The European Union and Israel: political and legal problems of scientific and technological cooperation in modern conditions

Shugurov Mark Vladimirovich ORCID: 0000-0003-3604-3961 Doctor of Philosophy Professor; Department of International Law; Saratov State Law Academy 410056, Russia, Saratov, Chernyshevsky str., 104 shugurovs@mail.ru Other publications by this author

Shugurova Irina Viktorovna ORCID: 0000-0003-3414-2704 PhD in Law Associate Professor; Department of International Law; Saratov State Law Academy 410056, Russia, Saratov, Chernyshevsky str., 104 ivshugurova@mail.ru Other publications by this author

The research was carried out at the expense of a grant from the Russian Science Foundation No. 23-28-01296, https://rscf.ru/project/23-28-01296/

Introduction

A distinctive feature of the EU is the functioning of the European Research Area (ERA), in which third countries are involved. One of them is Israel, which has a high scientific, technological and innovative potential. However, due to the situation of a new round of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in 2023-2024, which was expressed in massive military actions by the Israeli army during Operation Iron Swords, accompanied by a significant violation of international humanitarian law, as well as the catastrophic destruction of the scientific and educational structure in the Gaza Strip, EU-Israel cooperation in the scientific and technological sphere faced serious challenges. problems.

During the permanent academic boycott in 2001-2022 ^{[1; 2]}, national and global scientific associations mainly announced the suspension of their academic cooperation with this state. However, in 2023-2024, some universities and research centers of the EU member states initiated a procedure for reviewing relations with Israeli universities, research centers and companies ^{[3, pp. 78-94]}. Similar actions have been taken by universities in Asia, Africa and Latin America. In fact, this indicates a fundamentally new phase of the academic boycott of Israel, which has become the subject of special research ^[4-6]. The current review of relations in some cases is accompanied by the complete suspension of agreements concluded between European and Israeli universities. Universities that have made such decisions include: University of Valencia, University of Granada, University of Oviedo, University of Barcelona, French-speaking Free University of Brussels, University of Ghent, University of Oslo, University of Southeastern Norway, Nord University, University of Helsinki, Trinity College in Dublin.

In other cases, the rhetoric of "rejection" of Israel is not dominant, since the administrations of other European universities have chosen a compromise way of making decisions on partial suspension of ties (University of Turin, University of Palermo, University of Milan, University of Antwerp, University of Luvien, University of Tilburg), despite the significant pressure exerted by the protests, which are coordinated by the movement "Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions" (BDS) (Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions/BDS (https://bdsmovement.net /)), and in its composition – The Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) (The Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) (https://bdsmovement.net/academic-boycott#tab5 )). In Europe, the exceptions are Uppsala University (Sweden), Cambridge and Oxford Universities (Great Britain), as well as universities in Germany, which have spoken out absolutely against any form of academic boycott of Israel. This approach is similar to that of US universities.

It should be borne in mind that the academic boycott, albeit of a limited nature, is directed at the state, which is one of the leaders in the field of science, technology and innovation (hereinafter – STI). As I.G. Korotkov notes, "the limited natural resources, high scientific potential and professionalism of the workforce have become a powerful incentive for the development of the innovation economy and have brought the country among the leaders of scientific and technological progress" ^{[7, p. 12]}. According to the latest statistics, the country ranks 8th in the world in terms of the intensity of research and development (R&D), 6th in terms of the level of commercialization of knowledge and development, 7th in terms of knowledge diffusion, and 6th in terms of the share of R&D expenditures (Global Innovation Index 2024 Unlocking the Promise of Social Entrepreneurship. p. 15 (https://ict.moscow/static/pdf/files/wipo-pub-2000-2024-en-global-innovation-index-2024.pdf )).

Given the high degree of internationalization of the Israeli national scientific and technological complex, the situation that has arisen creates problems not only for Israel's development prospects, but also for multilateral research projects with its participation. The fact is that the above-mentioned procedures for reviewing and suspending cooperation directly affect projects at the level of the framework programs of the European Union (hereinafter – the EU). As a result, a whole range of problems arose related not only to the current, but also to possible future cooperation between the EU and Israel in the field of science, technology and innovation (hereinafter – STI). These problems are combined with the significant pressure exerted on the EU as an institutional structure by the anti-Israeli boycott movement aimed at excluding Israeli institutions from the Horizon Europe program (2021-2027).

Nevertheless, these kinds of problems are different from those that have arisen in international scientific and technological cooperation (hereinafter – ISTC) Russia and the EU. Recall that in 2022, universities and research centers of the member states, as well as the governments of the EU member states, synchronously introduced restrictive measures in the form of suspension of relevant agreements concluded with Russia and its scientific institutions. As a result of these measures, institutional cooperation was frozen (until further notice), and the implementation of the vast majority of projects was curtailed. In turn, the European Commission, driven by extremely politicized motives, suspended the participation of Russian scientific institutions in the implementation of projects under the Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe programs.

The purpose of the article is to reveal and systematize the political and legal problems that have arisen in the scientific and technological cooperation between the EU and Israel against the background of the unprecedented escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in 2023-2024.

The following tasks are aimed at achieving this goal:

– conducting an analysis of the legal basis for Israel's participation in the EU framework programs in the field of STI and determining the degree of its integration into the European Research Space;

– defining the specifics of the range of projects involving Israel in the EU framework programs;

– analysis of the controversial issues of Israel's exclusion from participation in EU projects and programs in the field of STI;

– Systematization of general and special EU rules governing the process of monitoring project applications and monitoring the use of research and development results;

– disclosure of the factors determining the peculiarity of the EU's scientific diplomacy towards Israel in the context of the current aggravation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

The achievement of the set goal and the solution of the research tasks was based on the use of the following methodological base: the principle of historicism, the historical and legal method, the formal dogmatic method, the comparative method, the systematic approach, the modeling method and the forecasting method.

The novelty of the study lies in the fact that for the first time in the scientific literature, it systematically analyzes the political and legal problems that arose in the space of cooperation between the EU and Israel in the field of STI in 2023-2024.

1. Israel's participation in EU research and development programmes: legal framework and results achieved

The range of bilateral relations between the EU and Israel includes trade, economic, military-technical, as well as scientific and technological cooperation. The legal basis for the diverse areas of cooperation between the EU and Israel is the Association Agreement signed on November 20, 1995 and entered into force in June 2000 (Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the State of Israel, of the other part (https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/israel/documents/eu_israel/asso_agree_en.pdf )). The Association Agreement, supplemented by a number of other agreements (EU trade relations with Israel. Facts, figures and latest developments (https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/israel_en)) It aims to provide an appropriate legal and institutional framework for political dialogue and economic cooperation between the EU and Israel, which is supported by actions within the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy. The action plans are aimed at the gradual integration of Israel into European policies and programs. This process is facilitated by ten subcommittees, which meet regularly to discuss priorities and exchange views. 

Cooperation between the EU and Israel in the scientific and technological field has a long history.Its most general legal framework is set by Article 40 of the Association Agreement. It enshrines the provision that the Parties undertake to intensify scientific and technical cooperation. It was envisaged that detailed provisions governing this area of cooperation and consolidating its objectives would be set out in separate agreements.

The EU funds several cooperation programmes in the field of STI, as well as academic exchanges, which are open to third countries that are not members of the EU. Since 1996, Israel has been among the countries that are involved in the European Research Space. Israel has become the first non-European country to join the EU Research and Development (R&D) framework programmes. Israel's special status is the result of the high level of its research potential and active policy in the field of ISTC. In 2004, an agreement was signed with Israel, which became the legal basis for its participation in the Galileo project and the global navigation satellite system. At the same time, Israel is a member of the Center for European Nuclear Research (CERN).

Israel, which was a full partner of the Horizon program, signed an Association Agreement with Horizon Europe on December 6, 2021, which entered into force on the same day (Agreement between the European Union, of the one part, and Israel, of the other part, on the participation of Israel in the Union program Horizon Europe – the Framework Program for Research and Innovation (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT /?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2022.095.01.0143.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2022%3A095%3ATOC)). As a result, he became a participant in the program (EU Grants: List of participating countries (HE): V3.1 – 07/11/2024 1 List of Participating Countries in Horizon Europe (https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/docs/2021-2027/common/guidance/list-3rd-country-participation_horizon-euratom_en.pdf)).

