Analysis of the strategies of China and the United States in Central Asia: a look at the "C5+1" mechanism

Tsao Khuan' ORCID: 0000-0001-9713-3325 Postgraduate student; Department of Comparative Political Science; Patrice Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University of Russia 117513, Russia, Moscow, Miklukho-maklaya str., 6 1136962398@qq.com

Introduction

The collapse of the Soviet Union was undoubtedly the most significant international event of the late twentieth century, as the former superpower collapsed and split into a dozen independent states. This event significantly eased the political pressure accumulated during the Cold War, and at the same time caused a shock reaction around the world. For the newly independent countries of the region, enthusiasm and jubilation over their newfound freedom were quickly replaced by awareness of serious difficulties and problems, and the most urgent question in this situation was how to deal with the political legacy of the Soviet Union (the difficulty of choosing and transforming political institutions, economic, ethnic problems, etc.). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia Russia, which inherited most of the Soviet heritage and international political status, was too preoccupied with its problems to pay attention to the numerous newly created countries, and a power vacuum formed in the post-Soviet space. As a result, various Powers outside the region are actively trying to extend their influence to this region.

Central Asia (Central Asia in this article includes five republics that became independent after the collapse of the Soviet Union: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan) is located in the interior of the Eurasian continent and is known as the crossroads of Eurasia. This special geographical location determines the geopolitical status of Central Asia and makes it one of the most strategically important regions in the post-Soviet space. As a result, this region inevitably attracts the attention of extraterritorial Powers.

The United States, as the number one power in the world in the post-Cold War era, unwilling to give up rivalry with Russia in the post-Soviet space, has developed a number of policy measures regarding Central Asia. The Central Asian countries – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – have a long border with China and a common cross-border ethnic group. The problems of terrorism, religious extremism and cross-border crime in Central Asian countries pose a great threat to the security of China's northwestern border region, which forces China to pay attention to its Central Asian neighbors.

Since the independence of the Central Asian countries, the United States and China have begun to develop political strategies and create various mechanisms for developing cooperation with the region. The Central Asia +X mechanism has been a common choice of both countries in recent years.

The methodological basis of this research consists in an integrated historical and sociological approach. The author uses the historical method to analyze the main factual information covered in the article as a whole. The comparative historical approach and system analysis make it possible to identify the stages of formation of the Central Asian strategy of China and the United States within the framework of the "C5+1" mechanism, to determine the specifics and identify the causal relationships of emerging trends and interactive events.

The mechanism of the Central Asia + X dialogue

In 2004, former Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi gave a speech at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy (Tashkent, Uzbekistan) on the topic "Towards a new dimension: Central Asia + Japan", in which a model of intraregional cooperation "Central Asia + Japan" (excluding Turkmenistan) was proposed ^[1]. In 2008, South Korea established the Korea–Central Asia Cooperation Forum, and in 2015, the United States launched the C5+1 dialogue mechanism, which includes meetings of foreign ministers of Central Asian countries with the US Secretary of State ^[2]. In addition, China, Russia, the EU, India and other countries, in cooperation with regional organizations, have created similar mechanisms for dialogue and interaction with Central Asia.

The "C 5+1" mechanism of the USA

The C 5+1 mechanism is one of the key achievements of the Obama administration's foreign policy. It appeared as a result of a meeting of the foreign ministers of the United States and Central Asian countries held in Samarkand (Uzbekistan) on November 1, 2015. At this meeting, the six countries signed a Joint Declaration on Partnership and Cooperation (also known as the Samarkand Declaration), in which they formalized the "C 5+1" mechanism, providing for regular meetings of foreign ministers in order to deepen multilateral cooperation ^[3].

In fact, the United States had already tried to propose a new mechanism for multilateral dialogue on cooperation even before this meeting. In September 2015, former US Secretary of State John Kerry met with the foreign ministers of the five Central Asian countries at the UN General Assembly in New York. In the two months following the UN conference, John Kerry visited five Central Asian countries. It is worth noting that this trip was the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union that the US Secretary of State visited all the countries of Central Asia, which indicates a significant increase in the strategic status of Central Asia in US foreign policy during this period.

