The Epistemological Frontier in the Culture of Science Communication after Paul Feyerabend

Bakumenko Gennady Vladimirovich ORCID: 0000-0002-1661-9428 PhD in Cultural Studies Independent researcher 352900, Russia, Krasnodar Territory, Armvir, Mira str., 80, office 1 genn-1@mail.ru Other publications by this author

1. Introduction

The invention of alternatives lies at the foundation of European science, which proposed a way to reassemble sociality based on the concept of scientific and technological progress, replacing religion on the social ladder between government and society and significantly expanding everyday ideas about reality through a secularized education system. Such a "privileged" position, according to P. Feyerabend, is detrimental to science ^[1]. Since the theoretical tradition engaged by the elite, in an effort to preserve its monopoly on the truth, is not interested in revising its postulates and is unable to do so, blind adherence to it refers more to the form of religious self-awareness than to the system of comprehension and mastering rational knowledge ^{[2, pp. 19-20; 64]}.

The need to explicate the "epistemological frontier" construct into theoretical discourse is due to an attempt to focus on significant structural changes in the translation and development of scientific knowledge in the context of methodological pluralism, the determinant of which is epistemological diversity. These changes are most obvious in the humanities ^[3], but they play an equally important role in the development of natural science ^[4-6]. We are talking about the validity of the doubt proclaimed by Feyerabend not only in the imaginary right to the dominance of individual traditions as systems of representations, but also in the stability of their categories, directing creative thinking into the beaten track of the observation lens ^{[2, pp. 53, 69]}. Feyerabend's position provoked the formulation of the problem of epistemological justice ^{[7; 6]}. The problem covers the culture of scientific communication as a whole, which, on the one hand, does not exist outside the palliative of rules and traditions, and on the other hand, requires their constant revision, remaining the most dynamic area of representation of scientific knowledge ^[7-9].

Using the metaphor of the observer, Feyerabend distinguishes two types of cosmologies: finite cosmos (Aristotelian) and infinite (modern science) ^[10]. The key distinguishing feature of the two types is the role of error: in the first case, the error is localized and does not lead to a revision of the ontological integrity, in the second it becomes a permanent mode of ontology expansion. For Feyerabend, the task of argumentation of justice (epistemological equality) of the two identified types of formation of the scientific picture of the world remains essential. In essence, we are talking about the productivity of two types of fundamental foundations of scientific and technical creativity: in the logic of closed (finite) systems, which corresponds to second-hand logic-integrity, excluding error as an anomaly, and in the logic of open systems, which corresponds to discrete logic, where the absence of error indicates a special case (anomaly) of a fragment of reality. It is quite appropriate to assume that if both of the bases can give both a positive and a negative result, then there may be an event horizon worthy of theoretical attention between them.

The purpose of the article is to reveal the descriptive and heuristic potential of the "epistemological frontier" construct for studying the event horizon between the limit values of the cosmological foundations of scientific creativity indicated by Feyerabend. To achieve this, we formalize the "epistemological frontier" construct and consider its applicability to understanding the philosophy of Feyerabend.

2. The theoretical construct "epistemological frontier"

The metaphor of the frontier (horizon) of science, describing a certain area of advanced frontiers, does not require a separate representation. Its prevalence is indicated by the headlines of scientific literature ^{[11; 12]}, a publishing project of Swiss neuroscientists, etc. A metaphor also has a mobile characteristic, indicating the point-of-view boundary between philosophy and science ^[13]. This metaphor is widely used to approximate a field of knowledge that has two contradictory characteristics: on the one hand, it is an assumed significant heuristic potential that can be realized in breakthrough technologies and significantly change perceptions of reality, on the other, on the contrary, high lack of demand due to the likelihood of exaggeration of potential. The key paradox of the frontier of science indicates the dimensionlessness of the content of the metaphor expressing it and excludes the possibility of its categorization.

