Signaling and Tactical Hedging as Political Tools in the Formation of Minilateral Security Coalitions: Quad and AUKUS in the Indo-Pacific Region

Mafuang Supatat ORCID: 0000-0002-2494-5602 Postgraduate student; Department of Comparative Politics; RUDN University 6 Miklukho-Maklaya str., Moscow, 117198, Russia supatatmafuang@gmail.com

Introduction

How is the minilateral cooperation formed and institutionalized? In the context of the transition from unipolarity to multipolarity of modern international relations (MO), cooperation in the format of minilateralism is becoming a key strategy that ensures national interests and identities.

Minilateralism as a subform of multilateral interaction is a strategic approach that allows States to form coalitions with a limited number of participants, which contributes to a more effective solution of specific problems. Minilateralism avoids the difficulties associated with the divergence of many national interests and offers more flexible mechanisms for reaching agreement between States. In addition, signaling as a process of transferring strategic intentions plays an important role in the formation of such mini-liberal coalitions, allowing to avoid misunderstandings and disagreements and create an atmosphere of trust between states with different interest groups. In this context, the concept of tactical hedging, based on dynamic interaction between states, offers a new perspective on the process of forming coalitions, focusing on the importance of strategic narratives and diplomatic communication.

Examples of coalitions such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between Australia, India, the United States and Japan (Quad) and the Trilateral Security Partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States (AUKUS) illustrate how states can use tactical hedging in minilateral structures to manage complex security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. These structures demonstrate how States seeking cooperation can adapt their strategies in response to changes in the international environment, while minimizing risks and tensions. Thus, the study of minilateralism, signaling and tactical hedging not only enriches the theoretical base of the Ministry of Defense, but also provides practical tools for states seeking effective cooperation in conditions of uncertainty.

This article examines for the first time the phenomena of minilateralism and signaling in order to create coalitions. The next section presents the idea of tactical hedging, describes its costs and benefits. The third section analyzes the design features of Quad and AUKUS, demonstrating the use of tactical hedging, despite the differences in their development and implementation trajectories.

Minilateralism and signaling towards "coalition building"

The creation of coalitions is extremely important for States seeking to participate in the formation of an international strategic environment, especially in the absence of significant material power ^{[1, p. 387]}; however, increasing participation in these coalitions makes it difficult to reach consensus due to differences in national interests. This problem of collective action suggests that the state should begin to form a coalition with those countries that are more likely to share its own strategic goals, interests and visions – that is, minilateralism.

Minilateralism can be explained by comparing its characteristics with the versatility that P. Keohane defines it as "the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more States through special agreements or institutions" ^{[2, p. 731]}.In determining the differences between minilateralism and multilateralism, qualitative characteristics are of the same importance as quantitative indicators. Multilateralism is distinguished by three fundamental features: generalized principles of organization, indivisibility and diffuse reciprocity ^{[3, p. 566-567; 4, p. 2]}. Generalized principles of a multilateral organization are norms of behavior applicable to a particular category of actions, regardless of individual interests or a specific strategic context ^{[3, p. 571-572]}. Diffuse reciprocity means that a multilateral agreement is expected to be able to "provide approximately equivalent benefits in aggregate and over time" ^{[2, p. 19-24; 3, p. 571]}. While multilateralism works on the basis of indivisibility and common organizing principles, which requires a broad and inclusive approach, minilateralism focuses on gathering a "critical mass" ^{[5, p. 4-5, 6, p. 5]}. This means "involving in negotiations the smallest possible number of countries necessary to exert the greatest possible influence on solving a specific problem" ^[7].

This conceptualization includes three key aspects. Firstly, minilateralism defines a limited group of countries capable of solving specific problems and involving them in the decision-making process ^{[8, p. 88-94]}. Secondly, minilateralism seems to be more flexible (adaptability) and resilient due to the smaller number of stakeholders and groups of involved interests ^{[8, p. 89; 9, p. 32]}. Thirdly, minilateralism is characterized by informality and practicality. "Minilateralism fills the gap between bilateral relations (led by both the United States and China) and broader regional multilateral blocs (such as ASEAN), covering from three to nine countries and characterized as 'exceptional, flexible and functional in nature' ^{[5; 10]}. Minilateralism is becoming a real alternative for States that do not receive adequate support through bilateral or multilateral mechanisms. This can strengthen global multilateralism in the context of weakening the obligations of States in multilateral relations ^[11].

