Nuclear powers’ reaction to the US development and testing of thermonuclear weapons in the early 1950s.

Belousov Lev Sergeevich Doctor of History Professor; Full Member of the Russian Academy of Education, Acting Dean, Faculty of History; Lomonosov Moscow State University 119234, Russia, Moscow, Lomonosovsky ave., 27 building 4 modern@hist.msu.ru Bueverov Artem Alekseevich Master's Degree Student; Faculty of History; Lomonosov Moscow State University 119234, Russia, Moscow, Lomonosovsky ave., 27 building 4 bueverov.artiom@yandex.ru Manykin Aleksandr Serafimovich Doctor of History Professor; Faculty of History; Lomonosov Moscow State University 119234, Russia, Moscow, Lomonosovsky ave., 27 building 4 modern@hist.msu.ru

Romanova Ekaterina Vladimirovna ORCID: 0000-0001-6138-5109 PhD in History Associate Professor; Faculty of History; Lomonosov Moscow State University 119234, Russia, Moscow, Lomonosovsky ave., 27 building 4 ekaterinavlromanova@gmail.com Other publications by this author

The end of the Second World War opened a new page in the history of international relations. The world has witnessed the formation of a fundamentally new world order. All previous models of international relations were based on the fact that the leading role in world politics was played by the states that were members of the "club of great powers". In different historical epochs, their number has fluctuated between five and seven countries. In other words, the world was polycentric, and everyone was used to it. After 1945, the situation was radically different. It quickly became clear that the architecture of the post-war world almost entirely depends on the actions of two new world giants, two superpowers, which in their potential and capabilities were many times superior to all other participants in international relations.

Their relationship has undergone a complex, dramatic evolution in a short period of time: from allies in the anti-Hitler coalition to states on the verge of a new, unlimited war. It did not come to such an extreme. Instead, the world has slipped into the swamp of the Cold War. Scientists are still fiercely arguing about the reasons why events unfolded in the format of the "cold war". Two of the authors of this article have already had to express their attitude to this problem ^[1-3]. Now I would like to draw attention to one very important circumstance that helps to understand why, despite the constant harsh "conflict interaction" between the United States and the USSR, their confrontation did not go beyond the Cold War.

One of the most important factors that led to such a scenario of the evolution of the bipolar world, in our opinion, was the fact that the two main actors of the then world politics – the United States and the USSR – had approximately equal potential of power. It is important, however, to take into account that its constituent components were far from equivalent. This was especially true of the military component of power. The USSR had, perhaps, the most combat-ready land army, the shock core of which consisted of tank troops. The United States had the most powerful naval forces and long-range aviation. This state of affairs had a contradictory effect on the perception of the international situation by the leadership of the superpowers.

On the one hand, both Washington and Moscow were quite clearly aware of the presence of a certain asymmetry in their components of power. This created a desire to take advantage of the advantages that were available at that moment as quickly as possible. In other words, this circumstance increased the desire of this state to strengthen its position in world politics, which led to an increase in international tension. On the other hand, the understanding that the main rival has approximately equal potential (with all the differences in the components of power) forced the participants of the "conflict interaction" to limit their ardor and show restraint in the international arena. The Cold War has become a completely acceptable form of interaction between superpowers in world politics.

However, at the final stage of the Second World War, the United States became the monopoly owner of a nuclear weapon unique in its power. This gave the American leadership the illusion of omnipotence and permissiveness. Simply put, the United States seriously expected that nuclear weapons would help them assert their dominant position in a bipolar world. Of course, Washington understood that their main opponent would try to eliminate this gap and create their own nuclear weapons, but they believed that this could happen no earlier than in 10-15 years.

These calculations, however, did not come true. In 1949, the USSR put an end to the nuclear monopoly of the United States. Having roughly miscalculated in their forecasts regarding the capabilities of the Soviet Union in the field of nuclear weapons ^{[4, p. 211]}, the United States, when reviewing its military and diplomatic plans, set a course for a forced increase in its nuclear potential in order to maintain as much separation as possible in this area from the USSR ^{[3, pp. 334-335]}. In addition, it was supposed to create weapons hundreds of times more powerful than the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. January 31, 1950 U.S. President G. Truman gave the green light to supporters of this option, publicly proclaiming the continuation of work "on all types of atomic weapons, including the so-called hydrogen, or superbomb" ^{[5, p. 138]}. Over the next few years, activities were carried out to create a new superweapon. In the spring of 1951, the first tests related to the development of a hydrogen bomb took place in the Pacific Ocean (Eniwetok Atoll), in the same place in the fall of 1952, the Americans successfully tested the world's first thermonuclear device "Mike", which some uninitiated eyewitnesses hastened to christen the "hydrogen bomb" [New York Times, Nov 17, 1952; Time, 17 Nov. 1952]. However, it was not transportable and was not suitable for combat use. In August 1953, the USSR announced the test of a hydrogen bomb. In terms of power, it was significantly inferior to the American device, but it was potentially compatible with delivery vehicles. As for the United States, their thermonuclear weapons were ready by the spring of 1954, when a new series of superweapon tests (Operation Castle) took place on the Pacific Bikini atoll. The circle of nuclear powers in the first half of the 1950s was not limited to the United States and the USSR. In 1952 The UK conducted nuclear weapons tests, and less than two years later its government decided to launch a thermonuclear program.

