Transformation of the discourse of the Lega party during the years of M. Salvini's leadership

Okhotnikov Daniil Igorevich ORCID: 0009-0000-7311-6109 Postgraduate student; Department of Philosophy of Russian History; Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences 109240, Russia, Moscow, Goncharnaya str., 12 building 1 danoxot@gmail.com

Introduction. In recent decades, the statement about the advent of the era of populism has become a commonplace in political research and journalism, the growth of the influence of populist-type parties is observed in the vast majority of countries of the world ^{[1, p. 7]}. In the EU member states, the results of national and European elections repeatedly confirm the high level of electoral support for right-wing parties, which means that the narratives promoted by right-wing populists do not lose their credibility in the eyes of voters. However, even against the background of the general "improvement" of the European political landscape, the Italian case is of particular interest to a political scientist, because the most right-wing government in the history of the Italian Republic has been in power in this country for almost two years. Of the three main parties in the ruling coalition, two – the Brothers of Italy (BI) and the League – are traditionally considered far-right, their programs are similar on many issues, which makes them direct competitors. At the same time, after explosive growth in 2018-2019, support for the League decreased from a record 34.3% demonstrated in the 2019 European elections to 8.8% in the last elections to the national parliament. At the same time, BI showed a reverse trend, increasing the rating from 6.4% to 26% over the specified period ^[2]. It is obvious that the "League", which is the focus of this work, has been going through a period of stagnation since 2022, from which it is desperately looking for a way out. At the same time, M. Salvini, one of the most prominent politicians who has led the party since 2013, a few years earlier managed to save the League from a situation of severe crisis and bring it to the top of the Italian political Olympus. We propose to consider in more detail the path traversed by the party under Salvini's leadership, analyzing the transformation of its public discourse.

Material and methods. The struggle for voters in one political field, coupled with the changing conjuncture, forces parties to constantly adjust their positions, which leads to changes in their discourse, which we can track over long time periods. The analysis of discourse, first of all, involves determining the set of topics that the party raises, the specifics of their interpretation and the place that is given to them. The best sources in this case are election programs and campaign materials. In addition, key concepts, metaphors, oppositions, and frames have a structure-forming function in discourse, the use of which is most clearly seen in policy speeches and interviews of politicians. Finally, we will be interested in the style and tools of political communication of the leader, since his role in the transformation of the party's discourse in recent decades has become decisive. It is impossible not to agree with K.G. Kholodkovsky that the Italian politics of the era of the Second Republic, which has traditionally been counted since the early 1990s, has a distinctly personalistic character, in other words, it is not so much parties that compete as charismatic populist leaders ^{[3, p. 9]}, which is perfectly illustrated by such extraordinary figures, like S. Berlusconi, W. Bossi, M. Renzi, M. Salvini, J. Meloni.

We proceed from the belief that discourse, including political discourse, is not static by nature, it constantly adapts to a changing agenda, political goals, audience, and information transmission tools. Therefore, to describe these changes, it is necessary to conduct a comparative analysis of the content of program documents, as well as slogans and key concepts presented in the party's discourse in various phases of its development, the communication style of party leaders, while simultaneously using electoral statistics.

Research results and their discussion. The origins of the modern "League" lie in the separatist movements that arose in the northern regions of Italy in the 70s of the XX century, the most influential of which were formed in the most economically developed Lombardy and Veneto ^{[4, p. 52]}. Formed on their basis in 1989, the "League of the North" (LS), led by the charismatic Umberto Bossi, demonstrated an autonomist version of right-wing discourse, which, having gained popularity in the northern regions of the country, by the early 1990s, when the political field of Italy was littered with the wreckage of the "heavyweights" of the First Republic, collapsed under the weight of accusations of corruption corruption within the framework of the "Clean Hands" process provided the voter with a serious alternative to the right-wing discourse of the post-fascist Italian social movement, which was on the sidelines of the political process during the post-war decades.

