On the social base of Sextus Pompey's Sicilian state: The origins of Cilician piracy and its first encounters with Rome

Lenchuk Vladislav YUr'evich Postgraduate student; Department of Ancient World History; Lomonosov Moscow State University 119234, Russia, Moscow, Universitetskaya pl., 1 lenchukvy@my.msu.ru

The era of civil wars of the 1st century BC is a significant period in the history of Ancient Rome, as it became the starting point of the events that led to the creation of the Roman Empire. Although this era includes many famous events, wars and battles, some topics have not yet been adequately covered. Piracy of the II–I centuries BC is an example of such a topic.

It is important to note that the Romans called all pirates by the word "Cilicians". In the works of ancient authors, we often find the phrase "Cilician pirates" regardless of their ethnicity. Appian referred to the Cilician pirates as Syrians, inhabitants of Cyprus, Pamphylia and the coastal countries of Pontus (Mithr. 94). Cilician pirates, as Plutarch describes, helped Sertorius capture the Pitius Islands and kidnapped the young Julius Caesar (Sert. 7; Caes. 1). They operated all over the Mediterranean. Apparently, there were quite a few pirates, and the Romans could not distinguish them. For this reason, they called everyone "Cilician pirates", which was reflected in the works of ancient authors.

Modern historians view Cilician piracy through the prism of those events and wars that only partially overlap with piracy (for example, the Mithridatic Wars). However, we believe that piracy of the 1st century BC is an original phenomenon in itself and deserves separate consideration, and not in the context of other events. Although the pirates did not have their own state in the full sense of the word, they were able to become a force that Rome eventually had to reckon with. The well-established mechanism of naval robbery caused damage to the Roman Republic during the first half of the first century BC.

Mithridates VI was the first to realize the benefits of cooperation with pirates. The king of Pontus found in the pirates a powerful ally for three difficult wars against Rome. After the war of Gnaeus Pompey the Great against the Cilician pirates in 67 BC, we do not find significant large-scale actions of pirates against Rome in the sources. However, we tend to agree with a number of domestic and foreign scientists that pirates played a significant role in the state of Sextus Pompeius in Sicily (43-36 BC).

M.I. Rostovtsev linked piracy with the social basis of the state of Sextus Pompeius. Of course, the scientist did not contradict the thesis about the predominant role of slaves in the Sextus Pompeius movement ^[10]. S.I. Kovalev also described the Sextus Pompeius movement as a "state of slaves and pirates". However, in his work published in 1939, he emphasized the importance of the slave element, considering piracy a secondary factor ^[5]. Modern Russian scientists such as A.B. Egorov and A.B. Snisarenko note the unique role of political emigrants and Italians in the state of Sextus Pompeius and, importantly for our study, emphasize the role of pirates ^{[3; 11]}. On the contrary, V.N. Parfenov considers the role of slaves insignificant and puts pirates and Italians at the center of the social base of Sextus Pompeius ^{[8; 9;]}.

Foreign historians have also often addressed the issue of the social base of Sextus Pompeius. In the 19th century, G. Weber emphasized the corsair character and pirate composition of the Sicilian state between 43 and 36 BC. French scientist J. Merien argued that Sextus Pompey used pirates in his service, probably including some freed slaves ^[17]. The German historian E. Maroti, who studied this topic, came to the conclusion that pirates played an important role in the state of Sextus Pompeius ^[18]. The pirates increasingly became an organized force under the command of Pompey, carrying out naval raids on his orders. The movement of Sextus Pompeius was complex in its social composition. The aristocratic elite, together with slaves and pirates, formed a single state.

It took Rome a while to pay proper attention to the pirates. This can be concluded on the basis of attempts to end piracy in Cilicia, undertaken before the operation of Gnaeus Pompey in 67 BC. At first it seemed that several military campaigns in Cilicia would solve the problem of piracy. However, even seemingly successful campaigns, such as the mission of Publius Servilius Vatia Isaurica (79-74 BC), did not have lasting success. The Cilician pirates recovered from the strikes again and again and continued to commit acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea. It got to the point that pirates operated off the coast of Italy and kidnapped noble Romans (Plut., Caes., 1).

