Prospects for China's Use of Artificial Intelligence in the Context of the US-China Geopolitical Rivalry

Kocherov Oleg Sergeevich PhD in Politics Associate Professor; Faculty of Political Science, GAUGN 603064, Russia, Nizhny Novgorod region, Nizhny Novgorod, Lenin, 70, sq. 40 netherdead@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

The problem of the influence of artificial intelligence (AI) and related technologies (procedural generation, language models, big data, cloud storage, etc.) on the socio-political sphere has become one of the most pressing issues in the last decade. Of particular interest are the prospects and risks that AI brings to international relations, especially in the context of their modern fundamental transformation and the escalated confrontation between the main actors (primarily the PRC, the Russian Federation and the United States). Of course, any attempts at forecasting here are complicated by the fact that, although significant progress has been made in the development of AI, it is obvious that this area is still in its infancy in many ways, and its potential is probably not fully capable of correctly assessing even the advanced "smart" computers themselves (not to mention political experts). Nevertheless, the influence of AI on international relations in various fields is beyond doubt and has already been widely discussed in the works of both domestic ^[11], Western ^[24], and Chinese ^[20] experts.

Quite a lot of publications are devoted to the problem of the use of AI in the military sphere. A kind of starting point here can be considered 1991, when Operation Desert Storm showed all the prospects for the use of information and communication technologies and advanced high-tech weapons in combat. In the future, "smart" weapons (high-precision warheads, drones, etc.) were used by the United States in all Middle Eastern conflicts, and in recent years, the Russian Federation has also used them within its framework. Of course, so far the military use of AI does not particularly correspond to the genre cliches of super-AI and killer robots that have developed in science fiction. Nevertheless, more and more often, research does not involve weak AI, but more complex types of it, thanks to which it becomes possible not so much the appearance of more precision weapons as the transformation of the war itself. For example, experts are greatly interested in the concept of "algorithmic warfare", which requires such a high speed of decision-making and reaction to enemy actions that human combatants are forced to rely on AI for this ^[33]. In a number of other concepts of war, a person actually ceases to be a participant in it at all and only watches the battle of machines from the side^[1].

Of particular interest to researchers is the PRC, which last participated in the war 50 years ago, but at the same time is extremely actively developing AI technologies, including in the military sphere (according to some researchers analyzing the geopolitics of AI and leadership in the field of high technologies, the PRC is still lagging behind in this area in a number of parameters only from USA ^[26]). In the works of domestic researchers, the use of Chinese AI is studied mainly in the context of protecting "smart" Chinese systems from external threats ^[9], as well as legal regulation of the AI sphere (including in the international dimension) ^[18], which is explained by the wide opportunities for Russian-Chinese cooperation in these issues. Consideration of the military use of AI in domestic works is much less common. Among them, the works of E.A. Razumov ^[13] and R.A. Kutnyak ^[8] should be highlighted. At the same time, in our opinion, despite all the advantages of these works, their main drawback is that they practically do not take into account either the specifics of modern wars (where the non-military component becomes much more important, and therefore the boundaries between war and peace are blurred), or specific geopolitical circumstances, in particular which China is located in. In English-language studies, much more attention is paid to the use of AI by the PRC in the "gray" sphere (see, for example, ^{[30, 25]}), but in most cases, the actions of the PRC are considered aggression, and the studies themselves often contain recommendations for the political and military leadership of Western countries.

