navir (north of Fort de France), so he prepared to wait for the attack here. However, the British launched attacks from the east (the main attack) and from the south of the island, which confused the French. Unable to contain their onslaught, the Vice Admiral ordered a retreat and held the main defense in the Fort de France area (on the west coast of Martinique). At the same time, the commander disbanded the National Guard, limiting protection to regular soldiers only. As a result, on February 3, 1809, the garrison locked themselves in Fort Desaix, which dominated the city of Fort de France, and in the Bouillé redoubt ^{[19, p. 257-259]}. It is interesting to note that the modest French forces here were opposed by 11 British generals (about one in fifteen hundred subordinates) ^{[20, p. 354, 355]}. The French held out for twenty days, withstanding enemy attacks and bombardments, and surrendered when there was a threat of an explosion at the powder magazine. The surrender of the French garrison in Martinique was signed on February 24, 1809 (the Vice admiral's brother, Brigadier General Villaret, took part in the signing). The surrender was honorable: the garrison had to leave the fortifications with military honors, but lay down their weapons behind the glacis (earthen embankment), the officers kept their swords. The French prisoners were to be transported on British transports to France, to Quiberon, and exchanged for British prisoners (of equal rank), with the exception of the Vice admiral himself and his adjutants, who were recognized as free and delivered without exchange (for the text of the surrender, see ^{[10, p. 332-338]}). Napoleon, however, opposed the exchange of prisoners. Therefore, only the Vice Admiral and his adjutants were brought to Quiberon. The rest of the soldiers and officers of the Martinique garrison (including Villaret's brother) were sent prisoners to England and released only after the fall of imperial power in 1814 ^{[19, p. 259, 260],[20, p. 365]}

The admiral, who arrived in France on an English ship, was ordered to temporarily stay in Rouen (Normandy), awaiting further orders. While in Schoenbrunn, Austria, on September 7, 1809, Napoleon ordered the formation of an investigative council to clarify the causes and circumstances of the surrender of Martinique. (Coincidence or not, the order to establish an investigative council in the Dumanoir case was given to the Decree on the same day, September 7. The Emperor was clearly concerned about the high command of the fleet.) Like the Dumanoir case council, the Villaret-Joyeuse case council had four members. These are: Marshal and Count Serurier (Chairman); Count Dejean, Minister of Military Administration; Senator and Count Lespinasse; State Councilor and Count Gassendi ^{[12, p. 1351],[20, p. 365]}. Their ages were somewhat younger than in the first council, but they were all military men with experience. Marshal of the Empire J.M.F. Serurier (67 years old, born 1742) became famous during the Revolution, especially in the campaigns in Italy, fought against A. V. Suvorov in 1799. Minister J. F.E. Dejean (60 years old, born 1749), a military engineer, also participated in the military events of the Revolution, since 1795 was a divisional general. Senator O. Lespinasse (72 years old, born 1737) led the artillery during the Italian campaigns under the Directory, and Commander Bonaparte achieved for him the rank of divisional general. State Councilor J.-J.-B. Gassendi (61 years old, born 1748) was also an artillery officer during the Revolution, was promoted to brigadier general, commanded artillery during the march to Marengo in 1800 ^{[3, p. 385, 386],[4, p. 217, 218, 530]},

^{[7, p. 165 It seems that the selection of such a composition was not accidental. There were no naval officers in it, but there were specialists in engineering and artillery, which was the best way to study the events of the siege of the fortress. Unlike the Dumanoir case council, the Martinique Surrender Investigation council did not directly interrogate Vice Admiral Villare, as it met in Paris, while Villare was in Rouen. The investigation was conducted on the basis of documents submitted by the participants in the siege: notes and letters from the Vice Admiral himself, responses made to requests from the council from the Chief of Staff, Director of Engineering, Colonel of the 82nd regiment, as well as a secret message from one "top agent" in the colony (un agent supérieur de la colonie). As can be seen from the final report of the council to the emperor dated November 29, 1809, the council assessed in detail the condition of the garrison on the eve of the siege, taking into account the number of cannons, rifles and ammunition for them, as well as the availability of provisions (grain, biscuits, salted meat, etc.) for a prolonged siege. The Council considered it quite satisfactory: "the artillery and the engineering unit were in as good a condition as the colony could afford," and "the zeal of the troops and the good spirit of the colony gave ... hope for excellent protection" [12, p. 1351]}. This hope was not fulfilled, mainly because of the mistakes made by the island's command. The members of the Investigative Council severely criticized Captain General Villaret's actions in organizing the defense.

