The problem of diplomatic recognition of the USSR by the Third Republic in the autumn of 1924: a view from France

Naumova Natal'ya Nikolaevna ORCID: 0000-0002-7502-2760 PhD in History Associate Professor, Department of Modern and Contemporary History, M. V. Lomonosov Moscow State University 119192, Russia, Moscow, Lomonosovsky Prospekt str., 27k4 naumovafrance@yandex.ru

Slesarev Il'ya Yurievich ORCID: 0009-0008-6968-6545 PhD in History Independent researcher 117449, Russia, Moscow, Shvernik str., 1k4 sles-il@yandex.ru

The centenary of the official diplomatic recognition of the USSR by France, which took place on October 28, 1924, serves as an additional incentive to study new aspects of a landmark event in the history of international recognition of the USSR and Franco-Soviet relations in the interwar period.

In the early 20s of the twentieth century. Soviet Russia was still perceived by the bourgeois governments of the West with great wariness and even hostility. These feelings were fueled both by the socialist transformations being carried out in the country and by the ambivalence of its foreign policy course. On the one hand, the young socialist state was extremely interested in establishing mutually beneficial trade cooperation with capitalist countries. Soviet Russia needed both Western investments and imports, especially of high-tech industrial products. The objective tasks of foreign policy required the RSFSR/USSR to break out of international isolation and integrate it into the world community. On the other hand, the Bolsheviks openly proclaimed their commitment to the ideas of proletarian internationalism and the world communist revolution. Through the structures of the Comintern, established in March 1919, they provided not only ideological support, but also significant material assistance to the left forces, primarily the Communist parties that were created everywhere in Western Europe in 1920-1921, aimed at destabilizing the internal political situation in their countries and seizing state power. It is clear that in such conditions, relations between Soviet Russia/USSR and Western countries developed unstable, and the parties had a large number of claims against each other ^[1].

As for France, many controversial issues accumulated between it and the Soviet state during the period 1917-1924, which aggravated the deep crisis of their relations, which were actually completely interrupted after the victory of the Bolsheviks ^{[2, 3, 4, 5, 6]}. Moscow condemned the Franco-British armed interference in the internal affairs of the country and the support of the White allies in the Entente armies in Ukraine and Siberia, their recognition of the provisional government of Wrangel (August 1920) as the official representative of Russia. The Bolsheviks complained to the leadership of the Third Republic in connection with the provision of territory by the French side for the "enemies of the revolution" who immigrated from Russia, primarily officers of the White Army, as well as due to the participation of military specialists and a contingent of the French armed forces on the side of bourgeois Poland during the Soviet-Polish war of 1920-1921, who played a significant role in the defeat The Red Army and the loss of western territories.

The Bolshevik government declared the Western powers, including France, in the artificial isolation of Soviet Russia, in the construction of "the Chinese wall to protect themselves, as a quarantine from the plague, from Bolshevism." However, according to the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars V.I. Lenin, even if "the gentlemen of Anglo-French imperialism, these owners of the most advanced technology in the world, if they manage to build such a Chinese wall around the republic [Soviets – auth.], then the bacillus of Bolshevism will pass through the walls and infect the workers of all countries" ^{[7, p. 164]}. Such a revolutionary attitude of the Soviet political class provoked a corresponding reaction from Western leaders: French Marshal F. Foch at the Paris Peace Conference (March 1919) spoke "about the sanitary cordon" necessary to combat this "epidemic disease" ^{[5, p. 208]}, which was Bolshevism for him.

Paris rebuked Soviet Russia in the Brest-Litovsk "betrayal" — the signing in March 1918 separate the Brest peace with the States in a Quarter of the Union, headed by the Kaiser's Germany. A serious obstacle to rapprochement with Moscow remained the issue of debts, without which normalization of relations with the RSFSR was not considered by official Paris (it was about French public and private loans, as well as compensation for French property nationalized by the Bolsheviks in Russia), and the creation of the French section of the Comintern (established in Moscow on March 4, 1919), whose The activity destabilized the internal political situation of the Third Republic ^{[2, p. 247]}. The bourgeois press put the "problem of debts and nationalized property" at the center of the question of Franco-Soviet relations ^[8], but did not deny France's interest in trade relations with the USSR and the concern of its political circles about the rapprochement of Soviet Russia with the defeated and, for sure, aspiring to revenge Germany, their close military-technical and economic cooperation after the signing of the German-Soviet treaty in Rapallo (1922) on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the countries and the settlement of all disputed issues. The failures of the French military and politicians in the framework of the campaign to occupy the Ruhr in 1923 ^[9], which was negatively met by the Anglo-American allies of the Third Republic, strengthened anti-Soviet sentiments in France associated with fears "about the strengthening of the "Soviet threat" and "coupling" Moscow and Berlin" ^{[6, p. 609]}.