In our approach to the problem under consideration, we proceed from the premise that a direct clash between China and the United States is unlikely for many reasons (but by no means inevitable, and therefore the opinion of G. Kissinger and G. Allison on the need for a responsible American-Chinese dialogue on AI issues is fair ^[32]). Therefore, the issue of Beijing's use of AI in the "political war"^[2] against the United States is becoming much more important. Of course, it must be borne in mind that this "war" (from a conventional point of view, which is not a war in principle) is largely defensive: It is caused by discursive and normative aggression against China by the United States, where many representatives of the establishment view Beijing as Washington's most important competitor in the global political arena, and Chinese values and norms as a threat to Western values and the model of liberal democracy. In this regard, the PRC is forced to look for ways to counter such aggression and at the same time prevent the "political" war from flowing into a "kinetic" war, i.e. conventional. In this sense, there is an increase in trade turnover between the countries, and meetings of high-ranking officials from both sides in the format of a "comprehensive economic dialogue" (largely frozen under Trump, but resumed under Biden, albeit in other forms), and attempts to find a common denominator on a wide range of international problems (from the "Korean issue" to the struggle terrorism and extremism), and Xi Jinping's constant rhetoric that the United States and China are not adversaries, and relations between them should not be dictated by concepts in the spirit of the "Thucydides trap" predicting the inevitability of their collision – all this can also be considered as Chinese tactics of "political" war, the purpose of which is not the realization of China's insidious plans and hidden ambitions, but the prevention of escalation. In any case, so far there is hardly any reason to believe that the American administration, on the one hand, will change its conceptualization of Beijing as the most important rival, and, on the other hand, will enter into a conventional armed confrontation with China, in connection with which, in our opinion, the "political" war will determine the dynamics of the American-Chinese relations in the long term, and the development of conventional military capabilities will primarily be understood as an important factor in preventing enemy aggression.

Before considering the prospects of the PRC's use of AI in political warfare, it is advisable to analyze what place AI occupies in Beijing's foreign policy strategy in the context of Chinese views on war at the present stage.

The role of AI in China's foreign policy strategy

The specificity of the Chinese military sphere lies in the fact that the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) is largely subordinate to the Chinese Communist Party^[3], and therefore the military strategy also depends on the foreign policy goals of the People's Republic of China. Since one of the most important tasks of modern Beijing is the construction of an alternative system of international relations ("new type of international relations", Xinxing Guoji Guanxi), based not on the philosophy of the permanent war of all against all Western political realism, but on the idea of harmonious, peaceful and equal coexistence of various actors rooted in the Chinese intellectual tradition, it is not surprising that That the cornerstone of Chinese military strategy remains the principle of "active defense" (Jiji fangyu) formulated by Mao Zedong. Within the framework of this concept, the PRC expresses its commitment to the principle of non-aggression first, but at the same time warns of the guarantee of massive retaliation. Due to the fact that in conditions of widespread informatization and high-tech warfare can begin and unfold extremely rapidly, the PLA pays considerable attention to intelligence and prevention of enemy aggression, as well as the development of its capabilities in the field of information and communication technologies. At the doctrinal level, this was reflected in the identification of "wars in the context of informatization" as the main conflicts in which the PRC may be involved in the future. Nevertheless, due to the development of AI technology in the last decade, another term is increasingly found in Chinese discourse – "intellectual wars" (jinenghua zhanzheng).

The interest in the strategic capabilities of AI, as well as the need to ensure the security of the People's Republic of China in this area, are reflected in a number of Chinese regulatory documents. So, in 2017, the Chinese government published a "Plan for the development of a new generation of artificial intelligence," which stated: "Artificial intelligence has found itself in the very center of international rivalry. It is a strategic technology that will determine the future, and all major developed countries consider the development of AI as an important strategy to increase their international competitiveness and ensure national security... Currently, China is in a very difficult situation in terms of security and international rivalry, and from a global perspective, it is necessary to consider the development of AI at a strategic level ..." ^[16]. According to the Plan, by 2025 AI should be systematically used in various spheres of society (including national defense) and become an engine for the development of Chinese industry and a driver of economic transformation. In addition, by this time, the main laws and ethical standards governing the AI sphere should also be developed. By 2030, China should become the world's main center of innovation in the AI field and achieve a breakthrough in all AI-related technologies, which should lead to a profound transformation of all spheres of society.

The important role of AI is also noted in official documents of the People's Republic of China in the military sphere. So, in the white paper "China's National Defense in the New Era" from 2019 (the latest at the moment) It is stated that "war is rapidly evolving into an informatized war, and the outlines of an intellectual war are already beginning to appear" ^[15].