The main point of the LS program was the demand for expanded autonomy for all northern regions, sometimes reaching direct calls for the formation of an independent state of Padania on their basis ^[5]. It is important to understand that the main attraction of this idea was provided not by political, but by economic benefits that the leaders of the BOS promised to the voters of their regions, building a populist discourse on the image of the enemy in the form of corrupt politicians of Rome, during the financial crisis of the 1990s. robbing hardworking northerners and giving the money they earned to idle southerners. The remaining problems in the form of rampant crime or illegal migration at that time were considered in close connection with the economy. Secessionist rhetoric reached a peak by 1996, when W. Bossi proclaimed the independence of Padania for propaganda purposes. It is noteworthy that until the end of the 1990s, the ideology of the LS was characterized by Euro-optimism, the party advocated European integration, but at the level of regions, one of which was to be developed Albania.

However, such a strategy brought only limited success and the independent Albania project was gradually phased out in favor of more realistic demands for expanded autonomy, primarily fiscal. By 1998, W. Bossi's position on European integration had also changed dramatically in connection with the discussed introduction of a single European currency: the eurooptimism of the "Europe of the Regions" (Europa delle regioni) was replaced by rejection of the proposed model of monetary integration, in which the economically backward South threatened the further development of the North ^{[6, p. 28]}. During the campaign for the 2001 national elections, the "Europe of Freemasons" and "Europe of Oligarchs" were increasingly appointed to the role of the main enemy instead of the "mafia South" and "Rome-thieves" ^{[7, p. 175]}. In subsequent years, while maintaining the economic agenda in the foreground, an isolationist transition from liberalism to protectionism was outlined against the background of growing globalist encroachments of the EU, and after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, anti-Islamic rhetoric was added to the anti-migrant rhetoric. Since 2000, the party has worked closely with the right-wing liberal Forward Italy and the right-wing conservative National Alliance and was a member of all Berlusconi's cabinets.

A separate thing must be said about the radically new style of communication for the 1990s, which was introduced into Italian politics by the founding father of LS U. Bossi and other party leaders: reduced vernacular vocabulary designed to demonstrate distance from traditional politicians who belonged to the old corrupt elite ^{[8, p. 46]}, outrageous, provocative visual design of campaign materials ^[9]. W. Bossi remained at the helm of the party until 2012, when he was forced to resign from his post as a result a loud scandal involving the misuse of funds from the party's treasury.

The campaign for the elections to the national parliament in 2013, which took place during the short period of leadership of the party of Roberto Maroni, was conducted unusually sluggishly. The transition from the aggressive style of the Bossi era to a restrained and pragmatic one is evident in the brief election program, which the party, having put forward several important theses about the "Europe of Peoples" (Europa dei Popoli) and the division of Italy into macroregions under the slogan "More Europe of Peoples, less European bureaucracy", fully devotes to socio-economic issues. The ultimate goal of the program is stated to be "development, growth and modernization of the country" ^[10]. The total orientation of the discourse on economic problems is exhaustively illustrated by a set of propaganda posters of the LS ^[11]. Here is a list of requirements and suggestions that have found a place there: kindergartens with lots of places, jobs for young people, decent guaranteed pensions, lower costs of medicines and medical research, and trains that keep up with the schedule. All of the above was proposed to be implemented on condition that 75% of the taxes collected in the regions were withheld, that is, it was again about some concessions in the field of fiscal policy. After the frankly disappointing election results (4.08% and 18 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 4.33% and 17 seats in the Senate ^[12]), it became obvious that the party urgently needs new ideas and a fundamentally different strategy.