Truman's January decision initiated the arms race to a qualitatively new level, and the leading players on the world stage clearly could not ignore this fact. The reaction of the political and wider public circles of the three nuclear powers (France and China were not part of this "club" in the 1950s; they tested nuclear weapons later: the first in 1960, and the second in 1964, therefore, consideration of their reaction is not included in the objectives of this article) to this decision and subsequent tests of thermonuclear weapons reflected their perception of the specifics of the bipolar confrontation and the influence on world politics of the factor of the emergence of weapons with unprecedented destructive potential. The appeal to the study of this issue is all the more justified because it remains in the shadow of research attention with a significant interest of domestic historians in the events of the beginning of the "nuclear era", the process of developing nuclear (including thermonuclear) weapons, primarily in the USSR and the USA ^[6-8].

The process of implementing the thermonuclear program was covered rather sparingly by the American government: already in early February 1950, the White House, under the pretext of observing security measures, forbade all structures responsible for the atomic policy of the United States to publicly discuss the problem of the hydrogen bomb [New York Times, 3 Feb. 1950]. The press was provided with only the most general information about the key nuclear tests mentioned above. This measure, however, did not always work. So, the news about the tests in the spring of 1951 caused such a violent outburst of discussion of the superbomb problem among members of Congress that one of the American legislators even complained to his colleagues for their excessive, in his opinion, openness in matters of superweapons [New York Times, May 26, 1951]. And in November 1952, reporting on thermonuclear tests, the United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) announced the need for a special investigation to identify those who made their observations public during their conduct [New York Times, Nov 17, Nov 18, 1952].

The presence of these facts, in our opinion, is quite understandable: the prospect of creating weapons that are many times more powerful than atomic bombs was too exciting not to attract the attention of both elites and the general public. Truman's statement of January 31, 1950 was the fruit of internal debates that took place in the fall of 1949, where supporters of entering a new round of the spiral of the arms race prevailed ^{[3, p. 335]}. Washington was fully aware that disputes over the issue of thermonuclear weapons would still take place, and therefore sought to demonstrate to the public through the press: the White House expresses a collective opinion, it is supported by representatives of both leading political parties and all structures dealing with the problems of US atomic policy [New York Times, 1 Feb. 1950]. The American military and political establishment really had reasons to associate themselves with Truman's decision. The bipolarization of the world was in full swing: 1949 alone. It was marked by such significant events for the future destinies of the world as the split of Germany, the creation of NATO and the victory of the Communists in the Chinese Civil War. At the same time, the USSR demonstrated that, despite the huge losses suffered during World War II, it has all the resources to eliminate the backlog from the United States in the field of nuclear weapons as soon as possible and at the same time preserve the most powerful land army. In the view of the American military, this circumstance multiplied the risk of changing the balance of power in the world not in favor of Washington. Guided by these considerations, in February 1950, the Ministry of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) unequivocally recommended that Truman "immediately begin a total hydrogen bomb development program" ^{[9, p. 538-539]}.

The prospect of restoring to the United States the lost monopoly on superweapons against the background of the growing confrontation with the Soviet Union by creating a hydrogen bomb looked too tempting not to use it, and for Congress. It is noteworthy that at the Capitol, the decision of the White House was practically not publicly criticized and was generally assessed as a justified and forced measure [Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 81st Congress, 2nd Session. Vol. 96. Washington, 1950. P. 1182, 1338, 1474, 1757, 1945, 1950, 3198].

And yet, it is not necessary to talk about the unequivocal and unconditional support of the American public and the establishment for the course chosen by Truman and continued by D. Eisenhower. Those who were openly skeptical about the White House's decision to launch a thermonuclear program – some atomic scientists led by R. Oppenheimer, some State Department employees, including J. Kennan, the first chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, D. Lilienthal (resigned in February 1950) - justified their position not only by moral and ethical, but also for practical reasons: the development of thermonuclear weapons, in their opinion, significantly reduced the chances of agreeing with Moscow on the establishment of international control and could provoke a new, even more destructive round of the arms race ^{[3, p. 335; 9, p. 540]}. In 1952, shortly before the explosion of the Mike device, a group of disarmament consultants (Panel of Consultants on Disarmament) prepared a memorandum where, in an attempt to convince the Administration of the need to postpone the planned tests of a thermonuclear device, the authors said that the creation of a bomb capable of eclipsing atomic weapons with its power would be more beneficial to the USSR than the United States, whose nuclear arsenal was already several times superior to the Soviet one ^{[10, p. 998; 11]}.

