Consociational democracy in post-conflict societies. The possibility of application in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Kojovic Sara Postgraduate Student; Department of Theory and History of International Relations; Patrice Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University of Russia Assistant; Department of Foreign Languages; Patrice Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University of Russia 117198, Russia, Moscow, Miklukho-Maklaya str., 10 k2 sara.kojovic96@gmail.com Other publications by this author

Introduction

Applied solutions to consociative democracy (especially in the countries of the "third wave of democratization") have opened up an important academic and practical question about the relationship between consociation, peacemaking and strengthening democracy. The traditional approach to the consociative democratic model was based on questioning its democratic potential. Thus, the main task of the classical theorists of consociative democracy was to prove that "... consensual democracy can be considered more democratic than majority democracy, and in many ways." ^{[1, P. 79]} Over time, such ambitions subsided. In most modern publications, consociation is mainly studied as a suitable basis for ending conflicts and preventing their recurrence in the fragile environment of post-conflict societies. The main axis of analysis in this approach to consociation is the relationship between consociative mechanisms and the maintenance of peace. The quality of democracy, as a rule, is not a subject of study, although it is implicitly assumed that where there is peace and democracy, success is better. Our intention is to explore both correlations in the article: consociation ensures peace, and consociation guarantees democracy, using the example of a deeply divided post–conflict society - Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Let us formulate the subject of our research attention as follows: can consociative mechanisms, in addition to influencing the end of the conflict, guarantee long-term peace and stability without the danger of the revival of "ghosts of the past"? And in connection with the above: are the imperatives of consociative pacification of post-conflict societies and their democratization mutually exclusive? We will defend the position that consociation can be considered a receptive mechanism for conflict management in these societies, but not a successful model for their democratization. Given the nature of the problem, we will approach the study from the point of view of the institutional paradigm. We will explore how formal and informal consociative institutions influence the processes of pacification and democratization of deeply segmented post-conflict societies.

The theses that we consider in this article are as follows: 1) the probability of maintaining peace is higher in post-conflict societies in which consociative mechanisms exist than in those that have not successfully implemented them; 2) consociative mechanisms used in post-conflict societies inherently undermine their democratization processes; 3) Bosnia and Herzegovina is an example of a country where it is impossible to implement consociative democracy due todue to the inconsistency of the ruling political parties and the lack of a common goal for the future.

Democracy and divided societies

To establish, at least in principle, the beginning of academic interest in the topic of ethnocultural pluralism, Will Kimlika correctly notes that the issue of ethnicity was considered secondary or settled in almost all academic disciplines for most of the 20th century, up to the 1970s. ^{[2, p. 363]} What began at that moment as a cautious question about the themes of identity, in the 1990s developed into a boundless interdisciplinary discussion about the justification of the demands of supporters of identity politics and the ways of legal and institutional respect for ethnic and cultural diversity.

Within the framework of political science, the discussion has developed equally widely both in the field of political theory and in the field of empirical and institutional analysis of modern political systems. While theorists have mainly been concerned with the ontological and epistemological foundations of identity pluralism, political empiricists focus on the question of whether representative democracy with its institutional solutions can survive in societies characterized by marked ethnocultural heterogeneity. The classical theorists of liberal democracy had no such dilemma. Any attempt to find any hint of cultural pluralism or ethnicity in their works is questioned. Early liberal theory was concerned with the idea of how people come together in a political community and how political communities should be managed, while the question of who joins, in terms of identity markers, remains on the sidelines. John Locke thus speaks of "an initial contract by which a number of people... they create a community or government in which the majority has the right to govern others," while Hobbes points out that "a state community is institutionalized when many people agree with each other..." ^{[3, P. 20]} As we see, the parties to a social contract are individuals, or rather people who do not represent ethnic groups. or any other groups. This basic knowledge of liberal social contract theories was important for other "inventions" of the liberal universe, including the principle of political representation. Liberal democracy thus acquires a representative form and, no less importantly, is cleansed of significant deposits of the "old regime." This meant, among other things, that the principle of political representation, in accordance with the proclaimed neutrality of the public sphere, should in no case reflect the individually identical structure of the population, but solely the interests of individual preferences. Thus, politics in the liberal sense is nothing more than "a way to combine the interests of individuals within a neutral set of rules and direct them into a political sphere that produces and shapes the collective goals of the community." ^{[4, p. 185]}

