The problems of the neoplatonic disclosure of the hypotheses of "Parmenides" and the solution of the "aporia of transcendence"

Chekrygin Oleg ORCID: 0009-0007-4393-1445 PhD in Philosophy independent researcher 24 Serpukhov val str., Moscow, 115419, Russia ochek@bk.ru Other publications by this author     Nadeina Dar'ya ORCID: 0009-0006-6063-8171 applicant; Institute of Philosophy of St. Petersburg State University; St. Petersburg State University 115682, Russia, Moscow, Orekhovy str., 59 Bogoslovblog@gmail.com Other publications by this author

Mezentsev Ivan Valer'evich ORCID: 0009-0008-8723-5641 PhD in Philosophy independent researcher 690025, Russia, Primorsky Krai, Vladivostok, Dzhambula str., 7, sq. 1 mezivan@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

The problems of the Neoplatonic disclosure of the hypotheses of “Parmenides” in the interpretation of A.F. Losev and the experience of solving the “aporia of transcendence”

Introduction

The relevance of research. According to Whitehead's statement, the whole of European philosophy, in its essence, is nothing more than notes on the margins of Plato's dialogues: either negatively critical or developing a positive character.

Despite the fact that Platonism originated in ancient times, it remains relevant to this day, indirectly or directly defining the peculiarities of perception of the concepts of "God", "soul", "ideal", etc. in European philosophy.

In the religious metaphysics of the Abrahamic religions, Platonism also continues to exist in a form "preserved" in the late Antique and medieval periods. The latest philosophical thought has repeatedly shown problematic aspects of Platonic idealistic philosophy at a fundamental level, which also confirms the relevance of addressing Plato's legacy in our days.

The development of metaphysical issues within the framework of European philosophical discourse is impossible without taking into account the theoretical experience accumulated by Platonism and the fundamental problems identified by it in attempts to build a holistic idealistic ontology and cosmology.

The relationship between ideal and material is one of the most persistent and difficult philosophical difficulties, which is actualized not only in philosophy proper, but also in mathematics (the ontological status of numbers), linguistics (the doctrine of the innate linguistic ability of N. Chomsky), psychology (questions of psychophysiology), etc.

Platonism posed this problem qualitatively, but it did not propose an evidence-based derivation of the material from the ideal, limiting itself either to pointing out the incomprehensibility and ineffability of the process, or simply bypassing this problem, or offering all sorts of controversial metaphors instead of a positive philosophical explanation (Plotinus). Plato, in particular, was completely unable to explain the transition from purely mathematical constructions to bodies that have mass and elasticity. The unresolved issue of the derivation of the material from the ideal largely predetermined the collapse of classical idealistic discourse in the 20th century and its criticism in the latest trends of thought.

So, the subject of the research being undertaken is the problematic of Platonic ontology and cosmology, and, above all, the difficulty of correctly deducing the non–absolute from the Absolute in the concept of Plato and his historical followers.

In this article, the authors set the following goal – to offer an original theoretical solution to the fundamental problems of the Platonic doctrine of the Absolute (One/Good), as well as Platonic cosmogony and cosmology, including through its alignment with the Hegelian approach to the interpretation of the Absolute Spirit.

To achieve this goal, the following tasks have been developed:

1) to reveal the features of the Platonic doctrine of the Absolute and the creation of the world on the basis of the dialogue "Parmenides";

2) describe the existing experience of interpreting the dialogue "Parmenides" in terms of cosmogonic representations based on the legacy of the Russian philosopher A. F. Losev, who is a universally recognized authoritative translator and researcher of the philosophical legacy of the great ancient philosopher;

3) to point out the fundamental problems of the Platonic discourse on the Absolute and the creation of the world, unsolvable and unsolved within the framework of the classical reception of Platonism in European philosophy;

4) to show the potential of using Hegel's understanding of the development of the Absolute Spirit to solve the problems of Platonic ontology and cosmology;

5) to reveal the possibilities of applying the concept and the term "superposition" to overcome these difficulties of Platonic thought.

1. Disclosure and analysis of the hypotheses of "Parmenides"

To understand the ontological and cosmological foundations of Neoplatonism, it is necessary to carefully analyze the positive hypotheses of Plato's dialogue "Parmenides". The significance of this text for the development of Neoplatonic thought was very great.: "Read the second part of Parmenides as Plotinus read it, with the single eye of faith ... – and you will find in the first hypothesis a clear description of the famous "negative theology", and in the second ... an interesting essay on the origin of the world from the marriage of unity and being" ^{[1, p. 342]}.