Members of Congress – including those who publicly supported the president – were also forced to acknowledge a number of issues raised by the January 31 decision. Most often, concern was expressed about the use of a new superbomb in a possible war, which is not surprising, because the development of effective means of defense against nuclear weapons was considered an unpromising occupation. Having accepted the fact of the continuation of the arms race, some congressmen, senators and some atomic scientists sought to enlist the White House's promise to use nuclear weapons only in response to the use of superbombs against the United States or its allies [Congressional Record. Vol. 96. P. 2543, 3199; New York Times, 5 Feb. 1950]. It is equally important that American legislators had to note a further increase in military spending [Congressional Record. Vol. 96. P. 2543]. In addition, there was no certainty (not only at the Capitol, but also at the Pentagon) that the American monopoly on the new superweapon would be long–term ^{[9, p. 539; Congressional Record. Vol. 96. P. 2543]} - the atomic explosion at the Semipalatinsk test site clearly forced the United States to take the capabilities of the USSR much more seriously. It was even suggested that the "Attila and Genghis Khan 1950 model" project, as one of the senators dubbed the hydrogen bomb [Congressional Record. Vol. 96. P. 3763], would be implemented by Moscow before Washington [Congressional Record. Vol. 96. P. 9537]. Perhaps it was this fear that prompted members of Congress even before August 1953 to ask questions about the damaging factor of a thermonuclear bomb on the example of large American cities [Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 82nd Congress, 1st Session. Vol. 97. Washington, 1951. P. 4040, 4161]. The announcement of a new – this time thermonuclear – explosion near Semipalatinsk quite clearly demonstrated that the new nuclear monopoly of the United States ended before it really began.

The reaction of U.S. officials to the Soviet test was contradictory. Without denying the fact of the tests themselves, they assessed its significance in different ways. Thus, the head of the Joint Committee of the Congress on Atomic Energy, S. Cole, after an emergency meeting and consultation with the acting Director of the CIA, hastened to assure the American people that the United States still has a significant advantage in the field of thermonuclear development [Times, Aug. 22, 1953]. U.S. Secretary of Defense C. E. Wilson, during a press conference held on October 6, 1953, reassured the public, stating his (fair at that time) doubts that the USSR had a hydrogen bomb in a form that would allow it to be delivered to the United States, and most importantly, bombers capable of doing so. According to his forecasts, such a threat could appear in about three years. However, just two days later, President D. Eisenhower announced the ability of the Soviet Union to strike the United States with atomic weapons and that such an ability would increase every year [Times, Oct 7, Oct 9, 1953]. Citing these contradictory assessments, the Wall Street Journal ironically noted that Operation Candor, announced by the US Administration, aimed at informing the American public about the dangers of the time being experienced, the power of the main enemy, the USSR, and the tasks facing American politics, turned into Operation Bewilderment [Wall Street Journal, Oct 8, 1953; Times, Oct 9, 1953], and the American correspondent of the British Times, saw in these inconsistencies a reflection of the process of uneasy awareness of the falsity of Washington's perception of its own technical superiority. At the same time, referring to Eisenhower's speech, the Times rightly predicted that in the context of undermining American supremacy by the Soviet hydrogen bomb test, Operation Frankness would be largely put at the service of justifying the growing costs of armaments [Times, October 12, 1953].

Not only Soviet achievements in the field of nuclear development, but also the balance of forces in conventional weapons were cited by representatives of the American establishment as arguments in favor of increasing military potential. The mood of the ruling circles of the United States was significantly influenced by the events of the Korean War. Supporters of the continuation of the arms race strongly emphasized that with the current alignment of forces, when the most powerful Soviet army could be reinforced by the troops of the USSR's allies in Eastern Europe and the gigantic mobilization resource of the PRC, nuclear weapons turned out to be almost the only deterrent to a potential enemy. In this context, any criticism of the decision to implement a thermonuclear program, although not regarded as treason, was exposed in a very unseemly light. For example, in September 1953, Time magazine published a laudatory article about the then chairman of the KAE and one of the most ardent apologists for the superbomb, L. Strauss, simultaneously exposing, according to D. Lilienthal ^{[12, p. 424]}, all opponents of thermonuclear weapons, if not traitors, then clearly imbeciles [Time, 21 Sept. 1953]. Such a blatant differentiation of the world into black and white was inherent not only to the correspondents of the leading American print media, it was also guided by the Republican Eisenhower administration, which in October 1953 approved directive NSC-162/2. It contained the concept of "massive retaliation", which was officially proclaimed by Secretary of State J. F. Dulles in January 1954 . Relying on its superiority in nuclear weapons, naval forces and strategic aviation and reserving the freedom to choose the place and methods of action in any potential conflict, the United States hoped thereby to deter a potential enemy ^{[3, pp. 347-348]}. The creation of a hydrogen bomb fit perfectly into this paradigm.