Since the "C 5+1" mechanism was formed, the US government has gone through three changes of power. Due to the changes in the international situation and the domestic political situation in the United States at different times, each government had different priorities in governance and diplomacy, in particular with regard to Central Asia. In this regard, it is necessary to discuss and analyze the development of the C 5+1 mechanism and the change in the US strategy towards Central Asia during these three periods.

1 period – under the Obama administration.

As already mentioned, at a meeting in Samarkand in 2015, the foreign ministers of the six countries signed a joint declaration on partnership and cooperation. In this declaration, the parties identified the following areas of cooperation based on mutual respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity: 1) economic cooperation, improving regional cooperation in trade, transport, communications and energy, as well as expanding business and investment ties between the United States and Central Asian countries; 2) environmental cooperation, promoting clean energy and green technologies and working together to combat climate change; 3) strengthening security cooperation for to solve cross-border problems and threats such as terrorism, arms and drug trafficking, as well as to jointly maintain political stability in Afghanistan; 4) humanitarian cooperation, expansion of exchange in education, culture and business, protection of human rights, development of democratic institutions, etc. ^[3]. Immediately after the Samarkand Conference, the US government announced a new program of assistance to the countries of Central Asia, the purpose of which is to strengthen competition between the economies of the region ^[4].

In August 2016, the second joint meeting of the foreign ministers of the "C 5+1" countries took place in Washington. Following the meeting, a joint statement was published, which was not much different from the Samarkand Declaration of 2015. However, during the meeting, the US Congress allocated $15 million for the creation of five joint working groups of the USA and Central Asia (From 5+1): The Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) Regional Dialogue; Central Asian Business Competitiveness (CABC); Competitiveness (CABC); Transport Corridor Development (TCD); and the Power of the Future and support for national and regional adaptation planning. The projects of these working groups are aimed at improving security, developing economic ties and increasing resilience to climate change ^[5].

The cooperation achieved and the statements made within the framework of the C5+1 show that at this stage the Central Asian strategy of the United States was focused on security and economic cooperation in Central Asia. The strategic focus of the United States is largely related to the international situation and domestic policy of the United States during this period: as for the international situation, Russia was subjected to economic sanctions from the West after the incident in Crimea in 2014, which further worsened the state of the Russian economy, already suffering from a sharp drop in world crude oil prices. As a result, Russia has no time left to prevent the United States from entering Central Asia, its traditional sphere of influence. While Russia is in a difficult position, the economies of the Central Asian countries have also suffered greatly and are in desperate need of external support, which makes it possible for the United States to implement its strategy in Central Asia.

In addition, China's influence in Central Asia is growing, and in 2013, during a speech at Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed the Silk Road Economic Belt initiative ^[6], which attracted the attention of Kazakhstan and other countries. As a result, the United States is currently interested in curbing the further development of Chinese influence in Central Asia. As for US domestic policy, the Obama administration is trying to cope with the consequences of the war in Afghanistan. After Obama announced the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, the geopolitical status of Central Asia as a springboard in the fight against terrorist forces has significantly increased. Strengthening counterterrorism cooperation with Central Asia does not make sense for the United States.

Period 2 – during the Trump administration.

In November 2016, Donald Trump was elected President of the United States. The change of government has a direct impact on the foreign policy of the United States, and Central Asia is no exception ^[7]. Since the beginning of his inauguration, Trump has consistently adhered to his "America first" campaign philosophy and has repeatedly repeated this basic principle in relation to foreign affairs. For example, in his speech at the UN General Assembly in 2017, he said: "As President of the United States, I will always put America first."^[8] Thus, in the very first days of the Trump administration, the United States refused to continue the Obama administration's strategy towards Central Asia. Central Asia was seriously marginalized in the US diplomatic strategy, and the Trump administration did not pay much attention to the implementation of the C5+1 mechanism. In 2017, six foreign ministers discussed ways to promote Afghanistan's economic development within a regional framework ^[9], but did not reach significant substantive agreements or a general statement. In addition, during the year, the Trump administration reduced aid programs to Central Asia; U.S. diplomacy towards Central Asia as a whole has been relatively restrained.