The minimal concept of democracy, strongly influenced by the works of Joseph Schumpeter, remains dominant in modern democratic theory. Democracy in this model is defined narrowly and operationally in terms of aggregation of interests and party competition. In his book Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Schumpeter openly equates democracy with the mechanisms of market behavior of individuals. According to him, democracy is "an institutional structure of political decision-making in which individuals acquire the right to make decisions through competition for the votes of the people." ^{[5, p. 122]} The struggle for power is considered as a key feature of the democratic dynamics. Samuel Huntington, following Schumpeter's definition, further sharpens the contours of the procedural understanding of democracy. In order for a country to be called democratic, Huntington tells us, it is important not only to hold elections, but also to change the government at least twice during the elections. ^[6] Seymour Lipset and Jason Lakin, adherents of the empirical definition of democracy, give the following definition: "democracy is an institutional structure in which all adults have the right to vote in free and fair competitive elections for their main executive branch and for the national legislature." ^{[7, p. 39]} Like Huntington Lipset and Lakin also believe that it is important for democracy that there is a real possibility that the ruling party will lose power. Robert Dahl, the most influential post-war democratic theorist, presents a variant of procedural democracy. Although its definition goes beyond the minimalist understanding of democracy, it coincides with the aforementioned definitions in two of its key pillars: democracy is at the intersection of competitiveness and inclusivity. ^[8] Dahl's pluralistic approach to the democratic process is undoubtedly an important contribution to democratic theory, but this concept, like those mentioned earlier, does not sufficiently address the problem of cultural pluralism.

This oversight will lead to harsh criticism, which will eventually lead to the emergence of a consociative model of democracy. According to supporters of the consociative theory, the ethnocultural segmentation of modern states is a fact that democratic institutions should take into account. Segmented splits can be religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural, racial or ethnic in nature and are especially pronounced in post-conflict societies. Parties, interest groups, mass media, schools, and voluntary associations are organized along these splits. Deep ethnic, religious, cultural and other social divisions and the groups that follow them are an obstacle to "neutral" democratic procedures. Where voters' political preferences are shaped by ethnicity or religion, parties representing minorities are usually unable to form a majority. They are systematically frowned upon and discouraged from participating in government. In these circumstances, supporters of the association tell us, democracy must act cautiously. Classical, aggregated mechanisms, given that they ignore the problem of ethnocultural diversity and identity, inevitably deprive minorities of the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process. The lack of legitimization of the majority model in ethnically heterogeneous, divided societies can eventually lead to the bloody dissolution of the political community or to the resumption of violence in the case of post-conflict societies. The explosion of ethnic conflicts in the nineties of the last century will further strengthen the position of supporters of unification that stable democracy in segmented societies is unattainable without some form of politicization of the ethnic group.

Consociative democracy as a conflict management mechanism

Consociative institutional solutions (separation of powers, autonomy, the right of veto and the proportional system) have become a popular means of ending civil wars. In an extensive analysis of the peace agreements that ended hostilities in 38 countries between 1945 and 1998, Matthew Hoody and Caroline Hartzell cite only one agreement that cannot be classified as a consortium. ^{[9, p. 7]} Helga Malin Biningsbo, in a quantitative study in which she included 118 post-conflict societies between 1985 and 2002, also observes a positive correlation between consociation and the achievement of peace. ^[10] An equally strong conclusion in support of the thesis that consociative democracy brings peace is provided by Barbara Walter, who argues that the likelihood that the warring parties will reach an agreement ending the conflict is even 38% higher if this agreement includes a joint division of power. ^{[11, p. 13]} In their analyses, the above-mentioned authors mainly consider the reasons why the negotiating parties prefer to agree to solutions containing consociative elements rather than others. Accepting their conclusions, in the following lines we will take another step forward and face a more complex dilemma - whether and how successful a consortium can maintain peace in post-conflict societies. We will offer several arguments in support of the thesis that the probability of maintaining peace in post-conflict societies in which consociative mechanisms exist is higher than in those that did not use them.