The decision to develop thermonuclear weapons and further follow this path did not remove the issue of arms control from the agenda. The prospect of sharing the fate of Hiroshima in the event of a new major war worried the American public too much [Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 83rd Congress, 1st Session. Vol. 99. Washington, 1953. P. 5948-5950; Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 83rd Congress, 2nd Session. Vol. 100. Washington, 1954. P. 3988-3989, 4551], which could not be ignored by congressmen and senators. Therefore, there were calls on the Capitol every now and then for the resumption of negotiations with Moscow on the establishment of international control over atomic energy, followed by nuclear disarmament [Congressional Record. Vol. 96. P. 1182, 1338, 1474, 1757, 1945, 1950, 3198; Congressional Record. Vol. 100. P. 4135-4136]. Back in 1950, the New York Times noted that Congress, against the background of discussing the problem of the hydrogen bomb, generally showed a greater willingness than the government to negotiate with the USSR [New York Times, Feb. 3, 1950]. D. Acheson, Secretary of State in the Truman Administration, was openly skeptical about the possibility of an agreement with Moscow ^{[11, p. 151]}. Nevertheless, the American Administration could not completely ignore the issues of arms control. They have often been the subject of discussion at sessions of the UN General Assembly.

Back at the dawn of the atomic era, the American side put forward proposals known as the Acheson–Baruch–Lilienthal plan. Implying the transfer of ownership of uranium and thorium deposits around the world to an international control body and the organization of atomic energy production under the auspices of this body, they were not without some reason perceived in the USSR as unrealistic, incompatible with the principle of sovereignty and leading to the establishment of "unlimited power of American monopolists who will turn into masters of the entire world economy, including in the field of atomic energy resources" [Pravda, December 16, 1950; 13]. The initiative put forward by President Eisenhower at the meeting of the UN General Assembly on December 8, 1953, was much less categorical, largely generated by the need to respond to the peaceful offensive of the USSR and the calls of the Western allies of the United States to reduce international tension. Advocating the creation of an international body, the atomic energy agency under the auspices of the United Nations, the American president proposed that countries involved in work on uranium and other fissile substances transfer part of their reserves under his control, thereby contributing to progress in the peaceful use of atomic energy [Times, Dec 9, 1953; However, Dec 10, 1953].

The impetus for a broader social movement for arms limitation and control was given by the American tests of thermonuclear weapons, which began in March 1954. The news of the radioactive defeat of the crew of a Japanese fishing vessel, as well as residents of the Marshall Islands, had a great resonance both at home and abroad. L. Strauss's careless statement at a press conference dedicated to the testing of thermonuclear weapons, who, in response to a journalist's question about the power of a hydrogen bomb, said that its explosion was capable of destroying a large city, for example New York, was replicated in the press. The day after the press conference, on April 1, 1954, the New York Times published the headline "A hydrogen bomb can wipe out any city" [New York Times, April 1, 1954]. The head of the Joint Committee of the Congress on Atomic Energy, S. Cole, wrote to Eisenhower that both in the United States and in the rest of the world people are amazed by the terrible consequences of the development of atomic weapons ^{[14, p. 20]}. However, such a reaction could not stop the American nuclear tests. Moreover, information about the explosion produced by the United States on Bikini Atoll influenced Britain's decision to develop thermonuclear weapons and "gave a new impetus to Soviet scientists in their search for a way to create an effective design of a high-power thermonuclear bomb" ^{[15, p. 1102]}.

The problem of creating a "superbomb" came to the attention of Soviet intelligence and scientists in the mid-1940s. In the summer of 1948, before testing atomic weapons, the USSR created a preliminary list of measures for the implementation of the superbomb project (RDS-6) ^{[6, p. 62]}. Thus, by the time of Truman's statement of January 31, 1950, The Soviet leadership has long been in a position of low start, as they say, and the directive of the American president became for him a kind of signal shot announcing a new round of the arms race.