In 2018, the six countries did not meet at the level of foreign ministers, and only working group meetings were held within the framework of the C5+1 mechanism. Although the C5+1 mechanism was still not fully operational, the Trump administration began to actively develop bilateral relations with the countries of Central Asia. During President Nazarbayev's visit to the United States in January 2018, the United States and Kazakhstan signed more than 20 commercial contracts and documents covering aviation, railways, medical services, etc. After the meeting with Trump, both sides established a strategic partnership in the 21st century and issued a corresponding statement ^[10]. In May of the same year, Uzbek President Mirziyoyev paid a state visit to the United States and met with Trump. At this meeting, the two leaders decided to strengthen cooperation between the two countries, opening a new era of strategic partnership between the United States and Uzbekistan ^[11].

In September 2019, six foreign ministers met in New York at a ministerial meeting dedicated to the "C 5+1" and issued a joint statement. This was the first time that US Secretary of State Pompeo attended a ministerial meeting on the C5+1. The statement emphasizes the need to strengthen the C5+1 diplomatic platform as a mechanism for dialogue and joint action, the development of regional economic trade, deepening cooperation in the fight against terrorism and support for the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Afghanistan ^[12]. Earlier, in May and August, meetings of the C 5+1 Security Working Group and the Security Forum were held in Dushanbe and Nur Sultan, respectively, where intraregional cooperation in combating terrorism and promoting peace and prosperity in Afghanistan were discussed.

In February 2020, US Secretary of State Pompeo visited Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and took part in the C 5+1 meeting in Tashkent. In addition to the usual issues of security cooperation, economic interconnection and the situation in Afghanistan, humanitarian issues, cultural exchange, education, science and technology, as well as human rights issues were also discussed ^[13]. In June of the same year, an online "C 5+1" meeting was held, which was also attended by Pompeo.

After the first meeting, on February 5, the United States published the United States Strategy for Central Asia 2019-2025: Promoting Sovereignty and Economic Prosperity. This is the first time that the United States has published a regional strategy for Central Asia in the form of an official document. It sets out six strategic goals: to support and strengthen the sovereignty and independence of the Central Asian states individually and as a region; to reduce the threat of terrorism in Central Asia; to expand and maintain support for stability in Afghanistan; to promote ties between Central Asia and Afghanistan; to promote reform of the rule of law and respect for human rights; to promote U.S. investment and development in Central Asia ^[14]. This document demonstrates the positive direction of the development of the US strategy towards Central Asia and indicates that this region is gaining more and more significant weight in US foreign policy ^[15].

The Trump administration's strategic orientation towards Central Asia has undergone significant changes. In the early years of his administration, Trump did not attach much importance to Central Asia, as evidenced, in particular, by the fact that in 2017-2018 the US Secretary of State did not participate in meetings within the framework of the "C 5+1" – officials at the assistant secretary level conducted a dialogue with governments. Subsequently, the importance of Central Asia in the strategic prospects of the United States gradually increased. Under the Trump administration, security cooperation remains the central task of the United States, and issues such as combating terrorist forces, cross-border crime and drug trafficking were vigorously discussed at C5+1 meetings. In addition, the United States is actively involved in economic cooperation with the countries of Central Asia, providing them with various degrees of economic assistance. Issues such as climate protection, humanism, science and technology, and democracy also attracted the attention of all parties. It was during this period – under the Trump administration – that the issue of cooperation with Central Asian countries to improve the situation in Afghanistan was brought up for discussion within the framework of the C 5+1.

Period 3 – the Biden administration to the present.