The "epistemological frontier" construct is close to a common metaphor, but it touches on a slightly different descriptive area formed as a result of comparing two or more different concepts or theories that characterize a part of reality in different ways. Despite the fact that such a comparison is part of a very common mental procedure accompanying general theoretical methods of analysis and synthesis, until recently this descriptive area itself (a certain state of knowledge intended for further understanding) has not received a generally accepted definition. To reveal it, it seems possible to adapt F. J. Turner's "frontier thesis", revived by Russian theorists ^{[14; 15; 16, pp. 269-270]}, since its object is a certain liminal area opposed to the dominant trend.

The idea of applying the "epistemological frontier" construct was prepared by discussions about the limits of rational knowledge.

A. Bergson pointed out the limitations of the positivist solution to the classical methodological problem, which presupposes the prospect of cumulative accumulation of knowledge about the object by the subject, emphasizing the paradoxical nature of the description by static categories of mobile (extended) reality ^{[17, pp. 206-299]}. Justifying the pragmatic theory of perception and interpreting cognition as the entry of consciousness into the extension of things, he essentially anticipates not only the conclusions of non-classical physics, but also non-trivial poststructuralist concepts of the sociology of science ^{[18; 19]}, and post-non-classical system representations ^{[20; 21]}. The extent of reality suggests that the description most accurately reflects only its discrete states: the relation of cognition to reality is not limited to the dialectic of the phase transition of quantitative changes into qualitative ones, which, of course, happens, but not always. Beyond the logic of descriptive systems of scientific knowledge, there remains the possibility of both rhizome relations of knowledge to the object of knowledge ^[22], which from the classical point of view is equivalent to a misconception or a poorly reasoned theory based on hypothetical assumptions, and a variety of network polymodal constructions ^[19] reflecting the relativity of knowledge determined by conditions and tools of observation.

The concept, as an element of the system of scientific representations, describes a certain segment of reality, highlighting from the set its common and distinctive feature that falls into the lens of observation. But how can we describe a phenomenon of greater extent than the objective of observation?

One of the solutions is N. Bohr's complementarity principle. P. Feyerabend's admiration for his positivism is not accidental ^[23-25]. Non-classical physics relies on a probabilistic analysis of physical processes, overcoming the extent of reality that defies direct observation. As a result, the representation of reality includes a special epistemological space between two or more probabilities, and it is in this space, defined within probabilistic limits, that our representation closes with the probability of reality. The idea of reality in this probabilistic interval can be fixed and conveyed only with the help of several concepts or multiple quantities. There is a need to fix the area of our ideas about reality within two or more concepts (two or more theories) with the theoretical construct "epistemological frontier".

The epistemological frontier is a theoretical construct that arises as a result of the description of some part of reality, as well as two or more theories describing reality, not using a single specific concept or a single general categorical system, but by comparing two or more concepts of the described part of reality, including mutually exclusive, or two or more theories. The epistemological frontier is a special form of theoretical representation of reality, suggesting ambiguity or versatility, including insufficient knowledge of the described object. Unlike the common metaphor of the scientific frontier, the epistemological frontier has limits of content within the boundaries of correlated concepts or theories. In contrast to the description characterized by truth/falsity, the basic essential characteristic of the epistemological frontier is the completeness of the coverage of many concepts (theories) of the described part of reality. Unlike the category of the concept, which implies maximum certainty, the epistemological frontier may include heterogeneous characteristics of an object due to the manifestation of its various properties in different environments or as a result of significantly different instrumental characteristics of optics or conditions of their observation. The epistemological frontier does not necessarily fix the certainty of some part of reality, but allows you to indicate the probability of its properties manifesting within the described limits.

The epistemological frontier thus focuses on the extent of a part of reality to the detriment of the unambiguity of its description. As soon as, with the help of an experimentally verified theory, we approach the unambiguous certainty of the object of knowledge, we leave the frontier zone of probabilistic values and discover one of the limits of the corresponding epistemological frontier, however, the probability of intermediate values is not excluded, but is emphasized by climbing to other limits of the epistemological frontier.

For example, W. Lynch's review of dissent and diversity ^[7] defines one of the limits of the "gray zone" of epistemological frontiers in issues on which consensus has been established in science, and alternative opinions are criticized in order to eliminate the most rational doubts about the dominant trends. As a result, Lynch reduces the "gray area" of scientific ideas, discovering that not all alternative positions should be taken seriously. Lynch sets the limits of epistemological diversity and reduces the scope of epistemological frontiers.