At the end of 2013, Matteo Salvini, an ambitious young politician from Milan, was elected federal secretary of the party. At the beginning of his work, he continues to actively promote the federalist agenda. The first major test in the new position was the 2014 elections to the European Parliament, for which the League presented a detailed 39-page program ^[13] with tables, quotations and links to statistics and writings by thinkers close to right-wing ideology, such as M. Venetiani. Thus, the new secretary sought to demonstrate a serious and thorough approach to solving the key problems of Italian society, which the party had lacked since the late 1990s after breaking with J. Miglio, the ideologist of the League, who developed the concept of dividing Italy into three macroregions ^{[14, p. 48]}. The program's preface argues that Europe as it stands is experiencing an existential crisis, undemocratic in its structure, unable to cope with the consequences of the global financial and economic crisis and at the same time hinders countries trying to act on this front independently. It should be noted that in 2011-2013 Italy, which was on the verge of default, was forced to exist in a regime of severe austerity under the control of the EU. The main focus, therefore, continues to be on the economy and, although the word "North" is scattered throughout the pages of the program, any Italian could subscribe to the requirements voiced in it. This is a program of harsh criticism of the EU, but not protection of the interests of the "Northerners". At the same time, an item appeared in the list of claims against Europe, which will later be heavily staked in all subsequent election campaigns of LS and BI. It proposes to replace the opposition "left–right" with "globalism – identity". The right accuses the EU of imposing a globalist agenda in an effort to deprive a citizen of his roots, community, values, turning him into a faceless "consumer". Summing up, it can be argued that the 2014 program, by emasculating the concept of "North" and abstractly raising the issue of identity protection, already marked a turn towards a new "League" ready to go beyond the northern regions.

In the same year 2014. Italy felt the first severe blow of the migration crisis, at the end of the year more than 170,000 illegal migrants moved to the country by sea from Syria and African countries, and in the next few years the order of figures remained the same: 154 000 (2015), 181 000 (2016), 119 000 (2017) ^[15]. As mentioned above, anti-migrant and anti-Islamic themes were present in the rhetoric of the BOS before, but an emergency of this magnitude, which also affected residents of absolutely all regions, became another strong motive for a radical restructuring of party discourse.

One of the largest researchers of European populism, D. Albertazzi, defines the transformation carried out by M. Salvini as a transition from a regionalist party to a nativist party, saying that it was "the leader of the LS who reformulated the ideology of his party through the prism of nativism" ^{[16, p. 660]}, and the ease of transition was ensured by the populist nature of the party's ideology, preserved and after the transformation. The opposition "we are them" was entrenched in the discourse of the liguists in a completely new interpretation, where "we" henceforth meant all Italians united by a common misfortune, and by "they" - illegal migrants uncontrollably flooding the country and Europe represented by the EU, doing nothing to protect its borders.

In the program ^[17] presented for the 2018 national elections, according to the results of which the "League for Salvini Prime Minister" (the party was founded in December 2017. In parallel to the continued existence of the LS, which it will actually replace by 2019) will yield only to the triumphantly performed "5 Star Movement", the concept of security is organizing. e.S. Alekseenkova notes that by 2018, two main issues on which the Ligists' election campaign was based had acquired an absolutely key role on the public agenda – economic problems and immigration, both of which were framed in the discourse of the League as threats to Italian society ^{[18, p. 107]}. In the work "The Politics of Fear", R. Vodak examines in detail the main discursive frames of right-wing populists, including on the example of drugs, considering right-wing radical discourse as a kind of mechanism for the production and exploitation of fear of the "Other", opposed to "us" on the basis of race, nationality, religion ^[19]. In 2019, instead of the "League of the North", the "League for Salvini Premier" ("League") went to the European Parliament elections, the main slogan was changed from "North first" to "Italy first". The authors of the program, according to the researchers, were inspired by the ideas of the French "National Association" ^{[20, p. 33]}, demanding withdrawal from the euro zone, revision of EU treatises in order to return full sovereignty to nations, protect national identity, and take tough measures to counter illegal migration.