On February 4, 1950, at a meeting of the Special Committee under the Council of Ministers, L.P. Beria, who supervised the atomic project, instructed to prepare a plan of concrete actions for the development of RDS-6 ^{[16, pp. 245-246]}. Three weeks later, he reported to Stalin that the Americans' statements about the possibility of creating a bomb more powerful than an atomic one were not far from the truth and that the presence of such weapons was in the interests of the security of the USSR ^{[16, pp. 281-282]}. Moscow assumed that the Soviet Union, as in the case of the atomic bomb, was in the role of catching up. Analyzing the information coming from America, the Soviet leadership assumed that the United States had already achieved its goal in November 1952. The "backlog" had to be eliminated immediately, as Beria had already informed the scientists working on the RDS-6s (the so-called "puff" designed by A.D. Sakharov) on December 2, 1952 ^{[15, p. 1101]}. By the summer of 1953, the bomb was ready ^{[16, pp. 688-690]}, and in August of the same year it was successfully tested.

Meanwhile, judging by some documents, there was no complete certainty about what kind of device the Americans experienced in November 1952 in the USSR. Thus, in a memo prepared at the end of June 1953 by the Minister of Medium Engineering V.A. Malyshev addressed to G.M. Malenkov on the state of work on the hydrogen bomb in the USSR and the USA, a very cautious conclusion was made that "according to the totality of published data, it can be assumed with a certain probability that in November 1952 the Americans a model of a hydrogen bomb was blown up" ^{[16, p. 688]}. Information about the explosion power ranged from 150 thousand to several million tons of TNT. In August 1953, probably in connection with its own hydrogen bomb test and the need to decide how to present it to the public, the Soviet leadership instructed TASS to check whether official statements about the creation or explosion of such a device had taken place in the United States. The answer was negative – there were no direct declarations of this kind. The statement by the chairman of the US Atomic Energy Commission said only that "the test program included an experimental contribution to the research of thermonuclear weapons." At the same time, formulations about the hydrogen bomb tests conducted by the United States could often be found on the pages of American newspapers ^{[17, p. 61]}.

The message about the hydrogen bomb test in the USSR was published in Soviet newspapers on August 20, 1953 [Pravda, Aug. 20, 1953]. The British Times, describing it as "the first statement made by any country about the explosion of what is known as the most powerful weapon in the world," noted at the same time the lack of special emphasis on this news [Times, Aug. 21, 1953]. Indeed, it was published on the second page of Pravda among other news. The text of the statement was concise. It said that "the power of a hydrogen bomb is several times greater than the power of atomic bombs." At the same time, the Soviet government stressed the unreasonableness of possible alarm in other countries caused by the Soviet test, declaring its commitment to the position of creating a regime within the framework of the United Nations to reduce and ban weapons of mass destruction.

Having announced their achievement and called on foreign governments to mutually renounce weapons of mass destruction ^{[17, pp. 68-69]}, the leadership of the Soviet Union realized that this round of the arms race would not be the last. Two months after the thermonuclear explosion near Semipalatinsk, the question of creating a more powerful hydrogen bomb was raised ^{[17, pp. 88-89]}. In November 1953, the Council of Ministers of the USSR approved the continuation of work in this direction ^{[17, pp. 98-99]}. The Soviet Union had yet to create a nuclear arsenal that was relatively equal in power to the American one. However, the key event has already happened – the United States has finally lost its monopoly on superweapons. The superpowers have almost synchronously raised the "bar" of their status to a new level.

During the first half of the 1950s, the Soviet press covered issues related to the development of thermonuclear weapons rather sparingly. This topic was reflected mainly in the speeches of government members published on the pages of newspapers. In the wake of Truman's statement of January 31, 1950, the central printed publications of the USSR began consistently to convey to citizens the same narrative – thermonuclear weapons are "just" a continuation of atomic blackmail by the United States and another proof of the rotten essence of the capitalist world, in connection with which it must be assessed only as a policy doomed to failure [Pravda, 11 Mar., 16 Dec. 1950; Izvestia 5 Apr., 25 Oct. 1950; Red Star, May 5, 1950]. Having fixed a similar characteristic of American policy in the field of nuclear weapons, the Soviet media practically did not use the concept of "hydrogen bomb" and synonymous phrases with it during the time period considered in this article. They appeared only in August 1953. [True, Aug 9, 1953; Krasnaya Zvezda, Aug 20, 1953], when Moscow was ready to notify the country and the rest of the world about the success of the USSR in developing thermonuclear weapons.