In January 2021, Biden was elected president of the United States, and his administration largely continued the Central Asian policy pursued during the Trump era. The C5+1 mechanism is the core of the U.S. diplomatic strategy in Central Asia. In contrast to Trump's initial indifference to the region, in April 2021, newly appointed Secretary of State Blinken took part in a ministerial meeting on "C 5+1" via videoconference. The conference was mainly devoted to the situation in Afghanistan and the desire to promote peace and stability in that country through cooperation and negotiations. In addition, an in-depth exchange of views took place on further strengthening the economy, regional security and combating climate change ^[16].

In July, Tashkent hosted the International Conference "Central and South Asia: Regional Interconnection. Challenges and opportunities". Through the C 5+1 dialogue platform, the parties seek to strengthen the link between Central and South Asia.

In September, climate policy leaders took part in a ministerial meeting within the framework of the "C 5+1", where issues of climate change, carbon emissions, water conservation and other issues were discussed.

Shortly afterwards, during the 76th session of the UN General Assembly, the foreign ministers of the C 5+1 countries held another meeting via video link with Blinken and five foreign ministers, focusing on Afghanistan, where the political situation has changed dramatically.

On March 1, 2022, a few days after the outbreak of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, U.S. Secretary of State Blinken held talks with the foreign ministers of the five countries via videoconference. The desire of the American side to hold talks is a sign of the desire for the five Central Asian countries to give their assessment and take a definite position on the Russian special military operation.

In September, during the 77th session of the UN General Assembly, a meeting of foreign ministers of the C 5+1 countries was held, which was attended by five foreign ministers of Central Asian countries and U.S. Secretary of State Blinken. During the meeting, the C 5+1 Secretariat was established to establish formal procedures, identify and promote common priorities, coordinate participation in intergovernmental communications, and plan top-level ministerial meetings and other events.

In February 2023, on the first anniversary of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, U.S. Secretary of State Blinken made his first visit to Central Asia, visiting Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and holding a meeting of foreign ministers of the C5+1 countries in Astana. At the meeting, a detailed plan for cooperation in three areas was presented: economics, energy and environmental security, as well as attention was paid to human rights and the rights of women and children in Central Asia ^[17].

Thus, the situation in the region and the international political situation have changed dramatically since Biden took office. In 2021, shortly after the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan, the Taliban came to power in the country and created their own government. In early 2022, Moscow launched a special military operation against Ukraine, raising concerns among Central Asian countries about their sovereignty and security. Washington sees this as a good opportunity to take advantage of the situation and involve Central Asia in the fight against Russia.

U.S. Strategy in Central Asia

The above analysis of the functioning of the mechanism of interaction between the United States and the countries of Central Asia "C 5+1" shows that the US diplomatic strategy towards Central Asia is mainly based on three important aspects – geopolitics, economics and value orientations.

1. The geopolitical aspect. In recent years, the national strategy of the United States under both Democrats and Republicans has remained unchanged: maintaining the role of the United States as the "world policeman". Today, the old world order and the hegemonic position of the United States face great challenges. In the National Security Strategy published by the US government in 2022, it is easy to see that the US views China and Russia as its main rivals. At the same time, China is perceived as "the only competitor with the intention to rebuild the international order." According to Washington, China is the country most capable of achieving this goal economically, diplomatically, militarily and technologically; Russia is described as a great threat to the existing international order ^[18], and Central Asia is a neighbor of both countries.

The countries of Central Asia have always been considered as a traditional zone of Russian influence, and Russia has an absolute right to vote in this region. To date, the Russian 201st Infantry Division in Tajikistan continues to contribute to Tajikistan's anti-terrorist, extremist religious might. Russia also has an air base in Kyrgyzstan. Over the past three decades, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have responded positively to a number of regionalization initiatives proposed by Russia. They joined the Russian-led CSTO, the Eurasian Economic Union, and others. Despite the difficulties that have arisen in recent years in joining these regionalized organizations, the Central Asian countries remain heavily dependent on Russia for economic and security issues.

As the economic and military power of Central Asia grows, so does China's influence in the region. These factors have attracted the attention of the United States, especially in recent years, many American scientists have called on the U.S. government to pay attention to the Central Asian region. Thus, the famous American scientist Frederick Starr stated in his article that "In the new era of great power rivalry, preventing the dominance of any country in the heart of Eurasia should be the goal of the grand strategy of the United States" ^[19].

