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Reference:
Li N.
Deepening the strategic partnership between China and Russia in the context of the modern international environment
// International relations.
2024. ¹ 4.
P. 1-16.
DOI: 10.7256/2454-0641.2024.4.71738 EDN: SYEKYZ URL: https://en.nbpublish.com/library_read_article.php?id=71738
Deepening the strategic partnership between China and Russia in the context of the modern international environment
DOI: 10.7256/2454-0641.2024.4.71738EDN: SYEKYZReceived: 18-09-2024Published: 06-10-2024Abstract: The relevance of the study is due to the rapid development of bilateral political and economic relations between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China in the context of modern international conjuncture, the rise of a direct and proxy confrontation between the states of the collective West and the countries of the global South, to which Russia and the PRC can be attributed. Moreover, it is worth mentioning the influence of the most important and current foreign political event of recent years: the beginning of a special military operation of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, which is the driver of bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. The object of study is the bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. The subject of study is the strategic partnership between China and Russia in the context of the modern international environment. The main task is to identify the key reasons for the rapid development of bilateral cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China after the activation of the Ukrainian crisis in 2013. This work is based on the power transition theory which concretises the process of global leadership transition from one state to another. The scientific novelty of this study is based on the definition of the Ukrainian crisis, which began in 2013, as the main driver of development of bilateral cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. Moreover, the author has identified the most pressing problems of bilateral cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, to which can be attributed the imbalance of political and economic cooperation, trade imbalance by groups of exported goods and technological dependence of Russia on the PRC. Keywords: Russia, China, Ukraine, USA, Power transition, Trade, Technologies, Sanctions, Crisis, PRCThis article is automatically translated. Introduction The relevance of the research topic is due to the rapid development of bilateral political and economic relations between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China in the context of the current international situation, which consists in intensifying the confrontation between the United States and its allies on the one hand and the Russian Federation on the other. Moreover, it is worth noting the influence of the most important and relevant foreign policy event of recent years in the face of the special military operation of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine, which serves as a driver for the development of bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China. The object of the study is the bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China. The subject of the study is the deepening of bilateral cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China in the context of the modern international situation. The main purpose of the study is to identify the key reasons for the rapid development of bilateral cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China after the intensification of the Ukrainian crisis in 2013. To achieve this goal, the author had the following tasks: to study the history of bilateral relations between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union; to analyze cooperation between the PRC and the Russian Federation; to investigate the impact of the Ukrainian crisis on relations between the previously mentioned states; to identify key problems of bilateral cooperation between the Russian Federation and the PRC. This work is based on the theory of power transit (eng. Power transition theory), which specifies the process of transition of global leadership from one state to another. In the course of this research, the author used the following methods: institutional, historical, statistical, analytical. The scientific novelty of this study is based on the definition of the Ukrainian crisis, which began in 2013, as the main driver of the development of bilateral cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China. According to the author, the Ukrainian crisis of 2013 and the subsequent actions of the states of the European Union and the United States revealed a number of reasons for such a rapid development of bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China: the final formation of the disagreement of the Russian Federation with the established international order after the end of the Cold War, based on the dominance of the United States and its allies on the world stage, undermining confidence in Western institutions that have demonstrated their bias, selectivity, and severing trade ties between the states of the European Union and the Russian Federation. Moreover, the author identified the most pressing problems of bilateral cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, which include an imbalance of political and economic cooperation, a trade imbalance in groups of exported goods and technological dependence of the Russian Federation on the PRC. Modernization of bilateral relations between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation after the end of the Cold War Bilateral relations between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union have gone through a difficult, eventful path, starting from the recognition of the PRC by the USSR and ending with the armed conflict on the territory of Damansky Island. The chronology of Sino-Soviet relations is perfectly studied in the work of a senior researcher at the Center "Russia, China, the World" I.S. Vinogradov, the author identifies the following milestones in the development of bilateral relations between the two socialist states: 1. 