Relations between central and regional executive authorities in the context of preparation for radical market reforms in Russia at the end of 1991

Logvenkov Il'ya Sergeevich ORCID: 0009-0007-3134-8869 PhD in History Associate Professor; Federal State Budgetary Educational Institution of Higher Education National Research University 'MEI'; National Research University 'MEI' 14 Vavilova str., Moscow, 117334, Russia ilya.logvenkov@gmail.com

The aggravation of foreign policy challenges in recent years has given rise to the processes of political and economic adaptation of Russia to new realities. The growing role of the state determines high requirements for the quality of centralized management, based on a realistic understanding of social processes and the use of adequate theoretical models. Rethinking the post-socialist experience of transformation allows us to turn to the managerial empiricism of this period, which is important for solving practical problems of ensuring the integrity of public policy on a federal scale. A partial revision of the prevailing ideas and the identification of the features of the functioning of the public administration system during the implementation of large-scale transformations determine both the scientific and practical relevance of this study.

The processes of disintegration of the Union state that unfolded during perestroika received a powerful impetus after the dissolution of the State Emergency Committee in August 1991. The total dismantling of the one-party system, the disorganization and uncertainty of the future of law enforcement agencies, the KGB, law enforcement agencies, a suppressed but unresolved political conflict and a number of other factors systematically undermined the already precarious position of the federal executive branch. The prospects of radical market transformations initiated in the autumn of 1991 in these conditions turned out to be directly dependent on the subordination and discipline of regional executive bodies. The government's course, which was given the name "shock therapy", assumed the achievement of a number of tasks, the most important of which were financial stabilization, large-scale privatization and economic liberalization. All of them had not only a central, but also a regional dimension, that is, they required a coordinated policy by public authorities at all levels. In the context of the dismantling of the unified party system, such coordination could only be ensured by the presidential vertical, which was in the process of formation. Thus, the government's ability to achieve the implementation of its own decisions was determined by the practice of interaction between the President of the RSFSR and the heads of administrations and executive committees of regional councils.

The functionality of the executive power system during this period received various assessments. The authors of the radical economic reform themselves, in their memoirs, mainly adhere to the position that by the end of 1991 the state authorities found themselves in a completely inoperable, paralyzed state ^{[1, p. 220; 2, p. 61]}. In the scientific works of the school they created, the problem of regional management is practically not considered, giving way to the relationship of the government with the Russian Central Bank and the Supreme Council ^{[3, pp. 180-204]}.

In the works containing critical assessments of radical market transformations, the focus of scientists' attention turned out to be the parameters of the economic reform itself, the viability of "shock therapy" as a complex of anti-crisis measures, but not the problems of its spatial implementation ^{[4, 5, 6, etc.]}. In some works, the issues of public administration dysfunction as a consequence of the reform itself, the rapid the growth of criminalization of the state and society, however, the previous period is practically not considered ^[7].

In relation to the problem of this study, the most valuable scientific research is devoted to the issues of state-building in the 1990s. A significant contribution was made to the study of the process of formation of the presidential power vertical ^[8] and regional government bodies ^[9], the role of the institute of presidential representatives in the public administration system ^[10]. At the same time, the source base of such works is mainly of a regulatory nature. Referring to the records of government agencies is rather an exception, which does not allow for reliable reproduction of real law enforcement practice. This circumstance is of particular importance in the light of the large-scale spread of legal nihilism during the political struggle of the Union and republican elites in 1990-1991.

Thus, the study involves solving two interrelated tasks:

1. Disclosure of the practice of interaction between central government bodies and regional ones and correlation of the results obtained with legislative norms;

2. Assessment of the functionality of the executive branch in the context of the implementation of the government's reform course.

The research methodology is based on a structural and functional approach. The state apparatus is considered as a set of complementary elements, the coordinated functioning of which generates the ability to manage as an emergent property of the entire system. The work is carried out in line with formal logic and is based on a complex of general scientific (analysis, synthesis) and historical (historical–legal and historical–systemic) methods.

The novelty of the research is determined both by the formulation of tasks and by the involvement of non–regulatory sources, some of which have not previously been introduced into scientific circulation.