Israeli researchers working at universities, public research institutes, private companies and government organizations have participated and continue to participate in various projects implemented jointly with colleagues from EU countries, as well as with colleagues from other countries (List of cooperation between universities and research centers of European states with Israeli institutions at the level of the European Framework Programs 7/FP7, Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe is given by: European universities’ cooperation with Israel in EU security research programs (11/16/2023) (https://stopwapenhandel.org/european-universities-cooperation-with-israel-in-eu-security-research-programs/)).

Over the entire period of cooperation, more than 5,000 research projects with the participation of Israel have been registered. Of these, 2,341 projects within the framework of Horizon 2020, in which Israeli institutions participate. (CORDIS. Horizon 2020/Israel. https://cordis.europa.eu/search?q=contenttype%3D%27project%27%20AND%20relatedRegion%2Fregion%2FeuCode%3D%27IL%27&p=1&num=10&srt=Relevance:decreasing). A number of projects were coordinated by Israel.

Associate membership allows Israel to continue and deepen research cooperation with an emphasis on common priorities, such as the dual "green" and digital transition, public health, etc. Examples of the most successful projects include Sniffphone (2015-2019), coordinated by Technion (Israel Institute of Technology), during the implementation of which an accurate and non-invasive method was developed detection of stomach cancer based on human respiratory analysis (Sniffphone (https://www.sniffphone.eu )). This should also include the Socrates project (2016-2020), aimed at exploring ways to improve the interaction of robots with users, taking into account a number of tasks and circumstances. The G2P-SOL project (2016-2021) was aimed at collecting, improving and disseminating genetic and phenotypic information about the four main crops of the Solanaceae family: potatoes, tomatoes, peppers and eggplants.

The status of an associate member in EU programs allows Israel to receive appropriate funding. The total amount of financing for Israeli organizations under RP7 (2007-2013) amounted to 879 million euros, under Horizon 2020 (2014-2020) – 1.28 billion euros, and finally, under Horizon Europe (2021-2027) in the period 2021-2023 – 503 million euros. According to statistics, since October 7, the EU has allocated 126 million euros to finance 130 research projects with the participation of Israeli organizations (Bhriain N.N., and Akkerman M. The EU’s support for Israel makes it complicit in genocide. (06.07.2024) (https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2024/7/6/the-eus-support-for-israel-makes-it-complicit-in-genocide)).

In addition, Israel participates in the Erasmus+ program for Education, training, youth and sports, which funds academic and youth mobility, as well as cooperation projects around the world. As part of this program, 9,592 Israeli students, professors and university staff visited Europe, and 7,481 European colleagues visited Israel between 2015 and 2022 (Erasmus+ for higher education in Israel (https://ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/erasmus-plus/factsheets/neighbourhood/israel_erasmusplus_2019.pdf).

As you can see, Israel is quite intensively integrated into the European Research Space, which undoubtedly contributed to building its potential in the field of STI. In turn, Israel cooperates closely with the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, as well as leading universities from Latin America, Asia and Africa. As N.V. Zhadovets notes, "international cooperation in the field of scientific research and technology is one of the central components of Israeli foreign policy" ^{[8, p. 83]}. The multi-vector nature of scientific diplomacy allowed him to intensify the internationalization of his STI sector, which, however, is fraught with the risk of complicating ties in view of his policy in the Middle East.

Another category of risks is related to the specifics of its participation in the European Research Area. In particular, security-related projects with Israel's participation occupy a prominent place among the projects supported by the EU within the framework of Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe. These programs are implemented jointly with European universities (European universities’ cooperation with Israel in EU security research programs (11/16/2023) (https://stopwapenhandel.org/european-universities-cooperation-with-israel-in-eu-security-research-programs/)). In addition to security research projects, some of which focus, for example, on disaster response or health issues, a number of projects involve improving law enforcement. Among them: LAW-TRAIN (development, coordination and training of international police interrogation techniques), MEDEA (creation of a network of security services in the Mediterranean and Black Seas region to respond to security challenges), "Powerful Lawful Interception, Investigation, and Intelligence" (POLIIICE) (promotion of European law enforcement agencies to new investigative methods terrorist crimes), ROXANNE (development of a law enforcement platform to combine new speech technologies, facial recognition and network analysis to facilitate identification). The latest project has raised concerns about the possible use of its results for mass surveillance of citizens.

Such projects are due to the fact that the EU has created a formal alliance with the Israeli police on the basis of an agreement to deepen ties with the Israeli police. Thanks to this agreement, Israel can share the personal data of Palestinians living under occupation with Europol. This marks another milestone in strengthening cooperation between the EU and Israel in the fight against crime, as well as in ensuring the right to privacy, which indicates a strategic partnership in the field of security and combating cross-border crime. However, as noted in the expert community, despite the fact that on paper the EU opposes the Israeli colonization of East Jerusalem, it supported the creation of a police force that plays an integral role in colonization (Cronin D. Rights and Accountability. Why are Israel’s cops a “strategic partner” for EU? (04.11.2022) (https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/david-cronin/why-are-israels-cops-strategic-partner-eu)).

Another feature of Israel's participation in EU programs is the involvement of Israeli military companies in multilateral cooperation. This took place at the level of FP7, Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe projects, in which the main Israeli arms companies (Elbit, IAI and Rafael) participated (Detailed analysis is provided by: European money for the war in Gaza: how EU research funding supports the Israeli arms industry (03/22/2024) (https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2024/european-money-for-the-war-in-gaza-how-eu-research-funding-supports-the-israeli-arms-industry/)). In addition, the Ministry of Defense participated in two research projects on drones (ResponDrone and UnderSec) funded by the EU, which received a total of 200,000 euros. The ResponDrone project, launched in May 2019, involves the development of a multifunctional UAV platform for rapid response services in order to increase their awareness of the situation, provide emergency services with enhanced capabilities to support search and rescue operations, as well as extinguishing forest fires (Horizon 2020. Novel integrated solution of operating a fleet of drones with multiple synchronized missions for disaster responses (2019–2022). Grant agreement ID: 833717 (https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/833717)).

The UnderSec project, which began in October 2023, involves the development of a modular and complete prototype system using multimodal sensors and robotic assets in order to increase situational awareness and improve response capabilities for ships, ports and marine infrastructure (Horizon Europe. Sensor-based prototype system for underwater security (2023–2026). Grant agreement ID: 101121288 (https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101121288)). It is quite obvious that the results of the projects can be used for military purposes, as well as the results of other EU-funded projects with the participation of Israeli companies.

In the situation of a new phase of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which in October 2024 was supplemented by the Lebanese-Palestinian confrontation, the participation of Israeli military companies, as well as Israel itself, represented by its universities and research centers, in EU programs caused not only sharp criticism in expert circles, but also led to a new wave of anti-Israeli protests.

2. The protest movement against Israel's participation in EU STI programs: an analysis of the discourse

Against the background of general criticism of the EU's policy towards Israel ^{[9, p. 36-37]}, the participation of Israeli companies producing weapons, as well as the participation of other companies associated with them, in EU framework programs became a separate subject of discussion. In addition, the imbalance in the EU's support for Israeli researchers on the one hand and Palestinian researchers on the other has been significantly criticized. So, if the former at one time received $1.3 billion under the Horizon 2020 program, the latter received only $330,000 (Cronin D. Palestinians get pittance as EU showers science grants on Israel (04/27/2023) (https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/david-cronin/palestinians-get-pittance-eu-showers-science-grants-israel)).

In 2018, the European Network against the Arms Trade (ENAAT), which promotes the "No EU Money for the Arms Industry" campaign and seeks to prevent the European Union from allocating funds for the development of the arms sector, was one of the signatories of the call for the immediate exclusion of all Israeli military and security companies from the EU framework programs (No EU money to the Israeli arms industry(17 April 2018) (https://www.eccpalestine.org/no-eu-money-to-the-israeli-arms-industry-a-call-to-stop-the-eus-role-in-militarisation-and-profiteering-from-human-rights-violations-in-the-occupied-palestinian-territory/)).