The main occupation of the inhabitants of Cilicia was piracy. This was due to several reasons. Firstly, it has to do with the area where they lived. According to Strabo, the Cilician Trachea was "uneven, rocky." It seemed that she was created for robbery (Strab. XIV.5). The high mountains forced the inhabitants to settle at their foot on the coastal plains, which were open to raids. The abundance of ship timber contributed to the development of shipbuilding. The locals were successfully engaged in navigation. However, besides the natural conditions, there were also political reasons that seem even more important.

Cilicia was a disputed territory claimed by the Seleucids and Ptolemies from the 3rd century BC. Over the course of several centuries, this region has become a battlefield. As a result, the local population led a paramilitary lifestyle, engaging in robbery and piracy. In the III century BC, in the war between Antiochus III the Great and Ptolemy IV Philopator (the Fourth Syrian War of 219-217 BC), Cilician pirates participated in battles on the side of Antiochus III ^{[4, pp. 220-224]}. There is no need to describe the course of the war in detail for this article, but it is important to highlight some significant points.

Ptolemy IV sent an embassy to the Romans complaining about Antiochus, who had seized Syria and Cilicia by force. Rome's attempts to resolve the conflict diplomatically proved unsuccessful. As a result, Rome was drawn into a war against Antiochus III, who again used the forces of pirates to fight at sea ^{[15, ss. 190-197]}.

According to Appian and Polybius, we know that the Cilician pirates participated in the naval battle of Myonesse in 190 BC. Nevertheless, they could not prove themselves: the Cilician pirates fled at the sight of the Roman fleet (Polyb. XXI.12; App. Syr.29). After two heavy defeats, Antiochus III began the negotiations that led to the conclusion of the Peace of Apamea in 188 BC ^{[16, pp. 277-280]}. According to this treaty, Antiochus III was obliged to give up the Asia Minor territories west of the Taurus Mountains. Moreover, more importantly for our study, the Seleucids were forbidden to form and maintain a military fleet in the Mediterranean (Liv. XXXVIII.38-39).

M.G. Abramzon writes that after the conclusion of this treaty, we can observe how the power of the Seleucids in Cilicia is fading. Many regions began to get out of control and even started autonomous coinage without a royal portrait ^{[1, p. 42]}. After the conclusion of the Peace of Apamea, Cilician piracy became chaotic. Pirates often served the eastern rulers, who, in addition to strengthening their fleet, thus controlled them. The absence of the Seleucid fleet gave the Cilicians freedom of action.

By the middle of the second century BC, the Ptolemies and Seleucids were experiencing a deep crisis and could not resist piracy. The revolt of Diodotus Tryphon against the Seleucids in 146-139 BC became a key event for the development of piracy ^{[11, p. 155]}. Diodotus Tryphon was a former slave who proclaimed himself the Syrian king. He intended to consolidate his power in Cilicia Trachea with the help of pirates ^{[13, p. 99]}. By patronizing them, he promoted the development of maritime robbery in these areas.

Diodotus Trifon founded Korakesium, a fortification on a steep cliff connected to the mainland by a narrow isthmus, his reference point (Strab. XIV.5.2). Korakesium was located next to the Tasheli ridge on the western side, and its double fortress, Korik, was built on the eastern edge. Pirates from all over the coast found refuge here. According to F. De Sousa, this place was so well adapted for defense that the fortress was used for many centuries by local residents ^{[13, p. 98]}.

In 139 BC, Antiochus VII was able to suppress the rebellion of Tryphon and force him to commit suicide. However, by this time the Cilician pirates had already established themselves too firmly on the coast of Cilicia. Numerous pirate gangs began to form, already without any influence from above. At first, the Cilician pirates were content with the loot they could get along the routes of the Levant. However, as their forces grew, devastation and plunder spread to the entire coast of Asia Minor ^{[19, pp. 205-206]}.

One of the largest slave markets was on Delos. It was possible to sell up to tens of thousands of slaves a day. For this reason, pirates flocked here under the guise of slave traders with loot to sell it. Strabo notes that the kings of Cyprus and Egypt helped the pirates, as they were enemies of the Syrians (Strab. XIV.5)

The Romans, who became rich after the destruction of Carthage and Corinth, were the main buyers of slaves. Therefore, they did not immediately take care of the issue of piracy. The Cilicians did not cause direct damage to Rome. In addition, such a developed maritime robbery finally undermined the power of the Seleucids. Nevertheless, in 143 BC Rome decided to send a commission, including Scipio Aemilianus, to Egypt and Asia. As Strabo points out, the commission was sent to "monitor the situation of tribes and cities on the spot." Scipio Aemilianus and other senators found out that the growth of piracy was caused by the political crisis in the Seleucid Empire (Strab., XIV, 5, 2).