The issue of the return of the Black Sea Fleet detained by France in Bizerte in the summer of 1923, which Wrangel had taken away from Russia, was also acute. In response to the Soviet protest, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, R. Poincare, put forward a diplomatic argument in a note dated June 20, 1923: the Soviet government has no right to demand back Russian ships, since it is not recognized; it is not recognized because it does not pay debts. But even in case of recognition, France still had the right to detain ships as collateral for unpaid debts ^{[10, pp. 165-166]}.

At the same time, negotiations on normalization of relations, albeit difficult and so far fruitless, were still conducted, although the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR G.V. Chicherin at the end of 1923 recognized the futility of attempts to "gradually achieve economic rapprochement with France as a result of the policy of the French government" ^[11]. Its chairman, R. Poincare, a prominent conservative politician, took a firm position on this issue and had no doubt that Moscow would have to make serious concessions in order to achieve French diplomatic recognition. The main stumbling block was still the issue of Russian debts, which acquired not only economic, but also ideological content.

Soviet politicians and diplomats carried out extensive information work in France, which contributed to the recognition of the USSR. It should be noted the important contribution of the Bolshevik K.B. Radek, a member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, who involved all diplomatic structures in order to penetrate the "masses [of the French – auth.] non-communists and the search for economic assistance abroad" ^{[12, p. 177]}, which required achieving a favorable information background. With the active assistance of the plenipotentiary mission in Berlin in 1922, K.B. Radek managed to establish contact with J. Saurwein, a journalist of the French newspaper Matin, who published a series of interviews with Radek himself, as well as with Soviet politicians and diplomats H.G. Rakovsky and B.S. Stomonyakov. They talked about the progress of Russia's economic recovery, its need for loans, and the need for practical solutions to foreign debt issues. According to the results of the publication, G.V. Chicherin wrote to Lenin that "the appearance of these articles was a colossal sensation, and the impression in France was enormous" ^{[12, p. 180]}. A study of archival data by historian A.V. Lavrenova shows that the campaign to bring France and the USSR closer together in the press was organized and paid for by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs through the mediation of French and German agents. Clippings of articles about Soviet Russia from leading print media, previously unnoticed in sympathy with the Bolshevik regime, testified to positive changes. From August to mid-November 1922, more than a thousand materials about life in Soviet Russia were published on the pages of French newspapers.

The role of the newspaper "Yumanite", the printing organ of the French Communist Party (PCF), established in December 1920, should be particularly noted. Yumanite became the main tribune for Soviet diplomats, the "mouthpiece of the Kremlin", the publication read by many Frenchmen, which opened headings for them with the headlines "In the USSR" or "In the Land of the Soviets" and "systematically ridiculed those who believed that the eye of Moscow was everywhere" ^{[5, p. 211]}. The editorial board of "Yumanite" attracted famous revolutionaries, such as J. Sadoul, who returned to his homeland in 1924 after several years of work in the French Communist Group in Moscow, or A. Marty, the "rebel of the Black Sea" (in 1919 he was one of the leaders of the uprising on the French squadron), or deputy M. Cachin, who visited in 1920. Soviet Russia, where the Second Congress of the Comintern was held in Petrograd. All of them were respected in society, their words were listened to, they were believed.

An extensive information campaign in the French Communist press served to prepare public opinion for the realization of the need for political and economic cooperation between the Third Republic and the USSR and the official recognition of the first state of workers and peasants. The scale of this campaign is indirectly evidenced by an anonymous book published in 1926 with a foreword by K.B. Radek "Behind the Scenes of the French Press" ^[13] translated by O.E. Mandelstam — a propaganda publication shows the author's deep knowledge of the peculiarities of the functioning of the French press in the first quarter of the twentieth century.

