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Reference:
Chmyreva V.
Turkey in the Focus of American Strategic Planning: Ñontinuity in US Foreign Policy
// World Politics.
2024. ¹ 3.
P. 21-31.
DOI: 10.25136/2409-8671.2024.3.71667 EDN: KKXVKV URL: https://en.nbpublish.com/library_read_article.php?id=71667
Turkey in the Focus of American Strategic Planning: Ñontinuity in US Foreign Policy
DOI: 10.25136/2409-8671.2024.3.71667EDN: KKXVKVReceived: 09-09-2024Published: 05-10-2024Abstract: In the Middle East and the Eurasian (post-Soviet) space, the US tactical interests lie within the framework of a single long-term strategy, which continuity is outside of fluctuations in the foreign policy environment. The study is aimed at examining the role of Turkey in the emerging architecture of world economy and geopolitics through the prism of US interests. The subject of the study is a set of key conceptual guidelines and officially accepted views on Turkish issues, reflected in the strategic planning documents of the United States. The relevance of the paper is determined by the need for a comprehensive analysis of the process of geopolitical transformations in the post-Soviet space, in which the role of Turkey acquires special significance. The source base includes legislative sources (regulatory and legislative acts) as well as the corpus of office documentation (documents of a normative, reporting and informational nature). US foreign policy practice as well as the intensification of US-Turkish interaction over the last years, including the development of new mechanisms and areas of cooperation, demonstrate the importance of maintaining allied relations with Turkey aiming to minimize risks and costs directly for the United States. Taking into consideration the growth of Turkish political subjectivity, foreign policy influence and its military potential, one should expect greater US involvement in the Turkish case in order to strengthen the allied US-Turkish partnership. Otherwise, US achievements in recent decades, including but not limited to the managing of East-West corridor, may be lost. In this context, US-Turkish disagreements on a number of issues are not an invincible obstacle for the US, and the United States is ready to build a new US-Turkish track based on Turkish foreign policy autonomy which does not contradict American long-term strategic interests. Keywords: Turkey, USA, NATO, Russia, strategic planning documents, National security strategy, US-Turkish relations, Middle East, Eurasian space, post-Soviet spaceThis article is automatically translated. The study of the US foreign policy theory and practice in relation to Turkey over the past decades, as well as the analysis of current political and economic processes in the context of international geopolitical escalation and economic turbulence indicate that "The Middle East remains a key zone of US geopolitical influence, and the main threats to American global leadership are located in the Middle East region. Moreover, without solving the problems in the Middle East and creating an outpost of the Euro-Atlantic community in the region represented by Turkey, the United States is limited in the ability to defend its own geopolitical goals in other regions" [1. C. 135-136]. Currently, the Republic of Turkey (TR), as before, is a "strategically critical" [2. C. 5] ally for the United States, and the potential of its transformation into a new pole of power and a world hub (transport, energy, diplomatic [3]) leads to the activation of long-standing calls among the American expert community to promote to involve the Republic in solving regional security problems from the perspective of Washington's interests. However, if in the Middle East the alignment of American-Turkish interests is situational and determined by the desire of the TR for geopolitical autonomy and increasing its own political influence, then in the Eurasian (post-Soviet) space Turkey is ready to play ahead of the curve, filling the vacuum of political will and power, and its policy does not contradict the strategic interests of the United States in the region. According to the American expert, "regardless of the state of relations with Washington or Brussels, Turkey's interest in preventing Russian domination in the Black Sea and commitment to deepening ties with Ukraine and the states of the South Caucasus generally correspond to the priorities of the United States and NATO," and the United States should work with Ankara, using its special relations with a number of countries, primarily the queue, with Kiev and Tbilisi, "in order to achieve common goals" [4. C. 24]. In the Middle East (BV) and the post-Soviet space, the tactical interests of the United States are inscribed within the framework of a single long-term strategy, the continuity of which does not depend on fluctuations in the foreign policy environment: to minimize the risks of the formation of a state or group of states that can act as a center capable of activating economic and political activities in terms of consolidating the region, challenging American global leadership which is reflected in the strategic planning documents of the United States. The main document defining the strategic goals, objectives, directions and priorities of the country's policy in the view of its ruling administration is the National Security Strategy. The evolution of the National Security Strategy (NSS) Over the past decades, the United States has been able to draw a conclusion about the strategic continuity and consistency of American foreign policy towards the TR, which is organically integrated into the architecture of Euro-Atlantic security built by the allies in the BV. "The foundations of our strategy change little from year to year; our interests and goals are based on enduring values" [5], stated in the National Security Council of 1988. The strategic goals of the United States remained constant in the 1990s: the security of the state of Israel, limiting the role and influence of Iran and energy supplies on which the "free the world" [6] – three pillars of the American-centric vision of the region and the basis for maintaining dominant positions in the world at the turn of the century. Since the mid-1990s, "democratic, secular, stable and West–oriented" Turkey has gained a European identity in the focus