Problems of implementation of public-private partnership investment projects in the housing and communal services sector

Likhachev Nikita Vladimirovich ORCID: 0009-0003-5968-2202 Master's degree; Faculty of Higher School of Management; Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation Head of the Department; Alfa-Bank JSC 127055, Russia, Moscow, lane Corner, 6, sq. 18 likhachev123@yandex.ru

introduction

In today's developing mixed economy, government institutions play a key role in determining strategies and directions of progress. At the same time, a significant part of the gross domestic product is created by private or quasi-private (companies that are created or partially owned by the state and other state-owned companies, but operate on market principles) organizations, which limits the ability of the state to conduct effective public policy. This highlights the need to use extra-budgetary sources of investment for the successful implementation of initiatives aimed at infrastructure development. Public-private partnership (hereinafter – PPP) is one of the main tools for co-financing projects with the participation of the private sector ^[1] and can be implemented in various forms, including concession agreements, offset contracts and life cycle agreements. PPP is effectively used both to finance large projects, such as the construction of transport routes, and to implement small initiatives, especially in communal infrastructure, where its role is significant. PPP is most widely represented (in absolute terms by the number of projects) in the fields of public utilities ^[2]. The widespread use of PPP projects in public utilities is due to the significant volume of projects requiring reconstruction, as well as a simpler and more predictable payback mechanism among other construction projects. If in PPP agreements in the field of road infrastructure, payback can be calculated based on approximate passenger traffic, which may not be achieved due to errors in forecasting and the cost of travel along the section, which may be too high for toll road users or direct payments from the budget (which may not be included in the next budget cycle), then concessions in In the field of public utilities, they are based on a tariff mechanism, which is much more reliable, due to the availability of data on the consumption of resources by the population in a given territory. The provision of heat supply, water supply, sanitation, electricity and other public services to the population is entrusted to the regional and local levels of government. At the same time, the budgetary provision of the regions of the Russian Federation is uneven, which makes PPP (in case of lack of funds for direct state financing through public procurement) extremely attractive for both public and private parties. Of the about 3 thousand concession agreements in force in Russia for 2023, more than 2.8 thousand were concluded in the housing and communal services sector, while the volume of attracted private investments amounted to about 2 trillion rubles. Thus, the success of the implementation of PPP projects directly affects the state of the housing and communal services industry due to its massive nature, however, the general condition of fixed assets of housing and communal services requires more investment due to accumulated depreciation. One of the regulatory legal acts of investment programs, housing and communal services industries, namely heat and water supply, is Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 410 dated May 5, 2014 (hereinafter referred to as "Rules No. 410") and Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 641 dated July 29, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as "Rules No. 641"). Legislation within the framework of PPP continues to adapt to changing conditions, therefore it will be advisable to consider the problematic issues faced by the implementers of PPP projects in the housing and communal services sector. The subject of the study will be the general state of the housing and communal services industry and PPP projects within this industry, through consideration of specific problems of ongoing projects from a financial and legal point of view. The development of the nature of the state's housing and communal services and the provision of housing and communal services was carried out by Ryakhovskaya A.N. ^[3], Dyatel E.P.^[4], they formed the interpretation of the economy as a public good and, according to this opinion, the state should create it, and therefore it is important to use the most effective methods to achieve the goals set goals.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In the course of this study, an in-depth review of sources was carried out, including a comprehensive analysis of Russian and foreign regulations, statistical collections of the Federal State Statistics Service and data posted by government agencies in the Unified Interdepartmental Information and Statistical System, Russian and foreign scientific publications. The analysis used financial and production reports of companies implementing PPP projects within the housing and communal services industry, as well as materials from regulatory authorities. Based on the data, conclusions were drawn about the general state of the system and state regulation. Thus, the article uses an institutional approach, a method of analyzing legislation, statistical analysis, financial analysis, analysis of judicial practice, comparative legal analysis (Russian legal practice and the experience of other countries are analyzed).

the main part

Due to the high importance of PPP projects in the public utilities sector, it is advisable to initially consider the problems that have formed in the industry, as well as to reflect these problems within the framework of project implementation and propose solutions to them. A common problem for the housing and communal services sector (both for capital and current repairs, as well as for suppliers of resources such as water, heat and electricity) is the problem of payback for doing business ^[5]. Contributions for major repairs and utility tariffs are regulated by the authorities of the Russian Federation (for contributions for major repairs – by the authorities of the subject). At the same time, due to the fact that housing and communal services issues are socially significant, executive authorities do not allow a significant increase in prices for the provision of such services.