In 2020, the integrated development of "mechanization, informatization and intellectualization" of the PLA was conceptualized by the Chinese leadership as one of the "Goals of the centennial struggle in the field of military construction" (jianjun Bainian Fendou mubiao) – the program of modernization of the Chinese army by the centenary of its foundation (2027) ^[22]. In 2021, the "Goals" were included in the "China's Socio-Economic Development Plan for the 14th five-year plan". As V. Kashin notes, the prioritization of the "intellectual" component is clearly visible in Xi Jinping's report to the XX Congress of the CPC (2022) ^[6].

Intellectualization is increasingly found in the literature of the PLA. So, in 2017, in the reissue of the fundamental work "The Science of Strategy", a separate chapter was devoted to the conflict in the field of "intellectual dimension". In the 2020 reissue, it draws the following conclusions:

· The war is gradually evolving into an "intellectual war". Unmanned aerial vehicles have become an important part of the armed forces, and their share on the battlefield will only increase, and therefore it is necessary to adapt traditional military strategies and tactics and the organizational structure of the army to wars in conditions of "intellectualization".

· Due to the strategic importance of developments in the field of military AI, some actors (primarily the United States) are trying to slow down the progress of their competitors in this field by various methods. Washington conceptualized its struggle in this area in the format of the "third offset strategy"^[4].

· The "intellectualization" of the military sphere gives countries that lag behind their rivals in terms of conventional army power a rare opportunity to make a leap in development and significantly increase their competitiveness. In order to take advantage of this chance, the PRC needs to develop a strategy and plan for the development of AI, as well as prioritize AI-related research ^{[39, pp. 174-181]}.

Finally, the PRC also plays an active role in international norm-setting in the field of military applications of AI. So, in 2021, the PRC submitted to the UN a memorandum "On the regulation of the military use of AI", in which it called on the world community to use AI in this area in good faith and responsibly, and to strictly observe national and regional ethical norms and international humanitarian law when developing and using "smart" weapons. In addition, in this document, Beijing noted the need to develop international norms for regulating AI based on the principles of multilateralism, openness and inclusiveness, in the format of a continuous dialogue between countries with the involvement of AI experts ^[37].

In 2023, on the sidelines of the third forum of international cooperation "One Belt, One Road", the Chinese concept of global AI norm-setting crystallized in the form of the initiative "global artificial intelligence management" (Quanqiu Rengong Jineng Zhili changyi). In his welcoming speech, Xi Jinping noted the need for information exchange in the field of AI development and the importance of "human orientation" in the development of any high technologies. The Chinese leader also stated the inadmissibility of using AI to interfere in the affairs of third countries (for example, influencing election results through the massive creation of fakes and manipulation of public opinion with their help) or in private life, as well as the importance of ensuring access to AI technologies, discussions about norms in this area and its global governance. countries ^[4]. In 2024, these principles were somewhat more detailed in the Shanghai Declaration on Global AI Governance ^[40].

Of course, Beijing's interest in informatization and intellectualization is manifested not only at the regulatory, but also at the institutional level. A detailed analysis of the main Chinese institutions, think tanks and AI technology development centers is presented in the detailed work of Elsa Kania ^[30], an expert in the field of Chinese "smart" developments. In this paper, it is enough to note that during the Chinese military reform in 2015, a new type of military was created – the Strategic Support Forces, whose competence included issues of cyberwarfare and information warfare. In addition, during the period of Xi Jinping's leadership in China, the civil-military integration program (Junmin Ronghe) began to play an important role, within which the civilian sector cooperates with the military in strategically important areas^[5].

Thus, AI is beginning to play an increasingly important role in Chinese political discourse and is seen as a strategically important technology. AI, from the point of view of the PRC, is an indispensable component both in the framework of the modernization of the PLA and in the process of forming a safe foreign policy environment for Beijing. At the same time, given the PRC's emphasis on "active defense", the principle of non-aggression and deterrence of a potential enemy, "political" war is becoming the most important dimension of modern Chinese strategy. In our opinion, China's use of AI in the framework of a "political" war with the United States in the coming years will be most promising in three areas: strategic control over the spaces and restriction of access to them by the rival, the search for new deposits of critical resources and the formation of an international agenda beneficial to the PRC.