1949-1956 – the period of establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the People's Republic of China following the victory of the Communist forces in the civil war in China. This period is characterized by the rise of bilateral cooperation between the two socialist states through comprehensive assistance from the USSR. The Soviet Union took an active part in building the industrial potential of the People's Republic of China, in rebuilding the state after the bloody civil war and the Japanese occupation. 2. 1956-1969. – the period of complication of bilateral relations, which began after the XX Congress of the CPSU, held in February 1956. This period is characterized by the intensity of ideological contradictions between the two socialist powers, which began after the condemnation of the cult of personality "as alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism and incompatible with the principles of party leadership and norms of party life ...". Based on the transcript of the XXII Congress of the CPSU, it can be concluded that the condemnation of the cult of personality in Marxist ideology by N.S. Khrushchev took place without specifying the latter in the PRC. Moreover, the sixth meeting of the XXII Congress of the CPSU was attended by Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee of the CPC Zhou Enlai, who repeatedly expressed support for the foreign policy of the USSR: "[Measures to resume experimental nuclear tests] represent important steps in upholding world peace and protecting the security of the socialist camp, suppressing imperialist military adventures and fully meet the interests of the peoples of the whole world."[1] Based on the previously quoted words of Zhou Enlai, it can be stated with confidence that both the USSR and the PRC made every possible effort to stabilize relations and neutralize the ideological contradictions that arose after the XX Congress of the CPSU, but further contradictions were complicated by territorial disputes between the two states and the suppression of the uprising in Czechoslovakia by the USSR in 1968 [2]. 3. 1969-1982 was a period of permanent tension in relations between the USSR and the People's Republic of China. The "cooling" of relations between the USSR and the People's Republic of China contributed to the development of relations between the People's Republic of China and the countries of the "first world": in 1971, the adviser to the President of the United States, R. Nixon's national security adviser, G. Kissinger, and in 1972, R. Nixon himself met with Mao Zedong. In the context of establishing relations between China and the United States, China began to reform its own economic model: in 1978, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, a policy of reform and openness was born, which consisted in combining socialist and capitalist models of economic construction, which in turn led to an increase in investments from Western states, primarily aimed at development the industrial sector of the People's Republic of China [3][4]. 4. 1982-1989 – the period of restoration of bilateral relations between the USSR and the People's Republic of China. This period is characterized by the solution of key obstacles to the normalization of bilateral relations between the USSR and the People's Republic of China, which include the presence of Soviet troops in Mongolia, support for Vietnam's policy in Cambodia by the USSR, and the introduction of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the USSR, all the previously identified obstacles in relations between the two countries began to be gradually resolved through the implementation of new political and economic concepts of the first president of the USSR, which led to the weakening of the USSR's position on the world stage and the further disintegration of the Soviet Union. In 1989, the final normalization of bilateral relations took place after Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Beijing and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. As for the bilateral relations between the PRC and the Russian Federation, it is worth noting that the demarche of the foreign policy vector of the Russian Federation in the first decade of its existence had a positive impact on bilateral relations with the PRC. In 1992, the "Joint Declaration on the Foundations of Relations between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China" was signed, the key aspect of which is set out in paragraph No. 2 of this NPA: "The parties emphasize the need to respect the right of the people of any country to freely choose their internal development paths. Differences in social systems and ideology will not hinder the normal development of interstate relations" [5]. Based on the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation in 2000, it can be stated with confidence that the priority of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation at the turn of the millennium was given to states that were previously ideological enemies and countries of the post-Soviet space due to the prospects for economic cooperation with developed countries of Europe and North America and preserved logistical, industrial and economic ties. In this NPA, the People's