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the overall U.S. diplomatic strategy was dominated by the fight against terrorism, and the U.S. government justified the establishment of military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (closed in 2014 and 2005, respectively). At that time, the United States viewed Central Asia as an outpost for counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan. A decade later, the United States shifted its strategic focus to the Indo-Pacific region with the Obama administration's "Return to the Asia-Pacific Region" and Trump's "Indo-Pacific Strategy." Although the content of these two strategies differs, the essence of both is to preserve the leadership of the United States in shaping the geo-order.

Everyone knows that the US strategy in Central Asia has never been carried out in isolation and alone, but has clashed with the policies and interests of other regional powers (China, Russia, Iran, etc.) ^[20]. Therefore, both the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and the strategic modernization of Central Asia correspond to the international strategic interests of the United States at the moment. In particular, after the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2022, Washington took advantage of Central Asian countries' concerns about their sovereignty and immediately convened a meeting of C5+1 foreign ministers. Secretary Blinken actively lobbied for the creation of a military base in the region to counter China and Russia, although this idea was eventually rejected by Central Asian leaders.

2. The economic aspect. Economic interests are a central part of the U.S. strategy in Central Asia. The countries of Central Asia are rich in resources, especially hydrocarbons. According to estimates by the Energy Information Administration of the U.S. Department of Energy, Kazakhstan alone has reserves of up to 14 billion tons of oil and 6.5 trillion cubic meters of natural gas. The oil reserves in the Kazakh Caspian Sea are even more impressive – about 110 billion barrels. Therefore, the priority for the United States in Central Asia is to ensure the possibility of creating alternative energy transportation routes in the Caspian Sea region bypassing Russia ^[21].

Strengthening the logistics sector in Central Asia, developing transport corridors in the region, improving transport productivity and efficiency, as well as promoting interregional ties were key issues discussed at each of the above-mentioned meetings within the framework of the "C 5+1". In addition, the United States has invested heavily in the energy development of Central Asian countries – for example, most of the investments in the oil and gas sector of Kazakhstan came from the United States ^[22].

In recent years, the United States has gradually expanded its economic cooperation with the countries of Central Asia. In addition to direct government investments, they also actively promote the business activity of American companies in Central Asia. Only in early June of this year, the American-Kazakh Business Council at the American Chamber of Commerce led a delegation to Kazakhstan, consisting of representatives of more than 20 American companies, to hold consultations to support trade and investment between the United States and Kazakhstan.

3. The value aspect. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States, in an effort to dominate, began to actively promote its values and take pride in being a beacon and model of democracy. After the independence of the Central Asian countries, the United States actively engaged in ideological propaganda in the region. The incident in Andijan in 2004 caused great dissatisfaction with the Uzbek government and the closure of the American base in Hannabad at the request of the Uzbek government. This incident led to a rethinking of the US strategy in Central Asia: in various public statements and speeches, the United States expressed its respect for the sovereignty of the Central Asian countries, and the C 5+1 platform is based on mutual respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.

In fact, the United States has not stopped its ideological penetration into Central Asia, but has applied a more flexible approach and means, providing substantial assistance to the countries of Central Asia to carry out democratic reforms and maintain social and economic growth ^[2]. The United States funds a number of NGOs that are active in Central Asia, promoting theories of democracy and freedom in the media, as well as organizing mass protests against local governments that the United States considers "dictatorial." They even directly interfered in the parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan in 2020 ^[23]. In addition, the United States invests heavily in education every year, strengthening cooperation with higher education institutions in Central Asia and providing scholarships to local students.

China's "C5+1" mechanism

China and the Central Asian countries have established a number of bilateral and multilateral platforms for dialogue and cooperation. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, in order to resolve border issues and strengthen mutual trust in the military sphere, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan jointly established a bilateral five-state consultation mechanism, which gradually developed and led to the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Shanghai in 2001.