According to some researchers, in parallel with the reformatting of the agenda, as well as the organizational structure and symbols of the party, Salvini softened his rhetoric in order to attract new voters ^{[21, p. 62]}. This is true, but only with regard to the topic of secessionism. However, according to Albertazzi, the autonomist agenda is almost completely disappearing from Salvini's discourse by 2018, giving way to the problem of relations between Italy and the EU ^{[16, 665]}. As for the rhetoric on other issues, its degree has only been increasing since 2015. Returning to the question of the role of the leader, we can safely say that the explosive growth in the popularity of the League in the second half of the 2010s was not least due to the personal contribution of Salvini, who made himself the main tool of the party. Under Salvini, who secured the nickname "Captain" (Il Capitano), the cult of the leader flourished even more exuberantly than under Bossi. Millions of subscribers on social networks, constant live broadcasts, trips to cities and towns in which the head of the League communicated with inexhaustible enthusiasm with urban and rural residents of any region, photo reports from the daily life of an "average Italian" named Matteo - with the help of information technology, the head of the League entered the lives of most Italian families. Of course, there was a solid team of SMM specialists behind the "Captain", who developed an extremely effective propaganda machine ^[22]. The image of the leader was built with an orientation towards the archetype of a Warrior (Hero), but at the same time integrated the features of a "man of the people". The same strategy was at the heart of M. Salvini's autobiography, released in 2016.

The consequences of previously unimaginable global crises that European countries have been experiencing since the early 2020s have made significant adjustments to the balance of power in the Italian political arena, including in the center-right coalition ^[23]. In the middle of 2021, the "Brothers of Italy" bypassed the "League" and further the gap between the right-wing parties only increased. Both parties have been campaigning together for many years, skillfully using sovereignist discourse, but the BI has always been in opposition, while the League has twice been part of governments with parties with a different ideological platform, which did not benefit its rating.

According to the results of the parliamentary elections in September 2022, in which Salvini's party received less than 9% of the vote, the victorious center-right coalition of BI, League, Forward Italy and the non-widely supported We Moderates bloc formed the first government in the history of post-war Italy under the auspices of the extreme right forces led by the leader B.J. Meloni ^{[24, p. 60]}. The party, which the leftists continue to accuse of not having completely outlived its sympathies for the figure of Mussolini, prevails over its allies both in parliament and in the government, in shaping the agenda and distributing public positions, which caused a number of concerns in the EU. Nevertheless, given the degree of the country's dependence on the external political and financial environment, it is obvious that, having moved from the opposition to the government, the primary task for the right was to guarantee the EU and NATO the preservation of the former foreign policy and economic course, which, among other things, led to a sharp softening of anti-European rhetoric. In addition, the parties could not continue to denounce with the same indignation the social and economic problems of the country, the management of which was entrusted to them by the voters. In this regard, official communication channels have received a different vector of work – popularization of the achievements of the new Cabinet of Ministers. Shocking posts on social networks about crimes committed by migrants and Italians oppressed by exorbitant taxes have replaced information cards with rosy statistics and victorious reports on completed points of the election program.

M. Salvini, who received the post of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Transport and Infrastructure, concentrated on the assigned area of work, updating in his communication the themes of work for the common good and fearlessness shown in the process of achieving it. This time, the "enemies" necessary to preserve the conflict frame and maintain the image of a Warrior were found inside Italy. Two categories are traditional for all Italian rightists: leftist forces (la sinistra) and representatives of the judiciary (la magistratura, i giudici), allegedly persecuting right-wing patriots for their beliefs, or making biased decisions under the influence of left-wing propaganda. In M. Salvini's interviews, posts and campaign materials, a third was added to them – a vague group of people who "resist modernization", saying "no" to everything new and important for the country. The slogan of this "creative" stage of the League was "Italy of the consonants / Italy of those who say YES" (L'Italia dei Sì).

Nevertheless, by the end of 2023, tension between the League and its partners began to grow, which was due to preparations for the elections to the European Parliament scheduled for early June 2024. In the European elections, each of the three parties acted independently, which means that competition between the allies could not but escalate. In the case of the League, the issue was of a fundamental nature: the party, dissatisfied with the low result in the 2022 elections and a secondary role in the coalition, had to try to take revenge. Similarly, the stakes were extremely high for M. Salvini, who risked losing his post as secretary due to a new failure.