A similar situation can be traced in military theoretical journals intended for cadets and officers of the Soviet Army. The topic of nuclear weapons, their improvement and combat use in general was presented in a very dosed manner, although the leadership of the USSR, according to the researchers ^{[18, p. 21]}, the relevant data were available. In the same articles, where fragments of this carefully classified information became available to the Soviet military, the idea was invariably broadcast that nuclear weapons were unable to solve the fate of a military conflict, their role was greatly exaggerated ^{[18, p. 21]}. This installation had its roots in the experience of the Second World War, which ultimately proved successful for the USSR. I.V. Stalin, according to researchers, regarded nuclear weapons as an important, but still one of the elements of the combined potential of power needed to win an all-out war ^{[1, p. 796]}. In his view, the multimillion-dollar land army was a factor that could compensate for the Soviet Union's lag behind the United States in the number of nuclear bombs and strategic aviation ^{[1, pp. 796-797]}. In this regard, it is significant that the authors of articles in military theoretical journals, where there are passages about the fallacy of the approach of American strategists to military planning, represented almost all major branches of the armed forces: infantry ^[19], armored troops ^[20], artillery ^[21], Navy ^[22], aviation ^[23-24], engineering and technical service ^[25]. Practically nothing was said about the hydrogen bomb, and it is also impossible to find a separate analysis of the features of this superweapon in terms of its use in combat operations. The maximum that the officers of the Soviet Army who read the issues of "Military Thought" or "Military Bulletin" could learn was the basic ideas about the principle of operation of thermonuclear weapons ^[25].

Researchers reasonably believe that such a specific approach of the Soviet state and party elite to the "nuclear education" of the command staff of the armed forces pursued the same propaganda goals as in the case of the bulk of the population of the USSR - the army and the people had to be convinced that no superweapon would save capitalism from a "historically predetermined" collapse ^{[18, pp. 21-22]}. However, in the case of the military, the absence in the public domain even after August 1953 of special articles and pamphlets containing information specifically about the hydrogen bomb was probably determined by another circumstance: Moscow's view of the Pentagon's unwillingness and inability to use thermonuclear weapons in the event of a new world war. Indeed, as noted by the great Soviet and Russian Americanist V.L. Malkov, already in 1950 the Pentagon recognized that because of its unlimited power it was not adapted for military use. "Its main purpose is to serve as a weapon of psychological pressure." ^{[6, p. 69]}. The same was said by unnamed American scientists, the report on the interviews with whom, published in one of the American publications shortly after the explosion of the Mike device, was translated into Russian and printed in a secret issue of the TASS Bulletin of Foreign Official Information, copies of which were sent to representatives of the top leadership of the USSR. ^{[16, pp. 549-550]}. Intelligence received information about the insufficiency of the US nuclear arsenal to deliver a fatal blow to the Soviet Union ^{[26, pp. 250-251]}. Nevertheless, this could not guarantee the long‑term maintenance of the Soviet-American confrontation without the final slide of the world into a full-scale war with the use of means of mass destruction. Therefore, receiving through its network of agents and drawing information from the open press about the work of the Americans on the "superweapon", trying to organize surveillance of American tests, the Soviet Union accelerated its own developments in this area ^[15].

The nuclear race was not limited to a competition between two giants. The countries of Western Europe also had something to think about after America announced its readiness to increase the pace of increasing the destructive potential of weapons. This was especially true of Great Britain, the closest ally of the United States and the third most powerful power in the world.

England was sidelined by two emerging superpowers during the Second World War. The confrontation of Western democracies with the USSR, which began after the defeat of the Axis countries, led to the development of Anglo-American "special relations", where Great Britain, due to the military and economic superiority of the United States, also had to be content with the role of a junior partner. The unfixed alliance on paper, although it had a solid foundation in the form of the anti-communist orientation of the policies of London and Washington, was still not a factor that automatically ensured comprehensive interaction between Britain and the United States. Thus, the American atomic legislation, adopted in 1946, did not allow for virtually any exchange of information about superweapons with any foreign state, including allies. Therefore, the United Kingdom and the United States, remaining the closest partners for each other, in the field of nuclear weapons until the end of the 1950s. They focused on the implementation of their own national programs ^{[27; 28, pp. 460-461]}.

At the beginning of 1950 The British did not yet have their own "atomic shield". Since the summer of 1948, American Air Force units have been stationed in the British Isles – several dozen B‑29 bombers capable of carrying nuclear ammunition, but Whitehall did not control their actions in any way ^{[29, p. 29-36]}. Despite the constant efforts made by British statesmen, until 1952 they could not get at least some kind of assurance from the United States that London would be involved in consultations or even simply informed in the event of the use of aircraft or a hypothetical decision by Washington to start a war using nuclear weapons. This was quite acceptable to the United States, which considered the Foggy Albion as one of the convenient bridgeheads from where it was possible to carry out air raids against the USSR ^{[1, p. 790; Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 81st Congress, 1st Session. Vol. 95. Washington, 1949. P. 12427; The National Archives (TNA). Cabinet Papers (Cab.). 158/5/11]}. However, for Britain itself, turning into a kind of "unsinkable aircraft carrier" ^{[30, p. 21; 31, p. 56]} meant an increase in the number of priority targets on its territory for a potential attack by Soviet troops, who found it easier to reach the United Kingdom than the North American continent. The desire to involve the United States more closely in the defense of Europe from the USSR outweighed fears of becoming the target of a Soviet strike as a result, however, a sense of vulnerability and lack of control over the possible actions of its main ally prompted London to follow the goal of developing its own nuclear weapons as early as 1947.

