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International relations
Reference:

The formation of the CIA as a key instrument of U.S. foreign policy in the Cold War era

Panov Denis Sergeevich

ORCID: 0009-0000-7454-5327

Postgraduate student; Institute of Social Sciences; Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration

82 Vernadsky Ave., Moscow, 119571, Russia

denpanov3000@yandex.ru

DOI:

10.7256/2454-0641.2024.4.72575

EDN:

RARUAW

Received:

04-12-2024


Published:

03-01-2025


Abstract: The object of the scientific article is the formation of the US intelligence agency. The subject of the study is the factors that served as the starting point for the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency as a strategic and analytical center within the framework of ensuring national security and a foreign policy instrument in the context of the formation of a bipolar system of international relations. The author examines in detail the evolution of the US intelligence agencies, the historical context of World War II, the disagreements of Joseph Stalin, Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt, and later Harry Truman on the post-war world order, as well as the paradigm of realism as the dominant view in American academic and political circles on international relations. Special attention is paid to the place and importance of the CIA in the formation of the US national security system, as well as the position of the political establishment on this issue.   The historical-genetic method allows us to trace the historical conditions and stages of the development of the intelligence structure in the relationship, as well as the idea of the need for such an institution at the beginning of the Cold War. The narrative method describes the history of the development of the US intelligence agencies, which led to the formation of an important foreign policy institution with broad powers to carry out state tasks. The scientific novelty of this work lies in the position that the creation of the CIA was dictated by socio-political views on the situation in the world in a certain historical period. This is reflected in the views of academic and political circles regarding US foreign policy activities. As part of the institutional reform carried out in accordance with the adopted Law on National Security, the organization was an integral and key part of the "conservative U-turn". In fact, the intelligence structure is the embodiment of the realist paradigm of international relations. The high secrecy and broad powers of the intelligence agency have formed the basis for conducting secret political activities. It has become a strategic center for the administration of covert politics, bypassing democratic principles. In turn, this consolidated the reliance on the use of force, including covert force, as the basis of American foreign policy pursuing national interests within the bipolar system of the world. The CIA became an institution whose activities were aimed at containing the USSR in the conditions of the outbreak of the Cold War.


Keywords:

USA, intelligence, Cold War, National Security Act, CIA, NSC, Roosevelt, Stalin, Truman, Churchill

This article is automatically translated.

Currently, the United States of America has one of the most influential intelligence services in the world. The American intelligence community includes 17 different government organizations that collect information and conduct intelligence operations in the interests of the country. The tools and methods used by the staff of these departments are constantly being improved and demonstrate their practical applicability. Nevertheless, throughout the entire period of the existence of the United States, there was no intelligence structure outside the ministries and individual services responsible solely for collecting and analyzing information, having coordination functions and capable of conducting covert operations abroad. This article examines the features, causes, and historical conditions of the formation of the Central Intelligence Agency as an independent agency that is at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy.

The American Revolution was the starting point in the formation of American government intelligence. It is worth bearing in mind that initially intelligence activities were limited exclusively to wartime. Accordingly, all the knowledge and experience that was accumulated during the period of armed conflicts was lost. In tragic moments of American history, we had to gain experience and knowledge again [1, p. 27].

Since the 1880s, permanent intelligence agencies have been formed. The year 1882 was marked by the creation of the intelligence service of the United States Navy. In 1885, the military intelligence agency of the US Army began operating on a permanent basis, which became the Military Information Department at the Office of Military Reservation. During the same period of time, the attache staff was formed, which was sent as part of diplomatic missions on foreign business trips to collect information. After the creation of the General Staff at the Ministry of War in 1903, the information Department was transformed into the Second Department of the General Staff, which was abolished after the reorganization of the Ministry of War in 1910, and its functions were transferred to the Department of Military Education [2, p. 43].

On the eve of and during the First World War (1914-1918), US intelligence consisted of departmental intelligence and counterintelligence services. They were not capable of solving national tasks. Their activities were limited exclusively to departmental interests, moreover, their functioning was complicated by interdepartmental competition [2, p. 43].