It took Bolshevik diplomacy seven years to get the recognition of the young state, the new Russia, from the Third Republic, with which France had previously had close military-political, trade and economic relations. Having a long history, they "provided fertile ground for Russophilia, contributed to the fact that the USSR was perceived [by the French – auth.] who took over the national and territorial baton from the Tsarist Empire" ^{[5, p. 213]}. The desire to restore economic and cultural cooperation and to find strategic balance in Europe again intensified among some French statesmen after the end of the Civil War in Soviet Russia, which testified in the eyes of the West to the undoubted strengthening of Soviet power. Old personal ties also played a big role in the emerging rapprochement. I would like to mention the famous politician A. de Monzi, who held various positions, including ministerial ones, in the state system of the Third Republic. From 1924 to 1927, he headed the Commission on Russian Affairs and negotiated with leading Soviet figures, mainly diplomats of the first generation. A. de Monzy knew H.G. Rakovsky and I.L. Arens, an employee of the NKID and a journalist who worked as the USSR envoy to France in 1927-1930. De Monzy was friends with them in his youth and in the 1920s was a supporter of the diplomatic recognition of Soviet Russia.

After the end of the Civil War, the Soviet-French scientific and teaching exchanges, which were interrupted in 1914, and now brought the intelligentsia of both countries closer together, were the first to resume. At the same time (in the early 20s), it became possible to organize creative trips of Soviet writers, cinematographers, and artists to European capitals - Paris, Berlin, and Prague, during which their residents were able to get acquainted with the life and works of representatives of Soviet culture ^{[14, 15]}. Finally, according to the fair statement of the French historian S. Kere, an important factor that influenced the change in attitude towards Soviet Russia was "the idea that was accepted or sincerely believed in, that it was possible to separate the Soviet experiment in Russia from the import of communism. This "philosophical Sovietism", based on a firm conviction of the superiority and rooting of the French Republican model, manifested itself especially in radical political circles and among intellectuals, "fellow travelers" fascinated by this new society" ^{[5, pp. 213-214]}. Such a position was disputed in anti-Soviet circles concerned about the "threat of ideological infection" ^{[16, 17]}. However, as already mentioned, despite the difficult negotiations over the "Russian debts" and the harsh attacks on the USSR by the anti-communist press, the influence of the Soviet country, which won the Civil War, proclaimed and began the successful implementation of the NEP, despite its own ideological and political attitudes, grew in the West and delegated the "white emigration", positioned itself as the main defender of the spiritual and cultural heritage of the Russian people. All these factors and circumstances contributed to the gradual progress of bilateral Soviet-French cooperation in the humanitarian field.

In 1923-1924, the international situation also changed: the governments of the great powers sought to develop a common coordinated line in solving the most important international problems; pacifist ideas and sentiments began to spread widely; numerous conferences on European security problems were convened; the "era of pacifism" began ^{[9, pp. 123-124]}. At the same time, the first hopes for the recognition of the Soviet state by the political leadership of France appeared. The evolution of the "Soviet" strategy of the diplomatic circles of the Third Republic towards the normalization of relations between the two countries, in which objective obstacles turned out to be much greater than in the case of other European states, has already been considered in Russian historiography ^{[18, 19, 20, 1, 21, 6, 22]}. At the end of Poincare's reign as head of government (1922-1924), French diplomats indulged in theoretical reflections on Soviet Russia as an "eastern counterweight" to Germany, which was rapidly restoring its economic position. However, according to the correct remark of the Russian researcher I.E. Magadeev, "the key in terms of ensuring the security of the Third Republic in Europe for its leadership were British guarantees (and to a lesser extent "rear alliances" with Central and Eastern European countries)" ^{[6, p. 627]}. The influence of the French military, which was rather radically opposed to the USSR, on the formation of Paris' foreign policy was gradually decreasing; increasingly, the idea of "cautious reconciliation" with Germany was discussed in political circles, which (the idea) Soviet diplomats regarded as a "conspiracy against us", "buying the grace of Poincare [by Germany – auth.] at the expense of our [with her – auth.] friendship" ^{[6, p. 628]}. Under Poincare, the French side continued to insist on the mandatory preliminary recognition of "tsarist debts", the provision by the Bolshevik government of compensation for nationalized enterprises to French owners, the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade, and the refusal to conduct anti-bourgeois propaganda in France.