The first reason for the positive correlation between the applied consociative solutions and peacemaking is the inclusive nature of the formula of consociative division of power, which helps to equalize the power and political importance of representatives of social groups in conflict. In the post-war environment, saturated with negative resentment and distrust, the mechanism of separation of executive power in these societies serves as an initial substitute for a scarce resource - mutual trust. The process of consociative pacification of post-conflict societies through the restoration of trust between yesterday's military opponents is implemented in two stages: first at the level of elites representing their social groups, and then at the level of leaders and members of social groups. The inclusion of representatives of all relevant segments in decision-making processes (primarily at the executive level) limits the "security dilemma" syndrome accordingly. Leiphart is absolutely right when he claims that in the absence of mutual trust after military conflicts, "of course, it is better to be in power with yesterday's rival than to let him rule in your interests and remain in opposition." ^{[12, p. 31]} In a consociative system, leaders share power by agreement, without dividing into winners and losers manage public affairs by harmonizing the special interests of the groups they represent. Consent is a prerequisite for decision-making, and their implementation has a better chance of success if representatives of all interested communities participate in their creation. In accordance with the inclusive logic of the division of executive power, leaders accumulate major positions both at the micro level (the level of the social group they represent) and in the global (state) political arena. Acting as "stakeholders", they balance the interests of the center and individual segments, becoming interested in preserving the community and their positions in power. At this stage, there is another important process of consociative pacification of post-conflict societies. The elites who were previously chosen to represent and protect the interests of their groups, having successfully completed this task, now demand from their followers a reciprocal service to recognize the legitimacy of the state institutions of which they are a part. Thus, there is a "reconciliation" between the state and society/societies, and the consensus of the elite begins to spread to all segments of the pluralistic community. The processes of cooperation and adaptation, as we see, take the form of a rational choice of elites. At the moment when the price of a potential return to war becomes higher than the interest in maintaining peace, the probability that one of the parties will withdraw from the consociative agreement drops sharply.

Another important "ingredient" of consociative engineering helps to strengthen mutual trust — the principle of proportional distribution of influence in key government positions. This implies not only the proportional distribution of seats in Parliament, but also the presence of representatives of relevant social groups in other government bodies (the judiciary, financial institutions, state-owned companies). In post-conflict societies, it is especially important that, following the principle of proportional representation, all parties in the new consociative structure (even those who were considered rebels in military conflicts) are represented in a single military force.

Numerous studies show that the autonomous organization of certain social segments can have an equally positive impact on stabilizing conditions in post-conflict societies. Similar to the division of executive power and proportional representation in key State institutions, a limited form of self-government enhances a sense of security and eliminates the danger of decision-making at the central government level that may conflict with the private interests of various subnational groups (for example, problems in education, religious organizations, and language standards). Autonomy can be achieved on a personal or territorial level, depending on whether the boundaries of social and regional divisions coincide.

Is there democracy in a consociative democracy?

On the previous pages, we explained why, in our opinion, consociative institutions do not have an adequate alternative in the process of pacifying post-conflict societies with a high degree of social division. However, we cannot observe such a positive correlation when considering the relationship between consociation and democratization. In the following lines, we will try to point out the key drawbacks of consociation as a model for democratizing post-conflict societies.

In order for democracy to be considered consolidated, which, according to Hague, Harrop and Breslin, represents the last stage of the democratization of society, it is necessary that "the opposition has real prospects of winning elections."^[13] The consortium theoretically and practically prevents the possibility of opposition actions and periodic changes of power actors. In such circumstances, elections lose their meaning, since the main political processes take place far beyond the electoral procedures and often secretly. The opinion of the public is insignificant, which negatively affects the lack of public interest and political anemia. The participants in the coalition consociative agreement, under the pretext of preserving the legacy of the peace agreement, as a rule, do not allow other, more moderate parties to enter the government. Similarly, consociative agreements often contain inflexible provisions on how to divide power between former rivals.