By the end of the First World War, which the United States entered in 1917, thanks to Colonel Ralph van Dieman (1865-1952), the "Intelligence Police Corps" was created. The new service worked in two areas: counterintelligence activities in the United States and intelligence as part of the American Expeditionary Force (1917-1920), which fought on the Western Front. Subsequently, in 1942, it was reorganized into the Army Counterintelligence Service. In addition, a foundation was created on which military and naval intelligence subsequently emerged, although the interbellum period was marked as the most difficult time for these two structures due to staff reductions and funding cuts [2, p. 60].

In 1941, the creation of a non-military organization, the Office for the Coordination of Information, headed by Colonel William Donovan (1883-1959). However, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent entry of the United States into World War II prompted the American government to immediately reorganize it into the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The created intelligence agency was staffed by historians, economists, political scientists and geographers.

The tasks of the organization included the collection and analysis of strategic information, the planning of special services operations and their management [1, p. 39] [3, p. 123]. Basically, the main objectives of the operations were to support the anti-Nazi resistance and supply them with everything they needed, and in places where they did not exist, to organize combat guerrilla groups and train fighters. Later, units were created within the OSS to conduct counter-espionage, organize sabotage, sabotage, as well as prepare and distribute "black propaganda" materials. This type of activity was an integral part of psychological warfare, based on intelligence data, in which the source is not disclosed, but it seems that the information comes from the enemy or the underground in his rear.

At the end of the war, this organization was engaged in the search for war criminals. It also included a "Unit for the investigation of theft of works of art", which was engaged in the search for cultural heritage items stolen by the Nazis [4]. After the end of World War II, the Office of Strategic Services was liquidated, with the exception of units engaged in intelligence and information analysis.

After the advent of peace and the creation of the United Nations, according to the anti-Hitler coalition, the system of international relations had to change dramatically. An important goal was to understand the mistakes of the past and avoid new conflicts. However, immediately after the end of the war, relations between the Allied coalition turned out to be tense. According to W. Churchill (1874-1965), the destruction of Nazi Germany became the starting point in changing the relationship between the countries of the West and the USSR. According to the British Prime Minister, Russian imperialism and the communist doctrine had no limit in their progress [5, p. 574]. In turn, the American leadership was clearly aware of the growing influence of socialism and the USSR, especially since it remained the only powerful state threatening the hegemony of the United States. It was necessary to take a number of measures that would allow the country to maintain its leading position on the world stage.

Disagreements in positions on the establishment of a fundamentally new system of international relations became a catalyst for subsequent reforms in the United States and the development of Operation Unthinkable on the instructions of the British Prime Minister. This is evidenced by the correspondence of W. Churchill, J. V. Stalin (1878-1953) and F. Roosevelt (1882-1945), and later Harry Truman (1884-1972), with whom the head of the USSR had a tense relationship. The starting point of the disagreement was Stalin's position regarding the formation of the Polish government of National Unity, which he expressed in correspondence with the heads of state at the stage of the defeat of Germany [6]. After intelligence officers reported on the "Unthinkable" military plans created by the coalition allies [7], as Oleg Alexandrovich Rzheshevsky writes in his article, the Soviet leadership ordered Marshal Georgy To Konstantinovich In June 1945, Zhukov (1896-1974) brought the Armed Forces of the USSR into combat readiness, which confirmed Stalin's determination to defend his position in the field of delimitation of spheres of influence [8].

In the current international situation, it became obvious to the US leadership that it was necessary to develop a modern system for ensuring national security and a complete reorganization of the armed forces [1, p. 41]. In this regard, work has begun on drafting a law on national security. Within the framework of his concept, the issue of creating a body that would be engaged in intelligence activities and ensuring national security in the new reality has become a key one.

The White House took into account the importance of having a structure that would constantly collect information, analyze it, and conduct covert special operations in completely new realities. According to W. Donovan, head of the Office of Strategic Services, during the outbreak of a new global conflict, the agency under his control should have continued to engage in intelligence activities and ensure national security in peacetime. The director of the intelligence agency had conversations with F. Roosevelt on this issue during the Second World War. The president was suspicious of some of the OSS's actions, but was nevertheless inclined to consolidate intelligence more than it had been before the war [9, p. 270]. However, due to the premature death of F. However, it was not possible to obtain approval for the continuation of the work of the organization created by William Donovan [9, p. 402].