It is advisable to consider an example of major repairs. After the transition of the capital repair system from direct budget financing to contributions from owners of apartment buildings ^[6] based on the area and the regional minimum standard of contributions for capital repairs, the dynamics of expenditures was characterized exclusively by growth, so in 2016, 2017 and 2018, 128.7 billion rubles, 162.1 billion rubles and 191.0 billion rubles were spent, respectively, and in By 2023, there are already more than 500 billion rubles. The average annual growth of more than 20% (more than 388% of the accumulated total) ^[7] is due to both the growing collection of contributions and inflation of building materials and builders' labor. The example of Moscow is indicative, the initial minimum contribution amount of 15 rubles per square meter was approved by the Government of Moscow on December 29, 2014, for 2024 the contribution amount is 25.58 rubles, an increase of 70.5% over 10 years. It is worth noting that the indicated growth rate of the minimum contribution for major repairs is average in Russia.

A similar situation occurs in terms of resource supply organizations (hereinafter referred to as RSO), as well as organizations providing housing and communal services (hereinafter referred to as housing and communal services).

Table 1. Financial indicators of utility service providers and their rate of change.

Source: Compiled by the author according to the data of the Unified Interdepartmental Information and Statistical System (Rosstat-EMISS)^[8-10]

Based on the data presented in Table 1, it can be concluded that despite the fact that the amount of expenses exceeded the amount of income of utility performers only in 2022, accounts receivable to these organizations have always grown at a faster pace than accounts payable. This situation is due to both the shortfall in payment on the part of the owners, and the economic validity of tariffs for housing and communal services. It is important to note that according to the Minister of Construction and Housing and Communal Services of the Russian Federation Irek Fayzullin, in 2020: "The collection rate reached a fairly high level and amounted to 96.2%"^[11], and for the first half of 2024 the indicator is approaching 100% (taking into account the collection of overdue debts) and 97.3% for current payments of the year. However, this figure means that 2.7% of non-payers of housing and communal services contributions shifted their expenses to payers, which leads to a gradual outstripping growth in accounts payable as in the period from 2006 to 2018, when accounts receivable to organizations providing housing and communal services increased by 467%, and accounts payable increased by only 391%. At the same time, the amount of tariffs for housing and communal services determined by the authorities is economically justified due to the fact that it imposes high payment discipline on consumers of utilities. This leads to a general decrease in the quality of services provided to the population, and can also lead to emergency situations.

A separate problem is the high deterioration of housing and communal services at the municipal level and the presence of a large number of facilities that require replacement and reconstruction. Depreciation of fixed assets of housing and communal services in Russia exceeds 60%, and in some regions wear reaches 90%, in this regard, the accident rate is constantly increasing, the number of water leaks is also increasing and the amount of heat loss during the heating season is increasing, which leads to additional costs^[12]. About 70% of the fixed assets of heating networks have 100% physical wear. And among the constantly functioning funds, heat energy losses on average in the Russian Federation exceed 15-20% of the total heat supply, the length of heat supply networks throughout the territory of the Russian Federation requiring replacement is 49.4 thousand kilometers. The deterioration of water supply and sanitation systems is at the level of 75-85%. More than 300 thousand kilometers of water supply networks are in poor condition and also require replacement, losses during transportation amount to about 30% of water^[13]. It should be noted that this problem was formed due to the fact that fixed assets were updated at a missing pace in the period from 1980 to 2010.