In such circumstances, it is not surprising that Truman's statement of January 31, 1950 and the subsequent news about the development of American thermonuclear weapons were perceived in Great Britain with increased concern. Introducing readers to the decision of the American administration, the Times newspaper, in its February 2, 1950 issue, drew attention to the dangers threatening all mankind in connection with the possible appearance of a new type of weapon [Times, Feb. 2, 1950]. No matter how destructive a nuclear weapon might have, it could not match the power of a hydrogen bomb. If a nuclear strike, in the assessment of the publication, could not always guarantee even victory in the war, the use of thermonuclear weapons threatened universal destruction. The Times did not have firm confidence in the deterrent potential of the "superweapon" – the possibility of its use, according to the newspaper, could not be ruled out in a tense international situation.

It seemed that the perspective outlined by the publication was supposed to lead to condemnation of the decision of the American president. However, the newspaper raised issues of the development and use of thermonuclear weapons. And if it was impossible to justify the second, then the first was recognized as almost inevitable in the face of confrontation with the USSR and the lack of guarantees that Moscow would not be able to create a hydrogen bomb. This position was shared by the British military. It is noteworthy that in the reports of British intelligence on the military and economic power of the USSR since the summer of 1950, there was a line in which it was supposed to indicate the number of Soviet hydrogen bombs [TNA. Cab. 158/11/21; Cab. 158/12/28; Cab. 158/13/9; Cab. 158/14/21; Cab. 158/14/65; Cab. 158/15/37]. Returning to the February Times article, we note that the hope of preventing the most terrifying arms race looked, in its presentation, rather illusory, but the publication called on the Western powers to direct all efforts to find ways to reach an agreement with the USSR, and Moscow and Washington to adjust their views and bring their positions closer on arms control issues.

Calls for the creation of a system of international control over nuclear energy, and subsequently for the cessation of thermonuclear tests, have been repeatedly heard within the walls of the British Parliament. The heads of government, whether Labor or conservative, who replaced him in 1951, in parliamentary speeches pointed to the USSR factor as an obstacle to such decisions [House of Commons Debates, 6 Mar. 1950. Vol. 472. Col. 70; House of Commons Debates, 5 Apr. 1954. Vol. 52. Col. 43–44. URL: https://hansard.parliament.uk]. The US policy was publicly supported. Thus, against the background of the US "Operation Castle" in 1954, Churchill rejected the possibility of attempts to influence an overseas ally in order to encourage him to abandon further tests of the hydrogen bomb and described these tests as "an integral part of the defense policy of a friendly power, without whose enormous power and generous assistance Europe would be in mortal danger" [House of Lords Debates, 30 Mar. 1954. Vol. 186. Col. 807. URL: https:hansard.parliament.uk ].

However, discussions in the military and government circles of Great Britain in the first half of the 1950s demonstrated that London could not fully rely on the United States for defense issues. Churchill hoped that Operation Hurricane (the code name for the British nuclear tests conducted in early October 1952) would encourage the United States to cooperate with Great Britain in the nuclear field ^{[14, p. 37; House of Commons Debates, October 23, 1952. Vol. 505. Col. 1270]}. However, less than a month later, the Americans tested a thermonuclear device, and London once again found itself in the position of an outsider in the growing arms race, which reduced Washington's potential interest in revising the 1946 law. The increasingly obvious lag of Great Britain behind the two superpowers and fears of being held hostage in their conflict, as well as the lack of funds to solve socio-economic problems, prompted London, which in the mid-1940s quite actively contributed to fomenting Soviet-American contradictions, to strive to reduce international tension.

The next impulse to such a policy was made in February 1954. statements by S. Cole, revealing the consequences of testing the American device "Mike". The information that a small island disappeared during their course, and a huge crater formed on the ocean floor, replicated by the British media [Manchester Guardian, 18 Feb. 1954; Times, 18 Feb. 1954], prompted Churchill to address Eisenhower in a private letter with a proposal for a trilateral meeting with the leaders of the nuclear powers. The British Prime Minister, referring to consultations with his advisers, who predicted that several hydrogen bombs could destroy millions of people, wrote about the dangers of a thermonuclear explosion for an island, small in area, but densely populated Great Britain, and also tried to convey to the American president the idea that such weapons could soon become serious a threat to the United States, whose territory will not remain invulnerable forever [TNA. Cab. 129/68/1].