of the American strategic vision and has taken a place (including, literally, in the National Security Council) in the context of US European policy. "Its continued ties with the West and support for common strategic goals in one of the most sensitive regions of the world are crucial," [7] sounds like a recurring leitmotif in American Strategy [7,8,9]. The historic decision of the EU to grant the TR the status of a candidate for membership in the European Union and the signing of the Agreement on the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and the Declaration on the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (Istanbul, 1999) in the presence of US President B. Clinton were declared the triumph of American diplomacy in the National Security Council in 1999 [10]. The energy agenda (development of the Caspian resources) is presented in the documents as the basis for the security of the United States, Turkey and other allies, as well as a storehouse of commercial opportunities for American companies [11]. The involvement of the United States in supporting these projects persisted in the following decades, determining the continuity of the American strategy in the region [12]. The beginning of the XXI century in the American foreign policy consciousness was marked by the victory of the "forces of freedom" in the fight against totalitarianism, in which the United States approved a "sustainable model of national success" based on freedom, democracy and free enterprise, and declared its own unprecedented military power and enormous economic opportunities [13]. The Middle East remains the focus of American attention, and among the priorities is the desire to create in the region "independent states at peace with each other and fully participating in the open world market of goods, services and ideas"; support for traditional allies (Egypt, Saudi Arabia) and countering "tyrannical regimes" (Iran, Syria) [14]; "unwavering commitment" to Israel's security; "access to energy" in the region and its integration into global markets [15]. Turkey, a key link in the architecture of Euro–Atlantic security in the BV, still occupies an important place among the European allies of the United States, with which cooperation continues on a wide range of mutual goals, and the priority is the promotion of stability and democracy in the region [15]. This strategic vision retains continuity in the updated Strategy of 2015, despite the revision of guidelines in connection with the Ukrainian crisis and the escalation in the BV: a united, indivisible and peaceful Europe, to which Turkey belongs in the NSC, is an "indispensable partner" of the United States, which manifests its readiness to expand the global security hub (NATO), transform relations with TR and strengthen ties with the countries of the Caucasus [16]. And despite the fact that there is no mention of Turkey in the 2017 Strategy of the administration of President Donald Trump, and the shift of orientation towards the Indo-Pacific region changes foreign policy priorities, Europe and the Middle East remain in the focus of American attention with the need to "maintain a favorable balance of power" that meets the interests of the United States and prevent the dominance of hostile centers of power [17]. Today, on the eve of the formation of a new world order, when US-Turkish relations have reached a historic low, the United States has formulated a new vision of a leadership strategy in which it guarantees support to regional partners and declares its intention to continue cooperation with the TR in order to "strengthen its strategic, political, economic and institutional ties with the West" [18]. Recognizing the ineffectiveness of the previous "military-oriented policy" in the BV aimed at the use of force and regime change, the strategy of the presidential administration of J. Biden presents a new vision: abandoning "grandiose plans" in favor of more practical steps in building partnerships, coalitions and alliances; maintaining leadership by encouraging economic, political reforms and regional economic integration, as well as the exclusive right to implement humanitarian assistance and manage long-term crises (migration crisis, etc.). This is the first time such language regarding Turkey has been heard in the National Security Council in the last few decades and indicates an improvement in US-Turkish bilateral ties. Despite the continuing tension due to the rapprochement of the TR with Russia (RF), China and the interest shown in the BRICS and SCO organizations, the United States welcomes Turkey's support for Ukraine and the preservation of trade and economic relations with Israel and demonstrates its readiness to accept an alternative external vector of the TR, provided that constructive American-Turkish relations are maintained. This indicates the transformation of the American approach to the Republic: in the changing geopolitical situation, the long-standing calls of the US expert community have been heard to pay close attention to Turkey and continue the policy of promoting their own interests in the form of behind-the-scenes, non-public diplomacy, avoiding "open pressure and arm twisting" [1. C. 53]. The US foreign policy practice and the intensification of US-Turkish cooperation in recent years, including the development of new mechanisms and areas of cooperation, demonstrate the importance of maintaining allied relations with the TR. From the point of view of Washington's interests, the importance of the Republic in maintaining the free flow of energy resources and global trade flow is difficult to overestimate, as well as its indispensability in ensuring the Euro-Atlantic security system. The inclusion of the TR in the program for the deployment of a missile defense system in Europe and the deployment of a NATO missile defense element (AN/TPY-2 radar) on its territory determine the legitimate place of the TR among European allies and in the orbit of NATO's external course, enshrined in the current US National Defense Strategy [19]. Numerous documents of a conceptual and strategic nature (Joint Regional Strategies, Integrated Country Strategies, etc.) developed by the US State Department are designed to "revitalize" international cooperation and relations of the United States with NATO allies, the EU and with regional