A detailed justification for such a call can be found in a special analytical report published by the European Center, which coordinates committees and associations in support of Palestine (Horizon Europe: Funding death, displacement & discrimination in Palestine (04/13/2023). (https://www.eccpalestine.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/ECCP-HE-Briefing-April-2023-1.pdf )). The document concludes that European Union subsidies directed to the R&D sector have become a crucial source of funding for Israeli academic institutions, enterprises and government agencies, including many military companies that are involved in actions that violate human rights and international law, including organizations that operate in illegal Israeli settlements and who profit from their activities. In principle, it is not just that the results of projects implemented by universities of EU states, as well as universities and research centers in Israel, have a double application, but also the results of projects implemented on a multilateral basis within the framework of EU programs. All this is far from accidental due to the significant scale of military-technical cooperation between the EU and Israel.

It is known that the EU, as well as the United States, are not only Israel's key partner in research and development, but also the largest supplier of weapons (Bhriain N.N., and Akkerman M. The EU’s support for Israel makes it complicit in genocide. (06.07.2024) (https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2024/7/6/the-eus-support-for-israel-makes-it-complicit-in-genocide)). It should be noted that the US position has changed somewhat recently. The fact is that the United States has threatened Israel with an arms embargo if the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip is not resolved by mid-November 2024 (the United States has given Israel an ultimatum (10/15/2024) (https://news.mail.ru/politics/63224331 /?frommail=1&utm_partner_id=547)).

It should be noted that weapons continued to flow from some EU countries to Israel even after the International Court of Justice, in its ruling of February 26, 2024, recognized the allegations of acts of genocide committed by Israel as plausible and confirmed the real and inevitable risk that irreparable damage would be inflicted on the Palestinians (International Court of Justice. Order (26 January 2024). Application of the Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide in the GAZA strip (South Africa v. Israel (https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240126-ord-01-00-en.pdf)). The International Court of Justice has urged Israel to implement a wide range of interim measures aimed at preventing genocide in the Gaza Strip. However, Israel did not implement these measures.

Further, in its advisory opinion of July 19, 2024, on the Legal Consequences Arising from Israeli Policies and practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem (International Court of Justice. Advisory opinion (19.07.2024). Legal consequences arising from the policies and practices of Israel in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem (https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/186/186-20240719-adv-01-00-en.pdf )), the International Court of Justice of the United Nations pointed to the international legal obligations erga omnes, which Israel violated. These included the obligation to respect the right to self-determination; the obligation arising from the prohibition on the acquisition of territory by force; obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law. As a legal consequence of these violations, the Court considers that third States, in relation to Israel in the current situation, bear the following obligations: the obligation to refrain from contractual relations with Israel in all cases when it intends to act on behalf of the Occupied Palestinian Territory or part of it on issues related to the Occupied Palestinian Territory or part of its territory; to refrain from entering into in economic or trade relations with Israel regarding the Occupied Palestinian Territory or parts thereof, which may consolidate its illegal presence in that territory, etc.

However, despite the EU's stated commitment to human rights and the rule of law, an arms embargo has not been imposed on Israel. Nevertheless, the member States of the Union are granted the right to independently take and implement measures to limit or ban arms exports as a way of responding to pressure from civil society. Indeed, some EU countries, including Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the Belgian region of Wallonia, have announced the suspension of arms supplies to Israel. But here it is necessary to take into account the existence of the practice of exporting weapons through the United States. Therefore, there is a preservation of workarounds.

In addition, investments in Israeli companies producing weapons continue to flow. All this means continuing the policy of supporting the Israeli military-industrial complex. In this regard, in the parliamentary request E-000771/2024 addressed to the European Commission (Israel's genocide in Gaza: immediate suspension of EU funds (EDF) to state-owned military company Israel Aerospace Industries. Question for written answer E-000771/2024 to the Commission (03/13/2024) (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2024-000771_EN.html )), it was noted that The state-owned company Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), which received 640,000 euros from the EU as part of project financing starting on October 7, 2023, is one of the pillars of the military and technological support for the current genocide in the Gaza Strip, as well as the military occupation and apartheid policy that Israel has been pursuing for many years, violating human rights, inherently belonging to the Palestinians. Therefore, in the light of Article 2 of the Association Agreement between the EU and Israel and the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Adopted by Resolution 260 (III) of the UN General Assembly on December 9, 1948 (https://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/conventions/genocide.shtml ) Three questions were addressed to the Commission:

1) Is the Commission considering the possibility of an urgent suspension of state financing of Intracom/IAI as a state-owned company owned by a third country against which the International Court of Justice has taken mandatory measures in connection with a possible genocide?

2) Is the Commission considering the possibility of conducting an urgent audit in order to ensure that none of the EU funds are used directly or indirectly to involve Israel in complicity in war crimes?

3) How does the Commission feel about the fact that a company that prides itself on testing its products in combat conditions, for example, in the context of the genocide in Palestine, receives EU funding?

As the conflict in the Gaza Strip continues to escalate and the number of victims continues to rise, the European Network against the Arms Trade (ENAAT) called for an immediate end to all European military support for Israel and for the EU to impose a comprehensive arms embargo on all parties to the conflict (European Union must end its military support for Israel (07/22/2024) (https://centredelas.org/actualitat/european-union-must-end-its-military-support-for-israel/?lang=en)).

The introduction of an immediate embargo on the sale of weapons from EU countries to all participants in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is considered as a step towards fulfilling the EU peacekeeping mission. However, decisive measures on the part of the EU have not yet been taken (Are European countries still supplying arms to Israel? (09.10.2024) (https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/10/09/are-european-countries-still-supplying-arms-to-israel) ) and are unlikely to follow in the near future. Similarly, there is no consistent EU policy regarding the revision of ties with Israel in the scientific and technical sphere. As in the case of military-technical cooperation, decisions are made at the level of individual states, or rather at the level of universities and academic centers. However, in this case, there continues to be significant uncertainty regarding the prospects for the implementation of projects within the framework of EU programs.

In the light of the current events of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, criticism of EU-Israel cooperation in the field of STI as such has been voiced at the top of its voice. The Open Letter, signed by 300 scientists committed to human rights and ethical values from universities in Europe and other regions, called on the EU to stop funding research projects that may directly or indirectly violate international law and human rights. This refers to the substantial research funding that the EU provides to institutions in Israel (Open Letter: The EU and Academic Institutions to Halt Collaborative Research Due to the Risks of Dual Use, Misuse, and Violations of Human Rights and International Law (02/07/2024)(https://docs.google.com/document/d/1tyhkVAgBZ90mI7ZgIJB0mxMWAXH-Z0jF/edit)).

In addition, the risk of double and inappropriate use of technological achievements (including know-how) developed within the framework of EU-funded projects, namely their use for military or other purposes, was indicated as one of the reasons for the termination of joint research. In the latter case, this leads to a violation of human rights and other obligations under international law, not to mention disregard for the ethical values of research activities. The Open Letter also called for the termination of funding for cooperation with organizations that are known or suspected accomplices of Israeli or other (alleged) violations of human rights and international law, including war crimes and crimes against humanity and genocide. In particular, the letter referred to the Israeli company Elbit Systems, which is the most important supplier of military technologies to the Israeli army used in the attack on Gaza (Companies Profiting from the Gaza Genocide (06.06.2024) (https://afsc.org/gaza-genocide-companies )). For a long time, this company has been involved in projects within the framework of Horizon 2020. Similarly, Israel Aerospace Industrie/IAI, which is a large Israeli state-owned company in the defense and aerospace sectors (IAI Systems In Action (https://www.iai.co.il/news-media/iai-action )), which is a participant in numerous projects as part of the Horizon Europe program.

Taking into account the above facts, the signatories of the Open Letter stated that academic circles in Europe and beyond cannot continue to cooperate normally with Israeli and non-Israeli partners when such partners are directly or indirectly involved in war crimes in the Gaza Strip.

It should be recalled that in the European academic environment there is a confrontation between two positions. The first position is to reconsider cooperation with Israel and move away from the usual mode of interaction that took place before October 7, 2023. The procedure for reviewing cooperation was initiated by a number of European universities, which, along with a wide range of scientists and experts who speak with open letters, are the exponents of this position.

The second position proceeds from the fact that academic institutions should not take the side of one or another participant in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In particular, the Vice-Chancellor of Uppsala University, A. Hagfeldt, stressed that his university distances itself from human rights violations taking place in the Gaza Strip. At the same time, in his opinion, cooperation remains the fundamental principle of the university (Hagfeldt A. Reply: “Collaboration is the path that will lead to positive change” (06/28/2024) (https://universitetslararen.se/2024/06/28/reply-collaboration-is-the-path-that-will-lead-to-positive-change/)). In addition, the Vice-Chancellor pointed out that the existing university procedures for verifying the content of projects from the point of view of ethics and human rights fully guarantee appropriate ways of conducting research collaborations. Therefore, in his opinion, due to these reasons, there is no need to politicize the issues of financing research collaborations. Opponents of this approach, on the contrary, argue that continued cooperation with Israeli scientific institutions is a matter of policy, since the current verification procedures are largely unable to solve the problem of ending human rights violations, to which Israeli scientific institutions are complicit.