The consociative provisions of the peace agreements also create an unfavorable basis for the realization of individual freedoms and rights, including those necessary for the "democratic game" of political rights. One should not lose sight of the fact that the main "players" in consociative political systems are ethnic elites, and not individuals (citizens). The Association is more focused on promoting collective rights, especially within the boundaries of ethno-religious groups. The social group to which a person belongs mediates his relationship with a broader global society. Collectives have the right to determine the desired amount of rights and freedoms of their members, which leads to a deviation from the basic liberal rule of separating political and legal identity from cultural and ethnic identity. ^{[14, p. 43]} The peculiar feudalization of the state and the official division into various ethno-religious collectives undermine the sense of a common civil (political) identity, the main function of which is to overcome the specified features. In its most drastic consequences, the primacy of collective rights can reduce citizens' willingness for mutual solidarity. Social positions are cemented by group affiliation, and group interdynamics is reduced to agreements between authorized representatives of collective identities. Lebanese sociologist Antoine Mesara warns of this danger, vividly describing consociation as a "social position ceiling system" that constantly allocates certain places in the political and broader social environment without the prospect of change. ^{[15, p. 8]} Leiphart himself agrees with the statement that the predetermined distribution of social positions and, consequently, social chances is the most corrupting element of consociation, as it resists attempts to redefine it. ^[16] In order to be able to talk about democracy at all, the opponents of strict multiculturalism conclude, we need to return to culturally undifferentiated citizenship and reject the conditions typical of pre-modern societies in which the political status of individuals was determined by their ethnicity, religious, cultural or class affiliation.

The reasons for the frequent consociative stumbles of the democratization process can also be found in the influence of international factors (States or international organizations that mediated peace) on the internal dynamics of post-conflict associations. The interest of the "third" party in the survival of the consociative system, as a rule, leads to the chronic absence of autonomous democratic models of reproduction of political power.

Consociative democracy on the example of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a prime example of a post-conflict State in which it is very difficult to implement a consociative democracy. Among all the post-Yugoslav states, this country is the most pronounced example of a territory where disorder has been present on the political scene since its foundation.

The identity of an ethnic nation and the legitimacy of its representatives are indispensable elements for building a consociative political system in Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite the numerous contradictions that arise in the aforementioned relations.

The main characteristics of consociative democracy, as noted by E.G. Ponomareva, which could be applied in BiH, are: the exercise of power by a large coalition; proportionality as the basic principle of political representation; the mutual right of veto; a high degree of autonomy of segments of society in solving internal issues within each group. ^{[17, p. 69]}

However, the above conditions are difficult to apply in BiH for various reasons. On the one hand, this system ensures the peaceful coexistence of various ethnocultural groups within the framework of a common state. On the other hand, it consolidates the power of ethnic elites in certain territories and encourages them to use nationalist rhetoric in political struggle, thereby perpetuating the division of Bosnian society. ^{[18, pp. 144-145]} State power based on a broad coalition of representatives of all important segments of a pluralistic society in Bosnia and Herzegovina means the inclusion of legitimate representatives of all three ethnic groups in power. communities. The principle of a broad coalition in the reality of ethnically divided societies means recognition of common sovereignty and equal representation of indigenous ethnic communities. The goal of broad coalitions is to share power through its joint implementation. "The separation of powers requires that the state be governed jointly, and not by one narrow group." ^{[19, p. 49]}

The division of power in the context of broad coalitions as a principle of consociative democracy represents division in the exercise of one power and does not mean the division of power as an electoral "trophy". On the other hand, the division of power in the form of a broad coalition is impossible without first defining the relations of ethnic communities to the existing state. "The division of power requires the consent of the majority of representatives of different groups in a certain system." ^{[19, p. 49]} An important element of broad coalitions is the agreement of the ruling elites around the political program as an action plan during the mandate period. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ruling elites are not ready to agree on a program for the development of society and the state, since state power is perceived not as a right and obligation, but as an electoral trophy that should be divided between political parties, completely without obligations and responsibilities. The fact that a Government at the level of Bosnia and Herzegovina has not been formed for a long time after the elections confirms the lack of responsibility of political parties to citizens and peoples. Governance on behalf of the people has transformed into governance by the people, which leads to the strengthening of party power and a decrease in the democratic nature of the political system. The coalition of several parties of three ethnic communities, formed after the first multiparty elections in the fall of 1990, existed only as a "mathematical formula" necessary to seize and exercise power. Programmatic coalitions based on common political goals and attitudes towards the state did not exist and do not exist now. National elites "played a key role in mobilizing ethnic identity" ^{[19, p. 23]}, but they failed to create a minimal common basis for the status and organization of the state.