Republic of China is considered as a foreign policy partner of the Russian Federation in the field of world politics. Moreover, this document specifies the situation that has developed in bilateral cooperation between the PRC and the Russian Federation at the turn of the millennium: "The main task remains to bring the scale of economic interaction in line with the level of political relations" [6]. The further development of bilateral relations between China and the Russian Federation was based on building political and economic stability through the creation of international organizations, which include the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the BRICS Group (originally BRIC). The key objectives of the creation of these organizations appear in their constituent documentation, in accordance with the SCO Charter, the key goals and objectives of the SCO are: strengthening trust, friendship and good-neighborliness between the member states of the organization; multilateral cooperation to ensure peace, stability, combating terrorism, separatism and extremism; promoting economic development, improving living standards citizens; prevention of international conflicts, etc. [7]. As for the BRICS, the key goal of creating this group of countries is economic cooperation based on uniting the interests of developing countries. This informal association of countries was created in contrast to the "Big Seven" that prevailed at that time, uniting the most economically developed countries of the millennium. It is important to note that in the period 2009-2014. The Russian Federation was a member of both the BRICS and the G7, which clearly indicates the multipolar vector of the Russian foreign policy of that period [8]. Summing up all the above, we can conclude that the history of bilateral relations between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation dates back to the time of the USSR and is divided into 4 periods characterized by both the development of interstate cooperation and its decline, accompanied by direct clashes. Normalization of bilateral relations between the PRC and the USSR began after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the USSR, whose foreign policy course was aimed at normalizing relations with key actors in the international arena. After the disintegration of the USSR, the Russian Federation sought to eliminate potential "stumbling blocks" in bilateral relations with the PRC: the ideological confrontation between the two states was leveled by signing a Joint Declaration on the Foundations of Relations between the Russian Federation and the PRC; the potential for armed conflict was reduced by signing the Agreement on the Russian-Chinese State Border in 1995 [9]; foreign policy interests Both states in adjacent regions, for example in Central Asia, have also been unified through the creation of the SCO. Thus, it can be stated with confidence that after the end of the period of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, the young Russian Federation was aimed at normalizing bilateral relations with the PRC by eliminating key problems of bilateral cooperation. Deepening the strategic partnership between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation in the context of the current international situation and the challenges of bilateral cooperation At the present stage, the international conjuncture is fully characterized by the theory of power transit (English power transition theory), the main provisions of which in the context of the "new bipolarity" are considered by Degterev D.A., Ramich M.S. and Tsvyk A.V. The authors note that, since the end of the Cold War and the economic rise of the PRC, the People's Republic of China It entered into an active confrontation with the United States of America for world domination. The key elements of the current confrontation between the powers for international hegemony are both conventional military potential, natural resource reserves, industrial production, etc., and technological potential, R&D spending, soft power, etc. The authors note that in the mid-2010s, China and the United States entered a phase of parity of the sum of forces while maintaining U.S. dominance in certain areas, which include "soft power" and the deployment of military potential [10]. As for the role of the Russian Federation in the previously outlined confrontation, it is worth noting that, according to the theory of power transit, the Russian Federation cannot be considered a superpower fighting the current hegemon for world domination. The Russian Federation is a great power on a par with Great Britain, France and Japan. This hierarchy is important for understanding satisfaction with the status quo that arose after the end of the Cold War: the Russian Federation is more dissatisfied with the foreign policy situation that arose after the collapse of the USSR than the PRC, which in turn justifies the impact of the Ukrainian crisis (2013–present) on bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China. The history of the Ukrainian crisis has been sufficiently studied by both Russian and Western scientists, which allows the author to skip the chronological description of this process. However, it is worth focusing on the changes in bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China against the background of the deterioration of partnership with Ukraine. The crisis phenomena of 2013-2014, dubbed "Euromaidan" in the Western press, entailed a number of negative consequences, the key of which can be considered the actual "rupture" of political relations with the Russian Federation. The coup d'etat, which led to the outbreak of full-scale hostilities in the South-East of Ukraine, had a