3. Epistemological frontiers of democratic relativism

The presented theoretical construct allows us to see the differences between the theory of research programs ^[26] and the concept of democratic relativism ^{[2; 10]} in relation to the driving forces of the development of science. If Lakatos observes the frontier zone of individual theories (the area of epistemological frontiers) in their "safety belts", then Feyerabend, using the example of the Copernian revolution, reveals the historical and cultural conditionality of the formation of a "hard core" of fundamental assumptions in the field of epistemological frontiers. The predictive potential of scientific theories, as a basic factor of their competitiveness, remains the common basis for the construction of epistemological models by Lakatos and Feyerabend, but epistemological anarchism presupposes a broader area of innovative scientific thinking due to the rejection of hierarchical subordination of the "hard core" and "safety belts" ^{[10, p. 80]}. Lakatos' position remains classical in the sense that he defends the epistemological unity of the "hard core", while his opponent thinks non-classically, pointing to the equality of competing epistemological models, and assumes a different nature of the driving forces of science: not the desire to strengthen the rigidity of the theoretical core, but on the contrary, the desire to dilute it by overcoming existing limitations. Feyerabend already thinks of the scientific picture of the world as an analytical palliative that directly provokes innovation. Understanding his own methodological attitude as a temporary palliative, Feyerabend establishes a new goal of the philosophy of science — the deconstruction of dominant traditions.

Feyerabend equally stands apart in relation to the ontology of science by Lakatos and T. Kuhn ^[27]. Both Kuhn and Lakatos see in the divergence of the general field of epistemology of science, in its stratification into a complex set of particular epistemologies, a temporary state requiring constructivist efforts to restore the general system. The peculiarity of Feyerabend's position is that the divergence of the general field of epistemology of science is elevated to the level of a methodological principle. According to Feyerabend, a hierarchically organized system of scientific ideas looks like a special case, and the clash of private epistemologies and their competition constitute the general field of scientific search. Feyerabend thinks of the field of philosophy of science as a complex set of epistemological frontiers, the search and clarification of the limits of which becomes the main goal. Let us emphasize that the analytical disposition of two or more epistemologies in Feyerabend's works is aimed not at deconstructing individual representations in the interests of constructing one, but at "justifying" a multitude of probabilities. It can be pointed out directly that the disposition of cosmologies, traditions, sets of norms and rules, research programs in various fields of knowledge from the perspective of Feyerabend does not lead to the deprivation of some systems in favor of others, but indicates the productivity of maintaining dispositions and competition.

In this regard, R. Kent's interpretation of Feyerabend's method as "philosophical Dadaism" ^[28], which has its own grounds, requires a separate comment ^{[29, p. 115; 30, p. 294-295]}. The construct of the epistemological frontier, as a temporary methodological palliative, allows us to take a slightly different look at the reason for Feyerabend's appeal to dialectical materialism.

Kent's arguments boil down to the postmodern game of Feyerabend, in which irony at a higher metatheoretical level dominates the logical harmony of argumentation, provoking the deconstruction of reality. Agreeing with Kent that Feyerabend's appeal to substantiate the productivity of dialectical materialism is not accidental, let us pay attention to the emerging epistemological frontier between epistemological anarchism, which does not break ties with the analytical tradition, and dialectical materialism, which denies idealism in principle.

It is the paradox of the irreducibility of two mutually exclusive philosophical foundations into the general field of the scientific picture of the world from the standpoint of either of these two traditions that causes confusion and gives reason to treat, on the one hand, Feyerabend's early dialectical experience as an intellectual "horse game", and on the other hand, to attribute all subsequent Feyerabend debates with colleagues to irony or play on the shop floor. Actually, there is no dilemma if we attribute the entire legacy of Feyerabend in its entirety to an intellectual game or accept democratic relativism as a temporary palliative for defining the boundaries of epistemological frontiers in any existing or probable, i.e. any possible prospects. For a thought experiment, we have a choice of three possible options: two of them were described by K. Popper, distinguishing between the "open society" and its "enemies", and the third was proposed by Feyerabend, doubting the possibility of choosing one of the options proposed by Popper. The choice between "open" or "closed" Popper societies is a choice between ideals, which in fact represent the limits of the epistemological frontier, implying the probability of reality both as close as possible to the boundary states, and between the designated boundaries.