Indeed, the boundaries between European programs for financing research and innovation in high-tech industries and the Israeli military potential, the use of which leads to gross violations of international humanitarian law, are quite transparent. In particular, the numerous results obtained during the implementation of projects with Israeli participation within the framework of Horizon 2020 had a dual purpose. Examples are the use of artificial intelligence-based systems, such as, for example, Habsora, to defeat military targets, which include armed Hamas cells, armories, anti-tank rocket launchers, launching pits, mortar mines, military headquarters, observation posts. At the same time, these systems were used to strike non-military targets in the Gaza Strip (Abraham Y. A mass assassination factory’: Inside Israel's calculated bombing of Gaza (11/30/2023) (https://www.972mag.com/mass-assassination-factory-israel-calculated-bombing-gaza /)).

In March 2024, the non-governmental organization Statewatch published an investigation that demonstrates that Israeli drone companies (for example, Xtend) received funding from EU framework programs and that this drone technology can now potentially be used in the war in the Gaza Strip (European money for the war in Gaza: how EU research funding supports the Israeli arms industry (03/22/2024) (https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2024/european-money-for-the-war-in-gaza-how-eu-research-funding-supports-the-israeli-arms-industry/)).

Concerns about projects that are questionable from the point of view of ethics and human rights and that are being implemented in cooperation with Israeli partners not only at the bilateral but also at the multilateral level have been expressed before. So, at the end of September 2016, an open letter was published, signed by 32 professors of the Catholic University of Leuven, which called for the termination of the university's participation in the LAW TRAIN project, which is being implemented within the framework of Horizon 2020 (Open brief aan KU Leuven-rector Rik Torfs: "Stop de samenwerking met de Israëlische politie (09/25/2016)(https://www.demorgen.be/nieuws/open-brief-aan-ku-leuven-rector-rik-torfs-stop-de-samenwerking-met-de-israelische-politie~b72e4662/)). The open letter followed after Portugal refused to participate in this project (Portugal exits controversial project with Israeli police following BDS pressure (08/23/2016) (https://stopthewall.org/2016/08/23/portuguese-government-withdraws-controversial-project-israeli-police-following-bds-pressu/)). In their letter, the professors stated that they are concerned about the plight of the Palestinian people, including Palestinian scientists and their students, whose rights are constantly violated by the occupying forces.

After the publication of the open letter, student protests followed against the participation of the Catholic University of Leuven in this project (Belgium Students Against LAW TRAIN: Professors, Don't Wipe Your Feet On Palestinian Human Rights! (09/29/2016) (https://bdsmovement.net/news/belgium-students-against-law-train-professors-don’t-wipe-your-feet-palestinian-human-rights)). Since this boycott was "targeted" in nature and did not indicate the comprehensive institutional responsibility of the European academic community and EU institutional structures, a number of public organizations supporting the Palestinian Cause (European Coordination of Committees on Palestine/ECCP, Portuguese Coalition against the Horizon 2020 LAW TRAIN project, Belgian Coalition against LAW TRAIN), for the Committee of the European Parliament on The Committee on Industry, Research and Energy/ITRE has developed Recommendations on the participation of the Israeli army, police and internal security sector entities in the Horizon 2020 program (The Palestinian Stop the Wall Campaign, The European Coordination of Committees and Associations for Palestine (ECCP), The Belgian Stop Law Train Coalition (2017).The LAW TRAIN project: concerns go unaddressed. Recommendations for the ITRE Committee regarding the participation of entities of the Israeli military, police and homeland security sector in Horizon 2020 (https://www.palestinasolidariteit.be/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/LAW-TRAIN-Horizon2020-review2.pdf)). They bring important information to the attention of the Committee, which it should take into account in the process of reviewing the implementation of the Horizon 2020 program.

The document notes that the European Commission resists the implementation of project inspections, and also insists on the absence of a regulatory framework for excluding Israeli military and police organizations, organizations of the internal security sector from EU projects. In fact, as indicated in the document, the European Commission undermines the provision on the prohibition of dual-use projects, ignoring its own guidelines on the misuse and/or malicious use of research and development results, as well as ignoring the impossibility of control by organizations from third States, especially when they systematically violate international law and human rights.

Pointing to the facts of Israel's use of technologies developed within the framework of EU programs for military purposes, the noted public organizations advocated the exclusion of Israeli military and police structures, as well as organizations of the internal security sector from EU funding. This is justified by the fact that the EU does not have controls that could prevent Israeli companies from misusing technologies and know-how developed as part of R&D financing. Thus, exclusion is the only way to comply with the ethical standards of Horizon 2020.

In general, we are not talking about excluding all Israeli institutions from all projects. It is recommended to stop funding dual-use research with Israeli participation. In addition, it is proposed to avoid the risk of misuse or malicious use of research results for unethical purposes, as well as to avoid spreading the mission/function of technology/information/data outside the project, which harms basic ethical values or civil rights.

The noted public organizations called on the ITRE Committee, during the Horizon 2020 review process for 2017, to ensure strict application of existing EU rules and positions regarding the participation of Israel and non-member States in EU funding cycles, especially given the lack of oversight outside the project.

Launching a broad discussion on possible academic sanctions against Israel is one of the directions for the realization of academic freedom. Similar discussions broke out in 2022 regarding the validity of sanctions against Russian universities and research centers ^{[10; 11]}. The difference is that in the case of Israel, discussions are unfolding about the possible imposition of sanctions at the level of the EU and its member states against the background of the actual adoption of restrictive measures by some universities. Whereas in the case of Russia, such discussions unfolded after a lightning break at the institutional level.

Once again, European universities, including universities of EU member states, have taken various measures regarding cooperation with Israel. However, it should be noted that decisive termination is still the exception rather than the rule. The most common measure reflecting the responsibility of universities is the procedure for reviewing cooperation, involving an assessment of existing bilateral agreements, as well as projects under implementation or planning. This work is carried out by the University Ethics Committees ((Advice on current collaborations between Ghent university and Israeli entities (30.05.2024) (https://www.ugent.be/en/news-events/enclosures/chrpdur-advice-and-overview.pdf )), ((Situazione israelo-palestinian, il Senato Accademico approva il documento di indirizzo (05/27/2024) (https://www.unipa.it/Situazione-israelo-palestinese-il-Senato-Accademico-approva-il-documento-di-indirizzo/)). They also focus on contracts with technology companies such as Hewlett Packard, which is accused of providing technology for Israeli control over the Palestinian people (Boycott HP (https://bdsmovement.net/boycott-hp )). The evaluation procedures established to verify research collaborations are based on the institutional commitments of universities and research centers in the field of ethics, human rights and academic freedom.

The focus is on checking the content of projects, clarifying information about project partners, as well as identifying possible and real problematic points, for example, the involvement of project partners in the Israeli military or in companies that cooperate with them. For example, a project partner can faithfully fulfill their obligations, but at the same time can not only put forward slogans in support of the Israeli army, but also provide practical assistance to it. It is appropriate to recall the Tel Aviv University's call for military mobilization ("Tel Aviv University's military efforts"), as well as the statements of the Rector of Ben-Gurion University, united by the slogan "Strong and united, we will win." None of the Israeli universities has called on the Israeli Government to stop bombing the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian universities located there. This once again confirms the conclusions about the complicity of Israeli universities not only in the genocide of the Palestinians, but also in the destruction of Palestinian science and education ^[12].

The evaluation procedures are advisory in nature, i.e. the final conclusions are not directly related to the final decision to suspend or continue the functioning of research collaborations. As such, withdrawal from the project in the form of suspension of participation in it, even if there are good reasons for it, has negative consequences for all participants, for example, failure to achieve planned results – scientific knowledge or technological developments. Meanwhile, financial and intellectual resources have been spent on the implementation of a particular project. Therefore, the evaluation procedure rarely results in withdrawal from the project and termination of contractual relations. The fact is that the retired partner can be replaced by a new one, or the project will be implemented on its own. Moreover, it is quite difficult to control how the results obtained will be used.