However, the diplomatic defeat of the Third Republic in the settlement of the Ruhr crisis of 1923; financial problems; pressure from the allies, who intended to help Germany to restore its economy and financial system (a goal directly opposed to French intentions to have a weakened "hereditary enemy" on their eastern borders for as long as possible) and Poincare's consent to the adoption of the "Dawes plan", having established a new, more favorable procedure for the payment of reparations for the Weimar Republic (1924), all this strengthened the mood in favor of Franco-Soviet cooperation, including within the framework of containing Germany on the "flanks" of the European continent. In addition, at the beginning of 1924, the USSR achieved diplomatic recognition "without any preconditions" (followed by the conclusion of trade agreements) of the leading Entente countries – Great Britain and Italy, which "created an important precedent that could not be ignored in Paris" ^{[1, p. 135]}.

But still, without in any way belittling the importance of the international situation that changed not in favor of France, which sought to assert its military, political and economic superiority in continental Europe after the war, it is necessary to emphasize the priority of internal political factors that pushed the leadership of the Third Republic to directly consider the issue of recognition of the USSR. We are talking about the victory in the next parliamentary elections in the spring of 1924 of the center-left coalition of the "Left Bloc", consisting mainly of representatives of radical socialists and socialists. The majority changed in the Chamber of Deputies, the key mechanism of the political system of the Third Republic, and the government was headed, despite the initial resistance of the president, former socialist and consistent anti–communist A. Millerand (1920-1924), leader of the radical Socialist Party E. Herriot, a well–known pacifist, supporter of reconciliation of the Third Republic with Germany and the establishment of political and economic relations, advantageous for France, with an ideological opponent, but a promising trading partner — the USSR ^{[2, 23]}. The mayor of Lyon, and now the chairman of the Council of Ministers, Herriot, after his private visit to the RSFSR (1922) in order to "establish economic relations" ^[24], enjoyed a reputation as a figure with a positive attitude towards Moscow. A similar position was taken by Herriot's successor as chairman of the Radical Socialist party, E. Daladier and A. de Monzy, who visited the USSR in 1923 and continued to insist that lasting peace in Europe is impossible without Russia, even Soviet, and France's cooperation with it, as before, is the "natural law of European equilibrium" ^{[25, p. 141]}. In order to normalize Soviet-French relations, de Monzy proposed to the government to solve the problem of "royal debts" and "nationalized property" in a slightly different way: to compensate French depositors for their losses at the expense of the state or through the participation of entrepreneurs – citizens of the Third Republic in Soviet concessions that appeared during the NEP era.

The implementation of a new economic policy in the USSR, which intensified the reflections of French diplomats on the possible evolution of Bolshevism towards the liberalization of the Soviet regime, "changed the mood in some socio-political circles of the Third Republic" ^{[26, p. 815]}. The report of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs "International Policy of the RSFSR in 1922" noted that "even irreconcilable enemies of Russia, like the newspaper Tan, are beginning to sound the alarm on the issue of France's incorrect attitude towards Soviet Russia and advocate rapprochement with the latter" ^{[19, p. 218]}.

The transformation of the "Soviet vector" of French diplomacy reflected the general results of the European policy of the supporter of collective security and disarmament, E. Herriot, who called from his post as chairman of the Council of Ministers to resolve all controversial issues through arbitration. They turned out to be disappointing, and France continued to lose its position in Europe. The French leadership failed to obtain London's consent to conclude a Franco-British defensive alliance and guarantees of the country's security, to achieve real financial and economic concessions from Germany. By agreeing to the signing of the "Dawes plan" (entered into force on September 1, 1924), which was actually developed without his direct participation and significantly infringed on the interests of France, the Herriot government deprived French representatives of the opportunity, as it had before, to play a decisive role in the reparations Commission, giving the decisive vote to the Americans and the British who supported them. Herriot also had to promise the Allies to withdraw all French military units from the Ruhr region within a year. As a result, France, "pursuing a policy aimed at preserving the Versailles status quo, switched from offensive to defensive, which, of course, weakened its European positions" ^{[9, p. 134]}. The de facto change in foreign policy was largely reflected in gradually increasing concessions to the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States – the latter, the Third Republic, moreover, owed about $ 6.8 billion. In such a situation, Paris was extremely interested in trade and economic cooperation with its former eastern ally.

The coalition government of the "Left Bloc", which went to the elections with the slogan of diplomatic recognition of the USSR, was under pressure from various lobbying groups of entrepreneurs who advocated the restoration and intensification of trade cooperation with the USSR. They took the victory of the center-left coalition in the elections with great enthusiasm and expected Herriot to take real action towards rapprochement with the USSR. The "National Committee for Economic Expansion in Central and Eastern Europe", formed in December 1921, headed by Deputy J. Jean-Gerald, on the pages of his printing organ, the magazine France–Russia, in the article "The Franco-Russian problem" in the summer of 1924, noted: "The results of the recent elections in France allow us to foresee that recognition of Soviet Russia will follow in a short time" ^[27].