In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed the "One Belt, One Road" initiative. Over the past ten years, China, cooperating with Kazakhstan on the "New Economic Policy of the Bright Path", with Uzbekistan on the "New Plan of Uzbekistan", with Turkmenistan on the "Revival of the Silk Road" and with Tajikistan on the "National Development Strategy until 2030", has created bilateral mechanisms for strategic dialogue within the framework of the "Belt and the ways." Russia is always present on all these platforms for dialogue and cooperation, and there is no mechanism for joint dialogue between China and the five countries. That is why the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of China and Central Asia was created (which many scientists and the media call the Chinese version of the "C 5+1" dialogue mechanism).

In July 2020, the first meeting of foreign ministers within the framework of the "C 5+1" interaction between China and Central Asia took place via videoconference, which was attended by Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi along with five foreign ministers. During the meeting, Wang stressed that cooperation between China and Central Asia is based on mutual needs and is not directed at third parties, nor does it affect other bilateral and multilateral cooperation relations in the region. The meeting took place during the covid-19 epidemic ^[24], so four topics were discussed at it: cooperation in combating the epidemic, promoting economic recovery, maintaining regional security and close international cooperation.

In May 2021, the second meeting of the foreign ministers of the "C 5+1" countries took place in Xi'an. This meeting was the first time since the epidemic that China hosted a multilateral meeting of foreign ministers, demonstrating the importance of Central Asia in China's diplomatic strategy. The meeting included consultations on strengthening cooperation in the field of medicine and healthcare during the epidemic, economic cooperation within the framework of the Belt and Road initiative, as well as on the problem of Afghanistan. Three joint statements were published: "Joint Statement on Joint Response to the new pneumonia Epidemic", "Joint Statement on Deepening Local Cooperation" and "Joint Statement on Afghanistan", as well as "Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of a mechanism for the meeting of Foreign Ministers of China + 5 Central Asian countries".

In January 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping held a video summit dedicated to the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the five Central Asian countries, at which the heads of state of the six countries jointly announced the creation of the Sino-Central Asian community of destiny. The third meeting of the foreign ministers of the "C 5+1" countries took place in Nur Sultan. Following the meeting, the "Joint Declaration on the Meeting of Foreign Ministers of China + 5 Central Asian countries", "Joint Declaration on the implementation of the video summit between China and five Central Asian countries", "Initiative to deepen cooperation between China + 5 Central Asian countries in the field of communications" and "China + 5 Initiative" were signed Central Asia for cooperation in the field of data security" ^[25]. The most important result of the meeting was an agreement on the establishment of a mechanism for the meeting of the heads of state of China + Central Asia.

In September, Chinese President Xi Jinping took part in a meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of State in Samarkand, during which he paid state visits to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. This was the first trip by a Chinese head of state after the epidemic. Summarizing the interaction between China and Central Asian countries over the year shows a high level of interactive dialogue between the two sides. Central Asia occupies a very important place in China's diplomatic strategy.

On May 18-19, 2023, the China–Central Asia Summit was held in the historical and cultural center – the city of Xi'an in western China – the starting point of the ancient Silk Road. 2023 marks the tenth anniversary of the Belt and Road Initiative, and the choice of Xi'an as the venue for this meeting demonstrates the importance that China attaches to this summit. As a result, the eyes of the whole world are focused on the interaction between China and Central Asia.

During the summit of the heads of the six states, it was announced the official creation of the mechanism of meetings of heads of state "China–Central Asia" (some Chinese media call this mechanism "C+C5", however, in this article, in order to comply with the logical sequence, it is defined as the mechanism of meetings of heads of state "C 5 +1"). In the "Final List of the China–Central Asia Summit" published by the Chinese Government, 54 agreements and initiatives were reached, including the creation of dialogue mechanisms, coordination of initiatives and development strategies within the framework of the Belt and Road, as well as cooperation in the fields of economic trade, transport, agriculture, energy, culture, education, science and technology and safety. 19 multilateral cooperation platforms were proposed, including 9 ministerial meetings, political party dialogues, administrative college cooperation networks, business councils, local cooperation forums, think tank forums, news agency forums and other platforms for dialogue in various sectors and societies. In addition, 9 documents on multilateral cooperation within this structure were signed ^[26].