While J. Meloni confidently pursued a course of rapprochement with the moderate right-wing European establishment, first of all, in the person of the head of the European People's Party M. Weber and the president of the European Commission W. von der Leyen, Salvini's strategy was to, once again turning to the rhetoric of confrontation with "oligarchic Europe", return to the "League" the votes of the far-right part of the electorate. Nevertheless, the leader of the League could no longer return to the complete denial of European integration in the current circumstances. The speech in the program ^[25] under the slogan "More Italy, less Europe" (Più Italia meno Europa) is about how the EU can be "corrected", stop the "follies" of its policy ("green deal", delocalization of production, militarization, uncontrolled reception of migrants, erosion of traditional values etc.), guided by "common sense" (buonsenso). The discourse on territorial autonomies and the requirement for the European Commission to discuss all planned innovations with the Committee of the Regions of Europe as a matter of priority are again extracted from the legacy of the BOS.

However, other elements of the League campaign contrast with the restrained and official tone of the program. A set of information cards published on the party's social networks daily in the last weeks before the elections has the task of visually demonstrating to impressionable voters the very "follies" brought to the point of absurdity: a pregnant man, the burning of the "Divine Comedy" by a group of people similar to Muslims, an "appetizing" burger with worms and insect larvae, the French president in full In the propaganda materials of the League, E. Macron and W. von der Leyen served as the personification of the "wrong" Europe, where the former was appointed responsible for dragging Europe into the world war, and the latter, in principle, for all EU decisions that contradict common sense. These names were repeatedly mentioned in M. Salvini's keynote speech, with which he closed the congress of parties belonging to the European far-right association "Identity and Democracy" ^[26]. The slogans proclaimed from the stage against migrants, Muslims, censorship and the European bureaucracy take us back to the days of the vociferous campaigns of 2018-2019, but they do not bring anything fundamentally new. The only non-standard move by Salvini in this campaign, which caused extremely lively discussions, was the decision to give the first place in the electoral lists to General R. Vannacci, who was not a member of the League, who published the scandalous book "The World on the Contrary" a few months earlier, which, without hesitation in expressions, criticized the neoliberal agenda of modern society ^[27].

The results obtained by the party in June this year generally correspond to the disappointing level of popular support demonstrated in recent months in polls: it failed to overcome the psychologically important barrier of 10%, as a result, the League sent only 8 deputies to the newly elected European Parliament instead of 28 in the previous convocation. The subsequent collapse of Identity and Democracy and the transfer of deputies elected from the party to the new Patriots for Europe association marked the end of the era of the League's leadership on the European right flank. Taking into account the fact that Forward Italy, which included "We are Moderate" candidates in its list, on the contrary, strengthened its position by gaining 9.58% of the vote, the League (8.97%) moved to third place in the ruling coalition ^[28].

Conclusion. Based on the results of the analysis, it can be concluded that a truly radical change of discourse in the history of the League party was carried out by M. Salvini in the second half of the 2010s. The shift of the agenda from local economic problems in the northern regions of Italy to issues of protecting national identity from external threats, carried out through the aggressive use of social media, provided the party and its leader has an unprecedented level of electoral support throughout the country, putting an end to an era of protracted crisis. At the current stage, the party, which has lost a significant part of its former popularity in the intra-coalition struggle with allies from the right camp, is trying to find a new niche, either softening its rhetoric under the influence of changing external and internal conditions, or tightening it in an effort to "bypass the nearest competitor on the right in the person of the "Brothers of Italy". However, without a radical change in the discursive structure, these attempts do not succeed, appearing in the eyes of voters as dubious tactical maneuvers, which, on the contrary, risk depriving the League of the support of part of its traditional electorate.

It seems that the above conclusions can be used in predicting the dynamics of the political struggle, primarily within the ruling coalition. We see that while maintaining the current situation with a stable government, the tactics of limited radicalization do not bear the expected fruits, the party seems doomed to be in secondary roles, and its leader is in the shadow of an objectively stronger competitor in the person of Prime Minister J. Meloni. Against this background, voices within the party itself can increasingly be heard calling for a "return to the roots", in other words, to the "northern question". Obviously, the time has come for M. Salvini to make difficult decisions and, perhaps, we are on the verge of opening a new phase in the more than 40-year history of the League, in which right-wing discourse will once again undergo a radical transformation.