Thus, the termination of the current project cooperation based on a negative ethical and legal assessment of the events of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is theoretically possible. However, in practice, the implementation of a "gap", i.e. withdrawal from the project and its unilateral curtailment, for example, in the form of unilateral termination of funding, is quite difficult, especially given the need for universities to maintain and support established research networks, as well as the need to pay salaries to their own researchers.

In addition to the evaluation of bilateral projects, the participation of European universities in multilateral EU projects, in which Israeli universities are one of the partners, is subject to evaluation. Thus, at an absentee meeting held on May 20 and 22, 2024, the Senate of the University of Ljubljana in Slovenia concluded that it would check future potential Israeli project partners within Horizon Europe for the latter's ties with the military (Senat UL na dopisni seji sprejel sklepe glede pomoči palestinskim študentkam in študentom ter sodelovanja z izraelskimi ustanovami (05/22/2024) (https://www.uni-lj.si/novice/2024-05-22-senat-ul-na-dopisni-seji-sprejel-sklepe-glede-pomoci-palestinskim-studentkam-in-studentom-ter-sodelovanja-z-izraelskimi-ustanovami)). In the resolutions adopted, the Senate provided substantial grounds for this decision. The key one is the recognition of violations of international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law in Israel and especially in Gaza, as well as in other occupied Palestinian territories. The resolutions stated that in the case of potential applications for new international projects within the EU, the university, before joining a consortium in which an Israeli institution will participate, will check such projects for possible links between Israeli partners with military structures or alleged support for violence against Palestinians.

3. General and special EU rules in the field of monitoring project applications and control over the use of the results obtained

As already noted, EU officials insist on the absence of a mechanism for excluding Israeli institutions from the Union's scientific programs. This kind of position is being criticized. In this regard, there is a need for a more detailed examination of the rules of the EU framework programs in the field of R&D in order to verify the degree of validity of both the stated official position and the approach expressed by its opponents.

It should be noted that an impressive list of general and special requirements is imposed on the content and participants of projects within the framework of EU programs. According to the general rules that define the fundamental legal framework for research activities, the requirement addressed to the institutions of the EU and its member States to respect fundamental rights (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (7 December 2000) (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT /?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT)), promote the application of R&D results, control the export of dual-use goods and know-how (Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokerage, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items (recast) (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT /?uri=CELEX%3A32021R0821&qid=1705768722807)), (EU Regulation No 428/2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokerage and transit of dual-use items Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention UN Security Council Resolution 1540 JRC Science for Policy Report 2019: Security and Defense Research in the European Union: A landscape review) and apply the precautionary principle (Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Current consolidated version: 09/01/2024), art. 191 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12016E/TXT#d1e6553-1-1)), as well as in the case of risks to human rights and in order to justify legal or political decisions, when the potential risk of dangerous consequences cannot be demonstrated or quantified with sufficient certainty due to lack of data, to suspend the implementation of projects. In turn, research funded by the EU, for example, within the framework of the current Horizon Europe program, must comply with EU legislation, national and international law, as well as comply with ethical principles (Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing Horizon Europe – the Framework Program for Research and Innovation, laying down its rules for participation and dissemination, and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1290/2013 and (EU) No 1291/2013) (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT /?uri=CELEX%3A32021R0695&qid=1706121011551#d1e2598-1-1).

In addition, EU law prohibits the financing of expenses arising from operations with military or defense consequences (Article 41.2 of the EU Treaty) (Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union - title v: General provisions on the union's external action and specific provisions on the common foreign and security policy - Chapter 2: Specific provisions on the common foreign and security policy - Section 1: Common provisions - Article 41 (ex Article 28 TEU) (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12008M041)).

In particular, part 2 of Article 41 of the EU Treaty defines that "operational expenses arising in connection with the application of this chapter shall also be charged to the budget of the Union, with the exception of expenses arising in connection with operations having military or defense consequences, and cases when the Council, acting unanimously, decides otherwise. In cases where expenditures do not relate to the budget of the Union, they are attributed to the EU Member States in accordance with the gross national product scale, unless the EU Council unanimously decides otherwise. With regard to expenses arising from operations with military or defense implications, Member States whose representatives in the Council of the EU have made an official declaration in accordance with the second subparagraph of paragraph 1 of Article 31 are not required to participate in their financing" (Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union - Title V: General provisions on the union's external action and specific provisions on the common foreign and security policy - Chapter 2: Specific provisions on the common foreign and security policy - Section 1: Common provisions - Article 41 (ex Article 28 TEU) (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12008M041)).

In accordance with these rules, within the framework of EU R&D programs, only research and innovative activities focused on civilian use are eligible for funding. Research whose results are intended for military use cannot be funded. Thus, in paragraph 2 of Article 19 of the "Ethical Principles of 2014 Horizon 2020", at one time it was clearly stated that research and innovation activities carried out within the framework of Horizon 2020 should be focused exclusively on civilian applications. Similar rules apply to Horizon Europe. The 2021 special guidance provides recommendations on ways to ensure that the claimed project study focuses exclusively on civilian applications (European Commission. Guidance note – Research with an exclusive focus on civil applications (2021) (https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/docs/2021-2027/horizon/guidance/guidance-note-research-focusing-exclusively-on-civil-applications_he_en.pdf)).At the same time, it should be clarified that if the research is intended for use in military applications or is aimed at military purposes, it cannot be funded within the framework of Horizon Europe. But this does not mean that projects involving the defense industry or military organizations are automatically excluded from funding: their participation is allowed if they are involved in research activities focused exclusively on civilian applications.

As you know, a significant number of technologies and products are universal and can meet the needs of both civilian and military users. They are called dual-use goods or technologies. Therefore, as noted in this Guide, if the research is aimed at developing or improving dual-use technologies or goods, it can still qualify for funding if the goods or technologies are intended for civilian applications.However, the applicant must confirm that, firstly, the proposed research activities have an exclusive focus on civilian applications and, secondly, if the proposed research activities include dual-use items in the sense of Regulation 428/2009 or other items for which a permit is required, it is necessary to comply with the relevant legal obligations regarding export/import licenses, as well as those related to the import/export of these items. The exclusive focus of the proposed research on civil applications is subject to verification during the peer review of the proposal at the application review stage. Further, according to EU rules, during the duration of the project, compliance with the relevant legal obligations listed above can be verified as part of the project review.

Aware of all the problems arising in connection with the development of dual-use technologies within the framework of EU STI programmes, the European Commission has developed rules on the dual use, misuse and malicious use of research and development results. At one time, they were set out in the guide on regulating access for projects applying for financing the development of dual–use technologies, products and services to Horizon 2020 (EU funding for Dual Use - A practical guide to accessing EU funds for European Regional Authorities and SMEs”, by The European Commission Enterprise and Industry, October 2014, Ref. Ares(2015)3866477 (18.09.2015)). Recognizing the problematic nature of the inclusion of such projects in the framework programs, the guide emphasizes the need to ensure that States that are not members of the EU, but participate in the financing of research by the EU, in the event that they systematically violate human rights for a long time, at some point in time are deprived of the right to participate in any research that results in knowledge or technology that may be used for non-civilian purposes, misused, or cause unauthorized use or disruption of a mission or function. Moreover, according to international law, States must take preventive and preventive measures to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law and prevent genocide.

It seems that the exclusion of such States from participating in programs requires political decisions, the adoption of which may cause difficulties due to the need to coordinate the positions of the EU member States. Taking this into account, the European Commission has taken a more realistic path of developing recommendations to identify and eliminate just the potential misuse of research results within the framework of Horizon Europe (European Commission. Guidance note — Potential misuse of research (2021) (https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/docs/2021-2027/horizon/guidance/guidance-note-potential-misuse-of-research-results_he_en.pdf)). The recommendations do not cover misconduct in the course of research (for example, falsification of research results, fabrication of scientific evidence, plagiarism). However, section 12 "Ethics and Honesty" of the Horizon Europe Program Guide (European Commission) is devoted to regulating the integrity of the research process. HE Programme Guide. Version 4.1 (05/01/2024). pp. 23-27. (https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/docs/2021-2027/horizon/guidance/programme-guide_horizon_en.pdf)). In the latter case, the verification is optional. As a result, there is no strict mechanism for monitoring the nature of the use of research and development results.