The phenomenon of minilateralism is driven by the need to counter security threats and strategic rivalry, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, where China has become much more assertive in creating minilateral cooperation with Southeast Asian countries as a "community of common destiny" under the leadership of China; nevertheless, minilateralism can create problems, including the need to manage the balance of power There is also a risk of exclusion of other states between the participants, which may exacerbate regional differences ^[12]. Despite this, minilateralism remains a valuable tool for States seeking to navigate complex geopolitical landscapes and achieve common strategic goals without the constraints imposed by formal alliances. Thus, signaling, coalition building and minilateralism together contribute to dynamic and strategic interaction within the framework of the Ministry of Defense, offering States flexible mechanisms to realize their interests in an increasingly interconnected world.

The term "coalition" is often used carelessly, ambiguously; no distinction is made between a coalition and an "alliance" or an association. It should be pointed out, however, that this term refers to a "group of like-minded States" that agree on the need for joint action on a specific issue at a certain time without commitment to a long-term relationship." This is its key difference from the "alliance — "a formal association of states for the purpose of using (or not using) military force in certain circumstances against states that are not part of them" ^{[13, p. 4]}.

How are mini-liberal coalitions created? We consider it necessary to draw attention to the fact that States seeking cooperation, despite the absence of a common background, identity, or even common memories and narratives, often face significant difficulties in navigating the path from basic trust to unified thinking. Therefore, it is often necessary to identify and use convincing mechanisms aimed at forming and activating a collective perception of shared experiences, especially a sense of common danger and insecurity.

Thus, the formation of coalitions between states does not happen automatically, despite common strategic interests, since the absence of binding treaties requires clear communication of intentions in order to avoid misunderstandings that could jeopardize cooperation. Therefore, communication — signaling — becomes a key factor ^{[13, p. 4]}.

The existing literature on signaling does not sufficiently reflect the dynamics of coalition formation. First, it is often assumed that actors have pre-defined strategic goals, such as strengthening alliances or strengthening military confidence, which is not sufficiently applicable to the formation of coalitions due to the lack of clear strategic goals in the initial stages of their formation, since coalitions may pursue several goals in peacetime, and member States They can set strategic goals in different ways ^{[13, p. 4]}. Secondly, the so-called "cheap conversations" can still be useful in the process of creating a coalition: cheap talk». As a rule, "cheap conversations" refer to "free, unverifiable statements", therefore they are not a reliable signal, since they do not guarantee the commitment of States to the statements made ^{[14, p. 1214]}. For example, the United States had no specific ideas about the agenda and functions of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), except to emphasize its commitment to the idea of economic cooperation in the region ^{[13, p. 5]}. Thirdly, although the process of coalition building is very dynamic from formulation to consolidation, the existing signaling does not sufficiently take into account the dynamic nature of coalition formation, paying more attention to state obligations than to the formation of alliances, while coalition building mainly belongs to the category of "alliance signaling", which emphasizes the desirability of the state as an ally and expectations from current or potential partners ^{[13, p. 5]}. Another potential category is "pseudo-signals: pseudo-signals", which are "cheap conversations, carefully veiled and publicly marketed as meaningful signals." Nevertheless, this signaling suggests that the sender of the signal is not considering the creation of a coalition, since as a result he "cannot convincingly communicate what this signal allegedly contains"^{[13, p. 5]}.

Simply forming a coalition is not enough to achieve a strategic effect. This forces Member States to coordinate their strategic goals and priorities. Moreover, signals are less effective when they contradict existing beliefs ^[15]. Conversely, if previous beliefs coincide with the signal being sent, these "like-minded people" may be inclined to coordinate their strategies. Thus, the concept of "tactical hedging" can serve as a basis for analyzing the dynamics of coalition formation.

The concept of tactical hedging

Tactical hedging based on strategic uncertainty focuses on process-oriented signaling, which makes it possible to assess international support or opposition before strategic changes and thereby reduce potential tensions. This approach is extremely important for forming coalitions, as it allows states to defend common interests through dialogue with potential allies, using "strategic narratives" that focus on changing perceptions to formulate problems and determine future commitments ^{[13, p. 6-8]}.

Tactical hedging serves as a foreign policy signaling mechanism that allows you to move away from "expensive signals: costly signals" to "cheap negotiations: cheap talks" aimed at understanding the strategic orientations of states and the appropriate definition of goals. Its distinctive feature is its process orientation, which emphasizes the interactive dynamics between states when assessing the reliability of partners before making material commitments. This process involves the development of specific narratives linking the historical context with strategic goals in order to achieve consensus on the formation of a coalition ^[16].