The creation of the institution of presidential power and the specifics of the process of dismantling the Union state have generated fundamental changes in the principles of interaction between central and regional government bodies. The legislative formalization of these changes was fixed by the decisions of the V Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR for a period of one year, during which it was supposed to implement the stabilization part of the new government course. The regulatory framework that delimited the competencies of various levels of executive power during the period of radical market reform consisted of the Constitution of the RSFSR (Constitution of the RSFSR as amended on November 1, 1991 // Electronic Museum of the Constitutional History of Russia [electronic resource] URL: http://rusconstitution.ru/library/constitution/articles/1289 , date of application: 08/10/2024) and relevant decrees.

The head of the executive branch was the President of the RSFSR, whose decrees and orders were mandatory throughout the country. He had the right to suspend the acts of subordinate executive bodies, including the Presidents of republics within the RSFSR, in case they contradict the Constitution of the RSFSR or existing legislation. The Government of the RSFSR, accountable to the President of the RSFSR, within its competence, was supposed to direct and verify the work of the Councils of Ministers of the Republics within the RSFSR, as well as directly direct the subordinate executive bodies. The resolutions and orders of the central government were binding throughout the country, and the acts of the Councils of Ministers of the Republics within the RSFSR could be suspended in case of contradiction to the Constitution or laws of the RSFSR, and the decisions of regional administrations were canceled.

The Councils of Ministers of the republics of the RSFSR performed executive and administrative functions within the administrative borders of the region and acted on the basis of general legislation, regional legislation, decisions of Congresses of People's Deputies, Supreme Soviets, heads of executive power (Presidents) at the national and republican levels. The republican governments had the right to overturn the decisions of the executive committees within their competence.

Unlike autonomous republics, the executive and administrative bodies of regions and territories (administrations) acted not only on the basis of legislation and decisions of representative bodies, but also acts of the President of the RSFSR and the Government of the RSFSR, to which the administration was accountable. At the same time, the relevant Council of People's Deputies could express distrust to officials of the regional or regional executive power appointed by the head of the administration, and also approved its structure. The head of the administration could protest the decision of the relevant Council of People's Deputies, but a simple majority of votes was enough to reject the protest (Decree of the President of the RSFSR dated 08/22/1991 No. 75 "On certain issues of the activities of executive authorities in the RSFSR" // Official Internet portal of legal Information [electronic resource] URL: http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&nd=102012341&rdk=0&firstDoc=1&lastdoc=1 , accessed 07/29/2024).

The resolution of the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR granted the President of the RSFSR until December 1, 1992 the right to appoint heads of administrations, taking into account the opinion of the relevant representative body (Resolution of the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR dated 11/01/1991 No. 1830–I "On the organization of executive power during the period of radical economic reform" // Official Internet portal of legal Information [electronic resource] URL: http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&prevDoc=102020228&backlink=1&&nd=102012920, accessed: 30.07.2024). In case of dismissal of the head of the administration from office on the recommendation of the regional council, the President of the RSFSR could appoint an acting one for up to 6 months (Decree of the President of the RSFSR dated 08/22/1991 No. 75 "On certain issues of the activities of executive authorities in the RSFSR" // Official Internet portal of legal Information [electronic resource] URL: http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&nd=102012341&rdk=0&firstDoc=1&lastdoc=1 , accessed 07/29/2024). On November 25, 1991, the President instructed the heads of regional executive bodies to appoint the heads of administrations of districts and cities of regional, regional and district subordination by December 15 (Decree of the President of the RSFSR dated 11/25/1991 No. 239 "On the procedure for appointing heads of administrations" // Official Internet Portal of Legal Information [electronic resource] URL: http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&nd=102013229&rdk=0 , accessed: 30.07.2024). The candidates had to be approved by the councils, but in case of their rejection, the head of the administration could appoint an acting one for a period of up to 1 year.

The configuration of executive authorities formed in this way assumed the existence of two fundamentally different management models. The Russian central government bodies had practically no real levers of direct influence on the governments of the autonomous republics, which gave a declarative character to the provisions of the Constitution of the RSFSR on the mandatory execution of acts of higher authorities. Under the circumstances, the center had to rely more on agreements rather than subordination.

On the other hand, in the territories and regions, the formation of administrations was carried out under the formal control of the president and the government with relative independence from the Soviets, thanks to the mechanism of appointing acting for a long time. The structure of the administration consisted of offshoot departments of central ministries, which assumed the creation of territorial networks (for example, health), committees on significant regional issues (for example, fisheries), auxiliary departments (for example, legal) (Resolution of the Head of the Administration of the Kaliningrad Region "On the structure of administration and reorganization of public administration bodies of the Kaliningrad region" from 08.02.1992 No. 32 // Official Internet portal of legal information [electronic resource] URL: http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&nd=126021511&rdk=0 , accessed: 30.07.2024). The appointment of senior officials of territorial administrations and the approval of the procedure for their work were coordinated with the relevant Russian ministries ^{[11, l. 82-85]}.