In general, agreeing with Kent's arguments and conclusions, we note that philosophical Dadaism remains for Feyerabend one of the possible methodological palliatives, the absolutization of which contradicts the basic principle of democratic relativism, which recognizes epistemological equality in the competitive struggle of turning scientific knowledge into an advantage.

We emphasize that the theoretical construct of the epistemological frontier remains only an analytical tool that assumes the variability of reality. But it also allows us to see significant changes in the culture of scientific communication, which became irreversible in the second half of the twentieth century. The point is that, whether we recognize epistemological diversity or reject it in favor of the monopoly of some construct of reality, the resulting knowledge can no longer exist in a single alternative system. It is broadcast discretely through various channels, creating conditions for fragmentation of reality. Attempts to reassemble reality in order to overcome its schizoid fragmentation lead to doubts about the systemic integrity of the transmitted knowledge systems. Therefore, the culture of scientific communication today is a system of broadcasting a complex set of epistemological frontiers that require clarification of their limits in each specific case.

4. Conclusion

Thus, if Ustrizhitsky and his colleagues determine the practical value of the theoretical construct "socio-cultural frontier" in describing with its help the mobile part of reality, i.e. the ontological mobility of reality described by concepts that are irreducible dialectically to common grounds, formed in various theoretical traditions ^[3], then the amount of knowledge set within the compared concepts is epistemological the frontier. We are talking about the limits of dialectical logic, which are most obvious precisely in the field of social and humanitarian knowledge, where such objects of knowledge as: man, creativity, life, art, communication, etc. — in principle, within the framework of the post-non-classical paradigm, they cannot be defined unambiguously. At the same time, the principle of epistemological justice justifies the existence of scientific knowledge simultaneously in several paradigms. For example, from the neoclassical point of view, the intention to generalize and reduce the idea of a part of objective reality to a specific definition and a clear concept is justified, while the post-non-classical paradigm does not deny the validity of two or more different concepts of the same object.

It should be noted that since the end of the XX century. not only scientific branches, but also individual disciplines (for example, cultural studies, political science, communication studies, etc.) appeal not to a single theory, but to a set of theories, between which a field of epistemological frontiers is formed. Therefore, the general research field of such a science from the classical point of view, in principle, cannot be considered a science, remaining an interdisciplinary space of scientific knowledge. But while in some cases convergence and complementarity are possible, in other cases dialectical synthesis is impossible for fundamental reasons. This is where the space of the epistemological frontier arises.

A striking example of the disclosure of the epistemological frontier is the dialogic method proposed within the framework of the general field of communication sciences by R. Craig ^[31-33]. Craig appeals to the practical value of communication success, even if its patterns are described in various theoretical approaches that overlap exclusively in a common object, but do not imply dialectical synthesis. However, the practical value of the epistemological frontier is not limited to communication studies. For example, understanding the legacy of individual cultural theorists of the Soviet era (A. F. Losev, D. S. Likhachev, M. M. Bakhtin, etc.) requires a comparison of their stated Marxist positions with other approaches, otherwise a significant, sometimes the most fundamental part of the theoretical experience of scientists who thought much more broadly than canonized Marxist-Leninist dogmas is lost.

The theoretical construct "epistemological frontier" proposed by the author certainly needs further theoretical criticism, including clarifying the limits of its application. Its heuristic potential consists, first of all, in the fact that with its help it is possible to fix the simultaneous justice and truth of contradictory propositions formulated on the basis of various theoretical positions: the multidimensionality of truth, even if it is paradoxical, is thus no longer a sign of the falsity of one of the judgments (this, of course, happens, but not in all cases). The coexistence of contradictory truths — and more broadly, epistemologies — is becoming the norm, especially in the field of social sciences and humanities.