According to the members of the council, the main reasons that led to the fall of French power in Martinique were as follows. The Vice admiral did not conduct offensive operations against the British, preferring defensive ones. He could have attacked the enemy before landing on the island, but did not do so. When the enemy landed from the east and from the south on Martinique, Villars divided the troops into three parts, mistakenly believing that there would also be a landing from the third side (from the west, in Kaz Navir), which significantly weakened the defense and did not move all available forces against the attackers. He also did not combine the line troops with the National Guard forces, which could strengthen the defense of the forts. Villaret, even before the British approached, hurried to evacuate Fort de France, although the resources allowed him to leave the garrison and defend himself. He did not monitor the removal or destruction of military supplies there, so the British, having captured the city, found cannons, mortars, shells, etc. Having chosen Fort Desaix as the main stronghold, the commander overloaded it with troops, although its casemates are designed for only 300 people. Finally, the vice admiral did not worry about the safety of the powder magazine, which could be evacuated in advance to the shockproof galleries or then covered with remnants from the destroyed casemates. In general, the investigative council was greatly surprised by the "haste" with which the troops chose to surrender to the enemy when the bombing had not yet destroyed the fortifications, succumbing to the fear of "seeing an exploding powder magazine" ^{[12, p. 1352]}. As can be seen from this list, the council made serious accusations against Villare, without even taking into account that he was a naval officer and had no experience in conducting land operations (which could explain the mistakes made).

The emperor, extremely dissatisfied with the concluded capitulation, the surrender of the garrison and the loss of Martinique, at first wanted a trial of the vice admiral. On December 6, 1809, a litter with Napoleon's signature was left on the report of the Investigative council: "sent to the Minister of the Navy to enforce the laws of the Empire against the accused" ^{[12, p. 1352]}. In accordance with this order of the monarch, Decree began to prepare the organization of the military council. In a letter dated December 23 to Secretary of War Clark (in the archival inventory, the addressee of this letter is mistakenly indicated as Dejan, Minister of Military Administration, however, the text contains an address with the title to the minister – "duc", Duke, and Clark was Duke of Feltre), the Minister of the Navy shared his thoughts on the organization of this vessel. In his opinion, the Captain General of Martinique and the commander of the garrison of this colony should be judged according to the laws and regulations of the Military Department and by a court of officers subordinate to this ministry. The proposed composition was to include the General-in–Chief of the armies (Marshal of the Empire) as chairman, three divisional and three brigadier generals as other members, as well as the commissaire-ordonnateur to perform the functions of commissioner of the Emperor. It was planned to convene the Council in Rouen ^{[1, f. 177, 177v]}. Clark, however, was in no hurry to respond to the request of the Minister of the Navy for the allocation of officers for this vessel. This was probably due to the emperor's own hesitation in punishing Villars. In the end, the Minister of the Navy himself presented Napoleon with an opinion on the desirable leniency to the vice admiral, given his merits in the naval service and incompetence in conducting land operations. The emperor's initial anger cooled, and the military council on the Villars de Joyeuse case was never convened. In 1811, the Vice Admiral was allowed to move to his family in Versailles, followed by his appointment as governor of Venice ^{[19, p. 263, 264],[20, p. 366],[14, p. 267]}.

The example of the Board of Inquiry in the case of Vice Admiral Villars de Joyeuse shows that the board acted impartially, painstakingly examining the available evidence, and its conclusions were accurate and objective. However, bringing the defendant to trial was outside the competence of the council, his opinion was advisory, and, as a result, the emperor did not use it.

Speaking about the institute of the Investigative Council as a whole, it can be defined both as a body of pre-trial investigation in a military criminal case and as a body for bringing charges. Given its collegial nature, it can be compared to a Grand (prosecutorial) Jury in Anglo-Saxon law. A grand jury (for example, in England or the USA) is a collegial jury board that summarizes the preliminary investigation (based on evidence collected by the police) and approves the indictment, referring the case to the court for further consideration. According to this model, in France, from 1791 to 1811, there was also an indictment jury for civilian justice. Unlike the prosecuting jury, the investigative council consisted not of jurors, but of appointed officers, who conducted the investigative actions themselves and searched for the necessary evidence, and then evaluated them and brought charges. However, the council did not have the authority to appoint a court, it was the prerogative of the emperor.

The Investigative Council based on the cases of Dumanoir and Villare de Joyeuse appears as an organ of the personal imperial authority in France. It was created on the initiative of the monarch, the emperor determined its composition and the place of convocation. The sovereign considered the final conclusions of the investigation on the existence of evidence of a crime and decided to organize a trial of the accused. It should also be noted that the use of the institute of the Investigative council was not carried out in every case. In fact, it was seen as a special favor from the monarch, who allowed for a preliminary investigation of the sufficiency of evidence to bring charges and create some kind of pre-trial guarantees against arbitrariness. However, as the practice of using the institute shows, the council did not always cope with the task of uncompromising investigation.