Regional structures of regulatory, law enforcement, judicial and other bodies formally worked independently under the administrations: antimonopoly committees, departments of internal affairs, State Arbitration, regional military commissions, tax inspections, pension funds, etc., as well as individual organizations, enterprises and banks. The head of the administration had no direct control over them and had to facilitate their work. In 1992, the government, in an effort to reduce the costs of the republican budget, shifted the maintenance of these bodies to the regions ^{[2, p. 230]}. This decision led to a sharp decrease in the effectiveness of their work as a result of an increase in direct dependence on administrations ^{[2, p. 230]}. Its subsequent cancellation partially solved this problem, however, territorial branches in any case often face the need to receive assistance from the regional leadership. In conditions of insufficient funding for government agencies, this only reinforced the tendency for local elites to merge under the leadership of the head of administration.

However, despite the existence of formal subordination relations, the executive discipline and the quality of the organization of the work of regional executive bodies remained unsatisfactory by the autumn of 1991. For example, on September 3, Yeltsin ordered to transfer the buildings of the committees of the Communist Parties to the use of courts located in unsuitable premises (Decree of the President of the RSFSR dated 09/03/1991 No. 32-rp "On urgent measures to improve the work of the courts of the RSFSR" // Official website of the President of the Russian Federation [electronic resource] URL: http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/169 , accessed 07/28/2024). By this time, 4 heads of administration had already been appointed, and within 10 days, responses were received only from 4 regions, and even those did not contain specifics about the execution of the order ^{[12, L. 26-27]}. During the same period, the AP received more than 130 appeals from the chairmen of the city district courts, who reported direct disregard for the orders of local authorities.

Another manifestation of the disorganization of the work of the executive branch was the premature local transition to market pricing. Thus, the regions apparently sought to overcome the collapse of trade, as well as mitigate the commodity deficit by attracting products with high prices, rightly believing that after the president announced his intention to carry out radical economic reform, they would not get anything for it. Already in November, the first reports of citizens on the liberalization of prices for food and basic necessities were recorded at the initiative of local administrations, which, in the absence of compensatory measures, entailed a catastrophic decrease in living standards ^{[13, L. 43]}. By December, contractual prices were introduced by the orders of the regional leadership in individual cities and regions, exceeding the established state prices by 5-7 times ^{[13, L. 61]}. Such a policy undermined the public's faith in the success of the reform and strengthened the demands for social compensation.

The response to the current situation was the formation of the Institute of representatives of the President of the RSFSR. The temporary regulation developed at the end of August assigned them the functions of interacting with regional authorities and facilitating the implementation of presidential decisions (Decree of the President of the RSFSR dated 08/31/1991 No. 33-rp "On approval of the Temporary Regulations on Representatives of the President of the RSFSR in the territories, regions, Autonomous Region, Autonomous Districts, cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg" // The official website of the President of the Russian Federation [electronic resource] URL: http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/165 , accessed 07/28/2024). Representatives were supposed to take part in the work of executive authorities, monitor compliance with Russian legislation, make proposals to the President of the RSFSR on suspending specific acts of regional state bodies and on the removal of officials. The scope of tasks required the creation of small apparatuses with representatives (2 people each in the territories, regions and autonomous regions, 1 each in autonomous districts) (Decree of the President of the RSFSR dated 10/14/1991 No. 55–rp "Issues of organizing the work of representatives of the President of the RSFSR in the territories, regions, autonomous Region, autonomous districts, Moscow, St. PetersburgSt. Petersburg" // Official website of the President of the Russian Federation [electronic resource] URL: http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/276 , accessed 07/28/2024).

The functions of representatives in the republics differed significantly. They only provided interaction, provided assistance to the state bodies of the republic in the execution of decisions of the Russian president and the government, made reasoned submissions to the republican authorities in case of violation of general legislation by them (Decree of the President of the RSFSR dated 02.09.1991 No. 34-rp "On approval of the Provisional Regulations on the representations of the President of the RSFSR in the republics within the RSFSR" // Official Internet–legal information portal [electronic resource] URL: http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&nd=102012401&rdk=0&firstDoc=1&lastdoc=1 , accessed: 30.07.2024). Representatives could participate in the work of the Supreme Council or the Government of the Republic, but only by agreement.