significant impact on international relations by forcing the Russian Federation towards a revision of the status quo. It is important to note that bilateral relations between China and Ukraine have not undergone significant changes since the coup d'etat in the latter in 2013-2014: trade turnover between the two countries has gradually grown, reaching figures of 9.19 billion US dollars in 2022. Since 2017, exports from China to Ukraine have grown by an average of 2.84% per year, imports by 5.26% [11]. As K.P. Kurylev, one of the key Russian researchers of the post-Soviet space, notes, the only negative consequence of the coup in Ukraine, which affected bilateral relations with China, was the inability to develop projects on the territory of the Crimean peninsula [12]. However, according to the author, the Ukrainian crisis of 2013-2014 served as one of the key factors in boosting bilateral cooperation between China and the Russian Federation for a number of reasons: 1. The Ukrainian crisis has demonstrated the Russian Federation's disagreement with the post-Cold War order based on the dominance of the United States and its allies on the world stage. The author believes that the "watershed" of relations between the Russian Federation and Western states was Vladimir Putin's famous Munich speech, the main theme of which was criticism of US attempts to build a unipolar world without taking into account the interests of the Russian Federation and other states. Moreover, the President of Russia declared the prevention of the expansion of the NATO bloc to the borders of the Russian Federation and the prospect, first of all, of economic, and then political, growth of other centers of power, to which the President of the Russian Federation attributed Russia, China, India and Brazil [13]. It is worth noting that there were no positive changes in the political course of the United States and European states towards Russia after such a loud demarche of the Russian Federation, which in turn led to the intensification of the conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in August 2008. The accumulated problems between the Russian Federation and the countries of the "first world" were not resolved, which, in turn, was demonstrated in Ukraine in 2013-2014. Solovyov E.G., Candidate of Political Sciences, member of the IMEMO of the Russian Academy of Sciences, notes: "With his defiantly unsystematic actions in Crimea in February 2014 (in the Western interpretation – "annexation") Moscow has actually called into question Washington's ability as a world leader to achieve its goals and maintain the norms and principles of the post-1991 world order."[14]; 2. The Ukrainian crisis has undermined confidence in the diplomatic institutions built with the participation of the United States and European states. The active phase of the Ukrainian crisis, characterized by fighting in the South-East of the country, has repeatedly tried to be resolved by signing international agreements with the direct participation of the Russian Federation: on September 5, 2014, the Minsk Agreements (Minsk-1) were signed, guaranteeing a ceasefire and a gradual peaceful solution to the conflict, but the ceasefire was repeatedly violated, due to- why this NPA did not bring such a long-awaited peace [15]. The next step in resolving crisis situations on the territory of Ukraine was the signing of the "Package of Measures for the implementation of the Minsk Agreements" (Minsk-2) on February 12, 2015 [16]. This document included a specification of the points of the Minsk agreements, however, like the previous NPA, it was not executed by the Ukrainian side. It is important to note that one of the parties to the settlement of the conflict in Ukraine was the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which was part of the Trilateral Contact Group for the Peaceful Settlement of the situation in eastern Ukraine, whose employees were repeatedly noticed for spying in favor of Ukraine [17]. Moreover, the European participants of the Normandy Four, who took part in the preparation of the second Minsk agreements in the person of ex-Chancellor of Germany A. Merkel and ex-President of France F. Hollande confirmed that the Minsk agreements served as a falsification of a peaceful solution to the conflict on the territory of Ukraine and were aimed at strengthening the armed formations of Ukraine [18][19]. Such actions on the part of the leaders of the European powers could not but affect the trust of the Russian Federation in relation to Western institutions. 3. The Ukrainian crisis has undermined trade ties built between the Russian Federation and Western countries. It is important to note that in the period 2014-2022, the sanctions pressure on the Russian Federation was multi-speed: more economic restrictions came from the United States, at the same time, the EU countries adhered to a more moderate position regarding Russia's economic restrictions due to their close dependence on Russian energy resources. As noted by Timofeev I.N. – Ph.D., General Director of the INF: "The history of sanctions against Russia in 2014-2021 can be considered a "vegetarian stage." In 2019, their contribution to the slowdown in economic growth was estimated at around 0.2% per year" [20]. With such "soft" pressure on the economy of the Russian Federation, the construction of the main gas pipeline from Russia to Germany called Nord Stream 2 continued, which clearly indicates the indecision of the EU states in the sphere of severing international trade relations with Russia. Of course, after the start of the special military operation of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine, all the previously identified factors of influence of the