In this regard, the payback parameter of PPP projects in housing and communal services is of particular importance. In accordance with the legislation, they are concluded in the form of concession agreements for the construction and (or) reconstruction of housing and communal services facilities. At the same time, the payback of the project in this area occurs due to the size of the tariff for housing and communal services (since the private party is engaged not only in construction, but also in subsequent operation, or receives a set percentage of the revenue of the operating organization). At the same time, due to the presence of out-of-pocket expenses (lost income) of operating organizations (RSO), the authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, as well as municipal authorities, are forced to introduce a mechanism for a minimum guaranteed income in the amount of 100% of the income required for the payback of the project, or a mechanism for paying the concedent for the amount of out-of-pocket income. Thus, a significant reserved part can be formed in the budgets of regions and municipalities, which, if necessary, cannot be spent for other purposes, even if this amount is not required in full.

In this regard, it is proposed to make adjustments to "Rules No. 410", as well as "Rules No. 641", which are the main regulatory legal acts in the field of formation of investment programs in the housing and communal services sectors.

1. The lack of measures in the profile (industry) schemes creates the risk of not approving the investment program.

An industry scheme is a document that defines the current state and prospects for the development of a particular branch of the municipal economy of a subject or municipality, in particular, it includes a list of facilities and works that are expected to be carried out by a certain date, for example, Moscow has an industry scheme for the development of heat supply until 2035 According to paragraph 6 of "Rule No. 410" and Paragraph 10 of the "Rule No. 641", the investment program should take into account projects whose feasibility has been justified in detail in industry schemes. This requirement was introduced in order to improve the quality of competitive procedures conducted for the creation or reconstruction of public infrastructure facilities (since the competition takes place based on the minimum selling price). However, in cases of municipal housing and communal services concessions, the competition is often held formally, since, as a rule, there are only a few companies in the region that agree to participate in the implementation of such projects and the competition is held with the participation of a single applicant. In turn, these standards for reducing the cost of projects create the risk of not taking into account individual costs in tariff regulation, namely:

· Depreciation arising from the revaluation of fixed assets, assets and facilities financed from the state budget in the fields of heat supply, resource supply and wastewater treatment;

· Financial resources to fulfill debt obligations and ensure interest payments when performing actions not provided for by industry schemes.

At the same time, judicial practice confirms the legality of the actions of local governments and tariff regulation to terminate the concession agreement in connection with non-fulfillment of the measures provided for in these cases (Supreme Court Ruling No. 304-ES22-1095 dated 03/21/2022).

2. The absence of measures indirectly related to construction and modernization in the investment program

Paragraph 9 of Rules No. 410, paragraph 10 (1) of Rules No. 641 establish lists of activities that can be included in the investment programs of the RSO.

In order to successfully perform their functions and fulfill contractual obligations, private partners (organizations) need to carry out a wide range of investment activities that are not always related to the construction or improvement of public infrastructure facilities. This may include, for example, the purchase of vehicles and servers, digitalization of processes (through the development of accounting systems). In this regard, some of these costs may not be included in the overall content of investment programs at certain stages. At the same time, these points of regulatory legal acts imply the presence in investment programs exclusively of measures for the construction, reconstruction and conservation of housing and communal services facilities.

It is advisable to consider specific public-private partnership projects, for example, a concession agreement for water supply and sanitation facilities in Moscow.Tyumen, approved by Resolution No. 699-pc of the Tyumen City Administration dated October 23, 2017. The average depreciation of the facilities transferred to the concessionaire under this agreement was about 60%. At the same time, in the acts on the results of control over the execution of the concession agreement, every year, starting from 2021, the financial overfulfilling of the expenditure plan is recorded, as well as the project has repeatedly increased in price ^[14]. This concession agreement confirms the previously stated problems. The over-fulfillment of the cost plan is explained by the advanced procurement schedule, as well as the performance of additional functions not included in the investment program, but related to the implementation of the concession agreement. At the same time, it should be noted that when comparing the current and the original version of Annex 7 to the concession agreement, within the framework of which the task and the main measures for construction and reconstruction were established, there was a significant increase in price for a number of measures, with a shift in deadlines for future periods. Thus, the initial agreement envisaged the construction of facilities for the turnover of flushing water and sludge treatment, within which the investment phase of the project was to take place from 2022 to 2024 with a total investment of 97.5 million rubles., In turn, in the latest version of the agreement, this event was postponed to 2025-2027 with a total investment of 257.5 million rubles. rub . The total number of events under this agreement was 47. It can be assumed that such a postponement of deadlines, for a number of measures, is partly due to the inability of the local budget to lay down sufficient amounts of additional financing of the project on the planned dates. Similar problems have been encountered in a number of concession agreements (water supply and sanitation industries) in Nizhny Novgorod, Volgograd and other regions. At the same time, the courts, in case of attempts to terminate agreements due to the failure to include an exhaustive list of measures in the concession agreement or incorrect calculation of the tariff, sided with the concessionaire.