With the advent of Harry Truman to power and the mood in American society, which contributed to the early demobilization, the OSS was in danger of disappearing. Even during the presidency of F. Roosevelt, the Budget Bureau assumed the responsibility to act as an outside observer and study the needs of the US government in the field of intelligence activities. According to the bureau's report provided by the results of the study, Donovan's project to create an intelligence agency, according to G. Truman, had all the signs that it would be an American "Gestapo" [9, p. 403].

Despite the desire to create a peacetime intelligence structure, Mr. Truman nevertheless supported the efforts of the Budget Bureau [10, p. 6], which considered it necessary to disband the Office of Strategic Services. Moreover, General W. Donovan's ideas about the non-departmental intelligence service as an organization operating on a permanent basis, back during the Second World War, faced discontent from such structures as the FBI and American military intelligence. In this regard, the final decision was made to abolish the OSS.

In accordance with Decree No. 9621 of September 20, 1945, the OSS was disbanded on October 1, 1945. However, the experience gained by the organization during the war was of great value. In this regard, there was a need to transform the intelligence structure, which would be able to perform its functions in peacetime, that is, to engage in analytics and special operations. As a result, the Department of Research and Analytics was transferred to the State Department. Another component of the intelligence service was transferred to the Ministry of War with the wording that the Minister of War has the right to eliminate it "at any time when he considers it compatible with national interests" [11]. Thus, within the framework of the Ministry of War, a strategic services unit was formed, consisting of secret intelligence and counterintelligence.

It can be assumed that the dissolution of the OSS marked the policy vector of the Truman administration as aimed at demilitarization of both society and government authorities. However, in September 1945, the president stated that he envisioned "a different kind of intelligence service from what this country had in the past." <...> a broad intelligence service attached to the Office of the President" [12]. That is, the main problem of the Office of Strategic Services was not the very existence and operation of such a service, but only its subordination to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In January 1946, the Central Intelligence Group was established, which became the operational component of the National Intelligence Agency. The main tasks of the organization were: planning, coordination of interagency intelligence and analysis of its information. It is worth noting that initially it was supposed to complement, rather than replace, the intelligence structures of various departments. According to CIA staff historian Michael Varner, on April 2, 1946, the National Intelligence Agency approved the transfer of the Strategic Services division as the Bureau of Special Operations to the newly created intelligence structure [13]. However, the transfer of personnel began only in June 1946, with the appointment of a new director of intelligence. Thus, thanks to the efforts of Assistant Director of Administration Donald Stone and Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy (1895-1989), the invaluable intelligence experience gained during World War II was preserved, represented by former employees of the Office of Strategic Services, already in a completely new interdepartmental body.

The Central Intelligence Group became a key organization that carried out intelligence activities abroad and was engaged in strategic prevention of any events that could harm the United States. She had two key tasks. The first is a timely strategic warning and protection against a repeat of events like the attack on Pearl Harbor. The second is conducting covert special operations abroad to prevent such events. This is what prompted the formation of the Central Intelligence Agency, which would centrally carry out external national intelligence.

The National Security Act of 1947 was a completely new milestone in American national security, it became a document that changed the structure of government agencies responsible for ensuring national interests. This was confirmed in the views of both the scientist Hans Morgenthau (1904-1980) and the diplomat George Kennan (1904-2005), who believed that reliance on liberal views in the implementation of foreign policy led to those irreparable consequences that could not prevent the Second World War. G. Morgenthau wrote: "the state has no right to allow its moral disapproval of encroachments on freedom to interfere with the success of political actions" [14]. There is an urgent need to reconsider the views on the implementation of US foreign policy in order to strengthen its position in the international arena and prevent the emergence of forces that could threaten the national interests of the country and disrupt the newly formed system of international relations.

According to G. Morgenthau, there was interaction and interpenetration of academic and political elites in the USA, which led to the emergence of an "academic-political complex", as a result of which universities became service stations for the requests of the ruling circles. Moreover, they have become an integral and irreplaceable part of the system [15, p. 436]. As a result of the intertwining of the scientific field in the field of international relations research and politics, realism, opposing open and transparent diplomacy, has become a key paradigm of the US leadership. Her representatives are Edward Hallett Carr (1892-1982) and G. Morgenthau defended the provisions according to which the full and authorized representative of national interests is a state that, on the basis of the competence of external sovereignty, has the monopoly right to represent the internal community, conclude treaties, declare wars, etc.