Therefore, in order to strengthen guarantees in order to avoid improper use of R&D results, the European Commission has proposed further recommendations aimed at improving the effectiveness of export controls for dual-use products (Commission Recommendation (EU) 2021/1700 of 15 September 2021 on internal compliance programs for controls of research involving dual-use items under Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokerage, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT /?uri=CELEX%3A32021H1700)).

At the same time, in the EU, in addition to the control mechanisms of a recommendatory nature, there are clear legal mechanisms for exclusion from the number of participants in programs or restrictions on such participation, which, depending on the situation, can be put into effect. Thus, entities subject to EU restrictive measures are not eligible to participate in any capacity (including as beneficiaries, affiliates, associate partners, third parties providing in-kind contributions, subcontractors or recipients of financial support from third parties, if any) in EU framework program projects. The effect of such a mechanism could be observed on the example of the decisions of the European Commission, which followed in March and April 2022, on the exclusion of Russia and Russian institutions from the Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe projects. As follows from the report of the European Commission, the participation of Russian state organizations in current or future projects has been terminated as part of the fifth package of sanctions. Sanctions and measures exclude all legal entities registered in Russia, Belarus or in the territories of Ukraine not controlled by the government from participating in the program in any capacity. However, individuals registered in Russia, Belarus or in the territories of Ukraine not controlled by the government can still participate in the "Marie Sklodowska-Curie Actions", which allows them to maintain contacts with representatives of the Russian and Belarusian scientific communities (Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament/ First biennial report on the implementation of the Global Approach to research and innovation (Brussels, 29.6.2023) COM(2023) 356 final https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT /?uri=COM%3A2023%3A356%3AFIN&%3Bqid=1688039213419).

As such, restrictive measures against third countries associated with Horizon Europe are provided for in the Regulation Horizon Europe 2021/6951 (Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing Horizon Europe – the Framework Program for Research and Innovation, laying down its rules for participation and dissemination, and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1290/2013 and (EU) No 1291/2013 (Text with EEA relevance)

(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/695/oj)). According to the rules of participation, legal entities from associated countries can participate on equivalent terms as legal entities from EU Member States, unless special restrictions or conditions are set out in the work program and/or the text of the call/topic.Such measures may include restricting the participation of legal entities established only in the EU or in certain non-EU countries in certain actions in order to protect strategic assets, interests, autonomy or security of the EU. Restrictions or conditions of participation may also be applied to legal entities established in an acceptable country, but which are controlled directly or indirectly by an unacceptable country. The right to participate is clearly defined in the work programmes of the European programmes in the field under consideration. Criteria concerning the establishment of a legal entity are also formulated in order to take into account the specific requirements of the policy, the nature and objectives of the action (EU Grants: List of Participating countries (HE): V3.1 – 07/11/2024 1 List of Participating Countries in Horizon Europe (https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/docs/2021-2027/common/guidance/list-3rd-country-participation_horizon-euratom_en.pdf). Thus, the regulation of participation is quite flexible.

Restrictive measures apply to actions related to strategic assets, interests, autonomy or security of the EU, as well as to legal entities directly or indirectly controlled by third countries or legal entities of third countries in cases provided for in Article 22(5) of the Horizon Europe Regulation. In particular, legal entities established in China do not have the right to participate in innovative projects implemented within the framework of Horizon Europe.

Limitations in the stated orientation of research and development at the EU program level to civilian applications are caused not only by the actual prospects for civilian use of dual technologies, but also by the influence of the military lobby ^[13]. Therefore, it is far from accidental that the Horizon Europe rules allow coordination with defense research funded by the Union in order to enhance synergy, and proceed from the recognition of the existence of the field of dual–use technologies (Council Decision (EU) 2021/764 of 10 May 2021 establishing the Specific Program implementing Horizon Europe - the Framework Program for Research and Innovation, and repealing Decision 2013/743/EU (Text with EEA relevance)) (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32021D0764)).

However, the matter is not limited to the influence of the military lobby alone. Recently, the development of dual-use technologies has aroused increased interest in the situation of the EU's desire for strategic autonomy and technological sovereignty. In particular, the President of the European Commission recently called for a new European defense thinking from institutions to industries and investors that can meet the "urgent need to rebuild, replenish and modernize the armed forces of member states" (Cit. on: Greenacre M. Europe must urgently invest in defense technologies, says Ursula von der Leyen (02/29/2024) (https://sciencebusiness.net/news/european-defence-fund/europe-must-urgently-invest-defence-technologies-says-ursula-von-der)). In this light, the Commission has begun consultations on strengthening the openness of Horizon Europe to developments in the field of dual-use technologies (Greenacre M., Matthews D. EUCommission launches bid to expand funding of dual-use research in Horizon Europe's successor (01/24/2024) (https://sciencebusiness.net/news/dual-use/eu-commission-launches-bid-expand-funding-dual-use-research-horizon-europes-successor)). For the first time, the Union's agenda for 2024-2029 included the topic of research and innovation in the field of dual-use technologies (Bresser J. EU takes aim at the dual-use divide (07/11/2024) (https://sciencebusiness.net/news/eu-takes-aim-dual-use-divide )). Therefore, it is quite logical that the European Commission plans to allow dual–use research in the successor to Horizon Europe - FP10, the implementation of which should begin in 2028.

The thematic White Paper of the European Commission proposes three directions for stimulating dual-use research (White paper on options for enhancing support for research and development involving technologies with dual-use potential // COM(2024) 27 final (Brussels, 01/24/2024) (https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2024-01/ec_rtd_white-paper-dual-use-potential.pdf)). The first involves the use of synergies between existing programs; the second aims to eliminate the exclusive focus on civilian applications in the "selected parts" of the next FP10 framework program; the third direction provides for the creation of a new tool for the development of dual-use technologies. These areas cause concern among researchers who prefer FP10 to be exclusively civilian (Matthews D. Universities not in favor of dual-use research (09/19/2024) (https://sciencebusiness.net/news/dual-use/universities-not-favour-dual-use-research )), (Greenacre M.Commission proposals for funding defense R&D get mixed reviews from universities (05/02/2024) (https://sciencebusiness.net/news/dual-use/commission-proposals-funding-defence-rd-get-mixed-reviews-universities)).

In the latter scenario, Israel's involvement, given the current situation, is a highly controversial issue, especially in a situation of fierce debate in academic circles, since allowing dual-use research in FP10 would call into question the traditional separation of civil and defense research that exists in many countries. The debate is caused by the fact that the question remains unresolved as to whether these military studies will be limited to the participation of EU member states or third countries will also be involved (Matthews D. Dual use research in FP10 could cause problems for associated countries, says EU's chief negotiator (10/24/2024) (https://sciencebusiness.net/news/dual-use/dual-use-research-fp10-could-cause-problems-associated-countries-says-eus-chief)).

In the context of the idea of forming a defensive union (A Europe that protects and that stands for true peace: building a European Defense Union (07.10.2024) (https://www.eppgroup.eu/newsroom/a-europe-that-protects-and-that-stands-for-true-peace-building-a-european-defence-union) ) and stimulating a new round of development of dual and military technologies in the context of the proclaimed desire for technological sovereignty and the implementation of a policy of cautious cooperation with China, curtailing scientific and technological ties with Israel it is impractical. But the expansion of scientific and technological ties with Israel, taking into account the current situation, is also a very controversial issue, since it can damage the image of the EU.

4. Features of the EU's scientific diplomacy towards Israel in the modern context

Despite the fact that European universities that have announced boycotts or have begun the procedure for evaluating their cooperation with Israel remain a small minority, there are concerns about the prospects for the implementation of current Horizon Europe projects with Israeli participation. The results of the impact of measures taken by some European universities to suspend agreements with Israeli research centers at the bilateral level, which simultaneously affect multilateral cooperation with Israel within the European Research Area, are not clear enough. In other words, there was a need to synchronize the actions of universities to adjust the strategy of cooperation with Israel at the integration level.