Figure 1. Change in the cost of some measures during the implementation of the concession agreement in relation to water supply and sanitation facilities in MoscowTyumen (Drawing currency: million rubles)

When analyzing Figure 1, it can be noted that some of the activities included in the concession agreement have risen in price by more than 3 times, while some have practically not changed in value, while it should be noted that it is precisely those activities that are more expensive, the costs of which are made directly in the year of adoption of the supplementary agreement to the concession agreement while other activities included in the concession agreement may be postponed to a future date without changing the price. It is reasonable to assume that when the implementation of these measures begins, which is planned in future periods, their cost will also increase.

Thus, it can be confirmed that in the current version of regulatory documents, the initial versions of concession agreements have an underestimated cost, which leads to an incorrect calculation of the subsequent payback of the project. If the entity or municipality has sufficient reserves to cover this increase in price, the project continues, but the burden on regional and local budgets increases, while in the described concession agreement, the risk of project appreciation is a special circumstance covered by the concedent (as in most other concession agreements related to housing and communal services). In conditions when it is impossible to include an increase in the cost of housing and communal services, contractors are forced to redistribute funds from other areas of budget spending.

If the concedent does not have sufficient funds to cover this increase in price, the implementation of the project may be under threat, which will entail litigation and early termination with payment of penalties.

3. The problem of approving the investment program during the construction of a new facility by a third-party company.

In accordance with the Federal Law "On Concession Agreements" dated 07/21/2005 No. 115-FZ, not only the reconstruction and use of the facility, but also the construction and operation of new infrastructure facilities are allowed within the framework of concessions.

At the same time, according to paragraph 1 of Rules No. 410 and Rules No. 641, an investment program can be approved only in relation to an organization engaged in regulated activities.

The private party to the agreement planning to operate the construction facility, at the time of conclusion of the agreement and the start of construction (before its commissioning), may not carry out regulated activities, which leads to the inability to approve an investment program for such organizations.

In accordance with current law enforcement practice, there are examples where a regional legal act may be adopted that establishes rules for approving capital plans of entities not engaged in regulated activities. It should be noted that the adoption of such normative legal acts, which do not directly contradict, but complement the existing legislation, can be considered as exceeding the official powers of regional authorities. At the same time, this restriction on the part of federal legislation exists, among other things, due to the low budgetary provision of regional budgets. Such restrictions should limit the size of investment programs of the subjects of the Russian Federation, which will reduce the risk of growth of inter-budgetary transfers from the federal budget, therefore it is advisable to develop other mechanisms for monitoring activities in the field of PPP from the regions, but they should not harm the potential expansion and renewal of housing and communal services funds.

4. Accounting for not all expenses in the calculation of the tariff

In accordance with paragraph 12 of the Guidelines approved. By Order of the Federal Tariff Service No. 760e dated June 13, 2013.

The exhaustive list of expenses included in the required gross revenue does not include the costs of bank guarantee fees and reserves for repairs. Reserves for repairs are necessary so that the concessionaire can evenly distribute the repair costs. If the above expenses are not provided for, there is a risk of cash gaps – a shortage of funds for major repairs, a decrease in the quality of services provided and, as a result, a decrease in commercial revenue (if any) and an increase in current maintenance costs.