Herriot could not ignore the fact that the British Labour Party recognized the USSR in February 1924 and successfully established a business partnership with it. French industrialists were attracted by Soviet markets and numerous sources of raw materials, on the other hand, they were reassured by the permission of the authorities of the RSFSR immediately after the introduction of the NEP to create concessions and joint ventures, the emergence in Soviet Russia of the opportunity to engage, albeit on a limited scale, in private business. The political leadership of Western countries had a growing intention to include the USSR in the emerging post–war world economic and political system, which, from their point of view, increased the chances of exercising control over the activities of the Soviet state and exerting serious pressure on it – if necessary for the West. In addition, according to the famous Soviet French scholar A.Z. Manfred, Herriot was worried about "the idea of France's foreign policy isolation, the need to find a reliable and powerful ally for it" ^{[28, p. 71]}, which the author considered the USSR to be.

Many Western politicians believed that Bolshevism, and this seemed to be confirmed by the NEP, was ready for liberal evolution and peaceful coexistence with the West. In France, some government and business circles "considered it a priority to "resume contacts with Russia," i.e. its de jure recognition should have been the first step, and negotiations on controversial issues the second stage" ^{[6, p. 649]}. The ideological reasoning of the new approach to relations between the West and the USSR was contained in the so-called "theory of rebirth", according to which "The country of the Soviets in the conditions of the NEP and under the influence of expanding contacts with the West will inevitably evolve towards a democratic republic and a market economy" ^{[9, p. 175]}. Herriot was also an adherent of this theory, confident that France, through its rapprochement and cooperation with the USSR, would contribute to "necessary changes" towards the liberalization of the Soviet political system.

Having assumed the post of head of government, on June 17, 1924, Herriot officially declared his readiness to recognize the USSR, specifying in diplomatic circles that it would happen "in a few days ... on the basis of conditions similar to those on which it was recognized by the British government" ^{[6, p. 647]}. Herriot noted in his memoirs: "The need to establish relations with Russia was so urgent that even the powers that did not recognize the Moscow government were forced, for example, to admit the plenipotentiaries of the Soviet Union as the only authorized representatives of Russia in resolving the issue of the straits" ^{[28, p. 486]}.

However, four whole months passed from the government statement to the diplomatic recognition of the USSR by France due to the urgency of solving the "German question" and the difficulties that arose in connection with it at the London conference, which the head of the Council of Ministers dealt with. It was only in the summer of 1924 that heated discussions unfolded in government circles about when and under what conditions "this excellent gift" should be made to Soviet Russia ^{[6, pp. 647-652]}. According to the French historian F. Desberg, "a decisive step towards recognition" was Herriot's decision to form in September a special commission to study the conditions for establishing diplomatic relations between France and the USSR, headed by A. de Monzy ^{[29, p. 34-35]}. In the first half of October, it held five meetings, and as a result of its work, a report was developed and submitted to the government, which called for recognition of the USSR according to the formula "recognition, and then discussion of the issue of debts." This proposal, as stated in the document, was aimed at "the reintegration of Russia into Europe and the return of France to Russia" before resolving the debt problem – the main stumbling block in all diplomatic negotiations between French and Soviet representatives. The text of the French recognition formula, which is beneficial for Moscow, was previously agreed upon at the meetings of A. de Monzy and H.G. Rakovsky. The Soviet envoy managed to achieve the adoption of amendments that "increased the emphasis on the establishment of official relations de jure (Rakovsky insisted that this word appear in the text), on their highest possible diplomatic status (exchange of ambassadors)..." ^{[6, p. 652]}. According to F. Desberg, in addition to political and economic arguments in favor of recognizing the USSR, the strategic consequences of the Soviet-French rapprochement were of particular importance: the inclusion of the Soviet state in the system of the "balance of power" in Europe; the weakening of its ties with Germany; bringing the policy of the Third Republic towards the USSR in line with the general strategy of the Western powers, primarily Great Britain. It was these factors that outweighed the arguments of supporters of a preliminary settlement of the "debt issue" and reduced the risk of Moscow conducting hostile propaganda on French territory. It should be noted: the decision to recognize the USSR de jure without additional conditions was agreed by the French government "with representatives of 1.2 million holders of Russian securities, who hoped that it would help move the matter of debt repayment from a dead point" ^{[1, p. 135; 30, p. 212, 223]}.