In this regard, it was important to restructure the system of state authorities and allow for a hidden foreign policy in order to avoid a repeat of tragic events. Thus, the reforms carried out in the United States after World War II were nothing more than a conservative reversal. There was a need to prevent the spread of communism around the world, as there was a serious fear that this would lead to a new war.

In accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, the Central Intelligence Agency was established [16, sec.102] and an advisory body under the President known as the National Security Council [16, sec.101], which assists the President of the United States in resolving issues related to national security, as well as coordinating agencies, related to these issues. The creation of these bodies was due to the fact that the State Department was unable to restrain the USSR [17].

The CIA, in turn, was assigned a special role in the restructured system of government authorities. This is confirmed by the powers assigned to the intelligence structure. The law gave the CIA exclusive powers [16, sec.102], namely:

1. Advice from the US National Security Council on intelligence activities;

2. To make recommendations to the National Security Council regarding the coordination of intelligence efforts of all government organizations involved in this.;

3. Provide assistance to existing intelligence organizations;

4. To carry out other duties related to intelligence activities and affecting the national security of the United States, as directed by the National Security Council.

Thus, from the very beginning, the CIA was presented to its creators not only as an information gathering and intelligence coordination apparatus, but also as a tool for implementing foreign policy by conducting covert operations on a global scale. This is evidenced by Directive 10/2, adopted on June 18, 1948, which established the Office of Special Operations to conduct covert operations. Subsequently, a number of secret directives were adopted, clearly indicating that from now on many decisions regarding the positioning of the United States on the world stage and the actions taken for this purpose will be made exclusively in hardware. The Law on the Central Intelligence Agency of 1949 classified information about the organization, responsibilities, leadership, ranks, salary and number of employees [18]. The creation of this structure eliminated the parallelism and confusion in the activities of the American special services. Perfectly clear contours in the activities of intelligence agencies began to take shape. From now on, the CIA was a key element in the administration of American foreign policy.

*****

Summing up, it can be clearly seen that the reform of the structure of American government agencies was influenced by several factors, namely: the current tense situation on the world stage after World War II, the need to preserve the experience and knowledge of intelligence activities, as well as the formation of a special relationship in the views on international relations of scientists and political elites. In the context of the newly emerging threat, there was an inevitability in the restructuring of public authorities and the formation of new structures, the key task of which would be to protect national interests.

The established stable relationship between the political establishment and scientists has shaped a clear direction of American foreign policy. With this intention, the US National Security Act of 1947 was passed, which can be fully described as a conservative act that marked a turn from liberalism towards realism. This implies the hidden use of force, which includes special operations to achieve the goals set for the state using all its potential and functions. American foreign policy has become increasingly based on a realistic paradigm of international relations. In this regard, a reform was carried out, as a result of which the National Security Council appeared, which became an important body in making foreign policy decisions, and the CIA became an analytical center and a foreign policy instrument aimed at achieving certain goals and objectives formulated by the political establishment in a confrontation between the two systems.