In analyzing Parmenides, it would be logical to rely on the already existing commentatorial tradition, represented, for example, by the chronologically distant Russian philosopher A. F. Losev ^{[2, pp. 497-504]}, who reveals in detail the content of these hypotheses.

The authors of this publication will be primarily interested in the first four "positive" hypotheses in their interpretation by Losev:

I. The assumption of one (137c – 160b).

A. Outputs for one (138c – 157b):

a) with the absolute assumption of one (137c – 142b) and

b) with the relative position of one (142b – 157b).

B. Conclusions for the other (157b – 160b):

a) with the relative position of one (157b – 159b) and

b) with the absolute assumption of one (159b – 160b).

The first hypothesis, which begins the second part of the dialogue, says: "only One thing." In this case, it is not yet claimed that it "exists" in the mode of "being", as in the second hypothesis; rather, here Plato considers it as an object of the mind. The one is, in essence, the substantiation of uniqueness as a property inherent in all things. In the logic of Platonism, nothing is possible without this property, and nothing can be without uniqueness. And therefore, nothing exists without a single one, because it is the condition for the existence of everything.

The second hypothesis, which states that "The One is," introduces the concept of being, thereby violating the original concept of absolute uniqueness. The emergence of being generates duality, since it is not identical to uniqueness, however, they merge into a single being. This being is a whole consisting of singularity and beingness. Being, like the One, is a condition for the existence of everything.

The analysis of the second hypothesis primarily raises the question of the nature and origin of being itself. M. Heidegger in his works pointed to Being as an independent entity, independent of its content with anything: being as an opportunity to be gives existence to everything else that depends on it in its being, and Being itself does not depend on anything that exists, being in a sense a "place" in which its filling with all that exists can be placed: ideas, matter, things, Cosmos and man. Heidegger's logic is as follows: "Instead of ascending from existence to the being of existence, he says, Plato only doubles existence, that is, his being appears only as a being of a different kind — ideas. Ideas are what make things exist. For Heidegger, being is what makes a being exist, but it is not itself existent, therefore, when existence is explained based on another being, and not from its being, existence is lost..." ^{[3, pp. 282-285]}

The "One Being" considered in the second hypothesis is self-sufficient and exists for itself. It is a single whole consisting of two interrelated components: Unity and being. The first component has uniqueness and simultaneously exists, the second component exists and has uniqueness. Thus, both components also consist of two parts. This process of separation can continue indefinitely, demonstrating how the "transition from one to many" (155e – 157b) is carried out, which Losev explains in his comments on the second hypothesis as follows: "If one thing really exists, it means that everything exists" ^{[4, p. 500]}.

The following hypothesis focuses not on the One, but on the "other" in relation to it. This "other" is not a complete negation of the One, but represents a certain difference from it. This "otherness" is a world of ideas consisting of many individual singularities. Each of these singularities contains the principle of the One, thus being involved in it. As a result, there is a combination of the One and the "other" in this hypothesis, but the "other" prevails, which makes it possible to call it "many".

The fourth hypothesis is entirely devoted to the "other", which defies description and cognition. This is "nothing", an indeterminacy that is transcendent in relation to both the being and the Super-Being of the first One. This is the first One in its complete denial. It is like absence, non-existence, which has no definite properties.

As a result, four positive hypotheses of the Parmenides dialogue suggest the following scheme of ontological levels:

1. The Absolute One

2. The relative one with the transition from one to many others.

3. Relative and other many things

4. The absolute other is complete Nothingness, negating both all that exists and the Super-Existent One.

2. Neoplatonic interpretation of the Parmenides dialogue

Now let's move on to Neoplatonism itself. Let us recall that the term "new Platonism" was negatively perceived in the XVIII century as a designation of the direction that distorted Platonic thought: "The term "Neoplatonism" was introduced in German historiography by I. J. Brucker and initially gave a sharply negative assessment of the analyzed period" ^{[5, p. 69]}. It is also worth mentioning that modern authors traditionally perceive Plotinus' philosophical system as the beginning of a new period in the development of Platonism, which does not correspond to Plotinus' philosophical self-perception: "However, Plotinus himself would be extremely surprised to learn about this. He considered himself a faithful follower of Plato, and spoke of his philosophical activity exclusively as exegesis" ^{[6, p. 95]}. His "neo" lies in the fact that Plotinus took this scheme and filled it with a peculiar cosmological content: "... identified the Origin of all things with the One of the first hypothesis of Plato's dialogue Parmenides" ^{[7, p. 657]}. The result is the following cosmological hierarchy:

1. A Single Initial

2. The One-Being–Mind

3. There are many other things – The Soul

4. Cosmos as the embodiment of the ideas of the Soul in matter

5. Nothing that denies both existence and Super-existence, as well as the One itself.

The Unified Plotina is an interpretation of the Unified One from the dialogue "Parmenides". According to the first hypothesis of Plato's Parmenides, “if there is only one,” then one cannot think about it or speak about it, for us it does not exist. This hypothesis corresponds to Plotinus' first principle, the One as the Super—essential Principle of Good. The One is the ineffable source of being, mind, and life, located beyond both the physical and the intelligible worlds.

Next comes the Mind. "According to the second hypothesis, "if the one exists," then it is already a single entity that unfolds in the boundless fullness of the intelligible world. The One-being corresponds to Plotinus' level of Mind" ^{[6, p. 101]}. It is worth saying that "Plotinus was the first Platonist to combine two aspects of the divine, namely the Demiurge creator and the intelligible paradigm into a single hypostasis of the Mind" ^{[6, pp. 95-105]}. As a result, unlike the Original, faceless First Principle, God turned out to be a person, self-aware and self-aware. We can say that this is the absolute consciousness at the heart of everything (it is noteworthy that in foreign literature the Neoplatonic concept of Mind is conveyed by a word with the meaning of "Consciousness" – "Absolute Consciousness"^[8]). This is the true being corresponding to the second hypothesis. The Mind is like a Single One, first of all in unity itself – the like-minded in It are merged into one whole. And each part of the one being is a multiplication of the fragmentation of the whole. Such fragmentation is infinite, and thus any information can be composed from these two elements (unity|being). And all of them are similar (but not identical) to the first one, embracing them all, the consubstantial one, of which they consist. This similarity is like a "reflection": "The One, being the most perfect being, necessarily extends its activity to the other, creating Mind, Soul and cosmos as reflections of itself... Plotinus compared the material world to a mirror image" ^{[7, p. 669.]}. That is, the one being is reflected in all subsequent divisions, which in turn can also be reflected in subsequent divisions. "The whole mind sees itself both as a whole and as parts. That is, one can imagine that it is a fractal: each small part is a likeness of the whole, a likeness of the whole world of ideas" ^[9].

As a result, we have five hypotheses of the second part of the dialogue "Parmenides" with the corresponding Plotinus principles.:

1. The absolute One is the First Principle, the Origin of the Good.

2. The relative one is the Mind, the Well–being.

3. The transition from one to the other is the Soul, the world of ideas.

4. The relative other is Space, the world of things.

5. The absolute other is Matter, hora, Nothing.

This is a well-thought-out and well-founded metaphysical system, which is quite relevant, despite the continuing popularity of the postmodern denial of the ontology of the One.

3. The problems of Platonic ontology and cosmology in the Parmenides Dialogue

However, there are difficulties in Platonism that have not received proper theoretical resolution, namely, justification.: 1) the transition from the One to the One Being; 2) from the One being to the many; 3) from the ideal to the material;

Also: 4) the presence of axiomatic assumptions that cannot be consistently deduced from previous principles (for example, one more principle is added to the One – being; to the Original, which, as the Absolute, is the fullness of everything, there is an opposing limit, matter).

5) the above–mentioned problem of primary materialism, which consists in the existence of low-quality matter along with the One, the "choir."

And 6) – the main thing: from the point of view of the authors, the problem of the "aporia of transcendence" has not been solved in world philosophy even to this day ^{[10, p. 34]}.

To try to find a solution to the above problems, let's go back to the first two hypotheses.