The author believes that Quad and AUKUS are built on the basis of liberal narratives from an influential hedger (a state using a hedging strategy), such as the United States. From Hedger's point of view, this narrative has a dual purpose: it helps to substantiate one's understanding of the international situation, ideological beliefs and strategic behavior in order to obtain diplomatic approval or, at least, tacit consent from the target State of sanctions. This is similar to the concept of a "strategic narrative", which is characterized as "a representation of a sequence of events and identities, a communicative tool through which political figures — usually holding elite positions — try to attach special importance to the past, present and future in achieving political goals" ^{[17; 18, p. 5]}. This follows from the way States and political actors use collective memories and myths to express cohesive identities, thereby reducing unpredictability and vulnerability. The discourse of the US narrative "Who is the real threat?" is an incentive for cooperation, because, as Miller emphasizes, a sense of common danger is the strongest motivator for cooperation ^[19]. Thus, tactical hedging is illustrated by abstract concepts of the Indo-Pacific region put forward by regional states. For example, this is Japan's "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region (FOIP)" strategy, which aims to provoke a reaction from allies and partners to create a coalition ^[20].

How is tactical hedging implemented when creating coalitions? Tactical hedging for coalition building consists of three main stages, which are described in detail in the specialized literature ^{[21; 22]}. At the initial stage, the hedger, often a state leader, initiates a symbolic and ambiguous foreign policy doctrine called a "diplomatic sign". This sign is intended to attract attention and provoke a reaction from other States, especially those with similar strategic interests. These diplomatic signs, expressed in the form of slogans or catch phrases, are extremely important because they reflect an ambiguous version of events; mainly, the point of view of the hedger, justifying his actions and emphasizing the imperatives of forming coalitions ^{[13, p. 10]}.

At the second stage, the hedger evaluates the reaction of other states and the chances of creating a real coalition. Positive reactions may prompt accelerated negotiations with like-minded states in the format of minilateralism. Conversely, different reactions may lead to the fact that the hedger will contribute to the formation of common interests with potential allies in order to expand the capabilities of the coalition ^{[13, p. 11]}.

The third stage includes a hedger and an assessment of the possibility of creating coalitions based on the alignment of threat perceptions, national interests and worldviews. Closer coordination of these factors contributes to the rapid formation of coalitions. Without close cooperation, diplomatic steps can be dismissed as mere rhetoric that undermines trust. The most important first step in the implementation of strategic concepts is the institutionalization of a soft coalition ^{[23, p. 90]}. At this stage, the constructed narratives illustrate the transformation of the global strategic environment, including general political principles and the framework of strategic achievements. The establishment of common strategic goals and effective approaches is necessary to strengthen the coalition. An effective coalition will surpass the previous "soft" coalition in the second stage, which will facilitate cooperation between Member States in implementing joint initiatives, strengthening strategic partnerships and potentially moving to formal alliances. It can be argued that minilateralism serves as an effective approach to creating a solid foundation for broader coalitions, allowing at the initial stage to cooperate with coalition states, solve problems of collective action and manage the growth of coalitions ^{[13, p. 11-12]}. Based on these theoretical assumptions, the following sections consider the emergence of Quad and AUKUS in the framework of hedging strategies used by Japan and Australia.

The Evolution of the Quad

The Quad, which includes the United States, Japan, Australia and India, has gone through various stages of coalition formation since its inception. The first coalition initiative, called Quad 1.0, originated in 2004 and was aimed at coordinating humanitarian and disaster relief efforts following the Indian Ocean disaster. This preliminary cooperation laid the foundation for subsequent strategic alliances, but did not lead to formal institutionalization due to weak ties with India and differences in the strategic priorities of the participants ^{[13; 24]}. For the first time, Quad was formalized as a coalition in the period 2007-2008. At the initiative of Japan to implement the "democracy-based strategic framework". This initiative failed due to different perceptions of threats from China and a change of leadership in the member countries, as a result of which Australia and India did not want to fully participate in this initiative ^{[13; 20]}. The second stage of coalition formation, Quad 2.0, began in 2016 with the implementation of the Japanese FOIP strategy aimed at countering China's assertiveness, which is growing along the coast of the South China Sea. At this stage, the main focus was on diplomacy aimed at easing tensions with China while gradually securing support from the United States and other democratic countries ^[13]. During these stages, Quad has evolved from a disparate group focused on disaster management into a more structured organization dealing with broader regional security and economic issues, while continuing to navigate the complex geopolitical landscape of the Indo-Pacific region ^[24].