In the autumn of 1924, the French bourgeoisie was wary, but generally calmly positive about the prospect of diplomatic recognition of the USSR. The formidable class battles of the 1919-1920s were a thing of the past, and the economic situation was rapidly improving. An article from October 17 in the newspaper "Tan" entitled "Daily Bulletin: the resumption of relations with Russia" is very revealing. Continuing to characterize the Soviet government as "a government established and supported by force," the newspaper admitted that it "was able to survive," and "The Soviets gradually acquired the image of state power" and "are forced to accept modern realities and restore relations with bourgeois capitalist countries" ^[31]. Tan hoped that the "recognition formula chosen by the government" would not infringe on the interests of France and its citizens in the USSR, which would appreciate the goodwill gesture of the Third Republic and "preserve in full the rights of France" arising from agreements and treaties "signed [earlier – auth.] on behalf of the Russian people." In his memoirs, Herriot explained the decision to recognize the USSR in this way: "I associate with my peaceful policy the initiative I took under a hail of grave insults to restore diplomatic relations between France and the Soviet government. The absence of any official relations with the government, which actually retained power in Russia for seven years, created an abnormal situation that was harmful to our subjects, since it did not allow the French government to effectively fulfill its duty of protection towards them. I was fully convinced of this during my stay in Moscow (in 1922) ^[32] [1922 – ed.], when I set myself the task of saving a young French officer who was arrested and sentenced to death on charges of espionage" ^{[28, p. 254]}.

The long-awaited recognition of the Soviet Union by the Third Republic took place on October 28, 1924 in the form of an exchange of notes. Prime Minister E. Herriot, on behalf of the Council of Ministers of the Third Republic, sent a telegram to Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR A.I. Rykov and Commissioner of Foreign Affairs G.V. Chicherin, stating ^{[33, pp. 514-515]} that the French government was ready "to establish normal diplomatic relations with the Government of the Union now through the mutual exchange of ambassadors." The document stated that France recognizes the de jure government of the USSR "as the government of the territories of the former Russian Empire, where its authority is recognized by the population, and as the successor in these territories of the previous Russian governments."

The message of the head of the French government stated that the establishment of diplomatic relations inspires confidence in "the possibility of a general agreement between our two countries," which is why special emphasis was placed on "the rights of French citizens based on obligations assumed by Russia or its subjects under previous governments, the observance of which is guaranteed by the general principles of law, which remain for us the foundations of international relations." relationships. The same reservations apply to the material responsibility that Russia has assumed since 1914 in relation to the French state and its subjects." Herriot promised on behalf of the French government that "from now on, non-interference in internal affairs is the rule governing relations between the two countries."

In Herriot's reply telegram, Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR M.I. Kalinin, A.I. Rykov and G.V. Chicherin welcomed the initiative of France and declared their readiness for further negotiations. Speaking at the CEC session on October 28, Chicherin stressed the "enormous importance" of establishing official relations and spoke of the "most serious significance of this step in the economic field" ^{[33, p. 517]}, and the first People's Commissar of Foreign Trade L.B. Krasin saw in it "the largest diplomatic victory of the Workers' and Peasants' state, completing an entire historical epoch the struggle of the Soviet state for the right to exist" and, in his opinion, the decisive role in the establishment of Soviet-French diplomatic relations was played by "the political change that came with the departure of Poincare" ^{[33, p. 525]}.

The exchange of diplomatic notes, which meant the recognition of the USSR by France, was widely covered by French newspapers across the political spectrum. Of course, this event made the biggest impression on the representatives of the left, primarily the Communists. On October 29, the newspaper "Yumanite", the press organ of the Federal Communist Party, published with the headline on the front page "The USSR is finally recognized!" and with photographs of the leaders of the Soviet government V.I. Lenin, G.E. Zinoviev, G.V. Chicherin, A.I. Rykov, M.I. Kalinin and H.G. Rakovsky. Communist journalists, while fully approving France's legal recognition of the USSR, warned their readers at the same time: "Today Russia has been recognized, but the struggle will not end there, it has simply changed its character … We know that this recognition did not come from the heartfelt motives of bourgeois politicians of the "Left Bloc" and will be attacked by the entire bourgeoisie, because it is interpreted no differently as a second political defeat [of France – auth.] after the Ruhr conflict. The imperialists used their associates from the "Left Bloc" to curtail the occupation policy in the Ruhr and replace it with the Dawes enslavement plan [which established a new procedure for reparations payments to Germany, at the same time he imposed strict control over the economy and finances of the Weimar Republic – auth.]. They dream of extending this plan to Russia and will use this recognition to carry out their plans.… Soviet Russia is recognized, but the dangers have not passed, but have become more serious and numerous. Workers, be vigilant!" ^[34].