Strategic control and access restriction

One of the most promising areas of AI application in the context of global geopolitical confrontation between powers is their control over spaces and the exclusion of the enemy from these spaces. Often, the term "A2AD" (anti-access and area denial), which originated in Western discourse, but is actively used by Chinese military theorists and political scientists, is used to designate a set of such events.

A related concept that is also of interest to Chinese researchers is the idea of "deterrence by detection", developed by experts from the Washington Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. According to this concept, "the enemy is less likely to resort to opportunistic acts of aggression if he knows that he is under constant surveillance and that his actions can be quickly found out" ^{[34, p. iii]}.

In the context of the US-Chinese geopolitical confrontation, "deterrence through detection" and restriction of access in the Indo-Pacific are of particular importance. First of all, we are talking here about the waters of the East China and South China Seas, where the PRC has disputes with most countries of East and Southeast Asia regarding the territorial affiliation of a number of islands, as well as the borders of exclusive economic zones. Although at the present stage these disputes do not spill over into armed conflicts, skirmishes often arise in the waters due to the fact that the parties are trying to strengthen their presence in the disputed territories through creeping penetration. A textbook example here is the Chinese "great Sand wall" (sha Changcheng), Beijing's project to create embankments on reefs in the South China Sea to expand its military presence on them. In recent years, this strategy has been applied by other parties to disputes in the South China Sea (primarily Vietnam ^[42]).

In addition, due to the fact that several large oil and gas fields have been discovered in the South China Sea, underwater confrontation is becoming an important factor in the confrontation in the region. As the International Institute for Strategic Studies notes in its annual report ^{[43, p. 7]}, one of the consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in the military sphere has been the growing interest of world armies (including the armed forces of China and Southeast Asian countries) in underwater drones.

It is not surprising that in such conditions it becomes extremely important to create a system for tracking the actions of competitors, as well as to respond promptly to threats. And here AI can play a leading role, which is already being used by Beijing to create the "great underwater wall" (Shuixia Changcheng) – a complex of sonar systems and sensors designed both to search for minerals and to control the water area and restrict access to it by enemy vessels.

Another important potential application of AI in deterring opponents in the water area may be the use of "swarm intelligence" technology, which allows groups of drones to synchronously carry out one goal. One of the most common tactics used by Beijing in the South China Sea is the "cabbage tactic" (juanxincai zhanshu). Its essence lies in the fact that the enemy's ships or ground facilities are surrounded by several rings of Chinese ships (tactics can also be used in the opposite direction, to protect Chinese facilities from the blockade). The use of a swarm of drones as part of this tactic can significantly increase the strategic capabilities of the PRC in the water area and reduce risks for Chinese military personnel.

The strategic control project in the South China Sea is of particular importance to the PRC due to the fact that the United States and its Asian allies have their own radar system aimed at deterring the PRC: the underwater fortified Fish Hook Undersea Defense Line, running from South Korea and Japan to Taiwan, the Philippines Indonesia and the Indian Andaman Islands (Fig. 1). Of course, this system alone will not be able to prevent the PRC from entering the Pacific space, but it provides China's rivals in the region with control over information along the most important trade artery for China – the Maritime Silk Road. Moreover, in the Indian Ocean, China may already fall for one of the two Indian "fishing hooks", which refers to the network of bases of India and its partners in the western and eastern parts of the ocean.