China's strategy in Central Asia

China's strategic positioning in Central Asia is motivated by several important considerations.

1. Border security. It is known that China shares a 3,700 km long border with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The Central Asian region is constantly under threat from external terrorism and extremism. Extremist groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Movement of Turkestan and the Messenger of Allah operate within the region. These groups undermine peace and stability in Central Asia, and there is also the potential for side risks. A large number of ethnic minorities live in the border areas of northwest China, some of them are also cross-border peoples. These ethnic groups share a common or similar language, culture, history and beliefs and are highly vulnerable to terrorist and extremist forces. Therefore, "apart from Taiwan, which is trying to split the country, northwest China is considered the greatest threat to the stability, sovereignty and integrity of China" ^[27] In China's opinion, a peaceful and stable Central Asia meets China's realistic interests, and joint work with Central Asia to combat terrorism, religious extremism and separatism is the basis of cooperation between the two sides and the core of China's strategy in Central Asia.

2. Economic factors. The rich mineral resources of the Caspian region attract the attention of the whole world, and China is no exception. The Chinese economy is developing rapidly, and the country needs a lot of energy for industrial development and people's lives. The rich reserves of oil and natural gas in Central Asia can meet this need. The China–Central Asia gas pipeline entered service in 2009. In 2022 alone, it supplied more than 40 billion cubic meters of gas to China ^[28]. Along with purchases of oil and gas from Central Asia, China is investing heavily in the development of mineral resources in Central Asian countries. In addition, China is the number one manufacturing country in the world and is actively looking for new markets for its products, while meeting domestic demand. Thus, from a geo-economic point of view, the countries of Central Asia are important for the Chinese economy as a source of resources and a market for goods ^[29]. Such economic complementarity between China and the Central Asian countries also naturally contributes to the development of economic ties between them.

3. Creation of a transport hub in Eurasia. More than two thousand years ago, during the Han Dynasty, the Chinese envoy Zhang Qian made a mission to the West and opened the Silk Road. This route was laid not for economic, but for political and military purposes, however, porcelain, silk and other Chinese goods entered Europe through the western corridor of China, through the whole of Central Asia. This opened up an economic and trade route linking Europe and Asia. More than two thousand years later, this major land route is still appreciated by the Chinese, as evidenced by the "One Belt, One Road" initiative.

The promotion of the Belt and Road and the strengthening of economic and trade corridors were mandatory topics of discussion at all meetings of the foreign ministers of the C5+1 countries, including at the C5+1 summit of Heads of State this year. The list of outcomes of the China–Central Asia Summit includes the promotion of the construction of China–Central Asia transport corridors; the development of China–Central Asia railway transport; improvement of transport infrastructure, including the construction and modernization of existing China–Central Asia railways and highways; development of optimal transit transportation programs from Central Asia to Southeast Asia Asia and other Asian countries, etc. Thus, the opening of transport links with Central Asia and the use of this region as a transport hub to connect the Eurasian continent is an important part of China's strategy in Central Asia.

Comparing the strategies of China and the United States in Central Asia

Comparing the strategies of China and the United States in Central Asia, similarities and differences can be noted. The similarity lies in the fact that, firstly, the problem of energy development is common in the dialogue between the United States and China within the framework of the "C 5+1". In addition, both China and the United States are strongly interested in the natural resources of Central Asia, especially in hydrocarbons. Back at the end of the last century, the United States began to help Central Asia develop oil and gas, and American oil giants ExxonMobil and Chevron began their own oil development projects in Central Asia. Almost at the same time, China's oil and gas cooperation with Central Asia began.