5. Separate accounting of expenses under concession agreements

According to paragraph 16 of Article 3 of Law 115-FZ, it is necessary to keep specialized separate accounting of expenses under the concession agreement. In this case, a situation may arise when one company manages facilities under various concession agreements and some components of the network (facilities) are transferred to other users on lease or another form of management, while others are operated under a concession agreement. In such cases, the concessionaire is required to keep separate cost records for each agreement in order to separate them from the costs associated with other facilities operated in the system.

At the same time, industry legislation does not provide for such a sign of differentiation as the conclusion of a separate concession agreement. It should be noted that, among other things, on the basis of the concessionaire's expenses, the economically justified amount of the housing and communal services tariff is determined, which leads to the fact that despite the fact that industry regulatory documents do not provide for separate accounting, participants in the process (concessionaires and tariff regulators) have to keep separate records in the context of concession agreements, as well as other the concessionaire's facilities, and then determine the total required gross revenue, on the basis of which a single tariff is calculated.

6. The impossibility of participation of the subject of the Russian Federation as a third party to a concession agreement in the field of solid municipal waste management and electricity supply

According to the Federal Law "On Production and Consumption Waste" dated June 24, 1998 No. 89-FZ, the management of solid municipal waste (MSW) is entrusted to the subjects of the Federation, not municipalities. This includes the creation and implementation of local programs, as well as the negotiation of marginal tariffs. Municipal organizations cannot perform these functions independently unless the subjects of the Russian Federation give them the appropriate powers in their laws. Even with such powers, interaction and coordination at different levels often take place through state administrative authorities, rather than through local government structures, which is due to the peculiarities of control in this area.

Municipal budgets often do not have sufficient funds to implement large-scale initiatives. In such cases, financing organizations require additional collateral from concessionaires in order to reduce risks. At the same time, government support measures are aimed only at financing regional initiatives in the field of solid municipal waste management, which leaves municipal programs without similar assistance.

Within the framework of the current legal system, a subject of the Russian Federation cannot act as a third party in a concession agreement concerning facilities related to the production, transmission and distribution of electricity.

7. Lack of funds to finance housing and communal services concessions at the local municipal level and the problem of depreciation of fixed assets

At the moment, the problem of updating fixed assets is that housing and communal services projects at the municipal level (each separately) are not capital-intensive, it is unprofitable and time-consuming for private investors to implement such projects with the involvement of municipalities due to the relatively high cost of attracting debt financing, difficulties in structuring such projects and risks associated with the return of invested funds^[15].

An example of such problems can be the concession agreements on the modernization of the water supply system concluded in Nizhny Novgorod with JSC DVK (Dzerzhinsky Vodokanal). In the period from 2015 to 2016, the concedent proposed to terminate the agreement and sued the concessionaire, who stopped the implementation of the agreement, due to insufficient capital intensity and low payback of those facilities that were transferred to the management of a private party. At the same time, the court sided with the private party ^[16].

The solution to the problem may be the creation of complex housing and communal services facilities within the framework of a single concession on the territory of a constituent entity of the Russian Federation, where the constituent entity of the Russian Federation will act as a concessor, which will increase the capital intensity of projects, create economies of scale, and also increase the attractiveness of projects for private investors and for banks.

However, the current legislation requires coordination with the Federal Antimonopoly Service in case the facilities are not technologically connected. The approval procedure with the Federal Antimonopoly Service complicates the process of structuring the project and can potentially increase the time and cost of the project.

In order to solve the identified problems, the following practical and methodological options for changing current regulatory documents are proposed.