In a situation of uncertainty, some universities in EU states began to turn to the European Commission to provide official guidance on whether Israeli institutions have the right to participate in Horizon Europe projects, since Israel's war against Hamas raises ethical issues. After some universities in European countries announced plans to suspend ties with Israel due to its military campaign in the Gaza Strip, Flemish universities (Belgium) announced that they need the recommendations of the Commission to find out whether Israel complies with EU ethical standards and whether to continue cooperation with Israeli colleagues. In its letter to the EU Commissioner for Research and Innovation I. Ivanova, the Flemish Interuniversity Council (VLIR) requested clear recommendations and/or instructions on how to act in Horizon Europe projects involving Israeli partners in order to better assess the compliance of Israeli partners with the ethical standards of Horizon Europe and the values of the EU (Flemish universities. Collaboration with Israeli partners under Horizon Europe ((30.05.2021) (https://sciencebusiness.net/sites/default/files/inline-files/027_2024%2005%2030%20European_Commission_Israel.pdf)). The letter also stated that any guidance on whether Israeli institutions meet the ethical standards set by the European Commission would be welcomed by the universities on the Council. The meaning of such recommendations was seen in saving time, material and intellectual resources that universities spend on verifying their academic partnership with Israeli colleagues. Flemish universities have stated that the recommendations of the Commission for Cooperation with Israel will help them reduce the administrative burden associated with conducting background checks of potential research partners.

Referring to Article 14 of the Horizon Europe grant agreement, which stipulates that research projects should be carried out in accordance with the highest ethical standards and applicable EU laws, international and national laws on ethical principles, Flemish universities expressed the hope that Israeli partners would nevertheless assume appropriate obligations and ensure respect for the core values of the EU, such as respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights, including the rights of minorities.

At the same time, German MEP H. sent his letter to the European Commission. Ehler (co-rapporteur of the European Parliament on Horizon Europe), who, as you know, in 2022, was a fierce advocate of severing institutional ties with Russia in the field of scientific research, also calling for the termination of the EU-Russia Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology (EU should sever scientific ties with Russia, says leading German MEP (February 25, 2022). URL: https://sciencebusiness.net/news/eu-should-sever-scientific-ties-russia-says-leading-german-mep (date of application: 10/23/2023). In 2024, in a rather harsh form, he asked the Commission to protect Israel's participation in the EU research and innovation program and proposed to include the fight against anti-Semitism in European universities in the political agenda of the European Research Area (Dr. Christian Ehler. Protecting Israel and its researchers (Potsdam, 4 June 2024) (https://sciencebusiness.net/sites/default/files/inline-files/240604_Letter%20COM%20Ivanova%20on%20Israel.pdf)), (Dr. Christian Ehler. Protecting Israel and its researchers (Potsdam, 4 June 2024) (https://sciencebusiness.net/sites/default/files/inline-files/240604_Letter%20COM%20Ivanova%20on%20Israel.pdf)). In his letter, he opposed the boycotts announced by universities and asked the Commission not to obey the requests of universities to suspend research cooperation with Israel.

As an argument, X. Elera pointed out the risks of undermining the European Research Space and the EU framework programs that arise in a situation where academic institutions discriminate against certain researchers on the basis of nationality. Concerned about the attitude of Europeans towards Israel and its researchers, he believes that the reaction of the academic sector is similar to challenging the place of the Jewish people in the European community and, in particular, the role of Israeli researchers in the European research space. This, in his opinion, is completely unacceptable and contradicts the essence of the European project. Hence his extremely negative attitude towards the decisions of some of the most radical universities, such as Trinity College in Ireland. Recall that after the student protests, Trinity College refused to participate in Israeli companies operating in the occupied Palestinian Territory and blacklisted by the United Nations (Student encampment and blockade at Trinity to end (05/08/2024). (https: //www.tcd.ie/news_events/articles/2024/student-encampment-and-blockade-at-trinity-to-end/)). In addition, a special task force has been established at the college, which should consider the sale of assets of other Israeli companies, as well as analyze the feasibility of further student exchanges with Israel.

As follows from open sources, the representative of the Commission confirmed that I. Ivanova received both letters. At the same time, it was stated that the EU is not considering suspending or reviewing the participation of Israeli organizations in Horizon Europe, while ensuring strict compliance with international law and ethical standards (Cit. on: Anti-semitic acts by Trinity College Dublin unacceptable in the Era (05/17/2024) (https://x.com/MEP_Ehler/status/1791394492148269530/photo/1 )). On the other hand, in its response to Science|Business magazine, the Commission stated that it is in constant dialogue with Israel, as well as updating reliable mechanisms to monitor compliance with the legal framework of Horizon Europe and remains vigilant to ensure that EU funds are used in accordance with ethical values and international law (Ibid.). Thus, the answer is And. Ivanova indicates that the EU is not going to review relations with Israel in the field of STI.

The first manifestations of this approach took place after the Hamas terrorist attack on October 7, 2023. Thus, the European Commission has decided to extend the deadline for accepting applications from partner organizations in the region to participate in the Horizon Europe program (Deadline extension for Horizon Europe calls following Hamas’ terrorist attacks across Israel (10/18/2023) (https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/news/all-research-and-innovation-news/deadline-extension-horizon-europe-calls-following-hamas-terrorist-attacks-across-israel-2023-10-18_en)). The decision indicated that in light of the upheaval caused by the aftermath of the Hamas terrorist attacks throughout Israel, the European Commission intends to carefully consider the problems faced by partner organizations in the region. One of them is difficulties in timely completion and submission of proposals for some Horizon Europe contests. The extension is intended to provide additional time and assistance to overcome difficulties that individual applicants may face.

This position is derived from the lack of the EU's desire to revise its foreign policy strategy towards Israel. As a result, it is quite obvious that contacts will continue in the spirit of the usual mode of cooperation. On April 16, 2024, the third meeting of the EU–Israel Joint Research and Innovation Committee under Horizon Europe (06.04.2024) took place online (https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/news/all-research-and-innovation-news/third-meeting-eu-israel-joint-research-and-innovation-committee-under-horizon-europe-2024-05-06_en)). In his opening remarks, the head of the EU delegation to the State of Israel and the representative of the Israeli Foreign Ministry stressed that the EU–Israel partnership is strong and covers various sectors from trade to research and innovation, being the most prominent area of bilateral cooperation thanks to Israel's association with Horizon Europe. It should be noted that the EU representatives stressed the importance of following the traditions of scientific diplomacy to solve common problems as a means of establishing peace and stability in the region. During the meeting, the Horizon 2020 impact assessment was discussed, issues of cooperation within the framework of the European Innovation Agenda, the role of research and innovation in achieving economic security, the progress made by Israel in implementing urban climate initiatives, etc. were considered.

In our opinion, the prerequisites for maintaining stable cooperation with Israel in the field of ISTC are reflected in the conclusions that were formulated during the second meeting of the Joint EU–Israel Research and Innovation Committee held in June 2023 (Second meeting of the EU-Israel Joint Research and Innovation Committee under Horizon Europe (06/14/2023) (https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/news/all-research-and-innovation-news/second-meeting-eu-israel-joint-research-and-innovation-committee-under-horizon-europe-2023-06-14_en)). According to the report, S. Ratso, Deputy Director General of the Directorate General for Research and Innovation of the European Commission, pointed out that Israel is one of the strongest member states of Horizon Europe. During the meeting, the opportunities provided by the new two-year Horizon Europe Work Program in relation to enhancing the participation of Israeli and European researchers and innovators in joint projects, thematic missions and EU partnerships were highlighted. For his part, the Israeli Co-Chair stressed the fact that Israel's participation in Horizon Europe makes a significant contribution to scientific and technological research, as well as contributes to the economic development of the country, contributes to the progress of Israeli industry and at the same time opens up opportunities for Israeli companies in European markets. He expressed the hope that Israel's participation in Horizon Europe would continue to follow the positive trend of full openness and cooperation on the part of the EU. Finally, both sides stressed the importance of long-term cooperation, which is based on fundamental R&D values such as academic freedom, gender equality, diversity, research ethics, open science and evidence-based policy development. It seems that these conclusions and plans reflect the MNTS paradigm between Israel and the EU.

However, this paradigm has been shaken by the actions of some European universities that have decided to reconsider their interaction with Israeli institutions in the NTI sector. In our opinion, such loosening does not have any serious consequences due to the fact that Germany's position plays a key role in the EU's policy towards third countries in the field of STI. In contrast to the hostile attitude towards Russia, which led to the severance of scientific ties, and an extremely cautious approach to cooperation with China, the German government persistently follows the established attitude towards Israel and its academic sector. Similar positions are shared by German universities, research centers and associations.