The Institute of Representatives functioned as part of the Control Department of the Administration of the President of the RSFSR headed by Chief State Inspector V. A. Makharadze (Decree of the President of the RSFSR dated 09/24/1991 No. 127 "On approval of the Regulations on the Chief State Inspector of the RSFSR and the Control Department" // Official Internet portal of legal information [electronic resource] URL: http://ips.pravo.gov.ru/?docbody=&nd=102012565&rdk=0 , accessed: 30.07.2024). In addition to summarizing reports from representatives, he could request information from any government agencies, conduct inspections, and also raise a question with the Prosecutor General of the RSFSR, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR and the KGB of the RSFSR about the investigation of the activities of executive bodies. The Chief State Inspector submitted candidates for the heads of administrations to the President of the RSFSR along with the Chairman of the Government of the RSFSR and the Head of the Presidential Administration of the RSFSR (Decree of the President of the RSFSR dated 11.09.1991 No. 112 "On the role of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR in the system of executive power of the Russian Federation" // Official Internet portal of legal information [electronic resource] URL: http://ips.pravo.gov.ru/?docbody=&nd=102012460&rdk=0 , date of the request: 30.07.2024)..

Personnel training has become a separate area of work. Thus, on the initiative of the control department, a training seminar–meeting was held in St. Petersburg on November 29 – December 1, involving the participation of 15 heads of regional administrations ^{[14, L. 108-110]}. Among other things, the training included the blocks "Research methods in the selection of administrative personnel", "Psychology of power and management", "Research on the socio–psychological status of the population of the region", "Mental self-regulation", "Interviews with the media", as well as a business game on legislation and other normative documents of the RSFSR.

The presidential control system was supposed to ensure the effect of personal presence on the ground, and the representatives themselves were appointed mainly from among democratic politicians, including people's deputies. However, its deployment was delayed, and by the end of 1991, representatives were appointed in about half of the regions and territories and only in some republics ^[10]. The small staff, extremely limited opportunities for representatives in the republics, and the leading role of political affiliation in the selection of personnel testified that the main tasks of the president's representatives were to promote the decisions of the central government and maintain the loyalty of the regional leadership. The issues of unification of legislation turned out to be deeply secondary. Of particular importance to these tasks is the fact that most of the top officials of the administrations came from the party and economic nomenclature.

As the work of the representatives unfolded, a number of problems arose that required personnel, organizational, financial or regulatory solutions. It turned out that in some cases it was not so much the promotion of a single course as the construction of one's own political career by lobbying the interests of the region in the presidential administration, in the Supreme Council, in the government ^{[15, L. 9]}. In a number of areas, representatives could not smooth out the conflict that broke out by the end of November between the executive and representative authorities, and in some cases completely undermined the authority of the president with dubious statements in the media, a free interpretation of decisions taken at the center ^{[15, L. 10]}.

A particularly acute problem in the work of the entire institute was the lack of a clear, well-developed course to follow. It was necessary to understand what to prepare for, however, the presidential administration considered it inappropriate to send drafts of the upcoming decisions of the president and the government due to their "often changing orientation" ^{[15, l. 22]}. At the same time, there was not even an operational government connection between Moscow and the offices of representatives in the regions, the provision of which with office equipment was planned only for December – January.

The deepening economic crisis posed increasingly difficult challenges to the central executive authority. The growing deficit in the conditions of disorganization of power gave rise to a tendency to economic isolation of the regions. By October, it was discovered that the opportunities provided by the decisions of the central government to leave part of the manufactured goods for local needs were used to preserve raw materials, materials, components, etc., but not for final products (Decree of the President of the RSFSR dated 10/15/1991 No. 143 "On economic relations and supplies of products and goods in 1992" // Official Internet–legal information portal [electronic resource] URL: http://ips.pravo.gov.ru/?docbody=&nd=102012460&rdk=0 , accessed: 30.07.2024). The raw materials stored in this way could then be sold for foreign currency or exchanged in the republics for food, while undermining the work of complex production chains ^{[1, p. 145]}.

In a number of cases, the heads of executive bodies directive stopped supplies to other regions. For example, the Saratov Region, due to crop failure, did not deliver agricultural products to the Khabarovsk Territory, which caused as a response the decision of the head of the administration to stop counter supplies of industrial goods ^{[13, L. 54]}. As a result, production stopped at the Khimvolokno production association located in the Saratov region, which supplied light industry enterprises throughout the country with products.