Yumanite conveyed greetings from the proletarians and members of the Federal Communist Party to "their comrades in Russia." A separate article briefly reminded readers of the history of revolutionary events in Russia and argued that counter-revolutionaries were in no hurry to lay down their arms. The next day, Yumanite published the full text of the French government's note signed by Herriot and Moscow's response confirming the establishment of diplomatic relations, adding: "We are not diplomats and ignore the clerical language. Under banal formulations, we want to see the true meaning of things. Have our ruling circles decided to abandon everything that happened in the past? No intervention? Good. But we must make a reservation – it was not the USSR that sent its army to invade France… It was not the USSR that put on the agenda of the League of Nations a proposal to dismember France" ^[35]. This is how Yumanite denounced the policies of the center-right cabinets that preceded Herriot's government, primarily the anti-Soviet strategy of Poincare supporters. These days, she also responded with angry criticism to the publication of the leading figure of the right wing of the SFIO, the former editor of "Yumanite" P. Renodel, published in the newspaper "Cotidien" ^[36], which stood on anti-communist positions and condemned any activity of the Comintern and the USSR as a whole. According to the Communists, "Renodel and his friends are still [in vain – auth. They hope that together with the lackeys from Wall Street they will be able to organize a new conspiracy against the USSR" [34].

The Socialist press also commented on the exchange of notes, but more restrained. One of the leading print publications of the SFIO Populer, which experienced serious financial difficulties during these years and was published only twice a month, only stated the fact of diplomatic recognition ^[37]. And "Devoir Socialist" explained to readers that "the fact of recognition [of the USSR – auth.] does not mean that France renounces the right to repay debts" ^[38].

As expected, the diplomatic recognition of the USSR caused a wave of indignation of Russian emigration in France. "Europe has capitulated to the Bolsheviks," wrote the emigrant newspaper Rus, published in Paris ^[39]. The Russian National Committee declared its indignation, sending a note of protest to the French government, acting senators and deputies. The illustrated application "Our World" responded with a sarcastic cartoon depicting representatives of the Bolsheviks and Herriot, who spoke: "I have fulfilled the duty of recognition, for you – the recognition of duty" ^[40]. But already in the second half of the 20s, most emigrant periodicals were forced to accept the inevitability of contacts between Western states and the USSR and realized the futility of ignoring the Soviet state that existed on the political map of the world ^{[41, p. 250]}.

The right-bourgeois French press covered in detail the events related to the recognition of the USSR, and did not hesitate to express its extreme wariness and even hostility to the consequences of the decision. The Eclair newspaper suggested that the French ambassador in Moscow would not have the proper influence, while the Russian embassy in Paris "would begin to promote Zinoviev's Third International [he was chairman of the Executive Committee of the Comintern from 1919 to 1926 – ed.]" ^[42]. Her fears were also shared by journalist Henri Bidoux, a correspondent for the right–wing newspaper Figaro: "Under a red flag, hiding behind diplomatic immunity, several hundred insidious liars are going to found [in France – auth.] the center of revolutionary propaganda, which will please Mr. Herriot" ^[43]. Speaking about diplomatic concessions to France and the threat of future economic expansion of the USSR, he also quoted from an interview with H.G. Rakovsky, then working as the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Great Britain, who declared the failure of France's anti–Soviet activities and its economic interest in the USSR: "In 10 years we [the USSR - auth. We will be importers of your goods and sellers of wheat, fuel, manganese, etc." [43].