1) In order to optimize the justification of additional groups of costs for projects related to the concession agreement, the author proposes to fix in Rules No. 410 and Rules No. 641 a provision on the justification of additional groups of costs for projects provided for in the concession agreement (for example, related to digitalization and automation of the project, revaluation of fixed assets, etc.) without the participation of the Federal Antimonopoly Service and regional authorities (for example, only with municipal authorities in the case of concession agreements at the local level), outside the framework of the general infrastructure map, to include them in investment programs, which will lead to the correct calculation of the housing and communal services tariff. Since making changes to the infrastructure map will require significant time spent on coordination with all participants in the process. At the same time, it is worth noting that not reflecting the full range of expenses during the implementation of the project leads either to non-payback of the project, or to improper fulfillment of obligations by the concessionaire. Thus, it should be noted that often, a bona fide concessionaire will still incur these costs (even if they are not included in the infrastructure map), however, due to the fact that these costs will not be compensated by his future profit from the operation of this facility due to the calculation of utility tariffs based on the costs indicated in the infrastructure map, the private partner will I have to save money at all other stages of the project, including at the expense of quality.

2) It is advisable to consider changing and expanding the list of investment measures that can be included in the investment plans of the RSO. The issue of introducing specific measures should be considered separately.

3) It is advisable to revise the "Rules No. 410" and "Rules No. 641", with adjustments to the selection of enterprises not engaged in regulated activities at the time of approval of the investment program, which will allow confirming investment initiatives of companies intending to implement regulated activities in new projects. For example, to allow the possibility of participation of such companies in cases established by documents of a municipality or a subject of the Russian Federation, while these companies will still have to participate in a tender for the conclusion of concession agreements, which will reduce possible non-legal risks.

4) It is proposed to expand the list of permissible expenditures in the Methodological Guidelines for calculating tariffs to include costs indirectly related to the project, as well as costs included in the investment program for this facility. It is possible to include the costs provided for in the concession agreement if the agreement is concluded at the regional level.

5) It is advisable to exclude from paragraph 16 of Article 3 of Federal Law 115-FZ industries related to heating infrastructure, heating networks, heating network infrastructure, water supply systems, water supply and water supply network, as well as wastewater systems. It is proposed to make adjustments, according to which separate accounting for such facilities will be carried out only if these facilities are assigned to different networks (for example, different water supply systems). In this case, it is proposed to calculate long-term regulatory parameters within the framework of one system based on the total base level of operating expenses. The values of the indicators for the calculation must be taken into account in accordance with the concession agreements, lease agreements, etc. concluded in relation to the objects of such a system.

6) In order to increase the attractiveness of investments in municipal solid waste and electricity management projects at the municipal level, it is advisable to take into account the role of the region as a third party in these agreements at the regulatory level, by analogy with projects related to water supply and heat supply systems. Thus, a larger number of projects will be able to participate in tenders for obtaining support measures, which will increase both the attractiveness and reliability for the investor of such projects, as well as the quality of projects selected for budget financing, due to the more competent participation of regional (compared with local) authorities.

7) It is advisable to consider the possibility of removing these restrictions, or provide for a simplified procedure for coordination with the Federal Antimonopoly Service, for example, if the share of housing and communal services under such concessions does not exceed 25% of gross revenue generated in a constituent entity of the Russian Federation within a certain economic activity in the relevant housing and communal services sector (information on the amount of revenue broken down by type of activity can be obtained due to the assignment of OKVED), then coordination with the FAS is not required. In this way, municipalities will be able to attract financially secure concessionaires who avoid joining the project due to the bureaucratic duration of project approval and low margins.

Table 2. Problems of PPP projects in housing and communal services and their solutions

Source: Compiled by the author based on the results of the study.

Based on the results of the analysis of projects and problems in their implementation, Table 2 is formulated.