Despite the pronounced conservative position of the official EU structures in relation to the ISTC with Israel, the European academic community is quite heterogeneous in terms of its vision of the prospects for cooperation. The position of representatives of the EU academic community, which is contained in the above-mentioned Open Letter of 2024, is quite curious. It calls on EU academic institutions involved in cooperation with known or suspected risky partners to take principled and immediate action to comply with their moral and legal obligations and eliminate these risks wherever they arise – in Europe or beyond. In addition, the EU, as a funding body, is required to establish a consistent policy at the EU-wide level and take concrete actions (including preventive measures) with regard to authorizing, financing, conducting, participating in or facilitating research cooperation that may directly or indirectly violate international law and human rights.

To this end, it is proposed to conduct an optimized, strict and transparent verification of the degree of compliance with ethical requirements and human rights in joint research projects in accordance with the Horizon Europe Regulation, taking into account that the seriousness of the issues raised should not be delegated to individual funding bodies or partners in order to avoid the risk of double or misuse in the process or as a result of joint research projects.

From our point of view, this approach is quite justified and consists in adapting the practice of evaluating and reviewing cooperation with Israel to the integration level of interaction. Therefore, it is quite timely to hear proposals to revise the Horizon Europe Regulations and related guidelines, which were mentioned above.

Against the background of the silence of the European Commission, which does not express the slightest desire to develop recommendations for the revision of the ISTC with Israel, the Open Letter sets out some recommendations that fill the existing gap. In particular, it is indicated that universities, as executors of research and direct participants in research projects, should:

– to ensure effective control over research cooperation and partners, including through decision-making by ethics and human rights bodies that are binding and independent of individual researchers or even individual research centers, which may not have real decision-making powers;

– to draw inspiration from the preventive and preventive responsibilities assigned to the EU and the States;

– to refrain, on the basis of clearly and transparently established policies, from engaging in cooperation with entities that are either directly or indirectly involved in violations of human rights or international law;

– refrain from participating in projects if there is a risk of double use or misuse of R&D results;

– Take measures to establish a balance between human rights and freedom of scientific research.

These recommendations are a private opinion of representatives of the academic sector, which is unlikely to have an impact on changing the institutional position of the EU.The fact is that, despite the existing tensions in bilateral relations, Israel remains the EU's strategic partner in the Middle East (Pasatoiu F., Nitoiu Ch.The EU and Israel as Genuine Strategic Partners(01.09.2020) (https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep26344 )), ^[14;15]. Of course, the strategic partnership is being rethought. It is argued that in the light of the decisions of the International Court of Justice of the United Nations, the European Union and European States cannot continue to do business with Israel as usual, but should instead challenge the illegal actions of the latter (Lovatt H. Unfair practices: How Europe can challenge Israel’s presence in Palestine (23.07.2024) (https://ecfr.eu/article/unlawful-practices-how-europe-can-challenge-israels-presence-in-palestine/).Eurochild and other civil society organizations call on the EU to suspend the Association Agreement between the EU and Israel in connection with the violation of human rights by the latter (Suspend the EU-Israel Association Agreement! (03/12/2024) (https://eurochild.org/news/suspend-the-eu-israel-association-agreement /)). From the point of view of experts, the suspension of the Association Agreement due to violation of the provisions of the Agreement on Human Rights will serve as a convincing signal that the EU's commitment to human rights is not just rhetoric.

Indeed, the Association Agreement between the EU and Israel stipulates that the parties, when creating an association, take into account the importance of the principles of the UN Charter, in particular, respect for human rights and democracy, which form the very basis of the Association. Article 2 of the Agreement states that "relations between the Parties, as well as all provisions of the Agreement itself, should be based on respect for human rights and democratic principles that determine their domestic and international policies and are an essential element of this Agreement."

The events of 2023-2024 showed that Israel grossly and massively violates human rights, which, however, it has done before, creating and expanding illegal settlements in the West Bank. Of course, the EU could not ignore these violations. Even before October 2023, the European Council had repeatedly expressed concern about the blockade of the Gaza Strip and called for military operations to be proportionate to international humanitarian law, as well as for Israel to ease restrictions on human rights in the Gaza Strip. However, such concerns were not followed by measures to put pressure on Israeli policy.

The lack of significant measures to influence Israel, including the adoption of sanctions, is largely explained by the divergence of the EU countries' attitude to the assessment of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in 2023-2024. (The Economist. The EU’s response to the crisis in Israel exposes its limits (19.10.2023) (https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/10/19/the-eus-response-to-the-crisis-in-israel-exposes-its-limits)), (Müftüler-Baç M., Uzun-Teker E. Rethinking the EU’s Strategic Partnerships in Times of Crisis (06.05.2024) (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/380700895_Judy_Dempsey's_Strategic_Europe_Rethinking_the_EU's_Strategic_Partnerships_in_Times_of_Crisis)). Moreover, in a Statement by the President of the European Commission on the occasion of the first anniversary of the terrorist attacks against Israel on October 7, 2023, it was noted that "the terrorist attacks by Hamas on Israel provoked an outbreak of violence that brought the entire region into a state of extreme tension and instability. All parties must act responsibly, with restraint and strive to reduce current tensions" (Statement by President von der Leyen on the one-year anniversary of the 7 October 2023 acts of terror against Israel (07.10.2024) https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/statement-president-von-der-leyen-one-year-anniversary-7-october-2023-acts-terror-against-israel-2024-10-07_en)).

As a result, it is reasonable to conclude that in the current situation, official EU restrictive measures against the Israeli STI sector are unlikely to be possible. Moreover, scientific sanctions as such have recently been closely linked to economic ones. Economic sanctions are not expected to be imposed on Israel. It is also necessary to take into account the fact that in the last decade Israel has become quite distrustful of the EU. Therefore, the EU's goal is to keep Israel in the orbit of its influence. And sanctions, taking into account the well-established and promising bilateral ISTC, can play a destructive role.

Conclusion

The actions of European universities to suspend cooperation with Israeli scientific institutions have called into question the implementation of not only joint bilateral, but also multilateral projects with the participation of Israel within the framework of programs supported and funded by the EU. Therefore, the consequence of these actions may be damage to the normal functioning of the European Research Area, in which Israel, as a highly developed state in the field of STI, occupies a fairly prominent place.

The conducted research has shown that these actions of European universities are aimed at upholding the ethical values and principles of science, as well as the norms and principles of the ISTC, including human rights and freedom of scientific research. Restrictive measures in the form of suspension of cooperation within the framework of some projects and possible suspension of cooperation within the framework of other projects, including multilateral ones, can well be considered as horizontal-level sanctions. In this case, European universities fully realized their autonomy and sometimes went against the guidelines of governments that refrained from taking any measures regarding restrictions on scientific and technological cooperation with Israel.

This scenario is different from the situation of the introduction of unilateral restrictive measures (sanctions) against Russian science and Russia's participation in international scientific and technical cooperation. In the latter case, there was synchronicity in the actions of scientific institutions of the EU member States, national governments and EU institutional structures. In the case of Israel, there is a divergence of positions. However, elements of divergence are also noticeable within the European academic community. This is evidenced by the discussion regarding the possibility and necessity of imposing sanctions on the Israeli STI sector at the level of the EU and its member States against the background of the actual adoption of restrictive measures by some universities. In the case of Russia, such discussions unfolded after a lightning break at the institutional level.

The study showed that there are sufficient legal instruments at the EU level to exclude Israeli scientific institutions and military companies from EU projects that develop dual-use technologies as a measure aimed at forcing Israel to change its policy towards the Gaza Strip. However, the European Commission does not intend to introduce restrictive measures, to adjust its traditional scientific diplomacy towards Israel, or to develop recommendations addressed to European scientific institutions, taking into account the current political situation.

As a result, the cooperation of the EU supranational structures is carried out as usual, despite Israel's clear violation of a number of provisions of the Association Agreement, as well as despite the decisions of the International Court of Justice of the United Nations.

Such a position can be explained by pointing to a whole set of factors, namely the action of the pro-Israel lobby, Germany's approach to cooperation with Israel, the lack of unity within the EU academic community and, finally, the prospects for the militarization of European programs in the field of STI. However, according to the authors of the article, inertia in the position of the supranational structures of the EU, primarily the European Commission and the Directorate General for STI, against the background of the suspension of cooperation, may lead to failures in the implementation of a series of multilateral projects within Horizon Europe and, as a result, to failure to achieve the planned result.