The Roman diplomatic mission was unsuccessful due to the weakness of the Governments of these countries. In the II century BC, the Romans did not have sufficient capabilities to maintain their own fleet in the East, so Asia Minor was left to its fate. Cilician pirates dominated the region, and, moreover, the Romans maintained friendly relations with them ^{[7, p. 65]}.

This changed in 133 BC, after Attalus III bequeathed the Kingdom of Pergamum to Rome. From that moment on, the Romans could not ignore piracy in the region, since it was directly within their zone of influence, and maritime robbery became a direct threat to the possessions of the Roman Republic (Just. XXXVII.1). If the Romans tried to control maritime security, they failed. Operations against sea robbers were mainly carried out on the initiative of local peoples. In this regard, Mr. Ormerod mentions the Ephesus decree. According to him, the inhabitants of Astypalea were furious when they learned about the looting of the temple of Artemis of Ephesus, and decided to personally fight the pirates. There is also evidence from Dion Cassius that cities in Asia Minor did not expect help from Rome and concluded agreements with Cilician pirates (XXXVI.20). G. Ormerod believes that the majority of the population in Pamphylia, Pisidia and Cilicia were engaged in piracy by the time of Mark Anthony's campaign ^{[19, pp. 247-248]}.

Thus, by the beginning of the 1st century BC, the Cilician pirates were a formidable and dangerous force: they had a large fleet, harbors, shipyards, many well-trained sailors and warriors; their troops were numerous and well organized. They expanded their influence throughout the Eastern Mediterranean and began to directly threaten the shores of the Apennine Peninsula. This required measures against pirates, and for this purpose Mark Anthony was sent to Asia Minor (Liv. Ep.68).

Little is known about Mark Anthony's campaign. Anthony was an excellent speaker, for which he received the cognomen Orator. He was a quaestor in the province of Asia, but had no merit. In 102-101 BC, the Senate sent Mark Antony as proconsul to Cilicia to fight pirates. Most likely, the passage from Cicero, in which Mark Antony tells about his journey, refers to this period: "Once, passing through the Cilician viceroyalty, I happened to stay in Athens for many days because of the unfavorable weather there, and there I moved daily in the company of scientists, almost the very ones about whom you were just saying..." (De orat. I.80).

Traditionally, it is believed that Mark Anthony did not fight on land. However, the epigraphy presented in M.G. Abramzon's work suggests the opposite. Several officers of Mark Antony, for example, Praetor Gratidianus and Quaestor Aulus Gabinius, were killed in Cilicia, which would have been impossible if Mark Antony had not landed ^{[1, p. 46]}.

An inscription found in Corinth reports that the Roman fleet crossed the Isthmus and sailed to Pamphylia, at the same time propraetor Girr equipped another fleet in Athens ^{[20, p. 4]}. Interestingly, the name of the commander on the inscription was erased. A.N. Sherwin-White suggests that this was done in the time of Octavian, since there was confusion with the name of the infamous triumvir ^{[20, p. 4]}.

The fleet was most likely not sent from Italy, since after the war with Carthage and before the Mithridatic Wars, the Romans did not have a powerful fleet. It is known that Rhodes and Byzantium put the fleet at the disposal of the Romans. It follows from this that Mark Anthony recruited sailors and organized a fleet to fight the Cilician pirates in Asia. A.N. Sherwin-White notes that in 102 BC Anthony could have been sent with consular powers to Asia, and Cilicia was considered as a zone of his military operations ^{[20, p. 4]}.

In 102-101 BC, Mark Antony probably conducted a number of military operations, information about which has not survived to the present day. The Roman invasion of Cilicia was carried out from Lycaonia through the Taurus Passage. M.G. Abramzon believes that there was no need for a major military action, and this explains the lack of detailed information in the sources. A large role in the campaign was assigned to the eastern coastal cities, in particular Rhodes. Returning from Cilicia to Rome, Mark Anthony celebrated his triumph ^{[13, pp. 107-108]}.