The socialist anticlerical daily newspaper "Lantern" warned its readers against "illusions about the Moscow government," which, despite the fact that it is "forced to adhere to the norms of international law, will not cease to be revolutionary": "We all talked about the crimes of Bolshevism, we condemned the attacks on freedom and human rights, but today we are talking about establishing the relations that a forty-million European power should have with another hundred million" ^[44]. The center-right Tan drew a parallel with the recent decision of the Herriot government to close the French embassy in the Vatican: "If politicians who are unfriendly to the Vatican accused him of interfering in the internal affairs of France, then what can they say about Russia's interference in our affairs, whose fanatical communist doctrine is almost a religion and is aimed at to interfere in the internal affairs of all countries" ^[45]. In this context, it is interesting that Jean Erbette, an influential journalist and political editor of the Tan newspaper, who held this position until 1931, was to become the first French ambassador to the USSR. De Monzy, to whom Herriot was the first to offer a diplomatic job in Moscow, knowing about his close acquaintance with a number of Soviet political figures, refused.

The bourgeois press feared the "export of the revolution" to the West, and also believed that the French government had made "too many concessions to the Soviets" by agreeing to diplomatic recognition of the USSR without first resolving the debt problem. Ten days before this event, the newspaper Tan directly opposed the fact that a similar Anglo-Soviet treaty "served as a model" for the Franco-Soviet agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations ^[46]. Fears of further rapprochement between the USSR and Germany persisted; information was leaked to the press about strengthening the combat capability of the "Bolshevik army", about its allegedly preparing attacks on Romania and Poland, which managed to capture part of Russian territory during the Civil War. The journalists argued their concerns about the aggressive strategy of the USSR aimed at "the widespread spread of communist ideas" with the facts of the Bolsheviks' incitement of British Communists to anti-government actions, the rapprochement of Soviet Russia with Germany after the signing of the Rapallo Treaty of 1922 between them, etc.

And yet, most of the editorials in the non-communist press agreed that after seven years of the existence of Soviet power, it would be strange not to recognize a socialist state with 130 million people living on its territory. The main controversy concerned the question of the forms of further development of relations between France and the USSR, the prospects for future negotiations on the settlement of economic relations and, mainly, the recognition by the Soviet Union of Russia's pre-revolutionary debt to France. The bourgeois-liberal news newspaper Evenman published a detailed article on October 29 with the headline "Yes! But we should be careful!": "Until now, Moscow's representatives have said bluntly that they refuse to recognize the debts of the destroyed tsarism. They refrained from adding the conciliatory phrase "We would be ready to do this the day you agree to recognize our government as legitimate." However, it has not yet become known to the French whether this formula was at least promised. Maybe it will be contained in the USSR's response? At the time of writing, their response has not yet been published."^[47] The editorial board of the Tan newspaper, on the contrary, rather expressed confidence that the Herriot government would be able to reach a compromise in negotiations with the Soviet side ^[48]. Petit Parisien gave a more restrained assessment: "Yesterday we told the Union: "Admit your debts and your guilt. Then we will recognize you." Today we say, "We know that you exist. We admit it. We will have an ambassador in Moscow, you will have an ambassador in Paris. That's all for now." But this is not enough. It doesn't even mean anything if it doesn't get its continuation."^[49]

The active public discussion of France's recognition of the Soviet state on the pages of the central press lasted no more than a week and demonstrated a clear polarization of opinions. At the same time, it seems that the French public and the political leadership were burdened by the lack of agreements with the USSR and, although with misgivings, approved the fact of its diplomatic recognition, which had already been too long. The coming to power in the summer of 1924 of E. Herriot and the coalition cabinet of the "Left Bloc" in parallel with the wave of recognition of the USSR by other leading European states made the French decision only a matter of time. However, it also posed to the government of the Third Republic the problem of France's perception of the double standard of the USSR's foreign policy, which had not changed since 1917 and was connected, on the one hand, with the official communist ideology of Bolshevik Russia, and on the other – with the state interests of power and defense inherited in whole or in part from the Russian Empire.

L.B. Krasin, a prominent Bolshevik and Lenin's associate, was appointed the first envoy of the USSR to France, retaining the post of People's Commissar of Foreign Trade. Thus, the Soviet government demonstrated its keen interest in intensifying economic ties with the Third Republic. However, in 1924 and later, there was no genuine normalization of relations between the two states with different political systems and ideologies: The Soviet Union continued to believe in its destiny as the flagship of the world proletariat, designed to crush capitalism; bourgeois France did not lose hope for the possible rebirth of the Bolshevik regime.

Established on October 28, 1924, diplomatic relations between France and the USSR, having experienced ups and downs in the 1920s and 30s, were severed by the Vichy government on June 30, 1941, eight days after the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War. A new era in their history will be associated with the name of General de Gaulle and his policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union in the 1940s.