Fig. 1. The "fishing hook" of the USA (source: https://apjjf.org/hamish-mcdonald/4309 )

Another promising area of AI application in the field of deterrence is control over the border between China and India, one of the US partners in the confrontation with China.. The specificity of the conflicts here is that the border runs in mountainous regions that are difficult for the conventional army to reach. In this regard, it is not surprising that one of the practical results of the Indian military AI program was the deployment of 140 smart surveillance systems along the Indian borders with Pakistan and China ^[35], which in the near future should cause a symmetrical response from the PRC. India's interest in the military use of AI is largely due to the rivalry between Delhi and Beijing and the unwillingness of the former to lag behind the latter in the field of defensive capabilities. According to Indian experts, although India as a whole responds effectively to China's attempts to creep into disputed territories, in recent years there has been another trend when China manages to gain a foothold on new frontiers (including thanks to more developed intelligence), and India has to put up with a new border ^[41].

Nevertheless, as noted by Pakistani researcher S. Mansour, India's actions lead to a violation of strategic stability in South Asia, since India's other rival in the region, Pakistan, does not yet have equally developed AI technologies and has to turn to China for help in their development ^[35]. India, in turn, focuses on developing its own capabilities in the field of military applications of AI, but at the same time actively cooperates on this track with the "enemy of its enemy" – the United States. For example, India and the United States have launched a program to finance joint startups in the field of quantum computing and AI. In addition, Washington is seeking to include New Delhi in its "Chip 4" alliance, a network that includes large manufacturers of semiconductors (the most important component for the development of AI technology), most of which are also geopolitical rivals of the United States ^[36]. Thus, the dynamics of the US-Chinese conflict is complicated by the Indian-Pakistani confrontation, and the arms race (including in the field of "smart" technologies) in both pairs will invariably influence each other in the near future and determine the need for strategic deterrence.

"Dual-use" bases

The second, closely related to the first, promising direction of using AI in the political confrontation between China and the United States is the creation of "smart" bases for "dual–use". Such databases could, on the one hand, contribute to the development of Chinese science (in particular, provide automated collection of biological, geological and other data), and, on the other hand, contribute to the search for new deposits of energy resources and critically important minerals, as well as potentially ensure the projection of Chinese influence in various parts of the globe.

As in the first direction, the creation of such bases in regions where human activity is difficult or impossible due to environmental conditions is especially promising. One of these regions is the seabed and ocean floor (including the ultraabyssal), which, with the development of technology, are becoming one of the new fronts of geopolitics ^[29]. In particular, in 2018, the design of the construction of a deep-sea Chinese "unmanned" base began ^[27]. In addition, the PRC is already actively using drones to collect information about certain deep-sea (up to 10 km deep) areas in the Indo-Pacific and analyzes the data using AI ^[28].

Another region is the Arctic, which is becoming one of the most important arenas of rivalry between the main international actors. Although China is primarily interested in the Arctic in terms of resource deposits, Beijing is implementing its Arctic strategy in the spirit of a holistic approach: "simultaneously define the discourse and legal norms related to the Arctic (political aspect), realize its economic interests (economic aspect), promote military-civilian integration and technological progress (scientific aspect) and prepare towards a military presence in the Arctic (military aspect") ^{[38, p. 239]}. At the same time, Chinese experts see broad prospects for the use of AI in the Chinese Arctic project. Thus, Dong Yue and Sheng Jianning propose to develop a plan for using AI for the sustainable development of the Arctic, apply AI for more effective global governance in the region (including through the transformation of existing governance mechanisms within the Arctic Council), and also declare the need to strengthen regional multilateralism and improve mechanisms for dialogue and information exchange to prevent Arctic arms races (including AI weapons) ^[3]. At the same time, there is no reason to believe that in the conditions of modern international tension, the PRC, the United States and other Arctic players will be able to reach agreements on peaceful exploration of the Arctic, and therefore the military component remains a necessary dimension of Beijing's polar strategy. China has already established itself quite firmly in the region: in 2024, it opened its fifth Arctic base and is actively using drones to develop the region ^{[30, p. 19]}.

Discursive confrontation

The third important dimension, much less embodied in the format of "physical" geopolitics, but at the same time having a huge impact on its dynamics, is the use of AI within the framework of the Sino-American discursive confrontation.