Based on the analysis of the industry situation, expressed in changes in the financial indicators of utility performers and the state of fixed assets of housing and communal services, as well as comparing these problems with problems that arise during the implementation of PPP projects in housing and communal services, it can be argued that the success of public-private partnership projects has a significant direct impact on the development of the industry. It is important to note that a number of industry problems are directly reflected in the implementation of PPP projects. Thus, by improving the methodology of project implementation, it is possible to achieve qualitative and quantitative growth of fixed assets, and as a result, services provided to the population. At the same time, problems common to industry projects were highlighted, and given the position of the court, which often sides with the concessionaire in resolving such disputes, it is obvious that the regulatory framework needs to be adjusted. Additionally, it should be noted that there are a number of difficulties even at the stage before the conclusion of the concession agreement, in particular, the procedure for including measures in sectoral development schemes. An industry scheme is a document adopted by the authority of a constituent entity of the Russian Federation for a long period, thus, at the stage of document formation, it is impossible to predict an exhaustive list of measures necessary for inclusion at the time of the start of the investment project, while, due to the growing number of PPP projects in housing and communal services, it is not possible to adjust industry schemes on an ongoing basis (since this would violate the principles of planning). At the same time, research on this topic widely highlights the problems of imperfection of the regulatory framework at the federal and regional levels, as well as the personnel incompetence of employees of local and regional authorities in the issue of PPP, and partly explains the low efficiency and problems of the housing and communal services industry. At the same time, the Federal Law "On Concession Agreements" dated July 21, 2005 No. 115-FZ, although it can be improved, but it is not the main cause of problems in the implementation of PPP projects, at the same time, regional regulations on PPP, after the entry into force of the federal law have less regulatory force and all projects are being implemented in accordance with federal law. The problem of PPP projects lies not so much in the acts regulating general provisions, as in industry documents. The qualification of personnel is certainly important, however, in a situation where regulatory documents and budget constraints do not allow projects to be structured in any other way, this indicator is secondary ^[17].

Public-private partnership in foreign countries in the field of public utilities differs significantly from the Russian one due to a different approach to forms of ownership. If in Russia housing and communal services facilities are state-owned (and transferred to the operational management of a private party for the duration of the project), then in Europe, mostly private service providers are owners of housing and communal services facilities, and therefore they operate on a market basis. At the same time, PPP agreements are also concluded in this industry, but they are primarily related to achieving state goals (for example, ecology), and not to servicing and improving the quality of public services provided ^[18], in particular to improve environmental friendliness in heat supply facilities, in eastern Europe PPP is also used directly in the construction of residential infrastructure ^[19]. In Japan, a distinctive feature of PPP in public utilities is that the objects of construction and reconstruction can be not only infrastructure facilities as such, but also entire areas requiring renovation and modernization. There is an example when, thanks to the active participation of citizens (in terms of the initiative budget), the local budget of Japan was able to reconstruct the area ^[20]

SCIENTIFIC CONCLUSIONS

Based on the data provided in the article, it is possible to formulate a number of conclusions that must be taken into account when deciding on amendments to regulations governing PPP in housing and communal services. Firstly, it has been established that housing and communal services directly depend on the success of the implementation of PPP projects. Thus, solving the problem of implementing this type of project, it is possible to ensure the development of the industry as a whole. Secondly, the problem of a shortage of financing for the renewal of fixed assets in the industry and the reflection of this problem at the "project" level, in the form of problems with the payback of PPP projects, do not come from the low payment discipline of owners, but primarily from the underestimated size of tariffs, including taking into account the implementation of public-private partnership projects (and incomplete accounting of expenses in the tariff). Based on the current payment for the supplied resources (including in the case of an increase in the tariff for the implementation of PPP projects), it is impossible to ensure timely modernization of worn-out funds. Thus, it is possible to formulate the need to increase the financing of the industry through budget co-financing and more additional self-taxation of citizens.

conclusion

In conclusion, it should be noted that the proposed options for improving the existing PPP project management system are aimed at qualitative growth and solving current problems arising during the implementation of housing and communal services projects. In particular, in the case of the implementation of the proposed measures, the problem with justifying the size of tariffs in the housing and communal services sector at the regional level, as well as problems with the payback and investment attractiveness of projects in this area, will be partially offset. Of particular importance is the solution to the problem of payback, which is already found at the stage of project implementation (due to the occurrence of costs not included in the calculation of the tariff). The described modernization of the regulatory system will increase the potential for modernization of the municipal infrastructure of the regions, as well as expand possible measures included in concession agreements. Also, with the introduction of these measures, the nomenclature of organizations will be expanded, which will find it easier to participate in PPP projects in the housing and communal services sector, and due to the increased investment attractiveness of projects, the subjects of the Russian Federation and municipalities will ensure the renewal of fixed assets and improve the quality of services provided to the population.