The problem of deducing being from the absolute One is key to understanding Plato's ontological concept, as well as to solving the aporia of transcendence: why and how the One comes out of its Super-non-existence into being in order to become a Single Being. "According to the teachings of the Neoplatonists, each new level of reality is a circular movement that includes 3 points: 1. The presence of the effect in the cause (μονή). 2. Exodus from it (πρόοδος). 3. Returning to it (ἐπιστροφή)" ^{[7, p. 660.]}. However, as already noted above, due to the aporia of transcendence in relation to a Single Super-Being, the neoplatonic scheme does not work: the Super-Existent Absolute has no reason to manifest itself in Existence, emerging from its Super-non-existence: "In the extremely abstract The form of the aporia of the transcendental principle is revealed in the 1st hypothesis of Plato's dialogue “Parmenides". It is shown here that if we consider the one in itself, regardless of everything that does not coincide with it, then any existential definition will have to be denied regarding such a one. In this case, we will have to say that it does not exist, including as a single one. It is “neither identical to itself or to another, nor distinct from itself or from another.” This means that one cannot say about it “the one is the one”, because it is devoid of any certainty and meaning that would distinguish it from other things and make it something existing alongside them. It also does not differ from anything else, i.e. it does not allow anything else outside of itself. Being such and denying its other, the one cannot be the beginning" ^{[7, p. 660]}. How exactly the transition from the first hypothesis "Only One" to the second "One is" takes place, Plato and the subsequent Neoplatonists never revealed, or rather failed to explain.

Meanwhile, according to the authors, being is already contained in the Single Absolute itself, as a possibility of being, and can be deduced from it without involving additional predicates and multiplication of entities. The One, being Absolute, has absolute freedom, which, however, it cannot even use, since it cannot be able to. If there were something else besides the Absolute itself, then the Absolute would also be on a par with itself, thereby losing its absoluteness. The only other Absolute is not something one, or two, or many, since nothing exists outside of it, as well as the "outside" itself, but only nothing, there is nothing, the complete negation of the Absolute as such, its disappearance, the negation and disappearance of its Super–non-existence to the present non-existence,"to the point of total destruction, in earnest." His freedom consists in what he can, not in what he wants – or he can "be or not be," staying in both possible positions at once.

The analogy to this dual "superexistence" of the One is seen by the authors in the concept of a Superposition of quantum objects: Schrodinger's cat is both alive and dead. Determining the location of such an object in a specific state is possible only by measuring it, that is, verifying its condition by observation, which presupposes the presence of an observer – before the act of observation, the object's position remains parallel and dual. In this sense, by analogy, the One can become a Single being only by becoming its own observer of Itself. To accept one of the two possible positions of Oneself present in parallel in the Super-Being Itself is possible only through the discovery of oneself in a reflection from one's negation, which is a double negation: the other is the One itself, which has identified itself, distinguished Itself from its own non-existence, and become to be. There is no volitional act on the part of the One, but only a reflection of one in the other, One in the other, and the other in the One, like a system of two parallel mirrors that create an endless perspective of their own mutual reflections in each other, the very world of many other things that multiplies not because it wants to, but because it can. In fact, this system of mutual reflections of the Super-Existent One and Nothing unnecessarily creates a world of many things without attracting the emanations of Goodness pouring out from the "outside" of the one and only One, or creating a world out of nothing with its abundance. This requires a Single or at least one-time volitional act, or an involuntary transfusion beyond oneself, which remains unexplained from the point of view of the limits and boundaries of the boundless and boundless Single Super-Being.

Let's now consider our proposed model based on the construction of neoplatonic cosmology more closely, let's look at it more closely. The relationship between the logic of Plato and Hegel in the context of the dialogue "Parmenides" was analyzed by researcher V. V. Semenov. He notes the dependence of the Hegelian unfolding of the Absolute on Platonism, and also identifies the differences between the Hegelian and Platonic interpretations: "Plato and Hegel rely on the dialectic of the identity of opposites with their self-movement, intuitively realizing that only such logic can explain the reason for the existence of the world and the possibility of its cognition. But Plato's logic loses out in comparison with Hegel's, although this is not fundamental. Hegel deduces the relation of opposites mainly from "pure reflection" and makes deductions from meaningful (removed content) concepts, while Plato does not always succeed. He uses empirical concepts much more often than Hegel in substantiating and approving the status of specific ideas" ^[11].

We find a different point of view from N. V. Golban: "But what makes the One (as well as every idea) lose its temper? Is there a contradiction in its depths? In other words, the One in itself must contain a certain moment different from the one, a certain negative moment in relation to itself. ... The one that is one is only a possibility, and as such it is completely simple and indivisible. And what makes such a possible existence become real remains inexplicable to Plato, the desire of the One to be is simply stated" ^{[12, p. 163]}

The existence of different points of view on the relationship between the Platonic and Hegelian dialectics of the unfolding of the Absolute once again proves the relevance of this study.