In Quad 3.0 Institutionalization accelerated due to U.S. influence caused by Japan's strategic hedging after 2020. At this stage, Quad focused on non-military cooperation in areas such as infrastructure, cybersecurity, climate change and maritime security, thereby acting as a diplomatic network rather than a military coalition. ^{[12; 25; 26; 27]}. This stage reflects a strategic shift towards functional cooperation and the development of common norms, but without direct military cooperation in order to prevent antagonism with China and maintain regional stability ^{[20; 28; 27]}. This strategic ambiguity provided Quad with the flexibility to gradually institutionalize without direct confrontation with China and simultaneously promote and comply with the "liberal international order (LIO) or rules-based international order (RBIO)" ^[28]. Quad's focus on regional public goods and the central role of ASEAN is an example of a tactical hedging strategy aimed at addressing regional concerns about great power competition and promoting cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. Thus, the formation of a Quad for the purpose of tactical hedging is a MOD method that allows to harmonize strategic cooperation and the need to take into account complex regional dynamics.

AUKUS: Double tactical hedging

Dual tactical hedging is reflected in two fundamental components of AUKUS. The first component is aimed at strengthening Australia's military potential through the acquisition of nuclear submarines with technical assistance from the United States and Great Britain, which serves as a strategic deterrent against regional threats, especially from China ^{[29; 13]}. This component required Australia to overcome diplomatic difficulties, such as the cancellation of the submarine deal with France, which was an important step reflecting Australia's strategic shift towards AUKUS ^[13;27]. The second component is dedicated to cooperation in the field of advanced defense technologies such as cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence and quantum technologies, which contributes to the future integration of the alliance countries ^[29], cooperation between the main members and reflects discussions on Japan and South Korea, consistent with the strategies of the member states in the Indo-Pacific region ^[24]. The dual tactical hedging strategy allows AUKUS to balance military exclusivity and technological inclusivity, reducing the risks of coalition building and strengthening regional security measures.

At the initial stage of the formation of the AUKUS coalition Australia has decided to accelerate the conclusion of a submarine agreement with France through cooperation with the United States and Great Britain in the field of nuclear submarines. This resolution was approved at the G7 summit in June 2021, and culminated in the official creation of AUKUS in September 2021, which marked a marked transformation of Australia's defense strategy and its diplomatic relations, especially with France ^{[13, p. 15]}. Australia quickly created a narrative framework that allows the three countries to quickly go through the initial, secondary and tertiary stages of tactical hedging. Thus, in the first stage in just three months in September 2021, Australia chose AUKUS over France. This decision will significantly affect Australia's diplomatic status with regard to France. In March 2023, the "optimal pathway" was proposed to solve problems related to the operational readiness of AUKUS submarines built in Australia. And the second stage is the rapid AUKUS initiatives to create nuclear submarines began with the rotation of nuclear submarines from the city of Perth, then Australia's purchase of Virginia–class submarines in the early 2030s and the construction of AUKUS-class vessels in Australia by the 2040s. Australia intends to purchase from the United States from three to five Virginia-class submarines (subject to Congressional approval) in the early 2030s.^{[27, p. 7]} This initiative includes large-scale cooperation in the field of modern technologies, including cybersecurity, artificial intelligence and quantum technologies, which are vital for expanding the collective defense capabilities of AUKUS members ^[29]. The third stage of the coalition formation involves a possible expansion of the membership of AUKUS, especially in the field of defense technology. At this stage, it is possible to attract new like-minded countries, and Japan is considered a potential candidate due to overlapping strategic interests and pre-existing defense relations with AUKUS members ^[13]. However, this expansion is approached cautiously, since the consolidation of trilateral cooperation is still a priority. Throughout these phases, AUKUS focuses on strengthening the traditional balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region, addressing the challenges posed by China's assertiveness, and securing RBIO. AUKUS' phased approach reflects strategic and tactical hedging to manage the complexities of international defense cooperation and the geopolitical dynamics of the Indo-Pacific region.

Conclusion

The interaction between signaling and tactical hedging as tools for forming a coalition in the format of minilateralism is crucial in modern defense strategies, especially in the context of strategic rivalry and escalating security problems. These relations underline the importance of signaling as a mechanism for forming effective coalitions, allowing states to skillfully maneuver in difficult geopolitical conditions. In addition, the tactical hedging paradigm is becoming an important signaling tool that facilitates the adaptation of states to changing global dynamics and contributes to the formation of stable alliances in a multipolar world.

The development of the Quad and AUKUS coalitions reflects the complex and multifaceted nature of the formation of international alliances against the backdrop of the rapidly changing geopolitical situation in the Indo-Pacific region. Starting with humanitarian activities and gradually moving to more formalized security and economic cooperation, Quad is an example of strategic hedging that allows member states to align their interests and at the same time prevent open confrontation with China. At the same time, AUKUS, which is based on dual tactical hedging, emphasizes the importance of military-technical cooperation between Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom to strengthen regional stability and counter new threats. Both alliances emphasize the need to adapt to new challenges and risks and thus the crucial role of diplomacy and multilateral cooperation in the modern world of defense.