A real war has unfolded over food, medicines and basic necessities. So, on December 3, 1991, by order of the Chairman of the Government of Moscow, Yu. M. Luzhkov, a cargo of medicines intended for residents of the Chelyabinsk region who were exposed to radiation due to the accident at the Mayak chemical plant was detained ^{[16, l. 106]}. Chairman of the Committee on Bread Products L. S. Cheshinsky reported on numerous cases of the heads of administrations imposing bans on the shipment of grain and compound feeds in order to meet the needs of local consumers ^{[17, L. 2-3]}. This led to disruptions in the supply of food and generated social tension in large industrial centers. To combat this practice, the committee was given additional powers: its instructions on the movement of grain resources became mandatory for all organizations in the territory of the RSFSR, regardless of subordination ^{[18, l. 154]}. However, the very mechanism of the committee's work, which assumed its activation already upon the fact of a violation, allowed only to smooth out, but not eliminate the problem. In some cases, a member of the government could also give the command to move goods quickly (via intercom) ("It is indecent to blame the former government for all sins" // Forbes [electronic resource] URL: https://www.forbes.ru/ekonomika/vlast/60059-neprilichno-vo-vseh-grehah-obvinyat-prezhnyuyu-vlast , date of issue: 07/26/2024), however, such manual control remained almost unnoticeable nationwide.

There were precedents of natural internal customs. On November 6, the dockers of the Novorossiysk port refused to unload the ship with 5 thousand tons of imported meat on board, unless 0.5% of the cargo was transferred to their disposal ^{[19, L. 6]}. Despite the warning of responsible officials about the massive spread of such practices, if these requirements were met, the Government was forced to give in.

Information received through various channels indicated that the country's economy was gradually beginning to segment. Price liberalization by itself could not help to overcome this problem, it only to some extent determined the spatial configuration of resource flows, their direction and intensity. The administrative response was the Decree of the President of the RSFSR "On the Single Economic Space of the RSFSR", which ordered regional executive bodies to ensure the free movement of goods (Decree of the President of the RSFSR dated 12.12.1991 No. 269 "On the Single Economic Space" // Official Internet portal of legal information [electronic resource] URL: http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&nd=102013534&rdk=0 , accessed: 30.07.2024). Officials whose decisions created obstacles and restrictions on internal resource flows had to be brought to administrative responsibility. The punishment for the offense was a monetary fine in the amount of 500 rubles. to 10,000 rubles. (Law of the RSFSR dated 10.10.1990 No. 228-I "On the relationship of Councils of People's Deputies and executive bodies during the period of economic reform" // Official Internet portal of legal information [electronic resource] URL: http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&nd=102010245&rdk=0 , accessed: 30.07.2024), that in the context of price liberalization and the non-business opportunities of the heads of administrations and executive committees was not too threatening. This decree allowed the representatives of the president to promptly cancel the relevant regional acts in the regions and territories, but the results of this work remained extremely limited ^{[2, p. 76]}.

The rapid destruction of the centralized management system based on monopoly and the all-encompassing influence of the Communist Party has sharply strained the issue of building a presidential vertical. The struggle between the union center and the Russian leadership undermined the normative and legal unity and executive discipline, generated impunity, and contributed to the plundering of nobody's property.

Despite the fact that the legislative framework for the formation of the presidential vertical was largely formed by the end of August 1991, the management system in its regional aspect remained decentralized and not fully functional. The institute of representatives of the President, created to overcome the current situation, was not adequately provided with personnel, resources and methodological support by the beginning of the implementation of the main measures of "shock therapy". The republics within the RSFSR were not actually included in a single management system, and relations with them had to be built on a contractual basis. Thus, the regulatory documents regulating the interaction of the regions and the center were largely valid only on paper.

The decentralization of available resources and the inability of the executive branch to pursue a unified policy across the country undermined the prospects for stabilization policy. The economic crisis intensified localism and regional isolation even where the executive bodies were headed by heads of administration appointed by the president. Lack of discipline and regional selfishness depressed the functioning of production chains and increased social tension due to downtime, uneven distribution of goods and spontaneous liberalization of economic activity. In the context of the destruction of the unified legal field, state property remained unprotected from theft and uncontrolled privatization. All this did not allow us to count on the holistic implementation of government reforms in the foreseeable future.