Secondly, both China and the United States value the special geopolitical characteristics of Central Asia as a transport hub. Washington wants to connect Central Asia and the South Asian subcontinent through Afghanistan, integrate the regions of Central Asia and South Asia, and build an oil and gas pipeline from Central Asia to Pakistan and India through Afghanistan. This US strategy – from the "Greater Central Asia Initiative" of the Bush era and the concept of the "New Silk Road" of the Obama era to today's "C 5+1" mechanism – remains consistent, although it differs in details, it has always been based on the idea of connecting Central and South Asia. China, for its part, is striving to build a China–Central Asia road and railway line to connect Eurasia and create a new era of the Silk Road overland economic belt.

The difference between the strategies of China and the United States in Central Asia is due to geographical factors.

The United States pays more attention to the geopolitical importance of Central Asia. In the three decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has always considered Russia its main rival and sought to contain it on all fronts – political, economic and military. On the European continent, the United States and the NATO bloc continue to shrink Russia's buffer zone by expanding their influence. In recent years, China has been building up its comprehensive power and is viewed by the United States as the number one competitor. In order to maintain its international hegemony, the United States puts forward slogans such as "Return to the Asia-Pacific region" and "Indo-Pacific Strategy", trying to restrain China's development. The US National Security Strategy for 2022 also shows that the US calls Russia and China its current and future competitors, respectively, and Central Asia is located between these two main US competitors. Thus, the reasons for the increasing importance of Central Asia in the U.S. diplomatic strategy in recent years do not require explanation.

China is guided by economic interests, and most of the cooperation between China and Central Asia within the framework of the Belt and Road and the C5+1 is based on the principle of economic cooperation. Chinese leaders have repeatedly stated that China does not seek hegemony and will never expand its sphere of influence. However, Washington has always maintained that China is challenging U.S. international hegemony and that competition is key to U.S.-China relations. Some scientists even claim that a new bipolar system of international relations is taking shape in the world. During U.S. Secretary of State Blinken's visit to China on June 22, Chinese leaders reiterated that China would not seek to challenge and replace the United States. The official Russian narrative also does not support the idea that the world is moving towards a new bipolarity, but insists that the unipolar age will gradually change ^[30].

In addition, for China, the most important strategic importance of Central Asia is to maintain stability in the northwestern border region. This was the basis of the initial cooperation between China and Central Asia: the joint fight against terrorism, religious extremism and separatism. From the U.S. point of view, only a stable and prosperous Afghanistan can act as a hub connecting the South Asian subcontinent in Central Asia. Therefore, working with Central Asia to promote stability and peaceful development in Afghanistan is also part of the U.S. strategy.

Conclusion

As part of the development of the C5+1 dialogue platform, the United States has created various interaction mechanisms over the past decade, including regular ministerial meetings and the C5+1 secretariat. Given that each administration has its own strategic priorities and diplomatic plans, the "C5+1" mechanism of the United States has developed unevenly. In the early years, its development was slow due to the change of administrations. It was only in the second half of the Trump administration that the C 5+1 platform began to actively advance after the strategic status of Central Asia was raised. To date, the Biden administration continues to use this mechanism to interact with Central Asia, and the United States will continue to play this role for some time.

The Chinese "C 5+1" mechanism was initiated during the epidemic, with the first meetings devoted to joint efforts to combat the epidemic and economic recovery. Just four years later, the Chinese "C 5+1" mechanism has developed rapidly. Earlier this year, in addition to the traditional meetings of foreign ministers, the first meeting of the heads of State "C 5+1" China – Central Asia took place, and the mechanism of meetings of heads of state "C 5+1" was officially established. Compared to the US mechanism, this mechanism is more complete and at the same time has a higher level.

Energy in Central Asia is a common concern of the Central Asian strategies of the United States and China. However, Central Asia is not the main focus of American diplomatic strategy, but rather serves as a turning point for strategic interests. The United States is trying to attract the countries of Central Asia with promises of participation in the region's economy, in the development of energy and infrastructure in order to create a counterweight to China and Russia. China, for its part, prefers to promote the joint development of the economies of these countries through the complementarity of resources and product markets. In addition, terrorism, extremism and separatist forces in Central Asia threaten China's sovereignty and stability, and joint efforts to combat these three forces are an important part of China-Central Asia cooperation.