Ukrainian crisis on bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China became more pronounced due to the transition of the Russian Federation's opposition to the unipolar world led by the United States into a hot phase, further discrediting international institutions and severing international trade relations between the Russian Federation The Federation and the NATO member States. Against the background of the intensification of the confrontation between the Russian Federation and NATO member states on the territory of Ukraine with the direct participation of the latter in hostilities, bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China have received a significant boost, expressed in the acceleration of both political and economic relations. High-level meetings between the leaders of the two states have been held with enviable regularity since 2022. As for the economic relations between the two states, in 2022 the bilateral trade turnover between the two states reached 176.4 billion US dollars [21], and in 2023 – 240 billion US dollars [22]. Since the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis in 2013, bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China have begun to develop rapidly, primarily in the political sphere, however, the economic component of bilateral cooperation has acquired indicators of permanent growth. All the key problems in the relations of the Russian Federation with the United States and the EU countries were solved with the help of the so-called "turn to the East" of Russia: In the international arena, as the leaders of both states have repeatedly stated, the People's Republic of China "[is] committed to approaches that fundamentally coincide with Russian approaches to the future world order and solving key problems of world politics" [23], for this reason, both the Russian Federation and the PRC are aimed at reshaping the system of international relations built after the collapse The distrust of the Russian Federation in relation to Western international institutions is compensated by the activities of international organizations of the East: as noted in the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation from 2023: "Russia strives to transform Eurasia into a single continental space of peace, stability, mutual trust, development and prosperity. Achieving this goal involves... the formation of a broad integration contour – the Great Eurasian Partnership – by combining the potentials of all states, regional organizations and associations of Eurasia based on the EAEU, SCO and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), combining the development plans of the EAEU and the Chinese initiative "One Belt, One Road" while maintaining the possibility of participation in this partnership, all interested states and multilateral associations of the Eurasian continent and, as a result, the formation of a network of partner organizations in Eurasia"; The rupture of trade relations with the United States and EU countries is compensated by the rapid growth of bilateral trade with the People's Republic of China: according to Eurostat data, the total trade turnover between the Russian Federation and the European Union in The period 2022-2024 decreased from 45.8 billion euros to 0.2 billion euros [24]. However, such a sharp reduction in commodity relations is offset by an increase in trade turnover between Russia and China, as reported by Reuters, in the first half of 2024, trade turnover between Russia and China reached 137 billion US dollars [25]. Thus, it can be concluded that the key factor in boosting bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China is the Ukrainian crisis, which intensified in 2013. The key reasons for this phenomenon are the final formation of the Russian Federation's disagreement with the established international order after the end of the Cold War, based on the dominance of the United States and its allies on the world stage, undermining trust to Western institutions that have demonstrated their bias, selectivity, and the severance of trade ties between NATO member countries and the Russian Federation. However, it is worth noting that, despite the rapid political and economic rise in bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, according to the author, a number of problems remain that complicate further mutually beneficial cooperation: 1. The imbalance of political and economic cooperation. As has been repeatedly noted by various experts, there is a clear imbalance between political and economic relations in bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China: as Zhao Huasheng, professor at the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University, reports: "We often hear that economic relations are the weak link in Sino–Russian relations against the background of excellent political interaction. I agree with that."[26] The Russian Federation does not represent a key trading partner of the PRC, being inferior to the ASEAN bloc, the EU, the USA, Japan, the Republic of Korea and India [27]. Of course, the bilateral trade turnover between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China showed significant growth against the background of the decline in trade with the previously designated actors, however, the overall indicators of bilateral trade turnover between the two countries remain quite low, especially against the background of rapidly developing political relations [28]. 