partners, which are implemented both within the framework of bilateral relations and in the format of multilateral forums [20]. Given that the above-mentioned documents define the context of US–Turkish cooperation, but do not contain any mention of the TR, it is advisable to turn to specific mechanisms for implementing the task of strengthening the Turkish Western orientation set in the National Security Council - to the body of office documentation (documents of a regulatory, reporting and informational nature) of the US Department of State. In this context, joint statements by the parties within the framework of a new format of bilateral dialogue – the US-Turkey Strategic Mechanism - are of interest. The US-Turkey Strategic Mechanism is a platform for bilateral cooperation, formed as a result of a series of agreements between Presidents R. Erdogan and J. Biden on the sidelines of the G20 summit (Rome, 2021). The announcement of the establishment of a mechanism to strengthen relations and maintain the dynamics of the bilateral agenda was announced in April 2022, when delegations headed by US Deputy Secretary of State V. Nuland and Deputy Foreign Minister TR S. They met in Ankara to discuss topics of mutual interest (economic and defense cooperation, countering terrorism, etc.); reaffirmed their common commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and welcomed Ankara's diplomatic efforts in de-escalating the conflict [21]. The increase in the number of US-Turkish meetings, including at the highest level, indicates the desire of the parties to intensify cooperation and develop a positive bilateral agenda on a wide range of issues. In 2023, U.S. Secretary of State E. Blinken and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova M. Cavusoglu held the fourth meeting of the Strategic Mechanism, during which they touched upon issues of allied partnership within NATO, strengthening defense cooperation and modernization of the Turkish F-16 fleet; reaffirmed support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and supported the mediation efforts of the Republic of Moldova in the Black Sea Grain Initiative; stressed intentions to strengthen coordination to promote peace in the South Caucasus, support the process of political settlement in Syria and strive for regional stability in the BV [22]. The parties highly appreciated the steady growth in bilateral trade and reaffirmed the importance of economic cooperation and effective supply chain management. The seventh meeting of the Strategic Mechanism Dialogue was held in March 2024 in Washington, under the chairmanship of the US Secretary of State and Foreign Minister TR X. Fidana. The extensive agenda of the discussions confirmed the intention of the parties to promote common goals and jointly solve global problems: the United States supported Turkey's efforts in the Black Sea, including ensuring the security of trade routes within the framework of the Mine Action Task Force (consisting of Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria); the parties announced the resumption of consultations on combating terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking, which pose a threat to the national security of States and welcomed the peace settlement processes in the Eastern Mediterranean (the signing of the Turkish-Greek declaration on friendly relations and good neighborliness in 2023) and in the South Caucasus (the parties pledged to work to promote the agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia). The ministers highly appreciated the growth of bilateral trade between the United States and Turkey, which reached more than $30 billion [23], announced the launch of the US-Turkish Dialogue on Defense and Trade issues and confirmed the effectiveness of the introduced bilateral programs and forums (Digital Dialogue, Partnership on Global Infrastructure and Investments (to create high standards of infrastructure in developing countries), Dialogue on Energy and Climate, etc.). They also recognized the importance of the development of nuclear energy and called on public and private structures to begin developing specific proposals for bilateral cooperation in this area [22]. (Note that the intensification of rhetoric is taking place against the background of how the Russian state corporation Rosatom is preparing to commission the first power unit at the Turkish Akkuyu nuclear power plant (2025) and is considering the potential possibility of implementing a nuclear power plant project in Sinop). In a joint statement, the parties did not ignore "one of the pillars of bilateral relations" – the development of American-Turkish humanitarian ties – and noted the successful development of the Fulbright educational Program, which celebrates its 75th anniversary in 2024. It is noteworthy that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, TR H. Fidan is a graduate of the University College of the University of Maryland, and before meeting with E. Blinken on the sidelines of the meeting of the Strategic Mechanism (March 2024), the minister actively interacted with his American colleagues and spoke at the Atlantic Council (USA, Washington) on bilateral relations and foreign policy priorities of the TR. In general, the objective of the above–mentioned documents and programs is to adapt US-Turkish relations to changing geopolitical realities and bring them to the level of integrated interaction, which is reflected in the current NSC 2022 in the form of a publicly announced plan, implemented in terms of bilateral programs and cooperation mechanisms and is inscribed in the context of global expectations of the United States. "Global Trends" is an analytical study by the National Intelligence Council of the United States, which is published with the advent of the new White House administration and is aimed at identifying global trends and driving factors that can determine the development of the state and society in the coming decades. Expanding the range of experts involved in the preparation of the report beyond the intelligence community and involving representatives of the government, scientific, political and academic communities from different regions of the world are aimed at analyzing in a strategic manner and increasing the predictive significance of the material, which ultimately forms the basis for developing