References
1. Dulles, A. (1965). The Craft of Intelligence. New-York: The New American Library.
2. Dundukov, M. Yu. (2019). US Intelligence and Counterintelligence (from the end of the 18th Century to the Present Day). Moscow: Litres: Samizdat.
3War Report of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services). (1976). New-York: Walker and Company.
4. Hussey, M., Kurtz, M. J. & Bradsher G. (2016). OSS Art Looting Investigation Unit Reports. Retrieved from https://www.archives.gov/research/holocaust/art/oss-art-looting-investigation-unit-reports.html#artloot
5. Churchill, W. (1991). The Second World War. Abridged translation from English. Book Three., Vol. 5-6. Moscow, Russia: Voenizdat.
6Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the Presidents of the USA and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945. Volumes 1 and 2.(1957–1958). Moscow. Retrieved from http://www.hrono.info/libris/stalin/stalin1941_45.php
7Operation Unthinkable: How Britain Planned an Attack on the USSR. (May 22, 2022) Retrieved from https://historyrussia.org/sobytiya/operatsiya-nemyslimoe-kak-britaniya-planirovala-napadenie-na-sssr.html
8. Rzheshevsky, O.A. (2008). At the origins of the Cold War. Vestnik MGIMO Universiteta, 3(3), 36-47.
9. Smith, B. F. (1983). The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of the CIA. New-York: Basic Books.
10. Warner, M. (Ed.) & Koch, S. A. (Ed.). (1998). Fifty years of the CIA. Place of publication not specified: Center for the Study of Intelligence. Central Intelligence Agency. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/fifty%20years%20of%20the%20cia%5B15465283%5D.pdf
11. Executive Order 9621 (1945). Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute of the United States Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS). Retrieved from https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d14
12. Troy, F. T. (1981). Donovan and the CIA. A history of the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency. Frederick, MD: University Publications of America. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00708R000600120001-0.pdf
13. Warner, M. (1996). The Creation of the Central Intelligence Group. Studies in Intelligence, 39(5), 111-120. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/Creation-of-Central-Intel.pdf
14. Morgenthau, H. J. (2005). Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 7th ed. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
15. Campbell, D. (2001). International Engagements: The Politics of North American International Relations Theory. Political Theory, 29(3), 432-448. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/3072558?searchText=Campbell%20international%20engagements&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasicSearch%3FQuery%3DCampbell%2Binternational%2Bengagements%26so%3Drel&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&refreqid=fastly-default%3A1ce9ba23e42ab2b8585bcb6719c6bb7f
16. National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. ch. 15 § 401 (1947).
17. DeConde, A. (Ed.). Burns, R.D. (Ed.) & Logevall, F. (Ed.) (2002). Encyclopedia of American foreign policy. Vol. 2. 2nd ed. New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons.
18. Central Intelligence Agency Act, 50 U.S.C. ch. 15, subch. I § 403a (1949).

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The reviewed article "The formation of the CIA as a key tool of U.S. foreign policy in the Cold War era" is devoted to the transformation of the tools and methods of U.S. foreign policy in the second half of 1940, and specifically to the formation of an independent intelligence agency of the CIA, which, according to the author, has become a key tool of American foreign policy. The title seems somewhat disorienting because the article mainly examines the period BEFORE the official registration of the CIA and only briefly reviews the period 1946-1947, i.e. the direct role of the CIA during the Cold War is not considered in the text, respectively, the conclusion (in itself quite legitimate) about the key role of the CIA in US foreign policy is based on somethe arguments that exist outside of this article; as well as the Cold War itself remains outside the chronological framework of the article. In general, the article consists of two parts, first the author gives a brief historical overview of the development of American intelligence services from the end of the XVIII century to the interwar period of the XX century, pointing out the shortcomings that existed then. The second part explains in detail how the results of the Second World War led to adjustments in American foreign policy doctrine in general and in the organization of intelligence activities in particular: "... it was necessary to take a number of measures that would allow the country to maintain its leading position on the world stage. Disagreements in positions on the establishment of a fundamentally new system of international relations became a catalyst for subsequent reforms in the United States…In the current international situation, it became obvious to the US leadership that it was necessary to develop a modern system for ensuring national security and a complete reorganization of the armed forces..." The author analyzes the process of transformation of the OSS into the Central Army in the first post-war years, highlighting the organizational, conceptual and legal aspects of this transformation. The author repeatedly emphasizes that the communist threat on the one hand and the traumatic experience of Pearl Harbor on the other hand led to the correction of American foreign policy from liberal idealism/isolationism to pragmatism, which was embodied by the Central Intelligence Agency/CIA with the right to conduct secret operations. ".... The US National Security Act of 1947, which can fully be called a conservative act, marked a turn from liberalism towards realism. This implies the hidden use of force, which includes special operations to achieve the goals set for the state using all its potential and functions. American foreign policy has become increasingly based on a realistic paradigm of international relations." In general, the author's conclusions seem justified, the title of the article and the thesis "From now on, the CIA was a key link in the administration of American foreign policy" remain controversial. It seems that such conclusions could have been made after considering some significant period of direct CIA activity, but the author dwells on the actual moment of the organization's emergence; we understand the logic of its emergence, but do not yet see its actions. Probably a more appropriate title (i.e. corresponding to the text of the article) would be "The emergence of the CIA as a marker of a turn towards realism in US foreign policy." There is no literature review in the text, the methodology of the research is not stated, nevertheless, the topic seems to be very relevant, the work itself is performed at the proper scientific and methodological level and may be of considerable interest to the reader. It is recommended for publication.