The broad coalitions formed in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the basis of electoral necessity and the common interest of "dividing the spoils" cannot provide the democratic qualities characteristic of consociative democracy without a minimal programmatic basis. The constitutional and political system of Bosnia and Herzegovina potentially allows for the creation of broad coalitions, but this is not enough if there are no points of contact between political parties of different ethnic communities. "In order to form a coalition for joint decision-making and inclusion of all groups, all major parties involved in forming the government must be ready to include 'others' in the government, otherwise the legal representation will remain just a representation, which will lead to the government looking like a scaled-down copy of parliament." ^{[19, p. 53]} Broad coalitions as the most important element of consociative democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina are impossible as long as the ruling elites understand the exercise of power as government ownership, and social and state resources as party electoral spoils.

Consolidation of the State and democracy in Bosnia should include, first of all, the creation of strong local self-government, the development of informal civil society institutions focused on social peace and stability, and the inclusion of civil structures in decision-making on a wide range of social issues. Unfortunately, practice shows that it is very difficult to implement this on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this regard, Kudryashova and Meleshkina rightly point out that "there is a mutual dependence between sovereignty and civil society: citizenship is the basis of sovereignty, while informal institutions of democracy and peace simply cannot develop without sovereignty. As a result, only popular sovereignty, based on a strong civil society, is able to oust nationalist leaders from the political elite who undermine the prospects for peaceful development. And the sad case of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a confirmation of this rule." ^[20]

Conclusion

In the article, we tried to prove that the main function of consociative mechanisms in post–conflict societies is to put an end to conflict and, more importantly, to prevent the resumption of violence, rather than building democracy. In the form of a concluding remark, we highlight the most important arguments in support of the claim that post-conflict consociative institutions preserve peace, but do not lead to democratic models of government.

Already in the first lines of the text, in which she explores the problematic relationship between unification, democratization and pacification in post-conflict societies, Anna Yarstad rightly warns that solving this issue is tantamount to "shooting at a moving target." ^{[9, p. 2]} The fact that this is an extremely "living" matter, in which many indicators are involved, opens up scope for various, often diametrically opposed, scientific conclusions. Supporters and opponents of the thesis of a causal relationship between consociation, post-conflict stabilization and democratization, however, agree on one thing: consociative peace agreements have become an indispensable means of ending military conflicts in deeply divided societies over the past three decades. It is more likely that the warring parties will agree to an agreement containing consociative provisions (separation of executive power, proportional representation in the main state institutions, the right to veto decision-making and autonomy) than to a conflict resolution organized according to the standards of the majority principle of democratic procedures. The motives for adopting the consociative scheme are numerous, but explanations predominate that explain such a sequence of events by a rational choice of the warring parties, whose main goal is not to find themselves in a subordinate position in the post-war balance of power.

The Consortium is not only the best way to achieve peace, but also a reliable means of preserving it. However, the imperative of long-term stabilization of post-conflict societies, as a rule, jeopardizes any attempt to democratize them. We find the reasons for both trends in the logic of consociative conflict management mechanisms. By recognizing the political importance of all social groups and their demands, consociative institutions enhance a sense of security and mutual trust. On the other hand, impenetrable political structures, reserved domains, the primacy of collective identity to the detriment of individual rights, as well as the significant role of external actors - guarantors of peace agreements - hinder the establishment of democracy in its essential aspects. It seems that in cases of acute identity conflicts and disagreements, peace mediators and negotiators always have only one offer on the table: peace or democracy.

Although this successful method of establishing and maintaining peace has also been used in Bosnia and Herzegovina, based on the example of other post-conflict societies, it has not been preserved in its original form in this country. This post-Yugoslav state is an example of such an organization of society, government, politics and life in general, where neither the equal division of power nor the equal rights of all its citizens are a guarantee of the successful implementation of consociationalism, the main goal of which is to establish peace. That is why Bosnia and Herzegovina today, 30 years after the civil war, remains an unstable country full of huge divisions and insecurity.