The problem for China in this area is that the United States largely sets the global political agenda and tries to formulate a certain global point of view on issues sensitive to Beijing (from the "duty to protect" and humanitarian intervention to trade norms and rules of global regulation of cyberspace). The PRC cannot afford not to participate in the formation of global discourse and its specific regulatory and institutional manifestations, since in this case Chinese interests simply will not be taken into account by other actors. In this regard, there has been a certain change of emphasis in the modern Chinese foreign policy strategy: from soft power, the PRC came to the idea of implementing "discursive force" (huayu quan) ^[2]. Many different terms are used to describe its various aspects: from the idea of "telling Chinese history well" (Jiang Hao Zhongguo Gushi) to the "Global Development Initiative" (Quanqiu fazhan changyi) ^[12]. In its most general form, this concept, which regularly appears in the speeches of officials^[6], is understood as the ability of a power to influence global discourse (including through the formation of international norms and institutions) and to realize its interests with its help. A textbook example here is China's opposition to Western accusations against it of violating the rights of Uighurs in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Beijing's response was to clarify its position on combating secessionism and radicalism, increase transparency of government practices in the region, and invite representatives of non-Western countries to inspections in the Xinjiang Region. The result of China's discursive efforts was that many representatives of the "Global South" supported the Chinese government on this issue.

In the field of "political war", discursive force is conceptualized by China in the format of "three wars" – an ideologeme that first appeared in the Chinese foreign policy narrative in 2003 in the document "Rules of Political Work of the PLA" ^[18]. The three wars include three types of politico-military operations: the struggle for public opinion (Yulun Zhan 舆论战), legal warfare (Falu Zhan 法律战) and psychological warfare (Xinli Zhan 心). The first refers to the creation of an international agenda that meets the interests of the People's Republic of China (primarily with the help of the media), the second refers to the appeal to both national and international legislation to counter the enemy, and the latter refers to the psychological impact on the enemy in its various manifestations. All these wars, from the point of view of Chinese theorists, are an important part of the concept of "active defense", since they allow for the containment of the enemy, as well as to form a foreign policy environment beneficial to Beijing. This point of view is expressed, in particular, in the previously mentioned "Science of Strategy" ^{[39, pp. 240-244]}.

We can talk about different ratios of discursive power and AI. First, it is extremely important for Beijing to use its discursive power to define the norms of global AI governance (in this context, they can be called "meta-norms"). According to a number of Chinese researchers, the PRC should not be afraid to use discursive force to promote the previously mentioned initiative "global management of artificial intelligence", which, from their point of view, largely expresses the interests of primarily developing countries ^[10].

Secondly, Beijing can resort to a variety of AI tools to realize discursive power.: from content analysis and fake recognition^[7] to the creation of "smart" bots that can not just express a given position, but effectively convince Internet users in the format of "dialog propaganda" ^{[1, p. 26]}. Due to the fact that the Chinese government is now actively investing in the development of the Digital Silk Road initiative, Beijing's opportunities in this area are very wide. Another very interesting area is the development of existing Chinese political concepts with the help of AI and the development of new ones. At the same time, it is important to understand that the effectiveness of AI in this area directly depends on its strength, and its correct application depends on the values that such a strong version of AI will follow. In this regard, the development of not just AI, but "Confucian-Marxist" AI becomes an important issue. Chinese researchers are already actively discussing which traditional Chinese ethical norms can be used to shape the morality of AI. Thus, Fan Xudong proposes to lay down as one of the values of AI the Confucian maxim "through the human to correct a person, and only after correcting, stop" (yi ren zhi ren, gai er zhi 以人人人人)), formulated in the 13th zhang of the classical Confucian treatise "Zhong Yun" ("Following the middle") ^[16]. According to Fan, it is necessary to lay in AI not such ethical principles that determine the complete obedience of AI to man, but values in line with a heuristic approach in which AI tries to consider problems from the point of view of the best solution for the "human situation" ^[13].