The discovery of five columns with the text Lex Romana de pirates persequendis (Cnidos. III.28-41) in Knida in 1970 proved to be very useful. The inscriptions on the columns complemented a similar text from Delphi and shed light on the goals of Mark Anthony's campaign ^{[12, pp. 153-167]}. The law dates back to 101 BC, probably the end of Mark Anthony's mission. The fact is that the law obliged the consul, who was in Rome, to send letters to the eastern rulers controlling the coast of the Eastern Mediterranean. Among them were the rulers of Syria, Egypt, Cyrene, Rhodes, Cyprus. The Romans' demand to the eastern rulers was that they stop the activities of pirates in their territories. Cilician pirates should not have been allowed to sail from the territories controlled by the eastern rulers, and a ban was imposed on the entry of pirates into the harbor. Governments were also instructed to ensure the safety of navigation for Roman citizens ^{[14, pp. 205-210]}.

The Cnidian columns also contain a fragment of text that is controversial among historians (Cnidos. III.35-41). The inscription on one of the columns served as a warning that the Roman people declared Cilicia their province; M. Hassell believes so ^{[14, p. 209]}. However, A.N. Sherwin-White disagrees and believes that there was an error when translating from Latin into Greek. As an argument, the scientist cites another inscription from Cnidus, in which Lycaonia is also declared a province, following the same translation, which is impossible, since Lycaonia was part of the province of Asia ^{[20, p. 5]}.

M.G. Abramzon follows A.N. Sherwin-White in this matter and adds that in fact it was not necessary for the Romans to create a second province in Asia Minor. The Roman commander could rely on the military resources of the province of Asia, as well as on the territories that Attalus III bequeathed to the Roman people. Thus, the issue of the creation of the province of Cilicia during the campaign of Mark Anthony is debatable, but we tend to think that A.N. Sherwin-White made convincing arguments. Consequently, in the case of Cilicia, the term "province" meant that this area was considered a war zone, and a Roman magistrate was appointed to Cilicia not to govern, but to perform police surveillance functions – combating piracy and ensuring maritime security ^{[21, pp. 222-224]}.

We get most of the information about the phenomenon of "Cilician piracy" from Roman written sources and epigraphy. In turn, Roman sources consider Cilician piracy primarily as an object of Roman military campaigns. For this reason, it is difficult to create an exhaustive and multidimensional picture of the social, economic and cultural mechanisms driving the multitude of ethnic groups united under the common name "Cilician pirates". However, creating a detailed picture of the political and military measures taken by Rome to combat piracy may help to better understand its nature.

Rome's attitude towards the Cilician pirates was not always hostile. In the second century BC, Rome used slaves, which pirates supplied to the markets of Delos. At the same time, the robberies and robberies that the pirates staged on the territory of the states of Asia Minor were clearly in the hands of Rome, which was pragmatically interested in this region. Everything changed with the formation of the Roman province of Asia in 133 BC on the territory of the former Kingdom of Pergamon. From that moment on, these territories were under the direct rule of Rome, and Cilician piracy began to threaten the prosperity of the new province.

However, Rome did not immediately pay attention to this problem. We know that the military campaign of Mark Antony in 102-101 BC was the first military clash between Rome and piracy. There is practically no information about Mark Anthony's campaign. We also don't know what exactly Mark Anthony got his triumph for. He probably won several victories over the Cilician pirates. However, as will be seen in the future, he still did not achieve success. Ten years later, the Cilician pirates will join Mithridates VI with renewed vigor, no longer as robbers, but as a cohesive naval force.

It is known that during this period the pirates continued their predatory raids on the shores of Asia Minor. However, now the Roman Republic was already among those who suffered directly from piracy. Now there could be no question of any dialogue between Rome and the pirates. For pirates, looting was a matter of survival. They could not give up robbery and plunder, while Rome could not allow the plundering of its territory. Thus, conflict was inevitable.

As mentioned above, Mark Antony's campaign ended in triumph. However, was it really a triumph? There is probably a lot we don't know, since most of the information has not reached us, but one thing is obvious – the problem of piracy has not been solved. Perhaps Rome underestimated its new enemy. Moreover, Rome itself probably contributed to the fact that pirates became a real threat. In the future, more than one military expedition will be sent against the pirates, but they will end in failure. Each time Rome sent more soldiers, but did not achieve the desired results. It all ended only when Rome granted imperium to Gnaeus Pompey in 67 BC. Using almost all the power of Rome, the future triumvir was able to end piracy at the moment when it was at the peak of its power, instead of cracking down on it much earlier, when it was just emerging in 102-101 BC.