Since the One has no "other" in itself, it is not limited by anything, which allows the One to possess absolute possibility simultaneously (out of time), or rather, "in parallel" with Itself, to remain in a state of negation of itself, simply to disappear from its Super-Existence, cease to Super–Exist until its complete disappearance - nothing else to Itself in its there is simply no money available. Disappearance, therefore, can be interpreted as a consequence of the universality of the One. This initial "non-existence" represents the absolute negation, the complete absence of the One, of all its properties and predicates, and its disappearance. There is no boundary between them, they super-exist in pure opposition parallel to each other, without limiting each other by anything. Being nothing, this "other" to the One does not violate its super-essential unity, does not prevent it from still being One.

The question of how existence arises from this opposition to the One of its Nothingness becomes a key one, and the answer to it is contained in the application to this "parallel" Superexistent pair of "negation of negation" through the reflection of the One in another Nothingness. Nothing that completely denies the One also has in itself its non-existence, the negation of itself as the negation of the One, that is, the reflection of itself "not-One" back into the One, which is a double negation, "not-not-One." As a result, the One who has returned to Himself through the double negation of Himself finds himself, becoming a "Single being." This encounter of the One with himself, twice reflected, self-discovery, causes Self-awareness in the One and becomes the being of a Single being who knows himself in his reflections. One can choose from two possible positions of Oneself to the Super-Being only through a double negation of Oneself: the One itself, which has known itself, which is different from its own non-existence, and which has become to be, will be different. This is the only way the Neoplatonist model works for the Super-Being: The presence of the super-being of the Other (absolute non-existence of the Super-Being) in the Absolute → The exodus of the Super-Being into the Other (non-existence), as a manifestation of the super-freedom to simultaneously be in Oneself and in that single state of the Other → The rejection of disappearance and the return through the denial of one's own non–existence to Oneself, as a self-realized Being, to one's being from non-existence into Being. That is, to a Single Being who has acquired being and personality in self-consciousness.

Thus, being in this context represents the return of the One to Himself, to self-control, which is a consequence of the original unlimited One. From the authors' point of view, this approach not only explains the "mechanism" of the One's exodus from Superbeing to Being, but also solves the stated aporia of transcendence in a consistent way without unjustifiably involving additional entities and new predicates of the One.

If we now try to apply the proposed model of "negation of negation" to lower ontological levels, then each of them will necessarily "automatically" generate the next condescending level of being through comparing Itself with its own non–existence: The Mind, denying its own disappearance, will generate a Soul, the Soul will embody ideas into things so as not to disappear ^{[13, p. 327]} – and the explanation of the existence of chora as low-quality matter simply disappears in this model, which leads to the rejection of the need to immerse spiritual ideas in the chaos of primordial matter and frees Neoplatonic ontology from accusations of primary materialism of both emanationism and creationism.

Thus, all six issues of Neoplatonism presented above are solved uniformly, within the framework of a single model.

Conclusion

The authors propose an original ontological model in which being and absolute existence (the One Being) are derived from the original One through a dialectical process similar to Hegel's "withdrawal" (aufhebung), realized through consistent negation and overcoming of negations. For Plato, the transition from the first hypothesis to the second is not explained in any way: here, the One of the first hypothesis, and now the "One is" of the second, and it remains inexplicable where and how the One got its existence.

The model of negation of negation proposed by the authors through the double reflection of Oneself as One, in our opinion, makes up for the lack of explanation by Plato of the transition from the One to the One-being and solves the general philosophical ontological problem known as the aporia of transcendence. Moreover, when applied to all ontological levels without exception, except for the unclaimed lower level of chora, low-quality matter, it is able to explain transitions from higher to lower levels without the need for emanation as a self-distribution of Good.

The model of ontology proposed by the authors, based on the superposition of the One (Superexistent) in two states — itself and its own negation, is, as far as the authors know, original. In it, the self-determination of the One requires an observer, the universe is presented as a reflection of the Super-Being in its negation (analogy with two mirrors), and the dialectic of "negation of negation" is applied to the ontological entities of Neoplatonism. The combination of these elements represents a significant scientific novelty, potentially significant for the philosophical community.

The authors are particularly grateful to the distinguished Dmitry Maryutin for useful and productive discussions regarding the derivation of the One-being from the One through "double negation".