2. Trade imbalance by groups of exported goods. According to The OEC (The Observatory of Economic Complexity), one can clearly observe a commodity imbalance in the framework of bilateral trade between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China: about 74% of all Russian exports to China are oil, gas and their derivatives, at the same time, China exports mainly goods from high-tech industries, which include include machine tools, electronics, cars, plastic recycling products, toys. As you can see, the Russian Federation exports energy resources to China to a greater extent, rather than industrial products, which clearly affects the trade balance between the countries and leads to the dependence of the Russian consumer market on exports of consumer goods from China, which clearly affects China's export structure. 3. Technological dependence of the Russian Federation on China. It is no secret that technological production is currently one of the key factors of the dominance of states in the international arena. According to the author, the key element of technological sovereignty and domination of the state is the ability to develop, manufacture and market microprocessors, which are a central part of the entire technological process and a measure of R&D development in the country. Of course, the key developers and designers of microprocessors are represented by Western IT giants: Intel, AMD, Nvidia, Qualcomm. However, all previously designated manufacturers, except Intel, cannot produce computing products at their own production facilities due to their absence and use the capacities of TSMC located on the island. Taiwan. Against the background of such a clear dominance of the US states and some of their allies in the field of microelectronics, both Russia and China have begun to develop their own microprocessors, the most successful of which can be considered Elbrus-8CV, Baikal-T/M/S, Loongson 3A6000. Of course, these processors lag behind their Western counterparts in performance and manufacturability, but they allow you to build real technological sovereignty. In both Russia and China, the main driver of microelectronics development is the military-industrial complex. However, it is worth noting that after the start of its own and unprecedented sanctions pressure on the Russian Federation, the domestic microprocessor manufacturing sector was threatened due to TSMC's refusal to produce these products [29]. At the moment, Russian processors are manufactured at the Micron plant in Zelenograd. At the same time, China, which is not burdened with such strong sanctions pressure and is a key manufacturer (not developer) of high-tech products, has all the opportunities to occupy most of the Russian IT market, which in the future may affect the realization of Russian technological sovereignty. Under the conditions of sanctions pressure on the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China serves as a reliable partner capable of providing Russia with the necessary high-tech goods, however, such a policy does not reduce the still high dependence of the Russian Federation on imports of high-tech products developed by Western companies, thus Russia finds itself in a situation of increased risk, consisting in maintaining dependence on Western technologies imported into in the form of Chinese goods, if necessary, the development of technological sovereignty [30]. Conclusion Summing up all the above, we can conclude that the history of bilateral relations between the USSR and the People's Republic of China can be divided into 4 stages characterizing fundamental changes in bilateral cooperation between the two states: 1949-1956 – the period of establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the People's Republic of China following the victory of communist forces in the civil war in China; 1956-1969 – the period the complications of bilateral relations that began after the XX Congress of the CPSU, held in February 1956; 1969-1982 – the period of permanent tension in relations between the USSR and the People's Republic of China; 1982-1989 – the period of restoration of bilateral relations between the USSR and the People's Republic of China. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation sought to eliminate potential "stumbling blocks" in bilateral relations with the PRC: the ideological confrontation between the two states was leveled by signing a Joint Declaration on the Foundations of Relations between the Russian Federation and the PRC; the potential for armed conflict was reduced by signing an agreement on the Russian-Chinese state Border in 1995; the foreign policy interests of both states In adjacent regions, for example in Central Asia, they were also unified through the creation of the SCO. Thus, it can be stated with confidence that after the end of the period of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, the young Russian Federation was aimed at normalizing bilateral relations with the PRC by eliminating key problems of bilateral cooperation. The key factor in boosting bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China is the Ukrainian crisis, which intensified in 2013. The key reasons for this phenomenon are the final formation of the Russian Federation's disagreement with the established international order after the end of the Cold War, based on the dominance of the United States and its allies on the world stage, undermining confidence in Western institutions that have demonstrated their bias, selectivity, the rupture of trade relations between NATO member states and the Russian Federation. At the moment, a number of unresolved problems remain in bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, hindering the further development of bilateral cooperation: an imbalance of political and economic cooperation, a trade imbalance in groups of exported goods and technological dependence of the Russian Federation on the PRC. References
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