***

Of course, with the development of AI, the current formats of "political warfare" will be significantly transformed, and the parties will have many new methods of contesting strategic balance. Far from all potential formats of confrontation between China and the United States in this area have been presented in this work, and in general it can only be considered an invitation to a more detailed discussion of these issues in Russian academic and expert circles.

If Russia, which has unfortunately lost much of its political capital in the Asia-Pacific region in recent decades, seeks to gain a foothold here as an important player, turning to AI technologies to increase its geopolitical influence is a necessity. One of the potential tracks of interaction between China and Russia in this area may be Moscow's involvement in the Chinese program of military-civilian integration in one format or another. A kind of trump card of the Russian Federation here is the experience of direct combat use of "smart" weapons. Another promising area of Russian-Chinese cooperation may be the coordination of actions within the framework of the discursive confrontation with the United States (in which Beijing and Moscow proceed from largely the same positions) and the exchange of experience in using AI technologies for political struggle, as well as to discuss a wide range of ethical issues in the field of AI application and regulation of global norms management in this area. Finally, the third promising area is the coordination of positions on the Arctic issue, which is especially important in connection with the activation of the Northern Sea Route in recent years. AI can be used here both to counter the strengthening of the Western presence in the region and to increase the effectiveness of Russian-Chinese economic and infrastructural cooperation. At the same time, of course, Russia should not develop AI cooperation with China alone, but it should diversify its foreign policy agenda.

^[1] In a certain sense, such a war would largely correspond to the ancient Chinese ideal of military action, which presupposes bloodlessness, prioritization of political means of conflict resolution and indirect ways to achieve strategic goals. So, the famous Chinese philosopher of the XX century. Feng Yulan, describing the attitude of the ancient Chinese philosophical school of the Moists to war, characterizes it as follows: "[The Moist philosophy of war] gives a good lesson to all of us how to settle disputes between two countries. There is no need to fight on the battlefield. It is enough for scientists and engineers from both sides to demonstrate laboratory attacking and defensive weapons, and the outcome of the war will be decided without a battle!" ^{[14, p. 72]}

^[2] The classical definition of this term was given by J. Kennan, according to whom political war is the application of the Clausewitz doctrine in peacetime (i.e., if war is politics by other means, then politics is war by other means). In the broadest sense, this is the use of all means at the disposal of the state, with the exception of war, to achieve its foreign policy goals ^[31]. Political war can be realized both in public actions of the state (from various forms of diplomacy to "white" propaganda and the use of financial and economic levers), and in covert operations (lobbying their interests, financing their agents abroad, etc.).

^[3] The party's control over the army increased in 2015 as a result of the military reform initiated by Xi Jinping.

^[4] The "first compensation strategy" was applied by Washington in the 1950s and implied, on the one hand, nuclear deterrence, on the other, attempts to prevent or slow down the development of nuclear weapons in unfriendly countries. The "second strategy" dates back to the 1970s; within its framework, the United States relied on the development of high-tech weapons and the informatization of war as opposed to the numerical advantage of conventional enemy forces. The "third Strategy" emerged in the second half of the 2010s, primarily to counter the growth of the military power of the People's Republic of China (in particular, in the South China Sea). For more information about the "third strategy" and the Chinese response to it, see ^[7].

^[5] For more information about the essence of this phenomenon, see ^[5].

^[6] In the context of this work, Xi Jinping's statement is extremely interesting that "the competition of great powers in the field of Internet security is not limited to a technological competition: it is also an ideological competition, a competition in discursive power" ^[14].

^[7] Another potential tactic in this area may be the generation by China itself of extremely realistic fakes for the discursive "weakening" of the United States. This practice raises many ethical questions, and its assessment by Chinese scientists and officials certainly requires a separate study. Let's limit ourselves here to two considerations. On the one hand, the creation of fakes, of course, contradicts the values declared by the PRC in the field of global AI management and the Internet space. On the other hand, if fakes can become a powerful tool not only to counter discursive aggression from the United States, but also to prevent conventional global conflict, is it worth ignoring such technology?