an effective strategy to protect the national interests of the state. The current forecast "Global Trends 2040" was released in 2021 with the subtitle "A more competitive world" [24]. According to the forecasts of the authors of the report, in the coming years the world will face more intense and cascading global problems, the solution of which will be complicated by the increasing fragmentation of the international system (at the state level – according to national, cultural, political factors); the growing rivalry between China and the West will lead to increased competitiveness of the international environment, in which "the leading powers will strive to to establish new rules of the game" [24 C.3]. Regional actors, such as Turkey, will strive for the role of great powers by forming regional coalitions and blocs: on the one hand, they can participate in solving global problems, on the other – use harsh methods in resolving conflicts in their region. Assessing the potential of Turkish foreign policy influence and methods of its implementation, the authors note that religious and ethnic factors in other countries (the Turkish diaspora in Europe) can be used or additional forces can be involved in interstate conflicts (proxy forces, private military companies, etc.) in order to minimize risks and costs directly for the United States (for example, conflicts in Libya and Syria with the participation of TR). Turkey, in the focus of the American strategic vision, appears to be an "average" power, traditionally playing an important role in ensuring the national interests of the United States and the North Atlantic Alliance. The task set in the NSC to strengthen the Western orientation of the TR is determined by the desire of the Euro-Atlantic allies to encourage the Republic to take active action in terms of ensuring the security of the region (NATO's advanced presence in the Black Sea, minilateral cooperation with Great Britain and Poland, etc.) in conditions when "Ankara ... is afraid to assume a more prominent role not only because of internal political and economic difficulties, but also because it seeks to avoid an escalation of the conflict with Russia" [4]. Russia, in turn, from the position of US interests in recent decades has gone from one of the centers of influence (along with China and India) to a "rival" and "threat" (NSC 2022) of the West [18]. It is noteworthy that in the "Global Trends 2040" Turkey is mentioned in conjunction with Russia (unlike the National Security Council) both in terms of domestic political and demographic characteristics, and in terms of foreign policy activity, while in the gradation of countries and regions, the TR still refers to "Europe", while the Russian Federation is ranked among a separate group of countries called "Russia and Eurasia" [24]. In this context, there is a polarization of opinions and assessments among the American foreign policy community: from the need to put pressure on the TR in connection with provocative actions against allies to Ankara's assistance in implementing projects of strategic importance involving international financial institutions (in particular, assistance in developing new sources of hydrocarbons). In general, there is an understanding that risk hedging requires government support, and the search for a new equilibrium relationship between the United States and the TR requires working with states in the region that are concerned about "Turkish ambitions" [4]. Given the growth of Turkey's political subjectivity, foreign policy influence and military potential, which today are not only beyond doubt, but have also reached a new macro-regional level, it is logical to expect greater US involvement in the Turkish case in order to strengthen the allied US-Turkish partnership, without which the US achievements of recent decades, among other things, on the construction of the East-West corridorThe West may be lost. The US-Turkish trade and economic relations are reaching a new level, and the parties "set a goal to increase the volume of trade ... to $100 billion per year" [25], which indicates that disagreements on a number of issues (the Cyprus conflict, Turkish-Syrian relations, the Kurdish issue, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and They are not an insurmountable obstacle for the United States, and the United States is ready to build a new American-Turkish track based on Turkish foreign policy autonomy that does not contradict their long-term strategic interests. And in this context, it seems fundamental to share Turkey's involvement in the implementation of allied projects within the framework of NATO and bilateral relations with the United States, within which interaction is conducted according to individual plans that take into account the mutual interests of states. Turkey, hedging military-political and economic risks in the context of geopolitical and military escalation in the Middle East and the post-Soviet space, in an effort to increase political subjectivity, regional leadership and domestic political stability, will strive to maintain conditional neutrality within existing organizations and blocs, balancing between the interests of dominant actors in world politics (USA, Russia, China; NATO, SCO, BRICS, etc.). "In my opinion, all these contacts will bear fruit sooner or later. We will see this," Turkish President R. Erdogan said in an interview with reporters after the NATO summit in Washington [26]. Against this background, Ankara is strengthening cooperation with Beijing and Moscow, using it as a practical tool to promote its own interests (in Africa, Middle Eastern states, Asia). The statement of the Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of TR X. is indicative. Fidan about Ankara's desire to become a member of the BRICS, which was made in China [27]. There is no doubt that Turkey is pursuing an independent multi-vector policy outside the North Atlantic Alliance: given the nature of bilateral relations between Ankara and Washington and the desire of the United States to maintain allied relations with the Republic, it can be assumed that Turkey initiated the process of differentiation of blocs and international alliances and the creation of a new architecture of international politics and security. References
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