Looking ahead, we note that in a memorandum prepared by the chiefs of Staff at the end of May 1954, it was predicted that in the event of a war with the use of nuclear weapons, Great Britain would be hit in its early days with such force that it would not only be unable to support further military efforts, but would also face the problem of physical survival [TNA. Cab. 129/69/49]. "The hydrogen bomb with its huge range and power, as recent experiments have shown, poses a serious threat to civilization, and any war can lead to its use," stressed the Labor leader K. Attlee, speaking in Parliament on April 5, 1954, with a proposal to immediately initiate a summit meeting [House of Commons Debates, April 5, 1954. Vol. 526. Col. 36]. On the same day, the Daily Mirror newspaper published the results of a survey with the participation of more than 14 thousand people, 92% of whom were in favor of holding a conference of the "big three" ^{[14, p. 48]}. Already aware of Eisenhower's negative attitude to such an initiative, Churchill, speaking in parliament, tried to give an expansive interpretation to the word "immediately" from the mouth of the leader of the opposition, emphasizing that it "should not bind us to take any action at the wrong time" [House of Commons Debates, April 5, 1954. Vol. 526. Col. 58]. Maintaining a "special relationship" with the United States remained a priority of British policy.

However, the desire to reduce tension was side by side with another trend – strengthening one's own forces. The tests conducted in 1952 by the United States, as well as the awareness of the limited possibilities of cooperation with the United States in this area, pushed British statesmen to consider the development of their own thermonuclear weapons. By this time, progress in the nuclear field had prompted British strategists to recognize the increasing role of nuclear weapons in war and, accordingly, the possibilities of nuclear deterrence ^{[32, p. 52]}. The issue of developing its own thermonuclear weapons was raised by Churchill in February 1953 and discussed further in the Atomic Energy Research Unit of the Ministry of Supply and in the Committee on Internal Defense of the Cabinet of Ministers established in 1953 ^{[14, p. 37-47]}. Military circles have been reviewing approaches to ensuring security in new conditions.

In the course of these discussions, the detailed consideration of which is not included in the objectives of this article, two main arguments were put forward in favor of the decision to develop thermonuclear weapons. Its possession could enhance London's prestige and influence in the international arena and give Britain a deterrent tool. If deterrence was directed against the USSR, which was perceived as the main threat to the United Kingdom, the strengthening of British positions in the international arena was considered in the context of Anglo-American relations. Paradoxically, the United States was, in British assessments, a potentially destabilizing factor in the system of international relations. The use of nuclear weapons by Washington was considered as an unlikely scenario, but possible due to the escalation of a local crisis or fears of strengthening the nuclear potential of the USSR. The main victim of the retaliatory strike in this case was the United Kingdom – in the above–mentioned memorandum of the chiefs of staff dated May 31, 1954, it was predicted that the USSR would have bombers capable of delivering the most modern nuclear weapons to its territory in 1955, and to the territory of the United States - only in 1958. Preventing war in such conditions was declared as the main task of Great Britain, which its leaders considered possible to solve by strengthening Atlantic solidarity and promoting the development of nuclear (including thermonuclear) deterrence forces. London had to convince Washington of its readiness to maintain the strength of European defense and demonstrate to Moscow the ability to strike back in the event of war [TNA. Cab. 129/69/49]. Such logic led, however, not without lengthy discussions, to the Cabinet of Ministers' decision in July 1954 to launch the British thermonuclear program [TNA. Cab. 128/27/47; Cab. 128/27/48; Cab. 128/27/54], which completed the process of entering the "big three" countries into a new round of the arms race.

Thermonuclear weapons have become a new factor in the emerging bipolar system of international relations. Its development and improvement were largely the result of an irreconcilable conflict of superpowers. The risk of universal destruction associated with the advent of "superweapons" did not stop the arms race, but the tendency to achieve relative parity in the nuclear sphere, which was outlined during its course, gradually turned into a guarantee of stability, based on the fear of retaliation. At the dawn of the nuclear era, this trend was just emerging – thermonuclear tests seemed to increase the degree of unpredictability on the world stage, raising questions not only about how new developments would affect the balance of power and strategies of the leading powers, but also about the degree of controllability of thermonuclear explosions, their consequences and the associated dangers of radiation contamination. That is why the hydrogen bomb tests prompted us to address the issue of nuclear arms control. However, the high degree of conflict and uncertainty, and most importantly, the perception of power as the basis of the positions held by the state in the system of international relations led to the fact that control issues receded into the background before the imperatives of the arms race.